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Japanese and Australian security alliances with the United States of America

Sampo Kemppainen

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ISBN 978-951-29-8588-3 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-951-29-8589-0 (PDF)
ISSN 0082-6987 (Print)
ISSN 2343-3191 (Online)
Painosalama, Turku, Finland 2021

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SAMPO KEMPPAINEN: Change and continuity in Asymmetric Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Japanese and Australian security alliances with the Unites States of America
Doctoral Dissertation, 362 pp.
Doctoral Programme of Social and Behavioural Sciences
September 2021

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the development of military alliances in the Asia-Pacific after the end of the Cold War. The research focuses on US alliances with Japan and Australia and tracks the central developments in these two alliances since the late Cold War period until the end of the 2010s. The research is designed as a comparative case study of these two alliance relations.

The research framework is constructed around four theoretical approaches to military alliances derived from the Realist School of International Relations: the framework of threats, the alliance security dilemma, the influence of domestic politics on alliances and, lastly, the asymmetric alliance framework.

This study provides comprehensive and historical parallel narratives of the two alliances. The developments in the alliances are considered from the perspectives of institutional and political structures, international military operations, defense procurement, and technological cooperation. The cases are divided into three periods that are designed to roughly correspond to the different dynamics of power relations in the region, beginning from the period of uncontested US unipolarity in the Asia-Pacific and ending with the increased military rivalry in the region and the rise of China.

While different theoretical frameworks are determined to have their own strengths and weaknesses, the longer time perspective used in this study clearly demonstrates that the asymmetric nature of these alliances is simply the strongest explanatory factor behind the persistent lines of development witnessed in the alliances. These long-term trends are, in turn, consistently found to explain several singular events better than short term focus on more immediate factors such as changing domestic circumstances.

The asymmetric framework has arguably been underutilized in the contemporary International Relations discipline, but the results of this work show that it can provide valuable insights for future research on military alliances, especially given the nature of today's world, characterized by increasingly fluid power relations.

KEYWORDS: Asia-Pacific, Japan, Australia, Unites States, Alliances, Strategy, Security Policy, Miliaty Alliances

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SAMPO KEMPPAINEN: Change and continuity in Asymmetric Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Japanese and Australian security alliances with the Unites States of America
Väitöskirja, 362 s.
Yhteiskunta- ja käyttäytymistieteiden tohtoriohjelma
Syyskuu 2021

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tämä väitöstyö käsittelee Aasian ja Tyynenmeren alueen sotilasliittojen kehittymistä kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeisenä aikana. Tutkimus keskittyy Yhdysvaltojen sotilasliittoihin Japanin ja Australian kanssa ja seuraa niiden keskeisiä kehityslinjoja kylmän sodan viimeisistä vuosista aina 2010-luvun loppupuolelle. Tutkimus on suunniteltu vertailevaksi tapaustutkimukseksi näiden kahden liittosuhteen välillä.

Tutkimuksen viitekehys rakentuu kansainvälisen politiikan Realismin tutkimusperinteestä johdettuihin neljään keskeiseen sotilasliittojen tutkimuksen malliin. Nämä ovat uhkien, liittodilemman, valtion sisäpolitiikan ja asymmetristen sotilasliittojen teoreettiset viitekehykset.

Työ tarjoaa kokonaisvaltaisen historiallisen narratiivin sen kohteena olevista sotilasliitoista. Sotilasliittojen kehitystä käsitellään institutionaalisten rakenteiden, kansainvälisten sotilasoperaatioiden sekä puolustushankintojen ja teknologisen yhteistyön kautta. Tapaustutkimukset on jaettu kolmeen ajanjaksoon, jotka on määritelty vastaamaan Aasian-Tyynenmeren alueen kansainvälisen järjestelmän voimasuhteissa tapahtuneita muutoksia, alkaen Yhdysvaltojen kiistattoman taloudellisen ja sotilaallisen valta-aseman kaudesta 1990-luvun alussa ja päättyen 2010-luvun kiihtyvän sotilaallisen vastakkainasettelun ja nousevan Kiinan aikaan.

Tutkimus löytää sekä vahvuuksia että heikkouksia kaikista neljästä käytetystä teoreettisesta viitekehyksestä. Kuitenkin, pidemmällä aikaperspektiivillä tarkasteltuna, sotilasliittojen asymmetristä luonnetta painottava viitekehys selittää selvästi parhaiten liittojen pitkään jatkuneita kehityslinjoja. Pitkän linjan kehityslinjat puolestaan selittävät myös yksittäiset tapahtumat vakuuttavammin kuin lyhemmällä tähtäimellä muuttuvat tekijät, kuten valtioiden sisäiset poliittiset olosuhteet.

Asymmetristä viitekehystä ei ole aiemmin kattavasti käytetty sotilasliittojen tutkimuksessa. Tämän tutkimuksen tulosten valossa on kuitenkin selvää, että viitekehyksen kautta voidaan saada arvokasta tietoa Aasian-Tyynenmeren alueen sotilasliittojen mahdollisista kehityslinjoista. Tällainen tieto on erityisen arvokasta nykyisen, nopeasti muuttuvan kansainvälisen voimatasapainon aikana.

ASIASANAT: Aasian ja Tyynenmeren alue, Japani, Australia, Yhdysvallat, Strategia, Turvallisuuspolitiikka, Sotilasliitot.

Acknowledgements

This work has been a long time in the making. It began in Tokyo in 2011 and the research and writing has been conducted over ten years in seven different countries. However, with the exceptions of periods spent in Japan, Australia, and the US, the variance in locations and the length of time this work as taken, has often had little to do with the research topic.

I have written much of this work in my spare time while primarily engaged with my full-time work and career. Consequently, there are several colleagues to whom I am indebted to, not only for contributing and supporting my work, but also for being flexible in facilitating time off for my writing spells.

In particular, I would like to acknowledge my teachers at the National Graduate Institute for Policy studies: Professors Takashi Shiraishi, Keiichi Tsunekawa, Yoko Iwama, and Narushige Michishita for getting me started on this work. A special note of thanks must also be accorded to the staff of the Institute and the personnel of the GRIPS library.

I would also like to thank the staff at the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University and Professor William Tow for hosting and advising me during my months at ANU's Hedley Bull Centre.

I highly appreciate the extremely valuable and constructive comments provided by the pre-examiners of this work, Professor Anders Wivel from the University of Copenhagen and Bart Gaens from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

I must also thank Nathan Adair for his help in final proofreading and editing this work.

Lasty, I wish to thank the people at the University of Turku Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, especially Professor Henri Vogt, for helping me finally pull this project over the finishing line.

September 14, 2021
Sampo Kemppainen

Table of Contents

PART I – Studying Pacific Alliances: Theory and Practice

1 Introduction: Military alliances and the Asia-Pacific region

Military alliances have always been a central feature of the international system. They have been present since the first rudimentary states were formed, and the formation of coalitions and alliances is thought to be one of the first forms of strategic thinking.[1] Throughout history, wars have been fought and won through alliance formation. The defining confrontation of the 20th century between the Warsaw Pact, formed around the Soviet Union, and the US-led NATO, was a confrontation between two blocs – meaning alliance systems. Neither has the concept of alliance lost its relevance in today's international relations, which is clearly evident in the contemporary debates on whether Finland and Sweden should join NATO.[2]

As alliances have been a central cornerstone of the relations between states, the classic works on international relations have discussed the formation and maintenance of alliances extensively. For example, in his classic work *Politics among Nations*, Hans Morgenthau observed that alliance relations are "historically the most important manifestation" and a "necessary function" of the balance of power between states.[3] In the complex international setting, alliances are usually viewed as a part of a wider system of the balance of power, which is made up of several states, each seeking to maximize its own security. Nevertheless, aside from a few notable exceptions, only a handful of studies have analyzed how alliances behave in the contemporary international system.

1 On the development of strategic thinking from the primitive societies to contemporary times see, for example, Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3-8.

2 For a short introduction into basic questions regarding alliances and on their role in international security see, for example, Allan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 197-199.

3 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 193.

This work studies the change and development of the US-centered alliance system in the Asia-Pacific regional security complex.[4] It focuses on the US alliances with Japan and Australia and seeks to analyze these two relations by examining their post-Cold War development in different areas of military and security cooperation. The theoretical aim is to test different theoretical models commonly used for analyzing alliances against observed events in the two cases and to contribute to our understanding of the relative influence of the diverse factors affecting long-term changes in the structures of military and security cooperation within alliances. Furthermore, a study of these alliances will allow this work to draw inferences concerning the future development of the Asia-Pacific security environment.

This work's central argument is that the observed patterns of *change and continuity in the military and security cooperation in these alliances are best explained through analyzing their asymmetric nature*. This argument is based on a theoretical framework of asymmetric alliances that is tested, along with other theoretical models of alliance cooperation, against events and developments in the two alliances. The study is conducted by observing developments in these alliances over a more than two-decade period and evaluating the events and developments against different theoretical frameworks. The use of an extended temporal period allows this research to analyze the development of patterns of cooperation in a systematic way instead of focusing on singular events. Where singular events are analyzed, it is done for the purpose of understanding how changing conditions can produce different kinds of outcomes in different periods. The study shows that while other alliance theories do well in explaining singular alliance events in the short term, a broader approach and longer perspective demonstrate that the asymmetric alliance model can cover a larger set of events and better explain long-term trends. While the entire story of such a complex social phenomenon cannot be fully reduced to a single explanation, the argument made here points to a major source of explanation often overlooked in contemporary accounts of events. The weakness of explanations failing to take this argument into account will be demonstrated by the analysis.

In the decades following the Cold War, these two alliances have evolved to include cooperation in fields and areas far removed from their original purposes. Furthermore, there is a clear similarity in these lines of development in the alliances studied here. As the title suggests, a distinction needs to be made between the changes and immediate developments that have followed different key events,

[4] Regional security complex is understood here, as formulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, as a group of states within a region whose security activities affect each other's to the extent that they cannot be analyzed or understood separately of each other. See, for example, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

several of which were seen as revolutionary at the time, as well as the deep structural changes that only appear through the lens of a longer-term perspective. It will be demonstrated that the contemporary developments in these alliances have been ongoing since at least the early 1970s. For example, after the instability of the 1970s, US allies in the region scrambled to increase their indigenous defense capabilities and reinforce their alliances with the US, putting in motion several processes that operate to this day. Also, the pressure for allied contributions to international operations, especially in the Greater Middle East region, already challenged these alliances in the 1980s. Policy lines initiated then created the patterns seen all the way up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s.

The global international system, as well as the regional system of the Asia-Pacific, is currently characterized by the changing dynamics of power relations and increasing focus on competition between the great powers. By most accounts, the global system is transforming from a unipolar one, which was based on essentially uncontested US supremacy, to a system of several competing powers. This means that while the US is likely to remain the most powerful nation for the foreseeable future, it will face increasing challenges in different regions.

Correspondingly, the US-centered system of bilateral alliances, sometimes referred to as the San Francisco system or the "hub and spokes"-system, remains a central feature of the Asia-Pacific security complex. US military presence has upheld the post-World War II regional order since the 1950s through its dominance of the maritime Asia-Pacific. During the Cold War and its aftermath, no regional power, including China and the Soviet Union, could seriously challenge US maritime supremacy in the region. On the other hand, US maritime power has had limited reach into the Asian continental mainland. It was this dynamic that defined the Cold War in Asia and created the three divided states in Vietnam, Korea, and China along the Asian coastline, two of which remain divided to this day. For decades, conflicts over these lines of division were suppressed by the predominance of US power. However, by the late-2010s, the primacy of US military power in the region began steadily eroding. Chinese defense spending is set to achieve parity with US spending within a few decades and, as US power must be projected across the Pacific towards the Asian littoral, its military advantage over China in the region is set to decline even faster.[5]

[5] For accounts of the post-World War II development of the Asia-Pacific, see, for example, Peter Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2005); Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). For a discussion on predictions of the changing global order see, for example, Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War: A History* (London: Allen Lane, 2017), 274-276.

While the regional security environment has changed, the old US-centered alliance structures have remained largely intact during the 1990s and 2000s. As the alliances were created during the early Cold War, they were originally based on the idea that the US was the preponderant center of military power in the world. However, with its power in relative decline and its willingness to maintain a stable world order waning, the US is becoming increasingly reliant on its regional partners. This shift in responsibilities makes regional US alliances more important than ever. Besides maintaining US influence, alliances work as an anchor for US forces to maintain access to the region, and the combined military strength of the alliance system can ensure a viable counterbalance to China for the foreseeable future. However, the problem with alliances is that they involve much more than a simple aggregation of power among its participants. They also include different interests and perceptions as well as the diverse domestic political and security environments of the participating states. Further, these factors change over time, and this requires continuous management to adjust the alliance relations.[6] The question of how the alliance structures, built on the basis of nearly absolute US power, will function in this new environment is increasingly relevant for our understanding of the dynamics of the emerging regional system.

The results suggest that the most significant changes in the structures of these alliance relations would be caused by changes in the underlying power relations, not simply between China and the US but also between US and other regional states. These results also provide insights into the current and future security situation in the Asia-Pacific. Most notably, the results suggest that the US alliance system will, in its traditional form, become increasingly unviable as the power dynamics shift within the region. Even while the need for security among regional states is growing, the asymmetric alliance framework implies that regional states will become increasingly cautious and even reluctant to follow the US lead as it will be less able to guarantee their security. Although regional states will still rely on the US, they will, however, seek to achieve more equal relations and hedge against the possibility that the US alliance will become a liability instead of an asset. This will in turn lead to increased hedging among regional states.

Therefore, while alliances are becoming more central to US regional leadership, the results of this research suggest that the willingness of US allies to support the US in exchange for protection is decreasing. As will be shown later, the reluctance to follow the lead of the senior ally can already be seen manifesting itself in the long-

[6] For discussions on the overall development of the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific see, for example, T.J. Pempel, "More Pax Less Americana in Asian," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10, no. 3 (2010): 465-490; Richard Smith, "Military Change in Asia," *Asia-Pacific Review* 16, no. 1 (2009): 73-83.

term trends in these alliances. For the regional security of the Asia-Pacific, this will likely mean an increasing emphasis on multilateral security frameworks and expanding investments in independent defense capabilities by regional states. These will increasingly be done at the expense of the US alliance system and, eventually, will mean an increase in the influence of states antagonistic towards US-led order in the region.

The current state of research on alliances has not kept up with the changing times. While prominent in the strategic studies of the Cold War, academic research on alliance theories declined after the late 1980s.[7] At the time, several writers argued that alliances had lost their relevance altogether as the threat of interstate war seemed to have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s.[8] However, by the mid-2010s, in the face of declining US primacy, aggressive policies pursued by large powers such as China and Russia have revived traditional security concerns. The resurgent specter of a great power conflict in Asia and Europe has again made the problems of power relations central to policymakers and scholars. In this changing environment, it is difficult to question the relevance of military alliances. The rich theoretical field of alliance theory, mostly developed during the Cold War, is only beginning to catch up with contemporary realities and several researchers have recently taken up the topic. Recent research themes in the study of alliances have, for example, included the influence of US alliances on the domestic political conditions of allied states,[9] the influence of alliances in multiparty wars,[10] and the causes and consequences of variation in the forms of military alliances.[11]

From a theoretical perspective, this work seeks to test theoretical models of change in alliance relations against the observed outcomes in our cases to determine what role different variables play in determining outcomes in these two alliance relations. The method employed in the study is designed using the analytical setting of comparative case studies. The work will begin with a discussion of the concept of

7 On debates about the changing nature and relevance of alliances, see, for example, Bruno Tetrais, "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol 27, no 2 (2004): 135-147; John H. Norris "When Alliance and Self-interest Collide," *Cambridge review of International Affairs* 16 no. 2 (2003): 359-368; Kurt M. Campbell, "The End of Alliances? Not So Fast," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (2004): 151-163.

8 E.g., Rajan Menon, "The End of Alliances," *World Policy Journal* 20, no.2 (2003): 1-20

9 Sung Jung, "Democratization and Alliance Commitment: US Democratizing Allies during the Gulf War," *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 4 (2013): 654–674.

10 Vasquez John A. and Ashlea Rundlett, "Alliances as a Necessary Condition of Multiparty Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no.8 (2016): 1395–1418.

11 Benson, Brett V. and Joshua D. Clinton. "Assessing the Variation of Formal Military Alliances," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no.5 (2014): 840–865.

alliance. By alliances, we refer to the specific military-security arrangements between two states. However, it should be noted that while military cooperation within an alliance's institutional setting forms an important part of any military alliance, it seldom covers the entire scope of alliance cooperation.

The concept of alliance is itself challenging. This study defines an alliance as a *formally recognized and institutionalized relation between sovereign states with the purpose and expectation of security cooperation based on interests and threats that can be different and diverge over time.* Hence, the focus of the study is on the development of different aspects of security cooperation and their institutionalized forms. Arguably, several other fields can also be considered to fall under the concept of an alliance, which can, for example, include military technology cooperation or cooperation in other areas of international politics and in international institutions such as the UN. The concept could arguably be expanded to include cooperation in almost any imaginable area of international relations. However, this work will concentrate on security cooperation in the military sense, including international operations as well as arrangements and institutions for defense cooperation in traditional defense issues including defense technology. These conceptual questions will be addressed in the first part of Chapter 2.

The conceptual discussion will be followed by a review of the theoretical models used for studying alliances. Based on a review of major theories, four different theory frameworks are identified to form the theoretical basis of this work, all of which have distinctive ways of using different variables to explain the politics and outcomes of alliance cooperation. Firstly, the framework of threats, refined from the simple calculus of balancing against the most powerful state in the system by including factors of capability, proximity, and perception of threatening intent, suggests that states form and maintain alliances as a response to the direct threats facing them. This framework has been systematically presented by Stephen Walt in *Origins of Alliances.*[12]

The second and arguably most influential way of modelling alliance behavior is the so-called "alliance security dilemma," originally formalized by Glenn Snyder in *Alliance Politics*. The basic argument of the alliance security dilemma is that when two states enter into an alliance relation, they become tied to the policies of their alliance partner, but they cannot be certain that the partner will support them in every situation. Firstly, this means that an alliance risks *entrapping* one state in an unwanted course of action, even war, because of its alliance. Secondly, it means that should one ally become entangled in a hostile confrontation, there is always the risk that its ally will refuse to honor its alliance commitment thus *abandoning* its ally

12 Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

who is reliant on its support. These two concepts, threats of entrapment and abandonment, form the Scylla and Charybdis through which alliance politics must navigate.[13]

The third framework, which is mostly drawn from works associated with the Neoclassical Realist school of international relations, draws attention to the role of domestic political elites in refining alliance responses. Randall Schweller, a notable proponent of this school, emphasizes that treaties are filtered and formed in the prisms of domestic politics before they have any causal relevance. For Schweller, the political aims of the domestic elites, their perceptions of the international situation, including threats and their political capability to act and enact legislation domestically, are the key variables that determine a state's security policies as well as its alliance formation and management.[14]

Lastly, the asymmetric alliance framework emphasizes that alliances usually involve tradeoffs of security and sovereignty between states of unequal power. This framework, proposed by James Morrow, models the alliance as an asymmetric bargaining situation in which the more powerful ally offers increased security to the weaker one in exchange for concessions on sovereignty. For example, the smaller state can cede its sovereignty in the form of access to its territory or supportive foreign and security policies. Simply put, the more powerful ally gains influence over the smaller ally's policies and territory. The amount and form of this influence is the outcome of unequal bargaining based on the exchange of security for sovereignty. The more unequal the power relation is, the more influence the powerful ally will have.[15]

These four theoretical frameworks essentially all stem from the traditional Realist school of International Relations (IR), which focuses on power relations in the international system as its central variable. The different frameworks, each in its own particular way, refine this basic proposition, thus allowing for more sophisticated analysis. The study of alliances has not been as prominent in the other IR schools of thought, and their frameworks and concepts are not as easily adaptable to the topic at hand, which, as noted, concerns state responses to changes in power relations in the international system – the very phenomena, for which Realist theories are made.

13 Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1997).

14 Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats, Political Constrains on the Balance of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006).

15 James Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no.4 (1991): 904-933.

Theoretical issues will be further discussed in the second part of Chapter 2, which will present full explanations of these frameworks and discuss how these theories have been previously used and developed. Specific hypothesis from these models will then be drawn and we will describe the processes that the different models would expect alliances to follow in different situations. Later in the study, these hypotheses will be considered, and their implications will be analytically tested against observed events in each case.

This work will further our understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the chosen four theoretical frameworks and improve the methods for analyzing changes in alliances. It will also contribute to the body of literature on Asia-Pacific strategic relations by providing an account of the post-Cold War developments and demonstrate the historical origins and continuity of the main lines of development in these alliances. The contemporary relevance of this kind of research concerns all US alliances worldwide. The study provides insights into questions about the influence that alliances have for smaller states' strategic choices and on how changes in relative US power will affect this dynamic. The case studies on Japan's and Australia's alliance relations with the US will, themselves, also be of interest to anyone concerned with the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific.

The US bilateral alliances with Japan and Australia are used here as case studies. Unlike the US alliances in the Atlantic, institutionalized under NATO, these alliances lack multilateral mechanisms, and their development and change are not subject to similar institutional controls or affected by multiple states' interests. From this study's perspective, the relative simplicity of these alliance relations allows for a simpler framework as the primary independent variables can be limited to factors involving only these two pairs of states. Importantly for the research setting, these two alliance relations have significantly different characteristics but have nonetheless been connected and shared common features since their inception in the early 1950s. Nonetheless, they differ in several key areas including historical conditions, threat environment, and traditional ways of cooperating. Further, the security strategies of Japan and Australia are very different: Japan was a central enemy of the western allies during the Second World War and is largely thought to have followed pacifist policies with a minimal military role since that time, while Australia has participated in every major war or conflict that the US has been involved in since the First World War. Yet, as the study will demonstrate, these two countries' relations with the US also share significant and increasing similarities.

Furthermore, US alliances in the Asia-Pacific are, on their own merit, important subjects of study. As the Asia-Pacific has become an increasingly central part of global order, and economic and social integration of the region has advanced rapidly,

political and military tensions seem to persist.[16] China's rise and the challenge of the prevailing international order, as well as uncertainty over the United States' declining ability to maintain its presence and dominance of the Western Pacific, create increasing strategic uncertainties within the region. At the same time, the choices made by regional actors are now more important than ever in shaping the regional order. Hence, it is vital to understand how regional states function and respond to changes in their strategic environment. As scholars of international strategy focus on the security choices of countries such as Japan and Australia in this changing environment, it is easy to point out that dramatic changes have taken place. However, many of the ongoing issues have been developing for several decades preceding contemporary events. Japan has steadily increased its military activity over dozens of years, albeit quietly but not without local and regional controversies; Australia, on the other hand, has struggled to balance its US relations with its increasing ties to a rising Asia since the late 1980s.

The case studies will concentrate on the period from the end of the 1980s to the mid-2010s and demonstrate how the alliances have come to share several significant developmental themes since the late Cold War. The alliances are analyzed by examining several different aspects of the relations. These include, firstly, the development of the overall institutional structures of the alliance relations, e.g., political relations, institutional arrangements, and cooperative agreements. Secondly, the study considers military contributions by Japan and Australia to US-led operations abroad as well as other international operations conducted by Japanese and Australian armed forces. Lastly, in order to test the theoretical frameworks as extensively as possible, technology cooperation is considered as it has played a significant role in both alliances.

Institutional developments in both alliances have been markedly similar in their overall trends. The development of the Japan-US alliance was largely stalled after the Cold War and mostly overshadowed by difficulties in bilateral relations. However, the alliance was reformed after the so-called Nye initiative in the mid-1990s. The working-level progress was then maintained, although the highest levels of leadership, again, became less engaged. The process of reworking the alliance was completed by the early 2000s, just in time for Japan to participate in the War on Terror. Afterwards, heightened interest in the alliance from both sides spurred

16 For a discussion about different levels of integration of the states, societies and economies in the region, see, for example, Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, Eds., *Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); John D. Ciorciari, *The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2010); T.J. Pempel, *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

another round of reviews of the alliance in the mid-2000s, but this was again followed by a drift in the relations. The latest efforts to revitalize the alliance have taken place in the early 2010s after both nations' relations with China deteriorated dramatically. In regard to the Australia-US alliance (Australia-New Zealand-United States, ANZUS), the alliance was seen as increasingly irrelevant in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But as with the Japan-US alliance, there was a period of intensified interest in the partnership in the mid-1990s, followed by a general lack of development in the late 1990s. The War on Terror, for its part, re-energized the alliance during the early 2000s, although the relevance of the alliance was again questioned in the late 2000's; however, since the early 2010s, it has been once again strengthened through several initiatives.

The international operations by Japanese and Australian armed forces considered here consist of US-led operations in the wider Middle East and other international operations, which mostly include UN peacekeeping missions. Again, the trends share notable similarities. Both Japan and Australia sent few personnel abroad in the late 1980s, but both sent forces to the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 and participated actively in the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. Both nations largely withdrew from the War on Terror by the end of 2000s. Unlike Japan, however, Australia returned its military to the Middle East in the early 2010s. Other international peacekeeping operations conducted by both Japanese and Australian militaries also increased significantly in the early 1990s. These deployments peaked by the late 1990s and early 2000s, only to be overshadowed by operations related to the War on Terror at the end of 2001. While maintaining smaller contingents in regional or UN operations, neither Japan nor Australia have returned to the 1990s levels of commitment in other international operations.

Military technology cooperation in the two alliances has been markedly different in the past. In the early 1990s, Australia was a hub of several US military signal stations and played a vital role in the US global sensor network. This was also reflected in the overall alliance relation, and the only US forces permanently stationed in Australia worked on these functions. For its part, Australia largely relied on US technology to maintain its military superiority in its region. Japan, on the other hand, has long possessed an advanced technological foundation of its own, albeit with most of its military technology copied from the US. Traditionally, Japan has sought military technology transfers from the US while the US side has sought to use Japanese markets, technology, and industrial base to support its own defense industry and development. These diverging interests in regard to defense technology cooperation have been a major source of friction in the Japan-US alliance. The dynamics of technology cooperation in both alliances changed with the advancement of the technology-driven development of military forces in the 1990s. By the late 1990s, both Japan and Australia were increasingly invested in advanced defense

technology cooperation and the US missile defense program. Despite domestic resistance, both formally joined the missile defense development by the early 2000s. Increasing participation in this key program has since become a central part of these allies' technology cooperation. However, at the same time, Japan has also pursued its own indigenous technologies in fields where US technology is already available. Australia, for its part, has few similar aspirations.

As noted at the beginning, this study argues that these long-term developments can be best accounted for through the theoretical framework of asymmetric alliances. In other words, this study will demonstrate that the shared and persistent long-term lines of development can predominantly be explained by the asymmetric nature of these alliances. By asymmetry, we mean that the US has been dominant in these security relations to the extent that it does not need to rely on other states to enhance its own security in the same way that its allies do. The US military, political, and economic power have exceeded manifold those of its allies or any of the states that might threaten it militarily. The prominent status that the United States has enjoyed over the last several decades in the Asia-Pacific and its almost hegemonic military power have allowed it to play a leading role, not only in cooperation within the alliance, but even for the overall security policies of Japan and Australia. Through its power, US policies and preferences, even its domestic politics, translate into demands and expectations for its junior alliance partners. However, this dynamic leads to different kinds of outcomes as US power declines in relation to its regional challengers and because regional partners must increase their own relative power to balance.

Covering a period of over two decades, the timeline of this study is divided into three periodic chapters in order to better manage different outcomes. The study is conducted by considering observed developments against four theoretical explanatory models of alliance cooperation. The analysis is supported by process-tracing and comparison across cases where a comparative framework is applicable.

The study is conducted by observing multiple alliance outcomes (development of alliance framework, contributions to alliance operations in the Middle East, increasing international operations, and technology cooperation) from official documents such as White Papers and reports on defense cooperation, previous research on the subject, and the publications of international research institutions. Different explanatory variables (threat environment, domestic policies, fear of abandonment or entrapment, and US demands for contributions) have been researched through similar sources, as well as through periodical publications, news sources, and previous scholarly works. Specific events are referred to through news articles and archived newspaper articles as well as using memoirs or academic works describing said incidents. Process tracing has been conducted through similar sources and complemented with interviews with recognized experts and practitioners

(identified in the footnotes). Declassified official documents such as embassy cables and government briefings have also been utilized where they have been available.

The next chapter will discuss theoretical issues and explain the research setting and methodology. This introductory chapter and the following theoretical chapter make up the first part (Chapters 1-2). The second part of the study will consist of the case studies, beginning with an introduction to their historical backgrounds and a review of relevant literature (Chapter 3), followed by the chapters of case studies covering different periods (Chapters 4-6). Finally, the third part of this work will compile the empirical and theoretical contributions and present the conclusions and implications (Chapters 7-9).

2 Theories and Methodology

This chapter will focus on the theoretical aspect of this study and present the methods and conduct of the research. The chapter is comprised of three parts, the first of which will discuss the concept of alliance. It will also provide the reader with an overview of the recent debates about what constitutes an alliance and how relevant the concept is in today's world. It is notable that while the term alliance is widely used in academic circles as well as everyday language, its meaning is far from unambiguous. Therefore, it is necessary to first clarify what we mean when using the term "alliance." The need for conceptual clarity is further accentuated as the study compares the theoretical frameworks developed by various authors who also employ different variations of the same concept. Without this conceptual analysis, the research setting runs the risk of comparing apples and oranges, so to speak. The first part will conclude by presenting our definition of alliance.

The conceptual discussion will be followed by a broader theoretical discussion on alliances. This part will present the major theoretical frameworks used to study alliances and will conclude by presenting the specific theoretical framework and hypothesis. As noted at the outset, this work tests and evaluates how the different theoretical approaches that model alliances fit the observed outcomes. A thorough discussion of the different theoretical approaches and their similarities and differences is therefore a necessary prerequisite for a plausible comparison across different theories. The last part of this chapter will discuss research methodology and the data used for the study. This section will detail the methodological setting and demonstrate how it will be used to achieve the study's goals. This part will also discuss in detail how the research has been conducted and what kinds of data were used.

Before moving on, one caveat should be introduced. As noted, the theoretical frameworks discussed here mainly stem from the Realist school of International Relations (IR). However, there are obviously several other schools of thought in IR that could be used to provide competing explanations for a state's alliance behavior. Liberalism is perhaps the most oft-cited theoretical competitor to Realism and it generally rejects the idea that the zero-sum game of power politics necessarily dominates international relations and tends to emphasize interdependence, the mutual benefits of cooperation, and international institutions. Correspondingly, the concepts and frameworks developed within the field of Liberalism are best suited for these contexts. Recent scholarship has increasingly emphasized the shared Rationalist underpinnings of these schools of thought, making the distinction between them somewhat artificial. Expectations of actors' rational agendas are also presupposed in this work. Constructivism, for many obviously the third central school of thought in the IR field, focuses on the social constructs that underlie the identities of the state actors and challenges the assumptions made by these

Rationalist schools. The questions that Constructivists generally ask, however, differ from those of this work.

The choice of Realist theories as the starting point is thus not arbitrary – far from it. This is a conscious choice made in light of the subjects studied here as well as the objectives of the research. While there have been Liberalist and Constructivist studies on alliances as international institutions or on values and ideologies as factors in alliance formation, they all share a common weakness in the sense that they typically focus on the preconditions of alliance formation or dissolution and rarely discuss states' activities and policies within existing alliances.[17] Naturally, this type of limited focus may also pertain to several Realism-informed approaches but overall, as demonstrated later, the Realist field provides particularly advanced tools for analyzing alliances. Realist concepts better cover the scope of a state's alliance behavior as these theories are developed for this very purpose.

It also seems that, as discussed in the introduction, states are increasingly resorting to power politics across the world and are, therefore, acting increasingly in accordance with the Realist paradigm. In a sense, we are not so much asking why states are going along with power politics, but rather taking it as a premise that they are doing so. Therefore, while acknowledging that the primary focus on the Realist school of IR leaves out several possible explanations, we nonetheless maintain that the chosen theoretical frameworks include those that provide the greatest explanatory power for the phenomena under study and can best cover the observed outcomes.

2.1 The concepts used in the studying of alliances

Alliances in International Relations

The study of alliances has been present in international relations research since the introduction of the discipline. Accordingly, alliances have been a constant topic in the classics of IR.[18] The oldest historical works such as Thucydides' *History of Peloponnesian War* describes conflicts that were fought, managed, and even initiated, over alliances.[19] More normative classics like Machiavelli's *The Prince*

17 E.g., John M. Owen, "When do Ideologies Produce Alliances?" *International Studies Quarterly* 49, (2005); Thomas S Wilkins, "Towards a "Trilateral Alliance? Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations," *Asian Security* 3, no.3 (2007): Kirsten Rafferty, "An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of Cold War Alliance Systems: Insights for Alliance Theory," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 36, no. 2 (2003)

18 Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 34-35, 142-143.

19 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989).

provide practical instructions on whom to ally with and under what circumstances.[20] These works informed the formation of the IR discipline and the school of Classical Realism, which is usually acknowledged as the oldest school of thought in IR. While this study is not an exercise in Classical, or even Neoclassical Realism *per se*; as noted, the concepts and models developed within these school of thought still dominate the academic research of international security today and therefore need to be briefly discussed.

Traditional Realism focuses on the *balance of power* between states in the international system. It sees alliances as one of the two central forms of *balancing*. Balancing here refers to a state's actions to maintain its security against perceived threats in the international system. As resources are more or less limited, this must be done in a way that ensures a state's security with the limited use of resources. Balance of power itself refers to the dynamic situation of how power, especially military power, is distributed among the states in the system.[21]

The central argument of the Realist paradigm is that the balance of power, manifested in the relative strength of different states and most powerful states in particular, is the most important factor that explains events in the international system. This idea relies on the assumption that states always seek to maximize their own security because their legitimacy relies on their ultimate responsibility to protect themselves and their populations. It is argued that, as the international system is inherently anarchical in nature, there can never be perfect trust between states and therefore no state can rely on another state or international organization given this ultimate responsibility. Therefore, out of necessity, all states maintain at least the minimum ability to defend themselves against organized armed attack. This framework can be used to provide plausible explanation on why states such as Switzerland continue to maintain expensive armed forces even when there is almost no conceivable direct military threat facing the state.[22]

The acquisition and maintenance of weapons and armies has always been expensive and maintaining defense capabilities is always a matter of seeking the optimal choice based on calculations of military strength. In the Realist model, states evaluate how much military strength their possible enemies can direct against them

20 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 77-79.

21 Arguably the best account of the classical realist framework is still to be found in the several reprints of the *Politics among Nations*. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006).

22 Anarchic nature of the international system and its implications presented in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press. 2001).

and then arm themselves so that they can defend themselves against their neighbors' attacks.[23] However, as information regarding other states' military capacity is always imprecise and subject to deliberate efforts of concealment, states must always factor in a certain amount of uncertainty regarding other states' strength. This leads them to arm themselves more than the minimum required to counter potential opponents' military strength. This in turn leads to a situation in which other states must also further build up their own strength to counter this added military power and this in turn may lead to an arms race. This kind of security seeking behavior with military capabilities under conditions of imperfect information is called a *security dilemma*.[24]

In the basic Realist model, there are two kinds of balancing. When a state seeks to balance against its opponents' military power by building up its own armed forces it is called *internal balancing*. The other way to counter security threats is by *external balancing*. External balancing means that states counter possible opponents' strength by allying with other states and creating coalitions consisting of several states. As the international system tends to produce few states with significantly greater power than the majority of smaller states, patterns of alliances usually follow the dynamics between larger powers. In practice, this usually means that smaller states ally with one larger power to counter another larger power.

The resulting system is characterized by the number of *poles* of power. Here, a pole refers to the most powerful states in the international system. These states are so powerful that smaller entities cannot realistically challenge their power and are therefore compelled to ally with one of the stronger states in order to maintain their independence and security. *A unipolar* system has only one dominating power that is so powerful that it does not have any peer competitors in the system. *A bipolar* system has two great powers of roughly equal power that draw the smaller states into alliance systems around them. If there are more than two great powers, each with significant enough power to threaten any of the other powerful states, the system is termed *multipolar*. According to the Realist models, the multipolar system is the most volatile configuration of the international system and will thus always tend towards a bipolar one. A unipolar system, on the other hand, will always contain an inherent tendency for the smaller powers to seek to revise the order as the single

[23] To be precise, the idea that states optimize their military so as to be able to defend themselves against attacks is associated with *Defensive Realism* theory, a subset of the realist school. The opposite school is that of *Offensive Realism*, which argues that states, and especially great powers, seek offensive capabilities in order to maximize their own power: Peter Toft, "John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 8, no. 4 (2005): 381–408.

[24] For a basic and authoritative presentation of the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

great power is otherwise in a position to dictate its own terms to all other states in the system. This will eventually change the system into a bipolar or multipolar one as revisionist powers eventually rise. Notably, the time of systemic change is considered the most volatile and dangerous period as powers maintaining the old status quo confront the rising revisionist states.

The form of the system also has significant implications for the smaller states. According to the classical theory, smaller powers can use the balance between the two competing powers to maneuver for their own interest and independence, seek protection from one greater power to maintain their independence against others, or, given favorable conditions, they can try to avoid confrontation by maintaining neutrality.[25]

It should be noted that while these traditional approaches have much to say about how different conditions lead to different kinds of alliances, the Classical Realist and Neorealist models often concentrate on the systemic level and on the actions of the great powers. They generally overlook the implications for the smaller powers and rarely focus on the processes of formation, maintenance, or the dissolution of alliances. Alliances are rather understood as the results of the changing dynamics of the system and not of primary interest on their own. As Realism's dominant explanatory variable, the balance of power has itself traditionally been used to explain outcomes of alliance formation.

Formed during the Cold War, the relevance of the Realist framework was questioned after end of the great power confrontation in the early 1990s. It was thought that the world had moved beyond power politics and entered a period of the "end of history" as traditional military power was believed to have lost its meaning.[26] This was also taken to imply that Realism as a major IR theory had lost its relevance. To counter this critique, Realists such as Kapstein and Mastanduno argued that the model of unipolar international order can easily explain the post-Cold War international system and maintained that states continued to engage in competition but that this went beyond the traditional military security issues characterizing the unipolar period.[27] This is explained by the simple logic of balance of power that precludes traditional balancing under unipolarity as the distribution of power makes such action essentially impossible. However, it has been argued that states who feel threatened by the unipole will still attempt to balance locally, either by sacrificing

25 Analysis of the models of polarity in the international system for example in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

26 Francis Fukuyama, *The end of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

27 Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno eds., *Unipolar Politics, Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999): 11-12, 485-486.

disproportionate parts of their wealth to do so, or by pursuing alternative asymmetric means.[28] As noted before, Whatever the interpretation of the immediate post-Cold War period, it currently seems that power politics have returned and therefore the traditional Realist concepts remain valid.

The debated concept of alliance

The debate about the continued relevance of power politics in the post-Cold War world has included questions about the contemporary relevance of traditional military alliances. This was also reflected in academic IR and was the basis for a debate about the "end of alliances" in which three main lines of argumentation can be identified.[29] Firstly, some writers have claimed that permanent formal alliances had been eclipsed by temporary coalitions that form and break up around different issues without further expectations of cooperation.[30] Secondly, others argued that these new kinds of coalitions were a new form of alliances and that the conceptual field of alliances was simply becoming broader.[31] A third line of argument has been that new forms of security cooperation are similar to traditional alliances and could therefore be explained through traditional concepts and theories.[32]

These arguments and the different positions within the debate illustrate a specific problem about the concept. When proponents of different positions discuss coalitions, temporary alignments, and formal alliances, they can base their arguments on a concept of alliance that is already geared towards a specific conclusion. Very rigid definitions of traditional alliances can easily be used as a straw man to make an argument that military alliances are no longer relevant. On the other hand, broad definitions, which include all kinds of military or security cooperation, can easily be used to produce numerous examples of security cooperation differing from traditional military alliances without considering how significant these instances of cooperation actually are.

Hence, one of the difficulties with these debates has been that, while there are several influential definitions proposed for the concept of alliance, the definition

28 John G. Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 20-22.

29 A review of the "end of alliances" debate for example in Kajsa Ji Noe Oest, *The End of Alliance Theory*, University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, Arbejdspapir, 13/2007: 7-16.

30 Menon, *The End of Alliances*, 1-5.

31 E.g., Bruno Tetrais, "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no 2 (2004): 135-147; John H. Norris, "When Alliance and Self-interest Collide," *Cambridge review of International Affairs* 16 no. 2 (2003): 359-368.

32 E.g., Campbell, *The End of Alliances? Not So Fast*, 161-163.

used by any one author has often been directly related to the argument he/she was trying to make. The main premises of an argument, and often the actual point of contest, can be ascertained from the way that writers define their concepts. Different ways of defining alliances also create problems about the scope of the debate as some writers have defined the concept so broadly that almost any association with security cooperation can be considered an alliance. When other writers at the same time define their concept narrowly, so that only formally declared and documented alliance relationships are considered proper alliances, this can clearly lead to people talking past each other's arguments.

While this debate has been largely overtaken by real-world events, and alliances have proven their contemporary relevance, the contemporary security environment clearly differs from the Cold War-era during which most of the present-day alliances, as well as alliance theories, were formed. As the existing alliance structures have developed and changed to adapt to the new situation, there is a clear need for the concepts used to describe them to adapt as well. This is the one point of agreement shared by the different contributors to the alliance debates and is also a founding assumption of the present work.

No holistic reevaluation of the concept has been attempted to date, nor will such an attempt be undertaken here either. But in order to achieve its goals, this study will need to demarcate the phenomena being studied – that is, military alliances in the contemporary Asia-Pacific. There have been earlier attempts to construct new conceptual ways of understanding the post-Cold War security relations in the Asia-Pacific. For example, Thomas Wilkins has analyzed the formation of the US-Australia-Japan trilateral defense dialogue from the point of view of shared values. Tomohiko Satake has argued that these alliances have moved away from traditional "defense burden sharing" to a new way of "security burden sharing." [33] However, these works have been limited in scope and have usually focused on a single side of the alliance relations, which, if anything, have only grown more complex after the end of the Cold War. As with the end of alliances debate, these theories have mostly been eclipsed by the return of the traditional military focus to Asia-Pacific regional politics. Next, we will review the most prominent ways of defining the concept of alliance before concluding with the definition used in this study.

One of the most influential definitions of the concept of alliance is offered by Glenn Snyder. Snyder has defined alliances narrowly as "formal associations of

[33] Thomas S Wilkins, "Towards a "Trilateral Alliance? Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations," *Asian Security* 3, no.3 (2007): 251 – 278; Tomohiko Satake, *From 'Collective Defense' to 'International Security': Security Burden-sharing in the US-Japan and US-Australia Alliances during Post-Cold War era*, The Australian National University, 2009.

states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership."[34] This definition can be understood as a narrow one because it presupposes that alliances include diplomatic recognition (formal association), specific means (military force), and even a target (against states outside their own membership). Some writers have further specified the need for a written agreement and institutionalization as prerequisites for establishing an alliance.[35] Others have emphasized the need for alliances to have a specific pledge to use armed force against previously agreed-on targets.[36] While strict definitions appeal with their neatness, these conceptual limits leave out a significant amount of cooperation, especially given the emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo that has been prevalent in post-Cold War international security. Snyder himself has noted that his definition might be useful only as a reference for students of history.[37]

One problem with these narrow definitions is that they leave much of the developments in an alliance outside the scope of the concept. For example, alliances might change in regard to threats or commitments. These changes over time can rarely be fully traced from formal alliance agreements. Furthermore, allies are often expected to show support for each other in circumstances beyond the use of military force. A continuous lack of at least diplomatic or rhetorical support will certainly erode the credibility of a defense relationship. These problems can, however, be addressed by loosening the definition.

In Stephen Walt's original formulation "an alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states."[38] Walt's only significant condition for the concept is that an alliance includes arrangements for security cooperation and is made between sovereign states. He later added other formulations into his definition, like the intention "to augment alliance members' power, security and/or influence," but his bottom line is consistent: whatever forms different alliances might take, the meaningful mutual commitment of support against threats lies at the heart of all alliances.[39] Kenneth Waltz also utilized broad definitions of alliances. For Waltz, as with Walt, alliances are made between sovereign states for

34 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 4.

35 E.g., Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reid Sarkees, "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2006," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no.2 (2006): 211-222; Eric Miller and Arkady Toritsyn, "Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Security Studies* 14, no. 2 (2004).

36 Luis Réne Beres, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments," *The Western Political Quarterly* 25, no. 4, (1972): 702-710.

37 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 3.

38 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 12-13.

39 Stephen Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 86-120.

the purposes of security cooperation. Waltz further emphasized that the interests behind security cooperation will not always, if ever, be identical. Waltz also notes that allied strategies will always be a form of compromise between varying interests. Hence, a state that may be wary of committing to an alliance may also be circumspect due to these diverging interests.[40] While Walt's and Waltz' definitions are broad, the concept can be broadened even further. Broad definitions, on the far end of the spectrum, can be found from writers who argue that an alliance can be understood as simply a promise of future security-related cooperation.[41]

If the concept is defined as a simple arrangement for security cooperation, it will clearly lose its ability to guide and operationalize research in case studies. While the broadest definitions provide a certain appeal in their unproblematic approach, definitions must also guide research frameworks, and broad definitions would include many open-ended factors. Further, overly broad definitions might unrealistically make it seem as if a given study's results could be applied to any case falling inside the definition, even though the results should be clearly limited in their applicability.

As noted, there is no generally accepted definition of the concept of alliance, and it is beyond the scope of this work to try to formulate one. From the perspective of the work at hand, the concept of alliance needs to serve two purposes. Firstly, a precisely defined concept of alliances as studied here is primarily needed to inform the extent and demarcation of the scope of the phenomena we are studying. Secondly, the application of results must be tempered by conceptual clarity, which can be used to inform which kinds of alliances the results relate to. As these requirements do not need a universally valid definition, but a particular one, it is enough to be informed by the discussions above in the sense that they demonstrate what can be understood to fall within the concept of alliance. Ultimately, there can be no question of the fact that the cases studied here fit into the concept as they fulfill the requirements of even the strictest definitional boundaries. These two purposes are served by applying the conceptual discussions above to the subject cases themselves. While this may limit the applicability of the results, I would argue that the clear articulation of the frames in which the results apply, allows for a more precise application in a wider variety of cases. Contextualizing our concept through the cases serves the purposes of demarcation and conceptual clarity without burdening the work by a pre-set that might not fully represent the cases.[42]

40 Waltz, *Theory of International, Politics*, 166.

41 Douglas Gibler and John Vasques, "Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (1998): 787.

42 For a discussion on contextualizing concepts and their use see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 19-20.

As required by Snyder's definition, these two cases involve formal written declarations between two sovereign states and include promises of combined action in the case of a security threat.[43] Both alliances involve extensive military cooperation during peacetime and preparations for extended cooperation in the event of a crisis. Further, both alliances have planning and security policy cooperation institutions to deal with changing threats. A different side of this is that as the threats have changed along with the regional security environment, the roles played by these three countries have changed. This development has sometimes resulted in bitter inter-allied frictions over different goals and interests, especially during the early 1990s, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. While the level of institutionalization varies, both these alliances have formally agreed upon institutional frameworks for alliance management.

As the narrowest definitions demand, these alliances were formed against a specific external threat. However, the perseverance of the alliances throughout decades of a changing international environment indicates that the threat itself is no longer a specific state or collectivity of states. As will be shown, policy documents and speeches by governments published throughout the preceding decades also confirm that the nature of the threats has changed many times. Still, alliances have involved continuous cooperation and planning against threats, even though the objects of these plans have changed over time. Therefore, it is logical to follow Kenneth Waltz in noting that the commitments will vary and that the cooperation itself is formulated by a process, thus producing compromises in strategy.

Based on the issues discusses above, the concept used here will be a composite formed on the basis of these arguments applied to the selected cases. We will define the alliances in this study as formal security relations. As there are undoubted expectations of security cooperation and support against threats that are at least somewhat changeable in direction and intensity, we will note that these alliances involve expectations of security and military cooperation based on changing interests and threats. We will follow Kenneth Waltz in noting that the commitments will vary and that the cooperation itself is formulated by a process producing compromises in strategy.

Presented in a formal manner, our definition says that *alliances are formally recognized and institutionalized relations between sovereign states with the purpose and expectation of security cooperation based on interests and threats that can be different and diverge over time*. The concept formulated in this way explicitly recognizes the evolution of the ways of intra-alliance cooperation as well as the different motivational factors and threats behind changes. It also acknowledges the

[43] "Combined" is the term generally used for military action involving components of two or more allied forces whereas "Joint" involves components of different services like the Air Force and the Army.

formal basis of these alliances as well as the institutional frameworks that have been created around them. By talking about security instead of military issues, we can encompass a broader array of events that go beyond bilateral military cooperation, which would likely miss important indicators as most contemporary security challenges are primarily dealt with by means other than strict military responses.

Our definition of an alliance is therefore fairly narrow, but in a study with specified and limited cases, this is more of an asset than a liability. We can restrict our study explicitly and do not have to include a variety of issues that might otherwise need to be discussed. The limited applicability of results is a given feature of case studies as the nature of the setting itself often leads to greater explanatory richness at the cost of parsimony.[44] To put it simply, the aim here is not to find a general theory of alliances per se but rather to test what theories apply and which do not apply to the circumstances at hand.

2.2 Theory and study of alliances

This part will outline the field of alliance theories and explain how the study at hand fits into this field. As the theoretical approaches have been developed within the various branches of the Realist tradition, the concepts used in discussing alliances also come from Realist literature. The general premises, or background assumptions, shared by these theories are the primacy of the anarchic international order and states' overriding motivation to seek greater security. The main differences between different Realist schools – and alliance theories as well – stem from variations derived from these basic positions. The main schools of contemporary thought within this tradition are the Neorealist school, which sees systemic variables as the most important focus of analysis, and the Neoclassical Realist school, which emphasizes the unit level factors – that is, the inner workings of the state in question – in filtering the systemic variables into actual state policies.[45] Notably, some of the theoretical approaches also rely on the conceptual language of Game Theory, which has also been prominent in the classical tradition of IR Strategic Studies.

The presentation will begin by discussing alliances in the traditional Neorealist framework. As Neorealism is premised on the assumption that the international system itself is the most important level of analysis for IR research, it focuses mostly on alliance formation as a systemic-level phenomenon. Alliances are seen as resulting from the systemic distribution of power and are important only as a specific element contributing to that distribution. While our focus is on two specific alliances, and we therefore need

44 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 31.
45 E.g., Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no.1 (1998).

unit-level explanatory theories, the basic systemic model needs to be discussed first as alliances always exist in relation to the international system. Theories of specific interest are presented in the four subchapters following the general discussion.

The roots and basic models of alliance theory

In the Neorealist model of international relations, first systematically presented by Kenneth Waltz, systemic polarity defines the nature of international order and the alliance choices of the states within that system. Because of the anarchical nature of the international system, states' primary motivation is to seek security, which is primarily accomplished by balancing against the stronger power. The optimal choice would be to balance internally by building up the state's own power: relying on others is always a risk in the anarchical setting as there is no guarantee that other states will respect their commitments. Those states not powerful enough to balance internally will, out of necessity, seek allies. The alternative to balancing is *bandwagoning*. This essentially means that facing a superior power against which the costs of balancing are too prohibitive, or if balancing is deemed otherwise impossible, smaller states choose to accept a sort of subjugation of their interests in order to appease the dominating state. However, bandwagoning is always a suboptimal strategy as it leaves the smaller state in a subjugated position. Therefore, alliances are a necessary outcome of the balance of power and the unequal distribution of power among multiple state-units is the most important factor that explains state behavior.[46]

The systemic distribution of capabilities is also the most important variable in explaining alliance formation. How the system works and how alliances are formed are defined by the polarity of the system. If there is only one pole, meaning there is only a single overwhelmingly powerful state within the system, Waltz expects that other states will eventually begin forming alliances to restrain the power of this unipole. This argument was so central to the Realist framework that the lack of balancing during the period following the end of the Cold War was used against Realists by arguing that Realism itself had become obsolete. In the face of this critique, Kenneth Waltz maintained that the lack of balancing was only temporary, and the balance of power would eventually bring about so many challengers that the system would eventually shift to a bi- or multipolar one. According to him, it was simply a matter of time before the laws of Realism would assert themselves.[47]

46 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 127

47 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no.1, (2000).

In a bipolar system, there are two preponderant state-actors powerful enough to threaten any other state in the system and who are not seriously threatened by any state aside from the opposing pole-state. These two superpowers are then necessarily opposed to each other, and secondary states will – voluntarily or involuntarily – join the alliance system formed around these two. In a multipolar system, there are more than two powerful states capable of seriously threatening each other. The multipolar system can have three or more poles according to the number of such primary states,

For smaller states, global polarity is often of secondary importance. As power diminishes over distance, smaller states seek security and influence within their region and do not necessarily see far-away powers as threats. From regional states' perspective, outside powers can be understood as *extra-regional balancers*, useful as an outside source of support. The preferred alliance partner for a smaller state is the great power that is relatively weaker in its immediate geographical area. The ideal choice would be to use the extra-regional great power to balance against a regional great power as this would allow the smaller state to retain maximum influence within its own region.[48] However, smaller states located deep within the sphere of influence of a great power are often forced to ally or bandwagon with their great power neighbor and are then left in a subjugated position. By joining the weaker or less threatening alliance system, a smaller state can maximize its own worth in the alliance and thus retain greater freedom of action. Therefore, all other things being equal, if secondary states are free to choose, they flock to the weaker side according to the basic Neorealist model.[49]

Under multipolarity, the principles of alliance formation are essentially the same as under bipolarity. The significant difference is that, as the number of available options for alliances become greater, alliance systems become more fluid and more prone to changes. This in turn makes the system less stable and therefore more prone to upheavals and wars. Therefore, as multipolar systems are essentially unstable, they have a tendency to eventually give birth to a bi- or unipolar system.[50]

As states generally seek both security and influence, they could seek to weaken or disband an alliance that limits their influence without increasing their security. On the other hand, if states are faced with a power that they are unable to balance against through their own actions, they could seek to strengthen their alliances in order to gain more security. In summary, if there are no powerful actors around to threaten a state, it is expected to disband its alliances; when faced with a powerful state, weaker states are expected to seek to ally against this power; and finally, if that power is too strong to balance against, states will seek to bandwagon with it.

48 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 162-163.
49 Ibid., 127,164-165.
50 Ibid., 126-127

Waltz also notes that states always have different sets of interests, and in that sense, alliances must therefore be considered to be formed by units that have some, but not all, common interests. As states have a large number of diverse interests, some are bound to conflict with those of other states.[51] Hence, we must also expect allied states to form compromises between shared and competing interests and also to maintain different notions of how to secure these shared and competing interests.[52] In a way, Waltz points towards a process of bargaining based on diverging interests as a source of outcomes in alliance policies, even though he does not further elaborate this point.

The basic Realist model discussed above has been further developed by several writers. Offensive Realism, most notably represented by John Mearsheimer, basically sees alliances as defensive solutions but adds some interesting elements to the theory. Mearsheimer argues that the nature of international anarchy not only dictates that the state-actors seek to make themselves reasonably secure from attack but that, due to the inherent lack of perfect information, the best way for states to secure themselves is to maximize their own relative power and ultimately seek regional hegemony.[53] According to Mearsheimer, alliances are therefore viable defensive constructs against possible aggressors but the primary interest is still the maximization of the state's own power in relation to other regional powers.[54]

As previously noted, at least the early post-Cold War Asia-Pacific can be understood as a unipolar system in regard to its power distribution. Among others, Mark Beeson has noted that the basic Realist framework and its parsimonious concepts have limited utility for sophisticated analysis of the contemporary US alliances.[55] Correspondingly, several writers have attempted to refine the basic model to better suit the post-Cold War world. Birthe Hansen argues that during a unipolar distribution of power, the incentive for secondary states is to free ride as much as possible, provided that the overall threat levels remain low. If threats arise, secondary states "flock" closer around the unipole.[56] The difference to bandwagoning is that the balancing logic is non-existent under unipolar order. Therefore, as long as the arising threats do not change the systemic polarity, the best

51 Ibid., 166-167.
52 Ibid., 166
53 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton 2001),30-33.
54 Ibid., 156-157, 344-345.
55 Mark Beeson, "The Declining Theoretical and Practical Utility of 'Bandwagoning': American Hegemony in the Age of Terror," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9, no.4 (2007).
56 Birthe Hansen, *Unipolarity and the Middle East* (Richmond: Curzon Press 2000), 15, 54-55.

course of action for smaller states is to seek security from the one state most capable of providing it.[57] This would suggest that as long as the system maintains a unipolar character, the balancing responses by regional secondary states would not necessarily follow a basic balance of power logic. On the other hand, the absence of balancing under a unipolar setting cannot be expected to follow if the systemic polarity begins to change.

Another perspective on secondary states' alliance strategies under unipolarity has been proposed through the concept of *soft balancing*.[58] This concept is based on the assumption that when the system is characterized by the unipolar distribution of power, the typical "hard balancing" by military means becomes prohibitively expensive and risky for secondary states. Robert Pape has presented four examples of the kinds of actions that could be seen as constituting soft balancing. Firstly, states can use active or passive means to deny access to territories under their influence. Secondly, states may form economic blocks that specifically or implicitly exclude some states and thus restrict market access. Thirdly, states can engage in signaling their willingness to form diplomatic blocks to counter other states' influence. Finally, states can try to entangle other states in diplomatic networks that would act as restraints on the dominant state's power.[59]

Bennet, Lepgold, and Unger have examined alliance behavior in conflict situations occurring within a unipolar system. Contrary to Hansen's argument discussed earlier, in their study of burden sharing during the Persian Gulf War, they argue that while the basic incentive for junior alliance partners was to free ride and not commit their own resources to the war, the position of the US as the single most powerful actor in the system allowed it to exercise powerful pressure. The free-riding incentive was thus nullified by the same dynamics of power that gave rise to this incentive.[60] This suggests that in a unipolar system, the smaller states lose some of their ability to resist the single powerful state.

Yet another way to explain the lack of balancing at the end of Cold War has been proposed in the form of the so-called *Constellation Theory*, which seeks to include the effects of past and present geopolitical factors into alliance behavior. This theoretical approach, developed by Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel, emphasizes that states' alliance choices take place in a continuum of time and space that set limits

57 Ibid., 51-52, 54, 56-57.

58 T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann eds., *Balance of Power Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2004), 3-5; Robert Anthony Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005).

59 Ibid., 35-38.

60 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War" *International Organization* 48, no.1 (1994).

on state actions. These geopolitical factors limit the choices that states have as secondary states are more restricted by geography.[61] Further, past alliance choices, or past geopolitical constellations, have a continuing effect on present choices. In a sense, states do not lightly switch their patterns of amity and enmity even though the realities of power remain fluid. Hence, for example, the European states remained in NATO in the post-Cold War world even though the immediate threats have changed.[62]

As noted, the Realist framework, as well as the authors writing within this tradition, are mostly focused on the system-level analysis of international relations. This is even more pronounced with Neorealism. As Waltz himself has admitted, Neorealist theory was not designed for the study of individual states or for the analysis of their foreign policy or security policies. In order to understand the actions of a single unit in the system, they must be studied at the level of the individual state but still within the framework of the international system.[63] Next, we will examine *four* different theoretical approaches for turning the system level into alliance outcomes at the unit level. As we will discuss next, there have been roughly four different analytical paths in turning this system-level framework into unit-level outcomes regarding alliances.

Theories of threats and perceptions

One of the most influential alliance theories is the balance of threat theory offered by Stephen Walt. While Walt follows most of the basic Realist premises, instead of balance of power, the central explanatory variable in Walt's theory is that of threat.[64] While it might seem that the difference is not that significant, the departure from power itself to power refined through a process of perception to become a specific threat is a major departure from Kenneth Waltz's original framework. The concept of threat itself is difficult to isolate from subjective perceptions and therefore, the focus necessarily moves one step closer towards the analysis of the subject states instead of objective structures. As Walt combines both systemic and domestic variables, he can be seen as an early representative (his main work was published in 1987) of Neoclassical Realism.

How threat is understood becomes a major source of alternative explanatory variables and can include elements such as perception, geography, history, identity,

61 Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel eds., *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration* (London: Routledge 2005),14, 16-17.

62 Ibid., 4, 29.

63 For an elegant presentation of the levels of analysis and of their relations see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

64 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances,* 4-5.

or any other variable that can plausibly be argued to contribute to a threat. Walt combines both systemic and domestic variables to his concept of threat by including the distribution of capabilities, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceptions of aggressive intentions in the concept.[65] Hence, Walt's concept of threat includes both systemic factors (distribution of capabilities) and unit attributes (offensive capabilities and geographic location) as well as domestic factors (perceptions of intentions). The alliance outcomes would then correspond to balancing behavior against the most threatening state in the region instead of the most powerful state in the system.[66]

This approach is further developed by a number of other scholars. Among them, Patricia Weitsman and Gregory Gause, both of whom have analyzed the levels of external threats experienced by a state as the primary explanatory variable for different alliance actions.[67] Gause analyzed the alliance choices of Middle Eastern states from 1971 to 1991 to see how these states chose to prioritize different kinds of threats when choosing who to balance against and with whom to ally. In doing so, Gause confirms that threats cannot be simply calculable from military capabilities and geographical reach but need to also include ideas about how to identify friends from potential enemies.[68]

Patricia Weitsman argues that specific alliance strategies, as well as an alliance's cohesion, can be attributed to different threat levels.[69] According to Weitsman's argument, if there are no threats or only low-level threats, states will hedge their bets by maintaining low-commitment policies towards alliances. When there are several increasingly powerful states that could become threats in the system, states will seek to maintain the status quo by engaging the rising states in institutional arrangements in order sustain it – Weisman uses the term "tether" – to describe state actions in the current international system. If this fails, states will engage in traditional balancing against the threatening state. Finally, at the far end of the spectrum of choices, states will bandwagon with the rising state if they think that it cannot be regularly balanced against.[70] This kind of conceptualization of states' optimum strategies can be seen as an escalation ladder that can be used to explain states' actions under rising threat levels.

65 Ibid., 21-23.
66 Ibid., 170-172.
67 Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
68 Gregory F. Gause, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf," *Security Studies* 13, no. 2 (2003).
69 Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances.*
70 Ibid., 3-4, 20.

The concept of threat seems a very straightforward way to explain alliance outcomes. However, as the overall balance of power during the post-Cold War era has been remarkedly stable and devoid of direct threats to a state's survival, it could have had limited use in the 1990s and early 2000s. As Weitsman noted, this framework suggests that without threats, states should limit their alliance commitments and seek to engage rising states within institutional arrangements. Essentially, Weitsman refined the traditional realist systemic framework in the post-Cold War setting to include unit-level actions through the concept of threats. For example, the notion of tethering a rising state to international institutions can be seen in China's inclusion into the WTO in 2001. However, the main focus in these theories remains at the systemic level, which limits their ability to predict specific unit-level outcomes.

Walt has also sought to address how threats can explain alliance outcomes under unipolar conditions. He draws implications from the basic Realist models to argue that alliances in the unipolar world will mainly be made with the intent of either exploiting or restraining the dominant power. The unipolar concentration of power to one state means that even the states allied with the unipole will be concerned about the possible repercussions of its actions.[71] Despite the structural incentive to balance against the US, the particular circumstances of US unipolarity – in particular the geographical fact that the US is the lone great power in the northern part of the Western Hemisphere – while all other large powers are located on the Eurasian landmass, means that other powers tend to focus more on each other and seek to ally with the US in order to balance against regional threats. For example, smaller states in eastern Europe seek US support against Russia, which is by far the biggest military force in the region. Correspondingly in Asia, states threatened by China or North Korea would seek US support in resisting threats from them. The lack of balancing against the US also implies that the US is not seen as a threat by states that could be able to balance against it. When US action is seen to threaten the prevailing order, secondary states prefer to soft balance through, for example, diplomatic or non-conventional means rather than to try to directly oppose the unipole. [72]

Walt also points out that the unipolar setting will have effects on the credibility of alliance relations. The unipole has less need of allies than smaller states and hence it also has less incentives to honor its alliance commitments. This seems to be a valid observation for US alliances, as the US-side clearly does not need its allies as much as they need the US. And while the single superpower might be willing to uphold its commitments in principle, for all its power, it might still be unable to effectively do so. As the single global superpower, the extent of a unipole-state's interest area is

71 Walt, *Alliances in a Unipolar World*, 99-103.
72 Ibid., 97.

also global. Therefore, it is likely that its focus will be overextended, and it will therefore often seem distracted from areas important to its smaller partners.[73]

Walt's main argument is that during unipolar conditions, secondary states will focus on regional threats instead of the global distribution of power and will try to use the unipole as an extra-regional balancer.[74] While this logic was also present during the Cold War, the global backdrop of the confrontation between superpowers is now gone and regional threats are no longer seen as part of an overriding existential struggle. This affects the dynamics of how the unipole behaves regarding regional conflicts as they can no longer be framed as part of a global struggle. Therefore, the secondary states now must compete for the attention of the unipole. However, as Walt himself notes, the implications of different phases of unipolarity under US leadership remain to be thoroughly addressed.[75] Notably, when he talks about the credibility of US commitments and its implications for smaller allies, Walt points towards the fear of abandonment faced by the smaller allied states, which will be discussed in the next section under the theory of the alliance security dilemma.[76]

Alliance games: two-level security dilemma

The most detailed description of how systemic factors translate into alliance outcomes was written by Glenn Snyder. Snyder's *Alliance Politics* has been one of the most influential works on alliance theory written after the Cold War. Unlike most alliance theorists, Snyder expands his theoretical scope to include actions undertaken by the members in the alliance and the negotiation between the states that form an alliance. He does this by separating the alliance life cycle into alliance formation and alliance management phases.[77] As discussed earlier, Snyder operates under quite a narrow definition of alliances, but as we have included the requirement of formally established relation in our definition, this cannot be seen to present any problems for our cases.

Snyder maintains that alliances are a necessary part of the international systemic structure but do not constitute the system in a way in which they could alter the basic logic, meaning uni-, bi-, or multipolarity. This is so because, even though alliance relations might be seen to aggregate the capabilities of several states in one block, the underlying discrepancies of power remain unchanged. Therefore, the polarity of power remains unchanged because alliance relations cannot overcome the basic

73 Ibid., 99-100.
74 Ibid., 111-112
75 Ibid., 87.
76 Ibid., 99.
77 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 19-22.

anarchic nature of international relations. However, the formation of alliances serves to differentiate opponents from friends and creates patterns of dependency and security.[78] Notably, Snyder discusses alliances in a multipolar setting and does not attempt to apply his framework to a unipolar setting. While he makes the caveat that the framework might no longer have been applicable during the unipolar system of the late 1990s, this should be taken as an acknowledgement of a lack of systematic research at the time rather than as an argument that the framework itself is fully incompatible. Snyder further notes that this topic should be taken up as a subject of further research.[79] However, while the framework itself has been extensively quoted and used, there have been few systematic attempts to assess the implications of unipolarity and shifts in systemic structure for the framework itself.

Snyder's main contribution to alliance theories is the formulation of the so-called *alliance security dilemma*, which deals with the process of bargaining within the alliances. Note that both Waltz and Walt had already written about the process of formulating compromises based on diverging interests between alliances but neither produced a coherent theoretical model of how this would work. The background assumption for the alliance security dilemma is that while the structural premises of balance of power mainly dictate the formation of an alliance, the terms of the alliance such as the commitment of resources and the precise events under which the alliance will be activated, are formed in a bargaining process between the states entering into the alliance. In sum, alliance formation is determined by international systemic impulses, but the specifics of the alliance are determined by the relationship between the allied states.[80]

The bargaining conducted by states during alliance formation always involves an element of conflict, although the common interests to ally are necessarily more powerful than conflicting interests. Otherwise, there would be no alliance. The formation therefore requires an effort of bargaining in which each side seeks to gain maximum commitments from the other side while minimizing its own obligations. The bargaining positions are determined by parties' relevant perceptions of the situation, relative bargaining power, and considerations of equity and salience.[81] As states commit themselves to an alliance relationship, they relinquish some of their future freedom of action to remain neutral in the event of a conflict in exchange for the promise that the other party will do the same. In essence, states exchange parts

78 Ibid., 19-22.
79 Ibid., ix, 3.
80 Ibid., 142-144.
81 Ibid., 151-153.

of their autonomy in order to gain increased security. This is also called the *security-autonomy trade-off*.[82]

After the initial alliance formation, the new alliance must be managed, and this again involves both common and competing interests between the allies. The management phase is characterized by an interactive process between what Snyder terms the *adversary security dilemma* and the *alliance security dilemma*.[83] The adversary security dilemma refers to the basic security dilemma under anarchy in which the intentions and real capabilities of possible adversaries are always unclear and therefore states must always acquire enough security to deal with the worst possible outcome.[84] The alliance security dilemma deals with relations between the allied states and arises when states with differing interests try to maximize their security by allying themselves, while simultaneously trying to maintain the greatest possible freedom of action within the alliance. The essence of this alliance security dilemma is conceptualized in *fear of abandonment* and *fear of entrapment*. [85]

The concept of threat is still a central feature of alliance management in Snyder's framework. Changes in threats, together with changes in the overall international situation, can affect states' calculus of the benefits gained from the alliance, and therefore, the original arrangement might become irrelevant unless it is adapted when changes occur. For example, a threatening state can become increasingly bellicose or powerful, thus increasing the threat towards one ally but not necessarily towards the other, thereby increasing the security needs of the threatened ally, who would then seek to deepen the commitment of the alliance. In the opposite situation, if the threat from the adversary state diminishes, this will create an excess of security for one state in the alliance, thus prompting it to seek to loosen its alliance commitments.[86]

Fear of abandonment describes a situation where a state is threatened by an outside actor; it then relies on its alliance partner for security but is unsure if its alliance partner will honor its commitments. The threat is that the ally might choose not to offer support and instead abandon the threatened state to its own fate. The more fluid the situation, as for example in a multipolar system with constantly changing alliances, the more severe the threat becomes. According to Snyder, fear of abandonment consists of two different components: the assessed probability that

82 Ibid., 180-181.
83 Ibid., 192-193.
84 Security dilemma in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978). Snyder refers to this traditional security dilemma as "adversary security dilemma" and the result on the interplay between the two dilemmas as "composite security dilemma" in Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 194.
85 Ibid., Chapter 6.
86 Ibid., 181-182.

the alliance partner will defect and the cost effect for oneself if it does. These component factors impact the overall calculus of a state. Their overall effect depends on the particular international situation and the subjective assessment of the individual state. The security costs of losing one's alliance will also depend on how reliant the state is on its ally.[87]

Fear of entrapment arises when a state feels that its alliance partner is behaving in a way that might provoke a conflict not desired by the state and thereby threatens to drag the state into an unwanted war. The behavior of an allied state can also negatively affect a state's relations with third countries while falling short of war. For example, a state's alliance partner might enter into a political, economic, or small-scale military confrontation with a third state, which would prompt an expectation of political support. The offer of support would then damage relations with the third state, while withholding support would risk damaging the alliance and thus increase fear of abandonment.[88]

As noted, the dynamics between fear of entrapment and fear of abandonment are essentially a function of the diverging interests of different states and the anarchic nature of the system in which there can be no real guarantees that pacts will be honored. Fear of entrapment and fear of abandonment are inversely interdependent in the sense that reducing one usually, but not always, incurs the cost of raising the other. This means that if a state, for example, acts on its fear of abandonment by increasing its alliance commitments and thus increases its ally's security, it might also embolden its ally to act more boldly towards its adversaries thus increasing the possibility of becoming entrapped in a conflict. Furthermore, as the state has now increased its commitments to the alliance, avoiding this conflict will prove more difficult than it would have been before. Therefore, the different particular circumstances of a specific alliance relation also affect the dynamics of the alliance security dilemma. For example, the flexibility of alliance relations and the diversity of interests between the allies can increase fear of abandonment; and high levels of interdependence can increase the fear of entrapment as well as the costs of abandonment.[89]

Overall, the severity of the alliance security dilemma, meaning the intensity of fears of abandonment or entrapment, is determined by common and divergent interests as well as dependence and commitment.[90] Dependence can also be understood through interdependence and differences in capabilities between the allies as these factors, together with interests stemming from the features of international system, determine how much a single state relies on its alliance for its

87 Ibid., 181.
88 Ibid., 185-186
89 Ibid., 307
90 Ibid., 186-187.

security. Snyder also makes references to domestic issues but does not include them in his theory. He merely notes that all bargaining passes through a "domestic prism," which can include ideological factors, political-structural issues, or the influence of specific groups or key individuals. For Snyder, the systemic structure is still the dominating factor in alliance politics. [91]

Domestic politics in alliance outcomes

Several writes have discussed the role domestic political processes play in shaping alliance outcomes. However, most particularly Neorealists such as Snyder, maintain that the international system and the distribution of power within that system are the most important determining factors for alliance outcomes. The school of Neoclassical Realism, on the other hand, emphasizes that role of the domestic prism through which all the inputs from the international system must filter through before they become any kind of foreign policy outcomes. While Neoclassical Realism in itself is not a theory of domestic politics or foreign policymaking, most of the writers associated with the school reject Neorealism's rigorous distinction between international politics and state-level explanations such as domestic politics. For Neoclassical Realists, this allows for a richer use of state-level intervening variables, which can be used to better understand how a given state functions in the international system.[92] In a way, when we test this framework's explanatory power, we are not examining domestic politics as a primary source of explanations but are rather asking to what extent do domestic politics influence alliance outcomes arising from the international system.

According to Randall Schweller, the balance of power as a theory rarely conforms with actual observed state behavior. Schweller offers two reasons for this. Firstly, states are not coherent rational unitary actors as traditional realist writers assume. Instead, states can display wide variety in their levels of coherence or incoherence regarding their domestic political structures, which necessarily affects their decision making and their balancing choices are limited by these internal conditions.[93] This approach is still rooted in the Realist school as the first variable is still the balance of power and the immediate outcome is the action of balancing. However, for Schweller, the domestic sphere is a central intervening variable, and the systemic balance of power has no explanatory power without it. Essentially,

91 Ibid., 131-132.

92 For a general description of the contemporary Neoclassical Realist framework and typical questions that it seeks to answer see, for example, Jeff Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016)

93 Schweller, *Unanswered Threats,* 11.

Schweller argues that the effects of the international structure cannot be understood separately from the state actors' internal motivations.[94]

The second way Schweller differs from the Neorealist mainstream is also related to his emphasis on domestic structures. Schweller argues that it is states' interests, and not power per se, that explain their decisions of alignment and allying as well as actions regarding their existing alliances.[95] He specifically argues against the idea that alliances are made solely on the basis of power or threats. Schweller points out that states often bandwagon with a stronger state even in the absence of direct threats in order to pursue other gains. Schweller agrees that threat perceptions are one of the main intervening variables that shape state interest but argues against Walt's notion that threat perceptions do not directly result from other states' capabilities and intentions but rather from the inner workings of domestic elites and their ideas. He further points out that there are several instances where states have pursued other interests at the cost of security and that state survival is rarely directly threatened or considered as a prominent factor in decision making. Therefore, if Realist theories are to be relevant, they need to take other factors into account besides power or threats.[96]

According to Schweller, there are four domestic factors that affect how states balance and ally. The first of which concerns the *consensus or disagreement among elites* who are responsible for the actual alliance decisions. Here, the most important factors are agreement or disagreement among relevant elites on the nature of the international situation, on the threats facing the state, and on how to best meet these threats. Other issues of agreement or disagreement can, for example, include different kinds of interests among the elites or different kinds of understandings of national interests. The second factor is the *cohesion or fragmentation of elites*. By elite cohesion, Schweller means political leaderships' ability to make decisions. The more fragmented political power in a state is, the less able it is to make difficult decisions on controversial issues. Fragmented domestic politics may also lead to a situation in which some actors might try to use outside threats or allies to reinforce their own domestic political standing. Elite cohesion may be fragmented by several factors including ideological factors, party politics, bureaucratic interests, or regional differences.[97]

The third factor is the *social cohesion of the state*. This is related to the role of external conflict in promoting ingroup cohesion, but only when there is already a

94 Ibid., 4-5, 189.

95 Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances, Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press 1998), 187-188; Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, chapter 2.

96 Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (1997): 927-930.

97 Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, 11.

sufficient level of social cohesion for the external threat to act as a unifying force. In other words, there must be a kind of consensus that the entity formed by the group members is seen to be worth defending. According to Schweller, the higher the in-group cohesion, the more likely it is that the state will pursue active balancing measures against outside threats. Furthermore, Schweller maintains that high social and political cohesion would seem to favor internal balancing over alliances. The fourth factor Schweller discusses is that of *regime or government vulnerability*. As weak regimes or unstable governments lack the ability to implement policies, they would also be unable to implement policies for balancing. A weak illegitimate government would also need to use coercion or appease opposition in order to maintain its position; this would further reduce its resources for balancing as military forces would need to be directed against internal dissidence instead of outside threats.[98]

In a nutshell, Schweller argues that decision makers' motivations and capabilities, as well as threat perceptions, determine their choices for alliance policies.[99] Further, Schweller notes that the state structure itself intervenes to limit the available options for action as vulnerable governments in states with little social cohesion are less capable of taking action on security issues.[100] Schweller's work has been quoted as one of the two prominent Neoclassical Realist alliance theories (Walt's balance of threats being the other). The main strength of his argument can be seen in the incorporation of a state's interests and internal capability into decision making as variables in alliance management and balancing.[101]

Notably, Schweller maintains that there is an objective international balance of power independent of a state's domestic factors that can be assessed in order to evaluate the correctness of a state's balancing actions.[102] Whether or not an objective

98 Ibid., 12.

99 The role of misperception and subjective assessments in determining alliance outcomes has also been analyzed by Thomas Christensen. Christensen notes that during relatively stable periods, elites tend to believe too strongly in the relative abundance of security, whereas misperceptions about threats become increasingly likely during shifts in the balance of power. These tendencies further increase miscalculations in regard to optimal security choices. Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940," *International Organization*, 51, no. 1 (1997): 65-97.

100 Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, 11-13, 27, 37-38.

101 Ibid., 59-60, 65.

102 Despite Schweller's emphasis on the domestic prism, he still maintains that there is an objective way to measure a state's balancing choices based on the correct assessment of the prevailing balance of power. Based on this criterion, he divides possible outcomes as "under-balancing," "non-balancing," "appropriate balancing," and "overbalancing." Non-balancing can take the form of buck-passing, bandwagoning, appeasement, engagement, or distancing, while under-balancing refers to insufficient balancing actions stemming from domestic issues and misperception. Overbalancing refers to overreacting due to the same factors. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, 9-10.

assessment of the correct balancing by any state is possible, all the aforementioned theoretical approaches share the premise that the international security environment, including the balance of power as well as patterns of enmity and amity, is the main source of explanation for balancing choices. However, as already noted by most of the writers introduced above, the logic behind the international balance of power is not a straightforward logic of countering power with power, especially when it comes to smaller powers and conditions of regional or global unipolarity.

Asymmetric power relations as alliance theory

When Snyder discussed the bargaining processes behind alliance relations, he noted the trade-off between security and freedom of action, or autonomy. This means that when a state enters an alliance with another state, it becomes tied to its ally in the sense that it is expected to offer support as agreed in the bargaining process of alliance formation. Further, it will be at least partially implicated in the actions of its ally and risks entrapment in unwanted courses of action. For Snyder, this is just a part of the overall setting of the alliance security dilemma theory, but James Morrow has made this trade-off a central part of his theory of alliance interaction: Morrow claims that alliances are best understood as trade-offs between security and autonomy between two or more states. His main argument relies on the observation that alliances are usually asymmetrical in the sense that one party is disproportionately stronger than the other and that an asymmetric power relation in an alliance is actualized through a trade-off between security and autonomy. This asymmetric model emphasizes that the two sides enter into an alliance with different but compatible interests and therefore, receive different types of gains from the bargain. According to Morrow, focusing on the asymmetric nature of alliances yields better explanations than simply seeing alliances as the joining of forces against a common threat or other specific purpose. For example, the asymmetric model can explain the perseverance and development of alliances beyond their initial purposes better than if alliances are treated as being solely based on a single common interest, e.g., joining forces against a specific adversary.[103]

According to Morrow, alliances are usually formed between great and smaller powers. Therefore, these relations are usually asymmetric. Symmetric alliances between two powers of similar size are also possible, however, Morrow argues that these kinds of alliances are relatively rare and short-lived: the aggregate power of two small states of equal size would not be enough to counter a major power, and major powers, who might ally to pursue common interests, would not want to limit

[103] Morrow, Alliances and Asymmetry, 915-917.

their autonomy for extended periods as their interest would, in time, increasingly diverge; therefore, an alliance would be disbanded when relative gains would diminish.[104] Asymmetric alliances are thus more likely to endure over time as they will continue to provide net gains for both parties even if the parties' interests are not fully compatible and change over time. This model still fits the fact that alliances are formed against threats but adds an explanatory model for describing how alliances accommodate the diverse and changing interest of their member states.[105]

In this framework, alliance costs and benefits result from the negotiated terms of the alliance. According to Morrow, all other things being equal prior to alliance formation, smaller powers would have roughly similar amounts of autonomy to pursue their ends in the international system as larger ones, but larger states would enjoy significantly higher levels of security. An alliance with a major power can therefore offer a significant increase in security for the smaller powers joining the coalition, but this comes at a corresponding loss of autonomy. Instead of security, the smaller state's main input to the alliance can consist of commitments to support the more powerful ally through access to its area or by political action, for example. This would limit the smaller state's options for future policy and thus sets limits on its autonomy for the benefit of the larger power.[106]

The great power, which already has a significant amount of security by itself, would not commit itself to an alliance with a smaller power purely to add to its own security. The benefits from this kind of alliance without partial control over smaller powers' actions would be outweighed by the costs as it would risk entrapment in conflicts with nothing to gain; no state can be expected to wage war in defense of another if it has nothing to gain from doing so. Therefore, the larger power has little to gain from the alliance in purely security terms. However, the weaker state can, for example, offer political or economic support, basing rights, or special privileges for the stronger state in exchange for protection, thus essentially ceding some of its sovereignty for security and, in this way, it can provide stronger power net gains from the trade-off.[107] So, according to the asymmetric model, when states form an alliance, the stronger party gains increased freedom of action through support from the smaller state in exchange for the increased security it provides.[108]

Thus, the trade-off between allies can serve different kinds of interests as long as there are also common or compatible interests on which the alliance can be

104 Ibid., 916,
105 Ibid., 906-907.
106 Ibid., 913-915.
107 Ibid., 914.
108 Ibid., 910.

based.[109] This basic logic also leads to the conclusion that the junior party's foreign- and security policies are partially determined by the preferences of the major partner, at least when it comes to threats or other issues most relevant to the alliance. However, this subjugation is not absolute. Junior allies might have considerable leeway to maneuver, depending on the specific conditions of the alliance, and the trade-off is always a function of states' preferences with respect to a combination of the degrees of security and autonomy.[110] In sum, asymmetric alliances are always trade-offs where autonomy concessions are traded for increased security by the smaller states, and greater autonomy or freedom of action is gained by the larger state that provides protection to the smaller ones.

Changes in asymmetric alliances can be explained by three different kinds of developments in the relations between security and autonomy. Firstly, change can stem from changes in the position of the weaker ally. For example, if the weaker state in the alliance gains greater independent security by increasing its own power, it will be less reliant on the security of its ally and will correspondingly seek to increase its autonomy in the alliance. Secondly, changes in the position of the more powerful ally can lead to pressure for a change in the relationship. For example, when the powerful state weakens, and its ability to provide security for its ally decreases, the other state's security gains from the alliance decline and it is again less willing to cede large parts of its autonomy in return. Thirdly, as power in the international system is always relative to the power of other actors, it is possible that the states' utility for the alliance changes for reasons external to the alliance, which might cause a state to re-evaluate its gains from the alliance. For example, changes in the distribution of power and threats in the system directly affect the security gains from the alliance by either reducing or increasing the need for security. It is also possible that the security provided by the alliance might diminish if the powerful state's potency declines in the face of an increasingly strong challenger. In this event, the security provided by the powerful ally would diminish at the same time as the security needs for the smaller state increase. This would clearly result in a re-evaluation of the exchange ratio of autonomy versus security in the relationship.

Accommodating these changes is more likely when the states gain more from the alliance in contrast to being unallied; therefore, symmetrical alliances between same-sized powers will tend to break down more easily as they are not as reliant on their ally for security.[111] Furthermore, as security is pursued through a combination of arming and allying, and both induce varying costs on domestic politics, these costs

109 Ibid., 905.
110 Shannon R. Tow, "Diplomacy in an asymmetric alliance," *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 12, no.1 (2012): 71-100.
111 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 919.

would also affect the utility of an alliance.[112] It should be noted that Morrow's theory of asymmetric alliances is limited to alliances defined in the narrow sense of the concept.[113] This is necessarily so as the idea of ceding elements of a state's autonomy would be in conflict with the concept of ad hoc security coalitions. However, the security-autonomy trade-off in asymmetrical alliances is arguably a relevant insight for the Asia-Pacific of post-Cold War where the US alliances are clearly asymmetric in Morrow's sense and fall under a narrow definition, as discussed before.

This kind of dynamic was also noted in the previously mentioned study on burden sharing during the Persian Gulf war by Bennet, Lepgold, and Unger. According to them, the overwhelming influence wielded by the US over its alliance partners forced them to commit their resources to the common war effort against their basic incentive to freeride and simply allow the US side to deal with the issue on its own. The process described by the study demonstrated that the US side exerted clear political pressure on allies that were unwilling to contribute forces, and some political actors – albeit not the executive leadership – threatened to end US alliance relations with countries unwilling to follow the US lead.[114] This clearly fits the framework of asymmetric alliances as the expectation is that as long as the alliance relations prevail, the dominant alliance partner will exert influence and demands regarding junior partners' policies and support.

Following Morrow's logic, some writers have emphasized that alliance relations can be used as a lever to influence junior allies' behavior.[115] Jeremy Pressman even argues that restraining an ally from undertaking undesired policies could be one of the central reasons that powerful states engage in asymmetric alliances.[116] The influence gained by a more powerful ally over the foreign policies of a weaker ally in asymmetric alliances, as described by Morrow, has also been noted to manifest in converging foreign policy behavior among junior partners in the alliance.[117] The concept of convergence can be defined as the tendency of policies to grow more alike

112 James Morrow, "Arms versus allies: trade-offs in search for security," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (1993): 207-233.

113 Morrow, Alliances and Asymmetry, 906-907.

114 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 48, no.1 (1994): 39-75.

115 E.g., Christopher Gelpi, "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Alliance Control," in *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallander (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

116 Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restrain in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

117 E.g., Glenn Palmer and Clifton Morgan, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Jennifer Strait, "Policy Convergence in Asymmetric Alliances," Annual International Studies Association Conference, 15-18 February 2004, New York.

in the form of increasing similarity in structure, processes, and performances.[118] This concept has usually been applied to the effects of globalization in the post-Cold War international society and specifically to western developed nations' economic and foreign policies.[119]However, there is no reason to think that the convergence effect would not extend to the security sphere as well.

Theoretical summary and hypotheses

This section will outline the theoretical setting of this research and present the overall hypothesis derived from the theories covered in the previous section as well as specify some key problems arising from different theories. The aim here is to create operational hypotheses that can then be assessed based on their explanatory power in relation to the empirical data presented in the following chapters. Theoretical approaches will be categorized under four main hypotheses determined by their main explanatory focus. In accordance with the preceding discussion, these four main classes of hypotheses are "threat-based theories," "alliance security dilemma," "domestic politics," and "asymmetric alliances."

Before moving on with the theoretical discussion, one caveat should be made. As the reader might have noted, the discussions on different theories include several references to writers across different theoretical approaches. Further, writers seldom restrict their analysis to a single point of interest but usually seek to include accounts of how other factors are accounted for in their preferred system. On the grounds of parsimony, all the different shades of grey have not been explicitly presented in regard to different authors. Instead, the division of alliance theories into four main schools has been conducted by presenting the main arguments of different authors. Of course, central factors such as threats feature in some way or another in all the theoretical approaches, as do domestic politics. However, for a theory to perform well it has to provide a kind of "covering law" that can account for examined phenomena in a comprehensive manner while still adhering to the principle of Occam's razor in maintaining parsimony by explaining the phenomena with the minimum number of additional assumptions added to the original theory.[120] If the simplest framework works best, it should be given a chance to stand on its own without additional assumptions. However, if additional intervening variables are

118 Clark Kerr, *The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 2-3.

119 Daniel W. Drezner, "Globalization and Policy Convergence", *International Studies Review* 3, no.1 (2002).

120 Requirements for a theoretical explanation are discussed, for example, in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 78-79, 225-227.

needed, they should then be added only when they bring more explanatory power to the discussion. Therefore, the issue is not if threats are included in one or all competing frameworks, but rather which framework makes best use of the variable.

The simple threat-based theoretical framework is arguably the most parsimonious approach to alliances. In a nutshell, states are expected to increase their balancing actions in response to increasing threats. While the concept of threat can be seen to include both systemic factors, such as distribution of capabilities, and unit attributes, like offensive capabilities, the concept must be operationalized as a subjective unit attribute. If there is a major subjective element in the concept (perception of intentions), and another element that can be understood as subjective (assessment of offensive capabilities), an objective assessment of threat is at best academic. Therefore, in the framework of this research, the best way to assess threats is to acknowledge that there is an objective factor behind the concept but concentrate on state perceptions of threats as an explanatory factor. Hence, we can understand threat perception as a unit attribute of the states in question, which can be assessed though internal discourses and the official publications of a given state, while still maintaining a critical view on how threats are constituted in the official discourses.

Following the threat-based theories described in the preceding section, we would expect alliance developments to correspond directly to changes in the regional threat environment as they are understood by a given state. These theories suggest that when facing clear threats, the primary course of action is to act against those threats by seeking support from the alliance in whatever way the alliance can be used to counter that threat. Under unipolar conditions without threats, smaller states should seek to free ride. Therefore, when we see indications that our subject states view something as a threat, we should expect to see some form of counter action or a set of counteractions to respond to the threat in their alliance policies.

There are several theories suggesting that the results of alliance formation and management are an outcome of a bargaining process. Waltz and Snyder both point towards bargaining based on diverging interests. However, only Snyder has provided a detailed model for this process. Understanding alliances through the alliance security dilemma framework does not provide additional insights into how alliances function on the systemic level. Instead, it provides a more comprehensive model of state interactions within an alliance. Threats remain a key component in Snyder's framework, but he moves beyond threats by discussing them mostly under the adversary security dilemma, which is only half of the picture here. The main story is derived from the alliance security dilemma, which tells us how the interaction within the alliance is expected to play out. Naturally, the main elements of the incentives still originate externally in the forms of threats and other interests, but the interaction between different interests are expected to take the specific forms discussed under the alliance security dilemma above.

Snyder's framework includes expected responses to fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. He maintains that the standard response to fear of abandonment is to try to move closer to one's ally and increase the ally's perception of one's loyalty. This is done to increase the other ally's benefits from the alliance and reduce its incentive to defect.[121] The reverse response, stemming from the fear of entrapment, is to move away from one's ally and reduce one's commitment or threaten to withhold support. Faced with defection or withdrawal from the alliance, an ally would face diminishing gains from the alliance and would need to calculate that into the benefits it obtains from continuing unwanted action. Moreover, threatening to withhold support beforehand would also lessen the costs of not supporting one's ally in the fight, should hostilities erupt anyway.[122] These ideal types of responses can of course manifest in a plurality of forms depending on the specific circumstances. However, it will be enough to understand the expected basic mechanisms and then see how they can be applied to the events in our cases.

To clearly demarcate the difference between the threat-based theory and the alliance security dilemma, it must be emphasized that what we term threat-based theories in this study do not adequately explain alliance outcomes that do not directly deal with threats. Doing so would require adding additional supporting assumptions to the theory, but this would then create a whole new theoretical framework. As noted, parsimony is one of the requirements of a good theory and therefore the theories need to be as specific as possible. Granted, other theories are more complex, but their complexity is systematically built prior to analysis of the observed outcomes. For example, the alliance security dilemma can also explain indirect outcomes other than meeting a given threat face on. These explanations could include, for example, contributions to far-away conflicts as a state would want to increase its alliance commitment in order to ensure that its ally will support it against future threats it might face.

The theoretical approaches that emphasize the role of domestic politics also include threats in the framework but treat them systematically different from the other theories. These theories add variables from the domestic settings in order to explain how threats are formed and are translated to policies. Thus, the status of the balance of power in the international or regional system can only be understood as threatening if it is first interpreted as such in a domestic political process. In a sense, they are filtered through a "domestic prism," through which they are interpreted and even built.

Schweller makes the explicit argument about the influence of domestic politics on alliance outcomes. As noted, Schweller posited that the main factors inside the

121 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 183.
122 Ibid., 185.

domestic prism are elite consensus and cohesion, social cohesion, and regime vulnerability. Based on these factors, states determine their interests and threat perceptions and determine the desirable policies. They also determine how well a state can implement its desired policies as weak regimes are less able and willing to implement controversial policies than popular ones. Hence, the questions of who rules domestic politics, in what way, and how strong ruling elites are, are also central to alliance development. If we follow the logic that the interests of the state are only explicit if filtered through domestic decision makers, any and all domestic interests, like trade issues, should come through the domestic actors.

It can be argued that while there are several different forces at play in the Asia-Pacific regional political landscape, including diverging international structures of production and economic interests, as well as historical grievances, the effect of these factors would be filtered through the same domestic political prims as threats. Therefore, the domestic explanatory framework has significant potential to include all kinds of interest in alliance outcomes. However, this would require careful analysis and process tracing of the political decision making beyond the scope of this work. The analysis here will be limited to observing the overall domestic political situation and the stated objectives of the political parties without going into a minute analysis of their interests.

The dynamic of balancing between threats and other interests can also be observed in the asymmetric alliance framework. As the trade-off in this framework is between security and autonomy, and as the model of asymmetric alliances would leave the senior ally in a position to dictate some policies to its junior partner, it is clear that the alliance relation will limit a junior ally's ability to pursue other interests. For example, pursuing friendly trade-based relations with a country antagonistic towards the senior ally would likely provoke the senior ally, which in turn could threaten the loosening of its commitments to a smaller ally's security. It might also seek to exert pressure on its ally in order to stop its unwanted relationships. This is also compatible with the Neorealist framework as the unipole should be in a position of influence through its overwhelming power as Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger argued.

Overall, the asymmetric alliance framework suggests that US policies should be a significant determining factor in the development of security cooperation in our cases. Further, as just noted, this influence should even extend beyond simple security issues to other areas as well. If this would be the most important variable, then the development of alliances could be expected to display similar tendencies under different conditions of other variables as this is the one variable that is shared as a similar factor in both of our cases. As suggested above, this could be expected to manifest in some signs of policy convergence in the junior allies as the US agenda for the Asia-Pacific region can be expected to have similar influences in all its

alliances. Of course, the specifics will vary in accordance with circumstances but there should be a noticeable trend.

Relative bargaining positions in asymmetric alliances are determined by the relative power of alliance partners. Relative power, therefore, also determines how much influence US policies and direct US pressure have on the alliance relations. As power in the international system is always relative to other states, the analysis must include more than just the measurement of power between allies. The balance of power within the region as well as the global distribution of power will have effects as well. The framework is based on a trade-off for security, and any threats arising in the system of US predominance are actually a symptom of diminishing US ability to provide security. Therefore, relative US power will be smaller if there are increasingly powerful states inside the region or in the overall system. Of course, if the smaller ally increases its own power, this will also affect its relative power in the alliance as it will be less reliant on outside security.

This focus on power relations inside alliances leads to expectations that differ from threat theories. As noted, if there is a regional rising power that is able to seriously challenge the powerful ally, this means that the amount of security that the powerful ally can provide actually diminishes. Threats-based theories would lead us to expect that in this kind of situation, the weaker states would share an incentive to solidify their alliances because of rising threats and would therefore be more willing to follow the lead of the powerful ally. The asymmetric alliance framework, on the other hand, leads us to expect that as the relative security gains provided by the powerful ally diminish, smaller states will actually be less willing to follow it as they gain less in return. The optimal solution for these smaller states would be to find alternative means to compensate for the loss of security provided by the powerful ally. They may also seek to assert themselves more forcibly within the alliance as they would feel that they no longer need to offer as much of their sovereignty in return as the other party is no longer providing as much security as it used to.

Hence, the concept of asymmetric alliances provides insights into the influence of changing power positions in a way the other theories do not. In sum, Morrow's argument suggests that if the relative power of the powerful ally decreases and it becomes less able to provide security, incentives for the junior ally to stay in the alliance would also diminish. This is because, even though the added security provided by the senior ally increases in value, the senior ally's ability to provide protection also diminishes. The senior ally's bargaining position would correspondingly weaken, and junior allies would be less inclined to follow its lead. This runs counter to the logic of threat, which suggests that junior allies will flock closer to the unipole if serious threats arise. Therefore, the issue becomes one of credibility: as long as the junior partners see that the senior party is able to provide them with net security gains, they should flock to the unipole if a threat arises, but if

the perception of the unipole's power declines, so too does its influence over its allies.

On the other hand, the traditional realist expectation is for the smaller states to free ride as much as possible when they are protected by a superior power. However, the framework of asymmetric alliances again provides more nuanced expectations. As Bennet, Lepgold, and Unger demonstrated, the powerful ally's bargaining position is enhanced by the discrepancy of power and lack of credible challenges under unipolarity. Hence, contrary to the free-riding logic, the powerful ally is able to use its preponderant position in asymmetric alliances to gain influence over junior allies' policies in order to override free-riding logic. The differences between diverse expectations from divergent theories are nuanced but still clearly present, each having distinct expected outcomes.

In sum, the hypothesis from the different theoretical frameworks are:

Threat-based theories:

> States seek to gain security by allying against the threats in their region, alliance outcomes are directed against threats. If there are no powerful states to balance against, alliances will weaken. Under unipolar systemic conditions, smaller states will offer low alliance commitment and attempt to free ride. If threatened, secondary states will flock to the unipole.
>
> Main explanatory variable: direct threat in regional setting

Alliance security dilemma:

> When there are fewer threats, states will prioritize other interests. The priority will be on the "fear of entrapment" and states will seek to distance themselves from an ally that would act in a bellicose way. When there are more threats, the secondary states will place less value on other interests. The priority will then be on the "fear of abandonment" and the states will try to seek closer relations with the senior ally and try to entrust it with their defense.
>
> Main explanatory variable: fear of abandonment or fear of entrapment depending on the security environment and the actions of the alliance partner

Domestic politics alliance theories:

> States' alliance behavior will be filtered through domestic elites' threat perceptions, interest, and decision-making ability. The state actions in the alliance are determined by the preferences and capabilities of the ruling domestic elites.
>
> Main explanatory variable: domestic political environment

Theories of asymmetric alliance:

> Junior alliance partners trade elements of their autonomy in exchange for security benefits provided by the stronger ally. The more security they

gain, the more they will support their ally. Therefore, the greater the asymmetry of power becomes, the more autonomy the weaker ally will concede. If the stronger party loses its relative power, the weaker power will seek to regain more of its autonomy.

Main explanatory variable: power disparity and demands for alliance partner

These four hypotheses will form this work's base assumptions that will be tested later. The testing of these hypotheses will be the most important part of this research and will be carried out by evaluating the hypotheses against the observed developments in a separate section at the end of each of the empirical chapters.

2.3 Research setting and method

This section will demonstrate how the theoretical discussion presented above will link to the empirical portion of the study that follows. As noted, the empirical part is composed of two case studies. The theoretical hypotheses derived from different theoretical approaches will be tested against the observed outcomes in our cases.

According to Stephen Van Evera, case studies are by their nature suited for theory testing in a narrower setting other than large-N studies and have the added advantage of providing richer explanations of complex causal relations through process tracing.[123] Case study setting is therefore well suited for comparative theory testing and development. This is supported by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, according to whom a case study is a "detailed examination on a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events."[124] Further, George and Bennet note that case studies are "a subset of qualitative methods that aspire to cumulative and progressive generalizations about social life and seek to develop and apply clear standards for judging whether some generalizations fit the social world better than others."[125] This further suits the purpose of this study as we are indeed attempting to compare how well different theories fit into events in the social world. Theories are, of course, generalizations of causal explanations.

The research is formed around the problem of how we can best explain the developments in these alliances. This problem is divisible to three questions:

123 Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to the Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 27-29, 54-55.

124 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 18-19.

125 Ibid., 28-29.

- What are the developments in each case?

- What is the explanatory power of each theoretical framework in relation to the observed developments in all the cases?

- How can the long-term developments in the alliance relations be understood and what are the implications for the future of the alliance relations?

These questions will be answered by applying the theoretical framework to the two case studies through our research setting as follows. To make empirical observations manageable, the cases will be divided to three periods of roughly equal length according to different phases of international events. These periods are 1989-2001, 2001-2008, and from 2008 until the late-2010s.[126] The study is conducted by observing the outcomes of the dependent variables in both cases during these time periods. This yields several observations of the developments (dependent variables) and answers the question "What are the developments in each case?" The explanatory power of the independent (explanatory) variables will be independently assessed for each observation.

The periodic division will serve the purpose of testing alternative explanations for alliance development under different phases of US unipolarity. While it has never been clearly established when exactly the US became the unipole, there is a general consensus that by the early 1990s, it was the clear unipolar power in the international system.[127] US dominance of the post-Cold War world order was established with the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the US resolve to uphold its new order was tested in the first Persian Gulf War (1990-1991). The US economy grew steadily, whereas the economy of its closest economic rival, Japan, stagnated. Further, if we consider the Asia-Pacific, there was no serious challenge to US supremacy since at least the late 1980s. Therefore, the period from approximately 1990 until 2001 can be seen as a period of uncontested unipolarity.

During the second period, from 2001 until early 2008, US predominance was tested by state and non-state actors alike. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and

126 The final time period is deliberately left vague as some observed developments continue beyond 2015 and others end before that date. As we observe development lines in various fields, it is impossible to find a specific time when all the developments have reached some kind of closure. While a specific year as an ending point would be a neat way to present the study, an arbitrary cut-off point would also arbitrarily cut off some development lines.

127 John G. Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6-7.

Washington, as well as attacks in other parts of the world, demonstrated that there were significant threats facing the "hegemonic" order from outside the system of states. The global War on Terror was a defining characteristic of this period, overshadowing the emerging traditional power-political challenges to the US-led status quo. However, even if challenges were rising, the continued prominence of US power – in Asia and elsewhere – indicates a continued unipolarity of the system.[128]

The third period runs from 2008 until the mid-2010s. While some would argue that the United States continues to maintain its unipolar position even in the second decade of the new millennium, the fact is that US power and relative influence had begun declining in the Asia-Pacific since at least the end of the 2000s. By this time, an ascendant China, coupled with Russia's resurgence as a military power, provided growing counterweights to US power globally. Further, by the 2010s, China was already replacing Japan and the US as the hub of Asian economic activity. The economic troubles of the late 2000s and early 2010s demonstrated the limits of Western economic prominence, and by the early 2010s, traditional geopolitics seemed to have returned to Asia and Europe.[129] As to whether or not China is actually seeking to overturn the international order established during the period of US hegemony, time will tell, but for our purposes, it is enough to know that it is a rising power that is increasingly able and willing to challenge the US and its allies for regional dominance. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the last studied period is characterized by an emerging new order in the Asia-Pacific.

The explanatory variables of different frameworks are presented as a historical and narrative form for each of the periods; the historical element in the study is important in itself. Some of the explanatory variables, mainly concerning the policies and posture of the stronger ally, are common to both cases and are therefore discussed at the beginning of each periodic chapter. The outcomes are then analyzed by comparing them to the explanatory variables of each framework. Comparisons between the cases will be conducted to ascertain if different conditions in explanatory variables produce differing results. The analysis is complemented by process tracing to confirm any causal relation. The comparative framework will then be used to assess the validity of shared variables in contrast to case-specific variables

128 E.g., Kenneth N. Waltz, "Intimations of Multipolarity," in *The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*, ed. Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), 14-15.

129 E.g., Evan Braden Montgomery, "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China's rise and the Future of US Power Projection," *International Security* 38, No.4 (2014); Aaron L. Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014).

and across different periods where possible. This will answer the second question regarding the explanatory power of each framework.

The study's comparative setting corresponds to the "least similar cases" design, meaning that the cases differ in most explanatory variables but coincide in dependent variables.[130] In other words, the least similar cases design asks, to what extent we can observe similarity in the outcomes when most other conditions are different.[131] This kind of setting in the social sciences is necessarily imperfect as no two variables can ever be entirely similar; nevertheless even given its deficiencies, this type of comparison can yield better and more thorough insights than observing a single case. In addition, the research employs process tracing to create the empirical narratives (independent variables) to be analyzed in light of the theoretical frameworks, i.e., to verify the validity the hypotheses related to the frameworks.[132]

In sum, the case study chapters are ordered so that they will first describe the regional context of the period under study, particularly from the perspective of the regional threat environment. This will be followed by descriptions of the relevant developments in the US, Japan, and Australia. Each particular event and development will then be assessed and analyzed from the perspective of our four competing theories. Finally, each period will be reviewed, and the developments therein compared to see how well each of the theories fit the outcomes of the period. These chapters will provide answers to the questions: "What are the developments in each case?" and "What is the explanatory power of each framework in relation to the observed developments in each case?"

The final question provides the topic for the third and final part of the study. This part draws together all the observed development in the cases concurrently with the analysis of the different explanatory frameworks. The discussion here will take stock of the strengths and weaknesses of each of the frameworks and seek out implications for the results in the bigger picture. It will justify the topic of this work by demonstrating, through the results of the study, the underlying differences between the observed short-term changes and the continuing long-term trends in these two alliance relations. The third part of the study will also draw on these outcomes to discuss the implications for the regional security complex and its future development.

130 E.g., Douglas Dion, "Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study," in *Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences*, ed. Alan Sica (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 95-112.

131 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 80-82.

132 Van Evera, *Guide to the Methods for Students of Political Science*, 61-62.

PART II – Case Studies

3 Introduction to Pacific Alliances: History and Theory

Before moving on to the case studies, some background information on the two alliances is in order. The two alliance relations in question are products of their specific historical lines of development, and both incorporate complex issues and factors stemming from their historical backgrounds. As these alliance relationships are a central part of the regional order, significant research has been conducted on these alliances since their inception in the early 1950s. This chapter will provide the reader with a basic understanding of the historical background behind these two alliances and discuss the main lines of the relevant research literature.

This chapter will also justify the comparative framework used in the study and provide an account of many of the issues that will be later referred to when discussing continuity in the alliance relations. The differences stemming from the early formative years of Japan's and Australia's relations with the US can still be seen to persist in many ways today. Their security choices are almost impossible to understand without a basic understanding of the historical factors and formative experiences including the role of military force in these nations' histories. The end of the chapter will summarize the starting points of the primary case study chapters that will follow.

3.1 Historical background of the US alliances in the Pacific

The roots of the US presence in the Pacific date back to the expansion of US economic interest throughout the Pacific after the consolidation of the western seaboard of North American under US control before the mid-19th century. By the early 20th century, the US had incorporated Hawaii into its fold and taken over the Philippine archipelago. However, US influence in the Pacific was still tempered by the presence of major European powers as well as the rising naval power of Japan. This all changed after the Second World War, which resulted in the supremacy of

US naval power in the Pacific Ocean.[133] During the early Cold War, the communist takeover of mainland China, the establishment of the Kuomintang government in Taiwan, the Korean War of 1950-1953, and the First Indochina War in 1954, created the dividing lines between the two opposing camps in Asia. While mainland Asia fell under the communist bloc, the US held supremacy over the maritime domain. US military power was anchored to the Western Pacific through a series of alliances and bases stretching from Japan and South Korea in the Northeast of Asia, through Taiwan to the Philippines and Thailand in Southeast Asia, with partnerships with Australia and New Zealand holding the southern end. The communist bloc, whether unitary or divided, could never seriously challenge the naval supremacy of the US-led alliances and hence conflicts took place on the fringe areas of the mainland and through the communist guerilla movements in Southeast Asia.[134]

Initially, there were attempts to consolidate these alliances into multilateral alliance arrangements. Most notable of these, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) framework included the Philippines and Thailand from Southeast Asia, as well as Australia, New Zealand, the UK, France, and Pakistan. However, these agreements could never develop the same institutional structures as the type associated with NATO. Some have argued that this was because of US unwillingness to tie itself down to the kind of arrangements, which in Europe at least, also acted as a constraint on US policies.[135] Furthermore, it would have been difficult for regional states to join in an alliance with Japan so soon after the Second World War. Therefore, smaller arrangements, such as ANZUS and the US-Japan alliance became central features of the so-called "hub-and-spokes" system of the trans-Pacific security arrangements, also known as the San Francisco system. This system remined essentially unchanged from the 1950s until the 1970s. Several low intensity conflicts were fought to maintain control of the Asian littoral, which eventually escalated into the US-led Vietnam War in the 1960s and 70s.

The most significant turning point for the Cold War in Asia arguably took place during the early 1970s. The traumatic experiences of the Vietnam War resulted in

133 For a history of the rise of US power in the Pacific see, for example, Jean Heffer, *The United States and the Pacific: History of a Frontier* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

134 For a historical account of the Cold War period in Asia, as well as discussion about the relevance of the term itself, see, for example, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ed. *The Cold War in East Asia: 1945-1991* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); Yangwen Zheng, Hong Liu, Michael Szonyi eds., *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Boston: Brill, 2010).

135 For a discussion about multilateral security structures in Asia see, for example, Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 36, no.3 (2002), 576-607.

domestic upheavals in the US and prompted the withdrawal of US forces throughout Southeast Asia, resulting in the fall of South Vietnam in the mid-1970s. The mounting costs of the war and domestic backlash were undoubtedly the key drivers behind the Nixon Doctrine, announced in Guam in 1969, which called for decreasing the US share of burden in alliances and for regional allies to bear the primary responsibility for their own security.[136] At the same time, the Nixon Government initiated a dramatic détente in Sino-US relations, which in a short time transformed communist China from an enemy into something of a strategic partner for the purpose of balancing against the Soviet Union.[137] The coinciding détente with the Soviets ended the first phase of the Cold War. As a result, the US military presence in the Western Pacific fell from approx. 750,000 troops of the late 1960s to a little over 100,000 in the mid-1970s.[138]

The re-intensification of the Cold War in the 1980s largely played out beyond Asia as China was no longer part of the Soviet bloc in any meaningful sense. Only the Soviet build-up around the Sea of Okhotsk affected the Pacific side directly.[139] The Reagan-era military build-up in the mid-1980s contributed to the final collapse of the Soviet bloc but also led to increasing US foreign debts, especially to Japan. The economic prosperity of Japan and Asia, increasing trade deficits, and the perceived loss of American jobs to Asian competitors, combined with a sense that US allies were free riding on massive US military expenditures and security guarantees, resulted in tensions in all US alliances, but in US-Japan relations in particular. At the same time, the Middle East was becoming a vital area for energy production, and the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf went increasingly to East Asia even though the US presence secured these shipments. Already in 1980, President Carter announced that the US allies who used this oil would be expected to also play a part in securing its flow through the Strait of Hormuz.[140]

136 For an extensive account of the Nixon Doctrine see Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability 1969 – 1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); For a critical account of the common understanding of the Nixon Doctrine see Jeffrey Kimball, "The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006), 59-74.

137 E.g., Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 – From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

138 Data on US military personnel from the United States Department of Defense: https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports(Accessed June 18, 2021)

139 E.g., Euan Graham, *Japan's Sea Line Security, 1940-2004: A matter of life and death?* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 125-126.

140 James Carter, 'The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress" (Speech, Washington D.C., January 23, 1980). https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/app-categories/spoken-addresses-and-remarks/presidential/state-the-union-addresses (Accessed June 18, 2021)

At the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific was one of uncontested US unipolarity. This dominance was backed by US forces based in the Japanese islands, which were – and remain to this day – the main forward operating base for US forces in the Western Pacific and Asia. While this had been the case for the majority of the Cold War period, the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia in the 1970s accentuated the role of Japanese bases. Only a small presence in the Philippines remained in the early 1990s and even this was withdrawn in 1992.[141] Australia had not been a major staging area for US forces since the Second World War, but its importance as a predominant state of its own sub-region and its historical alliance to US ensured that US interests in the Southern Pacific were maintained. Further, as the Second World War had shown, Australia was, and still is, a key fallback position in any conflict against a continental Asian power in the Pacific.

During the last years of the Cold War, Japan's role in the US military posture was summed up by Prime Minister Nakasone as "America's unsinkable aircraft carrier." At least in a strictly military sense, the characterization was accurate as the US military assets in Japan were remarkable. In 1990, out of approximately 100,000 US troops in Asia, around 45,000 armed forces personnel were stationed in Japan.[142] The array of military hardware in Japan was also impressive and the US had more advanced fighter aircraft in Japan alone than any regional armed forces could muster.[143] The US 5th Air Force with more than 120 advanced fighter aircraft and the US Navy's 7th Fleet's aircraft carrier supported by several cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines were all permanently stationed in Japan.[144] Amphibious assault ships in western Japan ensured that the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (3MEF), based in Okinawa, would have the capability to rapidly deploy to the Korean peninsula. These forces were stationed in 16 major military installations, 8 of which were in Okinawa. The bases in Okinawa were troublesome as the local population saw that their small province was bearing a disproportional burden of the alliance,

141 E.g., *New York Times*, "Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay," December 28, 1991.

142 Data on US military personnel from the United States Department of Defense: https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports (Accessed June 18, 2021)

143 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*. London: Brassey's, 1990; Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1991*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1991.

144 The forward-deployed Carrier Strike Group based in Yokosuka is the only US carrier force permanently deployed abroad. This forward deployment arrangement was first established in 1973 when the USS Midway assumed this role. Since then, several US carriers have served this function, upholding a continuous presence. This deployment reduces the access time of US forces to the Western Pacific by more than two weeks. Notably, the aircraft carriers and attack submarines of the US Navy are nuclear powered.

especially as almost all of the 21,000 marines in Japan were stationed on the islands.[145] Further US military assets could be sent from nearby Guam and Hawaii.

Hence, while the US mainland was on the other side of the Pacific, its network of bases and forward-stationed forces ensured that US military power in the region was uncontested. Additionally, while Japan and Australia are often said to be dependent on US security guarantees, they were by no means unable to defend themselves. Both Japan and Australia maintained their own military forces at levels that surpassed all other military forces in their respective regions.

In the regional balance of military power, Japanese naval and air power, with more than 60 destroyers and 340 combat aircraft, were arguably only surpassed by US and (possibly) Soviet forces. [146] Chinese and North Korean forces could easily match the numbers in manpower but lagged behind in terms of technology, aircraft, and vessels capable of operating in blue waters, hence their conventional forces did not pose a significant threat. It is also notable that while Japan adhered to its self-imposed ceiling of 1% of GDP on defense spending, in 1990 it was still the 6th largest defense budget in the world. In Asia, the Japanese budget surpassed almost threefold its closest defense-spending rival, China.[147] So while Japan is often cited as dependent on US, there were few threats that it could not deal with.

Due to the lack of a significant US presence in the Southwestern Pacific, Australia was essentially responsible for its own immediate security. While the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) were relatively small in comparison to the armed forces of some other western countries of similar size, they surpassed other regional armies in terms of technological capabilities, if not in manpower. The 68,000 strong ADF, with 12 advanced frigates, several submarines, and more than 20 costal defense ships, were mostly oriented towards defending the northern coast of Australia. For air supremacy and surveillance of this vast domain, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) had 60 advanced fighters and a fleet of 20 AP-3C Orion surveillance planes along with support and refueling aircraft.[148] So even while several Southeast Asian nations surpassed the ADF in numbers, none of them possessed any tangible power-projection capability, or vessels or aircraft capable of actually contesting Australian dominance of the so-called northern sea gap. Chinese or Soviet vessels did not operate in the waters near Australia in any significant numbers. Therefore, aside from the unlikely event of direct effort by the crumbling Soviet forces, a missile salvo from the Chinese

145 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1990*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1990., 180-181.
146 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1991*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1991.
147 Stockholm Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990.
148 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*. London: Brassey's, 1990.

missile forces, or a nuclear attack, both Japan and Australia were capable of securing their own territories. However, both countries were still prone to the effects of regional instability and both regions were home to several potential hot spots with potentially unstable regimes, territorial conflicts, or maritime border disputes.

3.2 Japan – US alliance

The Japan-US alliance was established by the Security Treaty, signed on September 8th, 1951. It came into effect simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, whereby Japan regained its sovereignty from the US occupation government following the conclusion of the Second World War. This pact was revised in January 1960 by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which has remained in effect since. Through these treaties, the US has committed itself to defending Japanese territory against foreign attack and has been given the use of bases on Japanese territory for the "purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East."[149] The treaty, together with the US presence on Japanese islands, has been the cornerstone of Japan's security policies as well as the foundation for overall Japan-US relations. While the arrangement is simple in its basic terms, the relationship is extremely complex and influenced by a variety of historical, geopolitical, and economic factors. The following section will provide a brief overview of its history as well as its modes of operation as they were in the early 1990s.

The roots of the arrangement are directly related to the end state of the Second World War in the Pacific, which in turn must be understood in the historical context set by the development of the Japanese colonial empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is worth noting that Japan's rapid expansion from an isolationist premodern state to the primary Asiatic power was initiated by a US fleet that forcibly opened Japan to the outside world in 1853.[150] The shock of forced outside intrusion

149 The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and United States of America, online from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html (Accessed June 18, 2021)

150 The significance of Japanese isolationism between the enactment of the Sakoku laws in 1635 and the arrival of the US fleet under Commodore Perry in 1853 is sometimes disputed. Nevertheless, the act of "opening up" Japan brought about massive changes in Japan's internal and external politics as well as economy. The arrival of Perry's battleships, coinciding with them the humiliation of China on the battlefield, which had until then been the center of Asian world, combined with the imposition of trade agreements that gave foreigners unfair advantages as well as extraterritorial right has sometimes been presented as a sort of the "birth trauma" of modern Japan. See, for example, Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

was followed by rapid industrialization under a mercantilist consensus embodied in the Meiji Japan's "Rich Nation, Strong Army" policy.[151] Domestic expansion was followed by imperialistic expansion abroad and military victories against China in 1884-85 and Russia in 1904-05, which gave Japan recognition as a partner for the western Great Powers of the time. The ultimate recognition of this was the alliance with Great Britain in 1902.[152]

However, success was followed by economic difficulties, domestic instability, and the rise of militaristic nationalism, all of which made Japan a natural ally for Nazi Germany. The military essentially seized control of the Japanese state in the 1930s. After the Manchurian incident of 1931, the Imperial Japanese Army began a creeping invasion of China without government approval, which escalated into a full war and led to the Japanese occupation of large areas of China. The expansion eventually brought Japan on a collision course with US interests in Asia and pulled Japan and the US into the Second World War in 1941. The Japanese defeat and surrender following the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was a foregone conclusion of its overreach, as it could not compete with the US industrial base and could never secure enough natural resources for its military machine. The pre-World War II militarism and the devastating defeat left deep marks in Japanese society, and the ensuing military occupation essentially imposed the role of a US satellite on the Japanese foreign and security policies for the following decades.[153]

The US occupation government, which ruled Japan from 1945 until 1951, imposed a new "peace constitution," abolished the Japanese imperial armies, and began to abolish the *zaibatsu* industrial conglomerates that had dominated Japanese industry. However, the beginning of the Cold War and the need for powerful allies soon overshadowed other priorities. By the beginning of the Korean War, a new dynamic of US-Japan relations had emerged. This dynamic was characterized, on the one hand, by US pressure to remilitarize Japan to support the global fight against communism

151 E.g., Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

152 Great Britain had followed a policy of not committing itself to formal alliances with European continental powers since the Napoleonic wars even though it had been courted by several of the major powers. The British policy of offshore balancing was meant to prevent any single power in the continent from gaining a wide enough margin of power in the continent to again threaten an invasion of the British Isles as Napoleon had done. The alliance with the Japanese was conducted mainly to balance against the Russian push to acquire more of the Eurasian land mass, which went against British colonial interests in India and Japanese interests in China. See, for example, Philips Payson O'Brien ed. *The Anglo – Japanese Alliance, 1902 – 1922* (London: Routledge, 2004).

153 For a historical account of the early occupation and its results see, for example, Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 1.

and, on the other hand, the Japanese mainstream consensus emphasizing economic development and minimal military role as embodied in the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine." The Yoshida Doctrine, named after the long-serving Japanese post-WWII Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, was based on its reliance on the US alliance for external security while relying on the pacifism embedded in the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to counter US and domestic calls for rearmament. Nationalism was mainly directed to economic performance and by the 1960s, the idea of Japan as a pacifist economic power became widely accepted throughout the nation.[154]

The US alliance was also imposed on Japan as a condition for returning Japanese sovereignty after the US occupation. The Security Treaty allowed US forces to be stationed on Japanese soil in order to "maintain order in East Asia and secure Japan from external threats," but also "to put down large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan." The Okinawa islands were left under US control. The treaty also allowed the US to unilaterally decide what forces it would maintain in Japan and restricted Japan's authority to engage in security relations with any third country without US consent. However, the treaty also stipulated that Japan should increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense.[155] How much Japan should build-up its military would become a central question for the alliance from the outset. More than three years after the peace treaty and following a significant amount of haggling by the Yoshida government and the US authorities, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) were formally created in 1954 with the strength of approx. 180,000 troops.[156]

While the US side criticized Japan's lack of progress in assuming a greater role in their own defense, even this limited number of troops allowed more US forces to be transferred to the Korean War from Japan without endangering the nation's defense. While it was understood that Japanese forces could not take part in the fighting in Korea because of historical sensitivities, the US shortage of minesweeping vessels prompted General MacArthur to demand Japanese vessels for that very purpose. Afterwards, close to 20 Japanese boats and their crews were sent to clear mined costal approaches for US forces. These vessels took part in some of the war's amphibious operations and suffered the loss of at least two ships and their crews in the fighting.[157] This experience would set an important precedence for contributions several decades later.

154 E.g., Samuels *Securing Japan*, 34-36.

155 Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America of 1951 available online at https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html (Accessed June 18, 2021).

156 E.g., Luis D Hayes, *Japan and the Security of East Asia* (Maryland: Lexington books, 2001), 94-95.

157 E.g., Thomas B. Buell, *Naval Leadership in Korea* (Washington D.C.: Department of The Navy, 2002), 33-35.

After several security reforms, including the drafting of a new defense White Paper called the Basic Policy for National Defense,[158] the newly installed Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government was able to negotiate a new version of the Security Treaty. From the Japanese point of view, the 1960 security treaty, which is still in effect today, was a clear improvement on the 1951 treaty. With the new treaty, the United States assumed the formal obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack, something absent from the 1952 treaty. The new treaty gave the Japanese government the right to be consulted about major changes in US basing and on the military use of US forces in stationed in Japan. The clause of using US forces to put down Japanese domestic disturbances was also removed from the treaty.

The treaty itself is brief and has several similarities to other security treaties of the era, including the North Atlantic- and ANZUS treaties. The first two articles of the treaty state that the parties would work towards peace and stability. Article III notes that parties will develop their respective defense capabilities, and Article IV notes that the parties will conduct joint consultations from "time to time" or when the "security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened." Article V states that the parties will meet common danger "in the territories under administration of Japan" and Article VI gives the United States the right to use military facilities in Japan for the purpose "of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East."

The new treaty reinforced Japanese international standing but left its obligations unclear. Article V of the treaty, which includes the common defense of Japan, also states that in the event of an "armed attack against either Party in territories under the administration of Japan," each party would "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." As Article 9 of the Japanese constitution essentially denies Japan the right to collective self-defense and as Okinawa, where most US forces were situated, was under US administration, Japanese commitments could be interpreted as quite minimal.[159] The new treaty also stipulated that both the US and Japan would further develop their military capabilities. However, as before, the repeated efforts by the US side to compel the

158 Japan National Defense Council, *The Basic Policy for National Defense*, May 20, 1957, Tokyo. https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPSC/19570520.O1E.html (Accessed June 18, 2021).

159 Article 9 of Constitution of Japan states that "Japanese people forever renounce war as sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." The interpretation that this article forbids Japan's participation in collective self-defense arrangements, as stipulated in the UN Charter, was first established by the Japanese Cabinet Legislation Bureau decision in 1960. Constitution of Japan available from the Japanese Prime Minister's Office: www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (Accessed June 18, 2021).

Japanese to increase their defense capabilities were repeatedly rebuffed. The dynamics of finding the balance between the more aggressive militarization advocated by the US and the right-wing revisionist elements of the LDP, and the pacifist principles of Article 9 and the post-World War II legacy championed by the left-wing elements in the LDP and the socialist parties, have been major ongoing issues for Japanese politics ever since.[160]

The treaty was unpopular in Japan and its signing sparked massive protests, causing the cancellation of a scheduled visit by President Eisenhower. The effort to push the revised alliance treaty through despite mass protests eventually forced the resignation of the right-wing government led by Prime Minister Kishi and allowed more left-leaning elements to take power within the LDP.[161] The new LDP-government under Prime Minister Ikeda steered clear of contentious security issues and shifted the Japanese policy focus to economic growth by announcing Ikeda's famous "income doubling plan."[162] This also temporarily satisfied the US side, which was worried about negative public sentiment and the growth of socialist movements in Japan. Accordingly, the CIA and the US embassy began to covertly support more moderate elements in the LDP. The emerging social consensus, which closely followed the Yoshida doctrine, was so successful that it solidified the LDP's position as the ruling party for more than 30 years.[163]

Economic success and the social consensus ensured stability in Japan after the uncertainty of the 1960s. The tug-and-pull between militarization and pacifism continued but with less public drama. In the late 1960s, Prime Minister Sato already agreed that Japan would pursue a more autonomous defense and agreed in principle on the Japanese role in the defense of South Korea and Taiwan in exchange for the return of Okinawa to Japanese control.[164] At the same time, to appease the pacifist elements angered by these concessions, Sato adopted the "three nonnuclear principles" of not manufacturing, not possessing, and not allowing nuclear weapons in Japan, even while maintaining that the weapons themselves were not unconstitutional. Again, caveats were made for US nuclear weapons by attaching a mention of US nuclear guarantees as one of the basic pillars of Japanese non-nuclear

160 E.g., Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," in *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 119-150.

161 E.g., Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 236-237.

162 E.g., Michael Schaller, "Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III, endings* ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 161-162.

163 Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 159-161.

164 Michel J. Green, "Balance of power," in *U.S. – Japan Relations in a Changing World*, ed. Steven K. Vogel (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

policy. There was also a specific agreement allowing US forces to maintain nuclear weapons in Okinawa. The spirit of the non-nuclear principles was further watered down as the Sato Government also explored the potential of a latent nuclear weapons capability through civilian nuclear programs.[165]

Another example of the tug-and-pull inherent in the Yoshida doctrine were the principles of arms exports adopted by the Diet in 1967. They initially only banned weapons sales to communist countries, countries under UN embargo, and countries engaged in war. The principles soon evolved into a blanket embargo on all exports of military hardware, remaining in place until the mid-2010s. In a sign of how contentions security issues were, even the term "alliance" was denounced by several Japanese governments.[166] This ambiguity in the Japanese security posture placed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in a difficult situation. Until the 1970s, the government White Papers emphasized that JSDF members were actually civil servants and not soldiers. There were also limits placed on the military-like activities the JSDF could perform, and unsanctioned operational planning under the so-called three arrows study (*Mitsuya Kenkyuu*) in 1963 led to public outrage among socialist politicians, many of whom insisted that the entire institution of the JSDF was unconstitutional. The resulting public backlash essentially froze all military planning for more than a decade.[167]

Even though Japan had formally re-established a military force under the name of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954 and assumed further security responsibilities under the 1960 Security Treaty, it was still able to reduce defense expenditures from a postwar high of 1.78% of GDP in the mid-1950s to less than 1% by the end of the 1960s.[168] This 1%-ceiling remained essentially unbroken until the mid-2010s.[169]

However, the Yoshida doctrine first began to unravel in the mid-1970s. The so-called "Nixon shocks" – the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Taiwan, demands for more defense burden sharing from Asian allies, and the opening of diplomatic relations with China without prior consultation with its allies – drastically changed the bargain of the US-Japan alliance of the early Cold War. The US presence, which was previously taken for granted, now seemed relatively fragile as the US withdrew over half a million troops from the region. Japan responded by adopting a new National Defense Program Outlines (NDPO) in 1976, which called for an autonomous defense capability. [170] This doctrine was enshrined in the

165 E.g., Pyle, *Japan Rising*, 251-253.
166 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 43-44.
167 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 52-53.
168 Ibid., 41.
169 Prime Minister Nakasone managed to break the 1% -ceiling for a few years in the late 1980s but even then, defense spending did not go above 1.01% of GDP and therefore the rise over 1% can be seen as a largely symbolic gesture.
170 Green, *Balance of power*, 18-19.

statement that Japan "…should be capable of repelling limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance."[171]

After President Carter announced further withdrawals of US forces from Asia, and the US Department of Defense started pushing for a wider Japanese role in the defense of the near seas, the Japanese government acquiesced to drawing up a document named the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation to facilitate the planning of concrete cooperation procedures and to increase the role of the JSDF in the alliance framework. The guidelines were signed in 1978 and included, for the first time, provisions for joint planning and exercises as well as a specific role for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in defending the sea lanes around Japan in coordination with the US Navy.[172] Japan also tried to ensure continued US presence in Japan by allocating a special "sympathy budget" in 1978 to share the costs of stationing US forces in Japan. This allocation evolved into a permanent Host Nation Support (HNS) arrangement by the 1980s and by the late 1980s had expanded to include most of the labor and facilities maintenance costs for US bases in Japan.[173] Overall, these initiatives marked the beginning of the process of broadening the Japanese Self-Defense Forces' roles in the alliance and increasing their capabilities to act as a regular military force. Arguably, this process has been on-going ever since, as new openings have steadily followed to this day.

During the mid-1980s, the re-intensifying Cold War, accompanied by the Reagan-era military build-up in the US, and especially the Soviet military build-up in the Sea of Okhotsk, again increased the pressure for a larger Japanese military contribution. Japan agreed to a new division of roles and missions in the alliance, which included, in principle, the expansion of the area of Japanese defense responsibility from the sea lanes upwards to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.[174] The new division of labor required the JSDF to contain the Soviet Pacific Fleet within the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk and to prevent their breakout to the Western Pacific. To be able to fulfill this mission, Japan acquired a large submarine fleet and surveillance planes. The Japanese land forces were focused on defending Hokkaido, which is strategically situated between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. While the JSDF would act

171 Japan National Defense Council, *National Defense Program Outline*, October 29, Tokyo https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html (Accessed June 18, 2021).

172 The text of the 1978 Japan-United States Guidelines for Defense Cooperation available online at https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19781127.O1E.html (Accessed June 18, 2021).

173 For an extensive account of the HNS see Tatsuro Noda, "Japan's Host Nation Support Program for the US – Japan Security Alliance: Past and Prospects," in *Asian Survey* 46, no. 6 (2006).

174 Green, *Balance of power*, 21.

as a shield blocking Soviet incursions, it would also protect US bases from which the US forces would conduct attacks against Soviet bases.[175]

However, as Japan had already in the 1980s become a rising economic power, second only to the US, a limited Japanese military contribution was not enough for those who thought that its economic success was built on free riding on US security guarantees and fueled by oil secured by US fleets. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, the Middle East became the focal point of global US strategy. The 1980s US doctrine for the Middle East – usually attributed to President Carter and referred to as the "Carter Doctrine" – emphasized securing the Persian Gulf from hostile domination by direct military means if necessary. President Reagan included the support of friendly regimes and maintaining regional stability in the doctrine. When the Iran-Iraq war threatened oil flows, US forces were used to secure shipments. As Japan was one of the biggest consumers of the oil from the Gulf, the US Congress demanded that Japan should also contribute.[176] The US administration then specifically requested Japanese contributions in the form of minesweeping vessels as had already been done during the Korean War.[177] While Prime Minister Nakasone seemed willing to oblige this request, he was unable to attain any political support for the idea. To compensate, Japan simply ended up supplying navigational facilities to the area as a form of regional development aid.[178]

The biggest frictions in the alliance were over trade. The US economy was in recession in the late 1980s while Japan was going through a massive economic expansion. The US trade deficit towards Japan rose continuously and the American popular perception was that Japan employed unfair trade practices. Japan was sometimes even seen as a kind of looming strategic-economic threat to US interests.[179] While the US Congress and Japanese Diet were antagonistic to each other, the executive branches ameliorated these conflicts. The personal amity between Prime

175 The "shield and sword" analogy has often been used to describe the division of labor in the alliance since the 1980s. It has been suggested that Japanese participation in this strategy and plans for Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force to fight Soviet vessels seeking to break the blockade already did away with the principle that Japanese forces could only be used for the self-defense of Japanese islands. From my point of view, these observations would seem valid as pursuing and attacking vessels at high seas can hardly be seen as self-defense in the strict sense of the concept. See, for example, Graham, *Japan's Sea Line Security,* 140-142.

176 E.g., Koji Murata, "Japanese Diplomacy in the 1980s," in *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*, ed, Iokobe Makoto (New York: Routledge, 2011), 157-158.

177 E.g., Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1988*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1988, 166.

178 Graham, *Japan's Sea Line Security,* 147-148.

179 E.g., *New York Times*, "THE WORLD; Japan`s New Investment Strategy…" October 14, 1990; On Japanese economy as a Strategically oriented military-like structure see Thomas M. Huber, *Strategic Economy in Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

Minister Nakasone and President Reagan was an often-noted factor in the bilateral relationships of the late 1980s.[180] However, frictions reached their crescendo in 1989 when the US Congress began a formal investigation of Japanese trade policies.[181] The two sides reached a negotiated settlement, but this failed to pacify most of the anti-Japanese sentiment in the US Congress.[182] Trade conflicts were only made worse by conflicts over defense and dual-use technologies. In the mid-80s, Japanese Toshiba was accused of selling advanced dual-use technologies to the Soviet Union, an incident that culminated in US congressmen physically destroying a Toshiba radio set with sledgehammers on the Congress lawn.[183] In the late 1980s, the technological conflicts derailed the F-2 Japanese indigenous fighter program as Japan was pressured into instead buying the US F-16 variant, which was to be cooperatively developed.[184] However, after US Congressional intervention, Japan ended up fully funding the development and assembly of the fighter in the US.[185]

Alliance structures and politics

At the end of the Cold War, the alliance was managed under the details agreed upon in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, signed in 1978. To this day, the guidelines have been updated only twice, in 1997 and 2015, and the renewed guidelines, as will be discussed later, have usually been understood to signify a new direction for the alliance. The particular details of stationing US force in Japan are set by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), first signed in 1960.[186] Notably, the Japan-US alliance has never had a unified military command structure similar to arrangements in the Republic of Korea or under NATO in Europe.[187] There is a

180 E.g., *New York Times*, "Reagan and Nakasone Meet Today," September 21, 1987.

181 Elisabeth K King, "The Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988: "Super 301" and its Effects on the Multilateral Trade System Under the GATT" in *The Journal of International Law* 12, no.2 (1991): 258-259

182 E.g., Koji Murata, "Japanese Diplomacy in the 1980s" in *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*, ed. Iokobe Makoto (New York: Routledge, 2011), 166-167.

183 E.g., George R. Packard, "The Coming U.S. – Japan Crisis," in *Foreign Affairs* 66, no.2 (1987).

184 The Library of Congress, "The FSX Agreement by Dick Cheney (*sic.)*, Secretary of Defense," Reprint of a statement presented by Secretary Cheney in Congressional testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington, D.C., May 3, 1989.

185 Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-2009: The Quest for Proactive Policy* (Boston: Brill, 2010), 103-104.

186 The text of US – Japan Status of Forces Agreement of 1960 available online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf (Accessed June 19, 2021).

187 Sheila A. Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S. – Japan Alliance" in *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 69-70.

complex structure of joint committees set by the alliance treaty, the Guidelines and SOFA, running from the ministerial level all the way to local level. However, in the early 1990s these regimes were only used for political cooperation and managing issues related to the stationing of US forces in Japan. The JSDF was not officially represented in any of the cooperation structures. This was hardly conducive to alliance cooperation, even if it can be argued that the basic cooperation concept outlined in the 1978 Guidelines did not call for a combined command structure as the division of labor already seemed quite clearly specified.[188]

The highest permanent consultation forums in the early 1990s were the yearly meetings of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), established by the 1960 Security treaty. On the Japanese side, the SCC was the higher-level meeting as it was attended both by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director General of the Defense Agency, both elected executive-level officials. However, the US participants in the SCC were only the US Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command, both of who were only career officials.[189] While there were no executive-level ministers in the SCC from the US side, it was still the main executive level meeting in the alliance and it was the SCC that signed all the formal declarations such as the guidelines for defense cooperation.[190] The Japanese side had long been unhappy with the fact that Japanese ministers only met with unelected US officials in this format. The SCC also had a specific Security Subcommittee, SSC, which has often been cited as the workhorse of the alliance,[191] and these were supported by a series of working-level and technical meetings.[192]

188 Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima "Managing the New U.S, - Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements" in *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 97-98.

189 Notably, the Commander of Pacific Command was not regularly based in Japan but in Hawaii. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1990*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1990, 294.

190 Ibid., 174.

191 Giarra and Nagashima, *Managing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*, 94-95.

192 As noted, there were also several other committees with specific tasks. For example, the implementation of the cooperation agreement was conducted by the Security Consultative Group (SCG), which consists of bureau directors from the Japanese side and an embassy minister and counselor of the US Embassy in Japan as well as the Commander and Chief of Staff of the US forces in Japan. There was also a Sub-committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), which worked as a preparatory committee for the SCG dealing specifically with defense-related issues and a bi-weekly Japan-US Joint Committee, established by the SOFA to deal with questions related to US forces in Japan. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1983*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1983, 204.

Notably, on the political side, much of the preparatory work in Japan was conducted through unofficial groups, most notably the LDP defense political group, which often took an active role in preparing alliance cooperation, especially in the 1980s.[193]

The basic defense concept agreed in the 1978 Guidelines was that Japanese forces should conduct defensive operation and "repel limited, small-scale aggression" by itself and, if needed, with the support of US forces. The US on the other hand, would also "conduct operations to supplement functional areas which exceed the capacity of the JSDF." The only coordinated planning on the military level was conducted under a series of joint studies and exercises.[194] The bilateral studies included plans to jointly respond to aggressions directed against Japan and the possibilities for the rapid reinforcement of US forces in Japan. These studies also formed the basis for joint operations to defend the sea lines with the understanding that Japanese forces would be responsible for the protection of the sea lines up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.[195] There were also plans to create several joint coordination centers for JSDF and US forces, but the fact that there was almost no progress on these for almost a decade is a clear sign that the Japanese were reluctant to allow the JSDF to form its own direct links to US military command.[196]

In the 1980s and early 90s, defense technology and high-tech weapons production were promising new areas of alliance cooperation. The basis for defense technology and procurement cooperation were already established by the 1954 Military Defense Assistance Agreement.[197] During the early years of the alliance, the JSDF was mostly supplied with transfers of old US military equipment.[198] However, this soon began to change with Japan's reindustrialization, and by the 1980s, 90% of Japanese defense procurement was handled domestically as much of Japan's advanced technologies in computers, engines, and other industries were also used for advanced military applications.[199] At the same time, Japanese companies were

193 E.g., Michael J. Green, "The Search for an Active Security Partnership: Lessons From the 1980s" in *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001*, ed. Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2001), 141-142.

194 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1990*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1990, 176.

195 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1988*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1988, 172-173.

196 Smith, *The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S. – Japan Alliance*, 80-81.

197 Text of the 1954 Military Defense Assistance Agreement available online at http://japan2.usembassy.gov/pdfs/wwwf-mdao-mdaa1954.pdf (Accessed June 19, 2021).

198 MacArthur begun providing Japan with howitzers and vehicles in 1952 and these were followed by all kinds of military hardware from frigates to handguns. Neil Renwick, *Japan's Alliance Politics and Defense Production* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 33.

199 Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 15.

increasingly competitive in the US markets and this made the US Congress increasingly protective of US industries.[200]

As noted above, issues related to technology transfers were also one of the major points of conflict in Japan-US relations and involved several stake holders with different motives. On the US side, the Congress and lobby groups working for the arms industries have traditionally sought to limit unilateral technology transfers and have instead favored the direct sales of US manufactured products to support US jobs and maximize economic gains.[201] On the Japanese side, aside from politicians, powerful ministries — notably the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) — have pursued their own interests through the defense industry and technology cooperation. The traditionally weaker Japanese Defense Agency had little leverage over these issues.[202]

Japan had already made an exception to the arms export ban in regard to the US in 1981 and a special Systems and Technology Forum was established in 1980.[203] However, by the end of the 1980s, US-Japan technology cooperation had led to only 3 agreements for transfers of technology from the Japanese side.[204] Japan had also agreed to participate in the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, also known as Star Wars) development of 1986 but this produced few concrete results.[205] Hence, by the end of the Cold War, there had only been limited cooperation in the form of transfers of technology from one side to the other with no real joint-technological development.

In sum, it can be seen that the Japan-US alliance underwent several different phases of development by the end of the Cold War. The alliance began with Japan under the direct control of the US occupation authorities headquartered in Kasumigaseki, across the moat from the Imperial Palace. As the US saw the need for dependable allies, Japan was allowed and even pushed to reindustrialize and remilitarize and was thus awarded a more equal treaty for doing so. As regional politics became more complex after the Vietnam War, the alliance shifted in response, and Japan was compelled to increase its military contribution. While the

200 E.g., Renwick, *Japan's Alliance Politics and Defense Production*, 89-90.

201 Michael J. Chinworth, "Implementing the U.S. – Japan Security Alliance: Fifty Years of Cooperative Programs," in *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951* – 2001, ed. Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler (Tokyo: Kodansha International 2001), 167.

202 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's security policy: political, economic, and military dimensions," in *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and external dimensions*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Routledge, 2008), 59-61.

203 Green, *Arming Japan*, 83-83.; Renwick, *Japan's Alliance Politics and Defense Production*, 92-93.

204 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1990*, Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd.1990.

205 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1988*, Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd.1988, 329-331.

alliance grew more equal and cooperation was developed in the 1980s, other issues began to increasingly factor in. Conflicts over trade, emerging narratives of a Japanese threat to US interests in the Pacific, and spats over technology transfers seemed predestined to break up the alliance. Some even predicted a looming great power confrontation between the US and Japan in the future, while the popular US movies of the period often depicted the Japanese as the "bad guys." A few years later, however, the Japanese economy collapsed and the accompanied political crisis and fragmentation of the traditional party politics in Japan meant that Japan would not be the next superpower but there was no way of knowing this at the time.[206]

These issues and the following developments in the 1990s and 2000s have been widely debated and researched in academic literature, albeit with decreasing frequency after the 1990s. As will be demonstrated next, there still remains a lack of comprehensive evaluation of the relationship from a longer perspective.

The Academic Literature on the Japan-US alliance

This section will discuss the academic literature written on the US-Japan alliance. We will only focus on some of the most important works and identify the dominant themes in the research literature. The emphasis will be on contemporary literature, but several of the themes have clear historical roots and illustrate how the alliance managers, many of whom had deep ties to US academia, understood the alliance at the time.

As noted in the introduction, the continuity of the alliance relations is one of the topics of this research. Kent Calder argues that the enduring logic of the alliance relation is actually to inhibit conflicts between the US and Japan as well as to maintain a stable security situation in the Asian-Pacific. For Calder, this logic is still as sound as it has been for the 60 years of the alliance. However, Calder notes a "silent crisis" in the alliance and argues that the steadily decreasing number of people familiar with Japan in the US administration has resulted in a deterioration of the networks needed for cooperation.[207] Calder also highlights certain significant changes in the alliance, especially in the range of military activities undertaken by Japanese forces. He further notes that the international contributions of the JSDF, which largely took place outside the US alliance in the 1990s, demonstrate a clear shift of emphasis to the more US-centric contributions after the early 2000s.[208] In a

206 T.J. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 183-184

207 Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S. – Japan Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 3-4, 14-15, 26-28.

208 Ibid., 134-137

nutshell, Calder acknowledges the diverse ways that the alliance had developed but still sees it to be threatened by complacency and overconfidence.[209]

Anthony DiFilippo's books, published in 1997, 2002, and 2011, are good examples of how the thinking about the alliance in the US academic circles has evolved over time. The first book, 1997's *Cracks in the Alliance*, argues that the inherent tensions in the alliance between two powers on opposite sides of the Pacific had grown to the extent that the alliance is all but ready to dissolve as it had lost all its meaning after the Cold War.[210] DiFilippo's second book on the topic, published in 2002, analyzes the alliance development following the reaffirmation of the alliance after the mid-1990s but maintains that the alliance is on unsound footing and has been built on "distrust and suspicion," is a "source of regional tensions," and as such, faces significant popular resistance.[211] However, by the publication DiFilippo's third book in 2011, the gloomy predictions have diminished and he instead focuses on alliance cooperation related to the issue of North Korea.[212]

DiFilippo's books are illustrative of distinctive themes in the literature on the alliance in the 1990s and early 2000s. First of these is the "alliance drift" theme, which talks of a crisis in the alliance. The second is the "reaffirmation" theme, which focuses on the efforts to reinvigorate the alliance. Thirdly, as the alliance serves security purposes, the theme of threats is always present but often receives less attention than could be expected.

The key book on the alliance drift theme is Yoichi Funabashi's work on early 1990s US- Japan relations. The book titled *Alliance Adrift* is a journalistic piece that describes confrontational and even hostile Japan-US relations, which are more or less successfully managed by a small group of like-minded experts and insiders.[213] Many of the works dealing with US-Japan relations in the earlier part of the 1990s share this sort of "friends or rivals" approach.[214] A book on the alliance to mark its 50th anniversary, edited by Stephen K. Vogel, even offers a specific focus on confrontation vs. cooperation in the alliance.[215] At the time, some writers argued that

209 Ibid., 237-238.

210 Anthony DiFilippo, *Crack in the Alliance: Science, Technology and Evolution of U.S. – Japan Relations* (Brookfield VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1997),1-4, 226-228, 270-272.

211 Anthony DiFilippo, *The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002),4-5, 54-55.

212 Anthony DiFilippo, *US-Japan-North Korea Security Relations: Irrepressible Interests* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

213 Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999).

214 E.g., Michael H. Armacost, *Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S. – Japan Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

215 Stephen K. Vogel ed. *U.S. – Japan Relations in a Changing World* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

there was a kind of historical necessity that the two powers on the opposite shores of the Pacific would clash in the future.[216] At the extreme end of this trend were the outright hostile approaches to Japan.[217] Some writers even speculated about the possibility of a military confrontation between the US and Japan.[218]

Works written at the end of the 1990s and after 9/11 typically emphasize the changes and developments within the alliance.[219] These writers usually focus on new ways of cooperation and change in Japan's position within the alliance. Specific turning points are usually found in the first Persian Gulf war, in the so-called 'Nye-initiative' of the mid-1990s, or in the 9/11 and War on Terror period. Discussions of issues such as the development of ballistic missile defense,[220] and analysis of the 1998 Guidelines of Defense Cooperation exemplify this theme.[221] The idea that a "more equal partnership" was now emerging through expansions of Japan's security roles can often be found in these works.[222] This of course implies the inequality inherent in the alliance from the outset.[223]

The threat of North Korea was usually viewed as the most significant outside driver behind the alliance in the 1990s.[224] The rise of China only emerges as a significant issue in the literature after the late 1990s, and even then, it is often

216 Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S. – Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).

217 E.g., Thomas M. Huber, *Strategic Economy in Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

218 George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991)

219 E.g., Thomas U. Berger, *Redefining Japan and the U.S. – Japan Alliance* (Japan Society, 2004); Ralph A. Cossa ed. *Restructuring the U.S. – Japan Alliance* (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2006).

220 E.g., Tetsuya Umemoto, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the U.S. – Japan Alliance", in *Reinventing the Alliance: U.S. – Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change,* ed. John G. Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrawe Macmillan, 2003).

221 E.g., Kooji Murata, "Do the New Guidelines Make the Japan U.S. – Alliance more effective?" in *The Japan U.S. Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century,* ed. Masashi Nishihara (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000).

222 Ralph A. Cossa ed. *Restructuring the U.S. – Japan Alliance: Toward a more equal partnership* (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 1997); David Arase and Tsuneo Akaha eds., *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Balancing soft and hard power in East Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

223 E.g., John Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy towards Japan 1945-1960* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

224 E.g., Charles M. Perry and Toshi Yoshihara, *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Preparing for Korean Reconciliation and Beyond* (Everett MA: Brassey's Inc., 2003); Masashi Nishihara ed. *The Japan U.S. Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000).

overshadowed by the War on Terror.[225] By the late 2000s, however, China had clearly become a major threat.[226] Besides threats, there are other functions that the alliance is thought to serve. Sometimes the alliance is seen as a basic structure for regional stability and cooperation over regional issues.[227] Hence, it is not always only seen as a military construct but as a platform for a multilateral approach to security.[228] Nonetheless, regional multilateral security initiatives have more recently been seen as a hedge against the possibility of a US withdrawal from the region.[229] Some also see these efforts as possible alternatives to the US alliance.[230]

The influence of Japanese domestic political and cultural characteristics is another recurring theme in the literature.[231] From this perspective, the dynamics between Japanese public aversion to militarism and the US pressure for larger Japanese military contributions are defining features of the alliance relation.[232] In Japanese public discourse, US bases, especially in Okinawa, are a central part of the domestic opposition to the alliance.[233] Japan's development from post-WWII

225 E.g., Mike M. Mochizuki, "Terms of Engagement: The U.S. – Japan Alliance and the Rise of China," in *Beyond Bilateralism: U.S. – Japan Relations in the New Asia Pacific*, ed. Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

226 E.g., Linus Hagstrom and Christian Turesson, "Among threats and 'perfect excuse': Understanding change in Japanese foreign security policy," *Korean Journal of Defense analysis* 21, no.3 (2009).

227 E.g., Chikaku Ueki, "Liberal Deterrence of China: Challenges in Achieving Japan's China Policy," in *The U.S. – Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism*, ed. Takashi Inoguchi, John G. Ikenberry and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

228 E.g., Inoguchi, Ikenberry and Sato eds., *The U.S. – Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Conclusion.

229 E.g., Van Jackson, "The Rise of Strategic Hedging across Asia: A System-Level Analysis", in *U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Greg Chaffin, (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2015).

230 E.g., John G. Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi eds., *Reinventing the Alliance: U.S. – Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change*, (New York: Palgrawe Macmillan, 2003), 9-14.

231 E.g., Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006); Yashihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welsh eds., *Japan as a 'Normal Country': A Nations in Search of its Place in the World* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

232 E.g., Glen D. Hook, Julie Gibson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, economics and* security, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 37-38; Gavan McCormack, *The Client State: Japan in the American Embrace* (New York: Verso, 2006); Yuki Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington's Expectations* (Washington: Henry S. Stimson Center, 2008).

233 E.g., Robert D. Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in the Postwar U.S. – Japan Relations* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2001).

pacifism towards becoming a country with a more "normal" security policy is one of the recurring narratives when authors describe Japanese security culture and its influence on the alliance.[234] More subtle descriptions, like Richard Samuel's *Securing Japan*, describe the strategic debates in Japanese domestic politics and their interplay with the regional change.[235]

Kevin Cooney argues that the changes – or the "maturation" – of Japanese security politics in the post-Cold War era have been due to the shocks of the end of Cold War, the Gulf War of 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. According to Cooney, these events created a sense of urgency about the increasing *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure, usually from the US). The pressure coincided in each event with permissive Japanese domestic political conditions. Cooney specifically emphasizes the role of individual political actors and attributes the development of Japan-US relations in the post-9/11 period to Prime Minister Koizumi's close relations with the Bush administration.[236] Several other authors have also argued that the interplay between foreign expectations, domestic politics, and powerful bureaucratic interest is key to understanding the development of Japanese security politics.[237]

As noted, few works deal with the long-term developments of the alliance and often the works that assume shorter perspectives misjudge the impact and implications of recent events. For example, Daniel Kliman attributes the Japanese deployment of replenishment ships to the Indian Ocean after 9/11 in support of US operations to Prime Minister Koizumi's leadership and the JDA's and MOFA's willingness to challenge Japan's constitutional restraints in the face of US pressure.[238] He does not consider that this kind of deployment was already envisioned in the 1998 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and was possible because of the new Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed a year prior to 9/11.[239] Further, the legal basis of the 1998 guidelines and ACSA was approved in May 1999, and therefore, the constitutionality of the deployment had already been affirmed.[240] Kliman also notes how the Japanese Self-Defense Forces begun to conduct anti-terrorism exercises in the early 2000s and

234 E.g., Soeya, Tadokoro and Welsh eds., *Japan as a 'Normal Country.'*

235 Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

236 Kevin Cooney, *Japan's Foreign Policy Since 1945* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 149 -150, 173-175, 202-203.

237 E.g., Takao Sebata, *Japan's Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2010).

238 Daniel A, Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik* (Washington D.C: CSIS Press, 2006), 68-69, 81-82, 85-86.

239 See chapter 5 and relevant discussion on chapter 6 for further details.

240 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2000*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2000, 125.

attributes this to the 9/11 attacks as well.[241] However, Japan had already been subjected to terrorist attacks in the mid-1990s and the first of such exercises had taken place in 1999. Further, in Japanese documents, terror attacks are associated with North Korean special forces, this did not change in the early 2000s.[242]

It should be noted that much of the literature on the US-Japan alliance is heavily policy-oriented and often serves a particular partisan political agenda for the alliance, which may limit the academic value of some of these works.[243] While not necessarily policy papers, these works often offer up to-do-lists of policy recommendations that the Japanese government – and more rarely, the US government – should undertake to maintain successful alliance relations.[244] This sort of shopping-list-literature is often linked to the alliance drift narrative as a way to enhance the message that something should be done.[245] Hence, it is important to keep in mind that many publications are loaded with political purpose. Overall, the writings on the US-Japan alliance are largely grounded in topical daily issues. Furthermore, it should be noted that most of the English-language work on the topic is of US origin. The dominance of the literature by US writers and Japanese writers educated in US universities could risk one-sided analysis. Similar challenges are also present in the literature on the ANZUS alliance. Analogous themes also share clear commonalities with those found in studies of ANZUS as will be discussed in the following chapter after a brief historical introduction.

241 Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World*, 26.

242 The anti-terrorism mission appeared in GSDF roles in the Mid-Term Defense Program published in 2000. The *Defense of Japan 2001*, published in July 20001, also notably has a subchapter dealing with infiltration of "guerilla-commandos" in relation to the spy boat incident of 1999. The White Paper notes that the GSDF had already trained to deal with this threat. Hence, 9/11 did not bring about radical changes in Japanese defense policies in this area. The Mid-Term Defense Program can be found in Reference 12 of the White Paper. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2001*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2001, 128.

243 For an interesting discussion on how close links between academics and government officials result in "irrelevant policy advice and poor scholarship" see, for example, Colin S. Grey, "What RAND Hath Wrought," *Foreign Policy* 4, (1971), 111 - 129.

244 E.g., Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin eds., *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999).

245 For example, The Armitage – Nye report of 2012 begins by specifically stating that US- Japan relations are adrift. The similar pattern of invoking some kind of "crisis" that must be fixed recurs in many such papers. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia*, A Report of the CSIS Japan Chair. Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012.

3.3 ANZUS

Ever since it was an isolated British colony, Australia has relied on the presence of a globally dominant maritime power in the Pacific. ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty) itself is a creation of the immediate post-World War II period, and the alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States was signed at the same conference as the US-Japan alliance in September 1951 in San Francisco.[246] Before the war, relations between the US and Australia had not always been friendly but as the limits of the British ability to protect its interest in the Pacific had become clear during the war, Australia sought to cement an official alliance with the newly dominant power in the Pacific. The roots and the logic behind Australian alliance behavior go back all the way to the beginning of the Australian colonial period. Any attempt to understand Australian alliance choices requires some familiarity with Australia's specific historical sense of threat and isolation from its peer group of western countries, which has led it to always align with the predominant western naval power.[247]

Australia began its history as an English-speaking nation when it was colonized by the British Empire in the late 18th Century. Since the arrival of the first British garrison in 1788, British troops were stationed in Australia until 1870 and held significant influence in the early formation of the Australian nation. Even while Australian colonies established their own militias and naval forces, their main protection came from far away Britain. For its part, Australia's supported the British Empire by sending troops to which ever part of the world British forces fought. Australia even paid subsidies to the Royal Navy, which in turn policed Australian waters.[248] Even after Australia's independence in 1901, its first naval buildup was

246 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS)*, San Francisco, September 1, 1951, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html (Accessed June 27, 2021)

247 For a mainstream discussion on Australian western identity see, for example, Allan Gyngell and Arthur Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chapter 10; For an account of how western identity and sense of isolation shaped Australian threat perceptions see Allan Dupont, *Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security* (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Institute, ANU, 1991); For a more critical appraisal see Anthony Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

248 For an account of the so-called "Imperial Defence" -doctrine see Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior and John Connor, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), 307.

initiated in the context of unified commonwealth naval forces under British command.[249]

Before the Second World War, British imperial defense cooperation was conducted around the so-called Singapore strategy. This strategy relied on building up Singapore's defenses so that it could function as a fortress against any aggressor until the British Main Fleet reached the Pacific.[250] However, when the Japanese attack came, not only were the British unable to send forces to counter them, most of the Australian regular forces were already deployed to Africa and the Middle East; thus the Australian forces left in the Asia-Pacific were defeated at the Battle of Singapore.[251] Therefore, Australia had no effective way to defend northern Australia against Japanese attacks until the arrival of US forces and there was little Australia could even do to prevent a Japanese invasion of the Australian mainland.[252] As it was, it became obvious that the British Empire could no longer ensure the safety of its dominions. In December 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin declared that Australia would from then on "…look to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom."[253]

The change of patron was not immediate and not without its own drawbacks. During the Pacific War, US commanders were accused of favoring US troops at the expense of Australians, while sidelining Australians from military decision making. The resulting antagonism even prompted Australians to seek an alternative alliance framework together with New Zealand and the European powers in the immediate afterwar period.[254] However, little ever came from this framework as it did not correspond to the post-war realities.[255] Australia still supported the British forces in Asia and Australians served under British command in Malaya and Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s.[256] It was only during the Korean War when Australian forces, previously part of the British brigade, were transferred directly under US

249 Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 71-73.

250 E.g., Christopher M. Bell, *The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between Wars* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 59-60.

251 E.g., Peter Thompson, *Battle for Singapore* (London: Hachette Digital, 2005); Frank G. Clarke, *The History of Australia* (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 136-137.

252 Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 171-172.

253 E.g., Desmond Ball, "The US-Australian Alliance," in *US Allies in a Changing World* ed. Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 250 -251.

254 Corall Bell, *Dependent Ally; A Study in Australian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Canberra: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1994), 30-33.

255 Christopher Hubbard, *Australian and US Defense Cooperation: Fighting Common Enemies* (Hampshire: Ashgate 2005), 19-20.

256 Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior and John Connor, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), 381-385.

command.[257] This was linked to the signing of the ANZUS agreement, which the British had actively resisted as it excluded British and other European colonies in Asia.[258]

ANZUS was not the only defense treaty framework available at the time. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), signed in Manila in 1954, included France and its former colonies in Asia, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and the US. Even though it has not been considered the most successful of Cold War alliances, SEATO was a significant cooperative framework until the early 1970s.[259] SEATO was utilized in the US intervention in Vietnam in the mid-1960s and Australian forces fighting in Vietnam did so under the SEATO agreement.[260] The War in Vietnam was in many ways a turning point in the Asia-Pacific and for Australian security and alliance politics. Australians troops fought in Vietnam from early 1960 until 1972. During this period approximately 50,000 Australians served in Vietnam, 500 of whom lost their lives.[261] At the time, Australian troops were also engaged in other Southeast Asian conflicts and the Australian government reintroduced military conscription to secure the necessary manpower for these conflicts. This contributed to a significant increase in anti-war and anti-US sentiment among Australians.[262]

The period from the 1950s throughout the end of the Vietnam War in the 1970s is sometimes referred to as the classical period of ANZUS, during which all three alliance partners partook in the same operations and frameworks. The enduring legacy of those times are the US communications and signals intelligence facilities, built in the Northwest Cape in 1963, Pine Gap in 1966, and Nurrungar in 1970. This period ended with the aftermath of Vietnam War, which had been the source of large-scale demonstrations in Australia, and the following massive US withdrawal from Asia.[263] These events coincided with the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia in 1971 and the disbanding of SEATO in 1977. However, even after SEATO was dissolved, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand retained their traditional

257 Dennis, Grey, Morris, Prior and Connor, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, 333-336.

258 Hubbard, *Australian and US Defense Cooperation*, 16-17, 21-22.

259 Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 215, 225.

260 It should be noted that this request was very likely prompted by the US and that the Australian contribution was already agreed on with the US side. See, for example, John C. Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British and American Empires* (Montreal: Mcgill Queens University Press, 2006), 130-131.

261 E.g., Jeff Doyle, Jeffrey Grey, and Peter Pierce, eds. *Australia's Vietnam War* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002).

262 Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 232-234, 239-243.

263 Hubbard, *Australian and US Defense Cooperation*, 53.

commitments with Malaysia and Singapore through the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), signed in 1971.

Australian security strategy of the period is usually referred to as the Forward Defence doctrine. The thought behind Forward Defence was that Australian armed forces and diplomacy were to be used in Southeast Asia to support the presence of its allies and to prevent the rise of hostile powers in the region. As Southeast Asia is the only region from which Australia can be conventionally attacked, this would essentially ensure Australian security. Furthermore, it was thought that Australian commitments to common security would ensure US support in the case of a future threat towards Australia itself.[264] However, after US and British forces withdrew from the region, this was no longer feasible. Australia therefore needed a new strategy. At the same time, the anti-war movement contributed to a shift to the left in Australian politics, particularly within the Labor Party, which assumed leadership of the country for the first time since the 1940s.

Therefore, by the late 1970s, Australia's security thinking shifted towards self-reliant defense. Its international contributions focused on the immediate neighborhood and contributions beyond the Southwestern Pacific were to be "political rather than military."[265] As for the alliance, it was thought that the US would guarantee Australia's security as long as Australia was able to defend itself independently.[266] However, consecutive Coalition Party and Labor Party governments failed to articulate how this self-sufficient and regional defense posture was to be achieved or to allocate resources to man and equip the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) for this mission. To add to these uncertainties, the anti-alliance fractions of the Labor Party gained support with the growth of the anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s.[267] In 1982, the Labor Party even made the nuclear weapons ban a part of its electoral platform. The US position was that any such ban would effectively mean an end to the alliance.[268] This confusion over Australian security strategy persisted until the late 1980s.

The official Defence of Australia doctrine was presented by Bob Hawke's Labor Party government in 1987 after years of balancing Labor Party's left-wing anti-

264 William T. Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player: U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy in the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 82-83.

265 Parliament of Australia, Defense Committee, *Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1976*, Canberra, September 2, 1976.

266 Parliament of Australia, Defense Committee, *Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971*, Canberra, March 5, 1976, Paragraph 19.

267 E.g., Kim C. Beazley, "Federal Labor and the Vietnam Commitment," in *Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War*, ed. Peter King (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 36-56.

268 E.g., Michael C. Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

alliance fractions with its more pro-alliance mainstream.[269] It was preceded by an influential study authored by Professor Paul Dibb in 1986, generally referred to as the "Dibb Report."[270] The report – as well as the following 1987 White Paper titled Defence of Australia – emphasizes the concentration of Australia's military capabilities to control and defend the so-called "air-sea gap" – the maritime area between Australia and its northern neighbors. The strategy envisioned concentric circles of layered security engagement from the Asia-Pacific area inwards to the immediate neighborhood and to Australia itself, the military defense of which was the innermost of the circles. [271]

At the time, New Zealand had banned all US warships carrying nuclear weapons from its ports, prompting a major crisis in the alliance. In response, the US formally suspended its treaty obligations with New Zealand.[272] As the anti-nuclear movement had made similar demands in Australia, this led to serious doubts about whether Australia's alliance would follow suit.[273] Further, the implications that the new doctrine would have for the alliance were unclear, especially as the Dibb Report downplayed the overall importance of the ANZUS alliance. To stave off the threat to the alliance, the Hawke government distanced itself from the anti-nuclear movement and sided with the US in the argument.[274] On US request, Australia also deployed a small Australian military force to the Persian Gulf during the Iran – Iraq war. [275] These actions were specifically done to maintain the ANZUNS alliance and were arguably successful in doing so.[276]

269 Peter Jennings, "The Politics of Defence White Papers," *Security Challenges* 9, no.2 (2013), 3-4.

270 Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister of Defence* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987).

271 Department of Defence, *Defence of Australia 1987*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987.

272 *New York Times*, "An End To ANZUS," December 1, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/01/weekinreview/the-world-an-end-to-anzus.html (Accessed July 27, 2021)

273 For a comprehensive account on the crisis see Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player*, 355-374.

274 E.g., Steward Firth, *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2011), 39.

275 Hubbard, *Australian and US Defense Cooperation*, 65-66,

276 Interviews with Hugh White, February 19, 2014, Desmond Ball, February 26, 2014, and Peter Jennings, February 28, 2014. White worked as a senior adviser for Kim Beazley and Bob Hawke. Peter Jennings worked as a defense adviser to the Coalition Party in the early 1990s and in several defense strategy posts within the Howard government. Desmond Ball was one of the most respected academic experts on Australian military strategy at the time.

Alliance structures and politics

Overall, ANZUS has always enjoyed bipartisan support in Australia as well as markedly high approval ratings among Australians in general. Even in the 1970 and 80s, this support was never been below 70%.[277] As with most western countries, international politics have rarely been a major topic in Australian elections after the late 1970s.[278] Despite some notable exceptions, alliance and security-related policies have also carried over between different governments – Labor or Coalition.[279] So, even though the nature of Australian defense was transformed from the 1970s onward, the most likely reasons for this were the trends in the regional setting and the drastic changes in US posture. The policies initiated under the Labor Party governments after the challenges of the 1970s and 1980s, were consistently carried over to the Coalition Party governments and the other way around.

The treaty itself forms the main institutional basis of the alliance. The only major change to the treaty framework was the ejection of New Zealand in 1986.[280] At the core of the treaty is the mutual obligation for the security of the parties. The treaty states that "The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific" and that "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."[281] Article VII of the treaty establishes a "Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies" and Article X establishes that the "…Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely."[282] While the treaty talks on the Pacific as the affected area, the ANZUS council in 1977 extended this to include the Indian Ocean.[283]

There has been an ongoing debate in Australia over whether the articles of the treaty actually oblige the US to defend Australia. Some have claimed that "consulting together" and "meeting common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes" mentioned in Articles III and IV do not constitute an

277 Desmond Ball, "The US – Australian Alliance," in *US Alliance in a Changing World*, ed. Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 271.
278 Bell, *Dependent Ally,* 173-174.
279 E.g., Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 149-151; Firth, *Australia in International Politics*, 24-25.
280 Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player,* 365-366.
281 Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, Articles III and IV.
282 Ibid, Articles VII and X
283 Bell, *Dependent Ally,* 139-138.

obligation for mutual defense.[284] However, the treaty does state that the treaty is entered into by the parties "to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone."[285] Further, as similar language can be found in several similar treaties that are generally considered valid for binding common defense, this kind of speculation seems rather academic.[286] Whatever the legal status of the articles, Australian governments have consistently referred to the US alliance as the ultimate assurance of Australian security and this idea is clearly based on the understanding that direct US military assistance would be forthcoming if needed.[287]

Unlike the US-Japan alliance, ANZUS does not have an institutionalized structure of committees to manage the alliance functions. Nor does ANZUS have a pre-established joint command like NATO or the US-Republic of South Korea (ROK) alliance in which US commanders are given operational command of allied forces. The principal forum for bilateral consultations since the mid-1980s has been the AUSMIN meeting between the US Secretaries of State and Defense and the Australian Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs. The AUSMIN meetings are set to take place annually, with the meeting place alternating between the US and Australia. These meetings usually release a communiqué reaffirming their mutual commitments and describing some of the key issues discussed.[288]

The alliance of course shares technical agreements regarding specific fields of cooperation. The status of US forces in Australia has been regulated by the Status of Forces Agreement, signed in 1963.[289] Logistics support and cross-servicing is

284 E.g., John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, "The U.S. – Australia Alliance," in *America's Asian Alliances,* ed. Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 94; Hubbard, *Australian and US Defense Cooperation*, 22-23.

285 Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, preamble.

286 For example, some of the language in the security treaty between the US and Japan is essentially identical down to references of meeting "the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". Japan – U.S. Security Treaty, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html (Accessed July 31, 2021)

287 Ball, *The US – Australian Alliance*, 252-253.

288 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *AUSMIN - Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations,* https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations (Accessed August 8, 2021).

289 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of United States of America concerning the Status of United States Forces in Australia, and Protocol*, Canberra, May 9, 1969, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1963/10.html (Accessed July 31, 2021)

regulated by the logistic support agreement of 1989.[290] However, aside from those working at the aforementioned signals intelligence stations, there were no regular US forces stationed in Australia. US forces visiting Australia were usually there for annual exercises, as for example, in 1989 when 2,000 US personnel took part in the Australian annual *Kangaroo* exercises.[291] US Air Force B-52s and KC-135s also periodically use the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) base at Darwin to reach the Indian Ocean and even to fly missions to the Persian Gulf and East Africa.[292] Aside from these, dozens of Australian and US personnel serve in each other's militaries through personnel exchange programs in any given year.[293] Interoperability between allied forces is regulated by the Quadrilateral Standardization Agreement between the US, Australia, the UK, and New Zealand. This framework determines details on technical issues, ranging from standardized operating procedures to the models of power output cables in motor vehicles.[294]

According to the 1987 Australian Defence White Paper, access to US technology was "indispensable" for Australia's self-reliance.[295] At the time, it was thought that "privileged access to the highest level of US defense technology," afforded to Australia by its ANZUS alliance, would allow Australia to develop technical capabilities for controlling Australia's vast maritime approaches.[296] The defense industrial relation between the ANZUS allies has generally been a one-sided affair, albeit with some significant cooperation agreements in specific sectors. Australia has usually relied on its technologically advanced ally for its advanced military equipment, and this has ensured high levels of interoperability.[297]

The technical details of the defense technology cooperation framework were already established by the late 1950s and 1960s through several bilateral agreements

290 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of United States of America concerning Defense Logistical Support*, Sydney, November 4, 1989, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

291 E.g., *Australian Defence Force Journal*, 77, July/August 1989, 5.

292 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of United States of America for the Staging of United States Air Force B-52 Aircraft and Associated KC-135 Tanker Aircraft through Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin*, Canberra, March 11, 1981, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

293 John C. Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 60-61

294 E.g., Harold A. Skaarup, *Out of Darkness – Light: History of Canadian Military Intelligence*, (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2005), 111-112.

295 Department of Defence, Defence of Australia 1987. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987.

296 Kim Beazley, "Self-Reliance: A New Direction" (Speech, Perth, May 23, 1987).

297 Bell, *Dependent Ally*, 61.

such as the 1958 Agreement for Defense Technology Information Exchanges,[298] the 1960 Mutual Weapons Development Program Agreement,[299] and the 1968 agreement on scientific and technical cooperation.[300] Already at the time, the most important field of cooperation was related to space exploration and its military applications, namely communications and signals intelligence. The two sides signed no less than 10 agreements and exchanges of notes relating to space vehicle tracking and communications during the 1960s and 1970s.[301] A major part of these agreements related to the US use of the joint facilities for such purposes. Missile defense also became a central theme in this field, and early on Australia played a role in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The SDI was an ambitious project, launched by the Reagan administration to establish a space-based defense system against Soviet nuclear missiles. Joint facilities at Nurrungar and Pine Gap would have played a key role in the early warning and target acquisition of the system.[302] While the SDI was never completed, it became a precursor to the US-led ballistic missile defense program.

Intelligence cooperation was a key feature of technical cooperation as well. The UKUSA (United Kingdom – United States) intelligence sharing arrangement has been the most significant framework for intelligence cooperation between the US and Australia and, according to some observers, altogether the most important part of the ANZUS alliance.[303] The agreement itself was signed between the US and UK in March 1946. Because of the deep linkages and pre-established spheres of cooperation between the commonwealth intelligence communities, the arrangement

298 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America to Facilitate Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes, and Exchange of Notes*, Washington, January 24, 1958, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

299 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Mutual Weapons Development Program Agreement Between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of United States*, Washington, August 23, 1960, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

300 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement Relating to Scientific and Technical Co-operation between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the United States of America*, Canberra, October 16, 1968, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

301 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Treaty Database, https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/treaties/australian-treaties-database (Accessed July 31, 2021)

302 E.g., Richard Rabin-Smith, *Australia and Ballistic Missile Defense*, ASPI Strategic Insight, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2004.

303 Ball, *The US – Australian Alliance*, 255.

necessarily involved Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as well.[304] Australian intelligence stations are mainly used to monitor the nearby regions and contribute to the overall coverage of the UKUSA community. One example of these is the Shoal Bay Receiving Station in northern Australia, which reportedly concentrates on surveying communications from the Indonesian archipelago.[305] By some estimates, however, the US signals intelligence and communication facilities located in Pine Gap in the Northern Territories and the satellite station in Nurrungar in Southern Australia are even more central to the alliance.[306] These stations have been used for communications and control of US intelligence satellites directed towards eastern Russia, the Middle East, and South Asia.[307] While these were originally US-run facilities, by the 1980s they had become increasingly shared between the allies. [308]

The academic literature on the ANZUS alliance

As with literature on the US-Japan alliance, a set of coherent themes can be identified in the works on ANZUS. These themes have evolved somewhat over the recent decades but still show clear continuity over a longer period. The works also reflect on how the alliance was seen at the time of writing and on how the authors wanted the alliance to develop. This section will discuss these themes. Works that have covered both ANZUS and the US-Japan alliance will be discussed shortly at the end of the chapter.

Arguably the most informative and comprehensive work on the history of ANZUS is the *Dependent Ally*, by Corall Bell, the latest edition of which was published in the early 1990s. Bell's central argument was that Australia's relationship with the US has been a patron-client relation whereby Australia's military choices have been determined almost solely by the need to contribute to the alliance. On the other hand, Australian contributions have been "token contributions," only made to ensure the continued security guarantees from the senior ally. As Australia has not faced significant threats itself, it has had no need to

304 For a historical account of the political side see Bell, *Dependent Ally*, 36-37; For a more technical discussion see Desmond Ball, *Code 777: Australia and the US Defence Satellite Communications System (DSCS)*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 56 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre/ ANU, 1989).

305 This station apparently played a significant role in the East Timor –affair in the late 1990s. See, for example, *NBC News*, "Keeping an 'ear' on East Timor", September 12, 1999.

306 Ball, *The US – Australian Alliance*, 255.

307 Ibid., 255

308 E.g., John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, "The U.S. – Australia Alliance", in *America's Asian Alliances*, ed. Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb (Cambridge MT: The MIT Press, 2000)

maintain large forces for purposes other than alliance contributions. According to Bell, this disregard of independent defense capabilities has left Australia in a permanently subjugated role to the US. Bell's work covers the alliance from its genesis only to the end of the Cold War, but few works have attempted to analyze the alliance in a historical perspective since, although Australian dependence on the US has been one of the defining themes in academic studies of ANZUS. In the 1990's, the argument was made that this dependence was changing as Australia began to concentrate more on its immediate region instead of far-flung alliance commitments.[309] Correspondingly, the US role was to ensure this self-reliance.[310]

The War on Terror gave birth to a new way to write about Australia's relations with the US. As with the Japan-US alliance, post-9/11 literature often has tended to focus on the impact of the War on Terror. It has been commonplace to argue that the post-9/11 operations were something new and raised alliance cooperation to a new level. However, several writers nonetheless expressed skepticism about how much of an impact the War on Terror actually has had.[311] These arguments took several forms. For example, Christopher Hubbard argues that the ANZUS alliance is one between "two very different" nations that nevertheless "fight common enemies" and that the emergence of new common enemies in the form of terrorist organizations had changed the alliance after the 9/11 attacks.

In Hubbard's account, the influence of powerful individuals has determined the evolution of the alliance into a kind of personalized domestic political explanation. However, Hubbard supports this argument with only one case study.[312] Nevertheless, the influence of individual actors and their critique was one specific theme that emerged in the post-9/11 literature. The critique against the War on Terror often focused on Prime Minister Howard and his personal relationship with President Bush.[313] Others, however, lauded Howard's ability to take the alliance to a new level of "intimacy" achieving significant gains for Australia.[314] In these works, there is a tendency to emphasize individuals' roles in managing the alliance.[315] This can be

309 E.g., Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player,* 117-118.

310 E.g., Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s* (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 59-62.

311 E.g., Derek McDougall and Peter Sherman, *Australian Security After 9/11: New and old agendas,* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006).

312 Hubbard. *Australian and US Military Cooperation*, 26, 43, 62, 75 -76, 97.

313 E.g., Robert Garran, *True Believer: John Howard, George Bush & the American Alliance*, (Crows Nest: Allen & Unvin, 2004).

314 E.g., Gregg Sheridan, *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US – Australia Alliance under Howard and Bush*, (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006). pp. 318-319.

315 E.g., Maryanne Kelton, '*More than an Ally'? Contemporary Australia – US Relations*, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008). pp. 1-2.

seen as contradictory as there was a broad consensus across political parties on most lines of Australian security policy at the time and the US alliance enjoyed wide-ranging bipartisan support in the country.[316]

Australia's geographical location as an isolated western country just south of the Asian landmass has always been one of the defining features of Australian security thinking.[317] Since the early 1990s, the theme of a rising Asia and its implications for Australian security have continued this tradition. Asia's rise has sometimes been seen as a dilemma for Australia: should it choose between its US alliance and its history as a western nation; or is its future role to be played in a region of increasing economic dynamism and prosperity albeit under eastern cultural influence.[318] Some have argued that it is precisely the US-alliance that allows Australia to hold influence in greater Asia and makes Australia strong enough to benefit from economic opportunities in region.[319]

While China largely did not feature in the Australian alliance literature of the early 1990s, it has become increasingly central after the early 2000s.[320] As Australia's gains from Chinese markets grew, the problem of increased economic links to China, coupled with the possibility of US-China hostilities dragging Australia into an unwanted confrontation, emerged as a central strategic puzzle.[321] At the same time, Australia's alliance relations with the US, as well as its relations with Japan, have been increasingly discussed in light of China's rise and the security implications this brings.[322] This has produced a debate about Australia's place in the new regional balance of power. Some notable authors, led by Hugh White, have argued that Australia's reliance on the US might be detrimental to its real interest as a "middle power" between two great powers.[323]

316 E.g., Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

317 Anthony Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

318 E.g., William T. Tow, "Introduction," in William T. Tow (ed.), *Australian – American Relations: Looking Toward the Next Century*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999)

319 E.g., Rawdon Dalrymple, "Overview: An Australian Perspective," in William T. Tow (ed.), *Australian – American Relations: Looking Toward the Next Century*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999)

320 E.g., William T. Tow, *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). pp. 2, 12-14.

321 E.g., Firth, *Australia in International Politics*, 145-146.

322 E.g., William T. Tow, Mark J. Thompson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto & Satu P. Limaye, eds. *Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan in the New Security Triangle*, (New York: Routledge,2007), 1-2.

323 E.g., Hugh White, "Alliances and order in the 'Asian Century'", in *Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation* ed. William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

This debate has become entangled with the traditional debate about the reach of Australia security policies between the limited Defence of Australia doctrine and those supporting a global reach in the spirit of Forward Engagement. Those arguing for the first side emphasize that the core of Australian security strategy should be in the defense of Australia's northern approaches (sea-air gap) and the secondary strategic interest area should be limited to the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia. Those of the second opinion would seek to increase Australia's global reach in support of the US and argue that Australia needs to be more able to contribute to allied military operations far abroad.[324]

3.4 Evaluations and Comparisons of the Historic Backgrounds

As demonstrated, the differences in these two alliances go beyond the establishment of the San Francisco system in the early 1950s and were evident throughout the Cold War period. Japan was at best a reluctant security partner of the US, while Australia has fought in all the major military engagements alongside US forces. The roles that these alliances played in the overall US Cold War strategy were also quite different. Australia was a source of support in military operations in Asia and elsewhere as well as a base for intelligence gathering and limited operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan, on the other hand, its southernmost islands located on top of key shipping lanes between the Northeast Asian mainland and the Pacific Ocean and within striking distance from Chinese and North Korean strategic areas, was a crucial base of operations for US forces, not only in East Asia, but also in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

While Australia had few US forces on its soil, it had a strong tradition of military cooperation with the US. Japan, on the other hand, hosted a large number of US forces but only held its first large-scale joint exercises in the late 1980s. Both Australia and Japan acquired or licensed large portions of their defense equipment from the US, but while ADF interoperability with the US was institutionally

[324] There are several variations on the names of these different schools of thought. Michael Evans, for example, has labeled these as "Defender-Regionalist" and "Reformer-Globalists" schools. These terms are, of course, often part of the debate itself as Evans clearly posits himself in the "Reformer-Globalist" school and paints a kind of "strawman" image of the out-of-date "Defender-Regionalists" as "little Australians" whose way of thinking is something from the 1970s and 1980s. See, for example Michael Evans, "Security and Defense aspects of the Special Relationship: Australian Perspective," in *The Other Special Relationship: The United States and Australia at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland, Douglas T. Stuart, William T. Tow and Michael Wesley (Canberra: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 281- 282

regulated from early on, JSDF interoperability with US forces was only formally studied after the early 1980s. Notably, while Japan and Australia had different kinds of technology bases, both were involved in the SDI project from the mid-1980s onwards. However, the Japanese technology base in this cooperation was more important for the US, while Australia mostly hosted US facilities. Hence, while Japan was in many ways militarily and economically stronger and much more central to US strategy than Australia, it was less able to actively contribute to the alliance. This was also evident from the fact that Australian defense cooperation with the US was coordinated in yearly ministerial meetings, while Japanese cabinet-level ministers negotiated with US ambassadors and generals.

Although dependency on the US was the one unifying theme in both alliances, the ways it was manifested in the relations were different. Dependency was also a constant topic in the academic works on both alliances. Australia has traditionally seen itself as a dependent ally and maintained its alliance relations despite political costs. Japan, alternatively, was made dependent by the US after the Second World War and has maintained itself as such, largely by its own choice. Both Japan and Australia consider themselves protected by the US nuclear umbrella, even though there are few countries with weapons capable of reaching targets in Australia, let alone interests in doing so. In both alliances, domestic political elites have sought to maintain their alliances even in the face of popular opposition. Examples include Prime Minister Kishi's political suicide in his effort to rewrite the alliance agreement, and the Hawke government's efforts to maintain the alliance despite contrary expectations from his own party.

From these historical accounts, it is evident that the US policy changes in the 1970s were a significant turning point in the Cold War period for both alliances. The Nixon doctrine, opening US relations to China, and the withdrawal of almost half a million US troops from the Western Pacific prompted both Japan and Australia to drastically restructure their security policies in the following decades. It is clear that the main drivers for these processes were not rooted in the changing threat environment or in Australian or Japanese domestic politics. Rather, the clear determining factor was the drastic change in US priorities. It can be argued that the Nixon doctrine was the first common driver for the alliances as it specifically emphasized the need for the US' Pacific allies to bear an increased burden for their own defense. Prior to that, the US had long demanded that Japan contribute a larger share of its own defense but had not actually demanded significant troop deployments outside Japan. On the other hand, Australia had deployed troops all over Asia in the previous two decades and there were no real signs that the US would have been concerned about the Australian share of defense burden. However, the US exodus from Southeast Asia drastically altered this dynamic.

Another important emerging dynamic was the US demand for allied contributions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, enshrined in the Carter Doctrine of the 1980s. When the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf threatened vital oil shipments, both Australia and Japan were called to contribute to the effort of securing the oil flows. In the early 20th century, the Middle East had been under British and French influence but after the mid-1950s, these nations' ability to play a significant role had decreased. As Soviet influence in the region was rising in the 1970s and 1980s, the US call for contributions especially concerned allies outside the European theatre such as Japan and Australia. This theme was clearly observable in both relations by the late 1980s.

There are few academic works that have analyzed these common issues in the alliances or compared the ANZUS and Japan-US alliance. One example has been Tomohiko Satake's analysis of the ways of cooperation in the two alliances. Satake uses the Gulf War of 1991, the reaffirmation of alliances in the 1990s, and the War on Terror operations in the early 2000s, as case studies to demonstrate how the alliances have moved in similar directions, involving contributions in non-traditional security areas.[325] On the other hand, Robert Blackwell and Paul Dibb have analyzed these alliances in the context of the regional balance of the late 1990s and concluded that the lack of common threats slowly eroded both alliances.[326] Other works have also emphasized the differences between these alliances while others have argued that the bilateral alliances actually form a part of a strategically interdependent system in which the logic of one alliance relation is actually dependent on other alliances.[327] This line of argumentation has been adopted by Thomas Wilkins who argues that the US-Japan and US-Australia alliances are in the process of forming a new sort of trilateral bloc.[328]

While many works have provided insights into the different alliance relations connecting the US to the Western Pacific, there remains a lack of a coherent systematic analysis of the developments of the two alliances after the Cold War. This work will seek to fill some of these gaps in the literature. In doing so, it contributes to the understanding of how US alliances in the Pacific function and what can be said about them as a system of alliances with shared attributes, instead of as singular

325 Tomohiko Satake, *From 'Collective Defense' to 'International Security': Security Burden Sharing in US – Japan and US – Australia Alliances in the Post- Cold War era,* Australian National University 2006.

326 Robert D. Blackwell and Paul Dibb eds., *America's Asian Alliances* (Cambridge: the MIT press, 2000), 16-17,

327 Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto eds., *The Future of American Alliances in Northeast Asia,* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 11-12.

328 Thomas S. Wilkins, "'Towards a "Trilateral Alliance?' Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations," in *Asian Security* 3, no.3 (2007), 251 - 278.

cases. It should also be noted that as the regional dynamics of the Asia-Pacific are rapidly evolving, the need to understand the previous historical developments becomes increasingly central for an overall understanding of the current dynamics.

It is important to understand that no social phenomena take place in a vacuum and that events are always conditioned by preceding conditions. This chapter has shown how the two alliances, which are the subjects of this study, have been formed and how they have developed during their early years. This chapter has also discussed the historical issues and the country-specific factors that have influenced – and continue to influence –strategic decision making in Japan and Australia. In other words, this chapter has described the surrounding and preceding conditions necessary for understanding how the alliances began to develop after the Cold War. While doing so, it has also demonstrated how the two alliances, which differ in their historical starting conditions, regional threat environments, and domestic political conditions, began to show increasing similarities from the 1970s onwards. The following chapters will pick up the story from here and apply the research framework discussed in the previous chapters to demonstrate how the developments following the end of Cold War can be explained.

4 Alliances in the Age of uncontested US supremacy (1990–2001)

As explained in the preceding chapters, the case studies will be presented in three periodical-chapters, written chronologically. This chapter will focus on the decade following the end of the Cold War. The 1990s were characterized by uncontested US supremacy in the global international order. The Soviet Union had collapsed, and US forces had shattered the Iraqi armies in the Persian Gulf War. This war demonstrated that old Soviet-style militaries, such as those of China and North Korea, would have no hope of prevailing in a conventional war against the US. This lesson was not lost on the regional powers as China immediately launched an overhaul of the PLA, and North Korea accelerated its nuclear weapons and missile development programs. At the same time, the biggest economic rival to US prominence, Japan, entered a dramatic recession from which it would not fully recover for two decades. For all intents and purposes, the United States was the unipolar power and the uncontested hegemon of the global order in the 1990s. As will be shown in this chapter, this had profound effects on its alliances with Japan and Australia.

The presentation will follow the research setting by first discussing the development of the explanatory variables during this period, beginning with a general overview of the security environment and the major development therein. This will be followed with an examination of US policies and posture in the region and the relevant developments in Japan and Australia. Each specific event or development will then be analyzed in a separate section. At the end of each section, there will be an assessment of the four different frameworks following the methods presented in chapter two. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of how the two cases compare in regard to the theories in said period.

4.1 The United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific at the end of the Cold War

After the Cold War, the United States was the world's only superpower. Its position as the sole great power in the Western Hemisphere made it virtually invulnerable as the Soviet nuclear forces were being dismantled. Importantly, however, this was not true for US regional allies in Asia-Pacific. The security situation of the Asia-Pacific of the 1990s was becoming increasingly complex as the regional threat environment evolved from the superpower confrontation of the late 1980s to smaller threats and localized confrontations. When discussing the security of Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, it is important to remember that the German unification in Europe was not reciprocated in Asia. To this day, there are two Chinas and two Koreas, and the fall of the Soviet Union did not change this – it only took away one of the potential guarantors of the North Korean regime. However, the major threat that the US

alliances were built against disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union, even as the regional security environment became unstable.

Overseas deployments of troops were necessary for the US to maintain its unipolar power, but at the same time, the costs borne by US taxpayers were increasingly difficult to explain. Therefore, US administrations needed to cut down expenditures. Consequently, the number of US troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific was reduced across the board. The number of troops in Japan fell from 50,000 in 1989 to 45,000 in 1992, and in South Korea from 45,000 to 35,000.[329] However, in comparison to troop reductions in Europe, these decreases were relatively small. Considering the US pullout from Asia in the 1970s, when US troop levels fell from three quarters of a million in 1969 to around 100,000 in 1979, it could be said that the troop reductions in Asian at the end of the Cold War were cosmetic. The symbolic number of 100,000 US troops in the Western Pacific was maintained throughout the period.[330] Towards the end of the 1990s, the number of US forces in the Asia-Pacific remained relatively stable, one major development being the partial relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to the US Pacific Ocean territory of Guam. This relocation was related to the envisioned return of some 50 square kilometers of land, held by US forces in Okinawa and the expected closure of the Futenma air base.[331]

The US presence in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific had been relatively small ever since the pullout of the 1970s. In the 1990s, the US presence was reduced to almost nothing as the number of US forces stationed in the Philippines was first cut down from 16,000 in 1989 to 2,000 in 1992, the remaining US bases were closed in 1993.[332] This left Australia as the only country south of Okinawa with US forces stationed on its territory, which only included approximately 300 US Air Force and 100 US Navy personnel. However, the largest number of these were stationed at the Pine Gap facility, which continued to expand throughout the 1990s.[333]

With the Soviet threat and the once-great Soviet Pacific Fleet, which had operated as far as the Indian Ocean and coast of Africa, deteriorating rapidly, there was no threat of superpower confrontation in Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the main

329 Data on US military personnel from United States Department of Defense: https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports(Accessed June 18, 2021)

330 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 editions (London: Brassey's, various years).

331 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, editions 1995-2001. Tokyo: Urban Connections, various years.

332 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1989-1990, 1990-1991, 1991-1992,1992-1993 editions (London: Brassey's, various years).

333 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1989-1990, 1990-1991, 1991-1992,1992-1993,1993-1994 and 1994-1995 editions (London: Brassey's, various years).

factors in the regional threat environment in the 1990s were related to local instability in the form of North Korea in Northeast Asia as well as fragile and failed states in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The potential challenge for the US-led regional order by China was almost non-existent in the first half of the decade.

The weak China of the 1990s

In the 1990s, China was militarily underdeveloped and lacked any real power projection capabilities beyond its small nuclear arsenal. But even in the early 1990s, there were signs that China's emergence as a regional power would have significant security implications in the long term. The 1989 crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square demonstrated that China would not follow the Soviet Union's path to rapid reforms, and China passed a controversial law in 1992 defining its territorial claim over the disputed islands in the East- and South China Seas. This legislation included the Senkaku islands held by Japan and islands within the so-called "nine dash line" in the South China Sea, including several Philippine-held islands. In 1993, just after the US pullout from the Philippines, China occupied the Mischief Reef claimed by the Philippines.[334]

However, the official documents in Japan or Australia did not show any alarm over these issues. In Japan's 1995 White Paper, Chinese military modernization was given only a passing note and was "expected to gradually proceed at a moderate rate." China's improving relations with the US and Taiwan were positively noted, while the claim on Senkaku Islands with the Territorial Waters Act of 1992 was noted only briefly.[335] The main reaction to the Chinese arms buildup in the early 1990s seemed to revolve around questions of whether or not to reduce Japanese ODA in response.[336] Even China's aircraft carrier program, which surfaced in 1992, was hardly noted.[337] By 1995, China's growing military expenditure was still less than half that of Japan's, and China's military was hampered by obsolete equipment and its reliance on an oversized mass-based army.[338]

The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996-97 showed that China was prepared to use military force to protect its interests. This crisis was ignited by Taiwan's President Lee's visit to the US in June 1995. In response, China deployed around 150,000

334 E.g., Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, "The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1", in *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, no.2 (2003): 344-345.
335 Japan Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1995*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1995.
336 *Japan Times*, "China arms plan triggers aid review," March 28, 1991.
337 Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," in *Asian Survey* 34, no. 5, (1994): 435-436.
338 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (Accessed July 31, 2021)

troops to the littoral region opposite Taiwan and conducted amphibious landing exercises in the area. These were accompanied by several consecutive missile tests, with several missiles splashing down close to Taiwan's harbors. In 1996, Beijing launched another series of missile tests in an apparent effort to make a statement before Taiwan's presidential elections. In response, Taiwan announced its readiness to repel what it termed a "communist invasion." The US response was to condemn Chinese actions and to order the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area in March 1996. Notably, one of the carriers was the USS *Independence*, sailing from its home port in Japan. The Chinese side responded by warning the US not to send the ships into the straits, which the US side refrained from doing, instead only maintaining its presence in the area.[339] The year was an election year in the US, so arguably the Clinton administration needed to appear tough on foreign policy without actually risking a conflict.[340]

The crisis and the dispatch of the largest US naval force to the region since the 1970s, brought new expectations of potential future conflicts. US military planning increasingly started to consider a conflict with China as a possible scenario and literature about a possible conflict between these countries proliferated.[341] In 1996, China also conducted a series of nuclear tests, which were condemned by the US as well as Japan and Australia.[342] These events, together with the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade by US forces in 1999 and the collision between a Chinese fighter and an EP-3 surveillance plane near Hainan Island in 2000, all contributed to changing threat perceptions about China. Both Japan and Australia also supported US actions around Taiwan. Japan did this by authorizing Japanese support for US

339 E.g., Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis – Its Crux and Solutions," *Asian Survey* 36, no.11 (1996).

340 For a review of the motivations behind the crisis and a discussion of the immediate impact on the East Asian strategic environment see Andrew Scobell, "Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no.2 (2000).

341 For the effect of the crisis on US military planning and nuclear posture see, for example, Jeffrey Lewis, "China's Nuclear Modernization: Surprise Restraint, and Uncertainty," in *Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in The Second Nuclear Age* ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2013); Richard C. Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker ed. *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). For more speculative work on US – China conflict see Ted Galen Carpenter, *America's Coming War with China* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

342 Colin Brown, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: January-June 1996," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 42, no.3 (1996): 334-335

vessels during the crisis.[343] Australia's government avoided direct action but publicly supported US actions.[344]

After 1996, relations with China were difficult for both Australia and Japan. Australia hosted the Dalai Lama in 1996 in the middle of the Taiwan Crisis, which was strongly condemned by Beijing. [345] The fact that the Tokyo statement and Sydney declaration confirming the US alliances in the Pacific took place during this tense period, ensured that the Chinese side saw the two alliances as unfavorably directed against it.[346] After dealing carefully with China's rise in the early 1990s, by 2000, Japanese White Papers increasingly pointed toward China as one of the major threats to Japan.[347] Australia was not immune from these concerns, even if its distance made it less susceptible to Chinese aggression. In early 2001, after the aforementioned incident involving a mid-air collision of US surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter, Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vessels were intercepted by the Chinese in the Taiwan strait. This confrontation was seen in Australia as retaliation for supporting the US.[348]

The North Korean nuclear crisis

As the Cold War ended, the prevailing sentiment was that peace would also eventually prevail in the Korean Peninsula. As part of its reduction of forces abroad, the US scaled down its forces in South Korea and withdrew its nuclear weapons from the peninsula. In an unusual step, the US implicitly acknowledged that these weapons had been removed.[349] The DPRK agreed to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreement in 1991, in return the US cancelled the US-ROK Team Spirit exercises scheduled for 1992. The situation, however, deteriorated in early 1993 as violations of the restrictions placed on IAEA inspectors by the DPRK became apparent and the increasing indications grew that North Korea had continued to process plutonium covertly.[350] The Team Spirit exercise, cancelled

343 E.g., Ikibe Makoto, "Japanese Diplomacy after the Cold War," in *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*, ed. Iokibe Makoto (New York: Routledge, 2011), 186-187.

344 Mohan Malik, "Australia and China: Divergence and Convergence of Interests", in *The National Interests in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-1997*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 112-113.

345 Ibid., 112-113

346 Malik, *Australia and China*, 94-95.

347 Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2000*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2000, 128.

348 Rod Lyon, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: January to June 2001," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 47, no.4 (2001):526.

349 Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 10.

350 Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 184-186.

for 1992, went ahead in 1993 despite DPRK protests, and in March 1993, the DPRK declared its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[351] A few months later, the DPRK performed its first test of its No-dong missile, capable of reaching most of Japan.[352]

The first response was to compel the DPRK to abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty through economic sanctions. To be effective, the sanctions relied on Japanese implementation as Japan had significant economic links to Pyongyang through the Korean association Chosen Soren.[353] The sanctions were set to escalate over time, beginning with the cessation of technical and economic assistance. This would be followed by a ban on remittances and scheduled flights to the DPRK. In the final stage, all shipping would be blocked.[354]After some internal debate, the Japanese government affirmed its support of UN-imposed sanctions and that Japanese logistical support for the blockade of DPRK shipping would be within the scope of the Japanese constitution.[355] Japan's readiness to support US-led sanctions regime was assured in discussions between US and Japanese diplomats.[356] As discussed later, these events likely had a significant role in prompting the reaffirmation of the alliance and, at the very least, highlighted a clear set of action points that could be singled out for improvement.[357]

At the height of the crisis, the use of US military force to destroy or seriously degrade the DPRK nuclear program was a real possibility. In 1993, Japan and the US began a secret contingency planning for a possible military escalation and the US issued a list of measures needed from the Japanese side. Japanese support for military action was affirmed in a meeting between US Secretary of Defense Perry and the head of the Japan Defense Agency Aichi in April 1994.[358] This was a significant commitment from the Japanese and could have been politically controversial, should hostilities actually have broken out. One US diplomat

351 Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1994*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1994, 36-42.

352 E.g., Narushige Michishita, *North Korea's Military Diplomatic Campaigns,1966-2008* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 93-94.

353 Chosen Soren is a pro-DPRK Korean citizen's organization in Japan that has been the source of substantial financial support for the DPRK regime in the form of remittances. These remittances have not been carefully monitored but the yearly transactions in the early nineties are estimated between $200 and $600 million.

354 Christopher W. Hughes, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security," *Survival* 38, no.2 (1996): 90.

355 Ibid., 89.

356 United States Department of State, Embassy cable 00966, 1994/06/09, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1961-2000.

357 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going Critical*, 209.

358 Ibid., 177-179, 216.

described the North Korean issues as having produced a "heightened spirit of cooperation" in Japanese defense officials and identified "great potential for very productive political, operational, and technical collaboration" resulting from the crisis.[359] Technology cooperation for the development of ballistic missile defense systems was also reinvigorated during discussions in 1993.[360]

The diplomatic efforts eventually succeed in calming the crisis with the so-called Agreed Framework declaration. This agreement allowed for limited nuclear power capability for the North Korea and alleviated its short-term energy need with fuel shipments. The framework needed US allies, namely Japan and the ROK, to bear the main financial burden as the US Congress blocked any financial aid.[361] But the respite was short-lived as the DPRK provocatively launched a two-stage ballistic missile over Japan in September 1998. While the DPRK claimed this was a test launch of a space vehicle, most Japanese and US sources asserted that this was actually a test of intercontinental missile technology.[362] By the end of the 1990s, there were serious doubts about the disarmament as North Korea was, according to a preponderance of evidence, still pursuing its nuclear program.[363] The incident was followed by an encounter between a Japanese Coast Guard vessel and two North Korean spy boats in March 1999.[364] These events demonstrated that even though military confrontation was avoided in the mid-1990s, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula remained a real possibility.

This crisis has been cited as the second failure of the US-Japan alliance and one of the factors contributing to the so called "alliance drift" between the two.[365] However, there are few issues in which the allies were significantly at odds over the

359 United States Department of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, August 4, 1993, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1961-2000.

360 United States Department of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 00913, 1993/09/23. *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1961-2000.

361 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going Critical*, 177-179, 290 -292.

362 E.g., New York Times, *North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory*, September 1, 1998.

363 E.g., Richard L. Armitage, *A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, no. 159, March 1999.

364 Joshua Ho and Sam Bateman (eds.), *Maritime Challenges and Priorities in Asia Implications for Regional Security*, (New York: Routledge, 2012). pp. 203-204.

365 E.g., Satake, Tomohiko "The Origins of Trilateralism? US-Japan-Australia security relations in the 1990s,"in *International Relations of the Asian Pacific* 11, no.2 (2011): 89.

crisis. Japan was willing to do what was asked of it, even militarily, despite the fact that supporting the US blockade and potential use of force against the DPRK from Japanese bases might have sparked public backlash. It seems clear that the Japanese government was willing to pay this price. Therefore, the negative effects of the crisis on the alliance are not clearly visible, while several instances of successful alliance cooperation are easy to identify.

Regional instability in the South

As noted, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific had few direct military threats towards US allies. The Southeast Asian armed forces were more likely to be directed against domestic foes and lacked maritime power projection capabilities. The remoteness of any threatening state actors and the implausibility of threats arising without significant long-term signals had been noted in Australian White Papers since 1976. Further, ADF capabilities far surpassed those of any other regional state. US and Australian surveillance capabilities virtually guaranteed a clear warning should threats emerge.[366] While there were no powerful hostile states in the south, there were several weak ones, the failure of which could mean the spread of social and political instability in the region. There were several ongoing local insurgencies in the Philippines, some of which had links to the radical Islamist movements in Indonesia, while the Cambodia-Vietnam War had technically only ended in 1991. The Pacific islands held several weak and failing states that could have destabilized the region.

The late 1990s saw several security challenges in the South Pacific. The first was the Sandline crisis, which began in February 1997 when the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) hired mercenaries to put down a rebellion in Bougainville. The Howard Government announced that the use of mercenaries was unacceptable and ADF fighters intercepted a cargo plane carrying heavy weapons to the mercenaries. Amid emerging information regarding the misuse of international aid funds, the PNG Defense Forces announced a military coup. The situation was resolved but, the incident turned out to be first of several in area.[367] The long-simmering tensions between different ethnic groups in the Solomon Islands escalated into open violence in 1998 and the conflict would continue until the arrival of a peacekeeping force in 2003. In Fiji, the parliamentary elections of 1999 resulted in serious tensions

366 Paul Dibb," Australia's Defence Policies in the Post-Cold War Era", in *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in the World Affairs 1990-1995,* ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), 70 -71.

367 Ross W. Johnston and Geoffrey Stokes, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: January-July 1997," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 43, no.3 (1996): 294-295.

between different ethnicities. These tensions escalated into a military coup by hardline Fijian nationalists in May 2000.[368]

In July 1997, the Asian financial crisis broke out and seriously destabilized the political landscape of Southeast Asia. Several of Asia's best performing economies collapsed and only a few regional countries, notable among them Australia and China, avoided the contagion of the crisis. The economic crisis soon became a social crisis and rioting broke out in several countries. The crisis prompted political changes in South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. In Indonesia, the crisis resulted in the collapse of the Suharto regime in May 1998, which in turn led to political instability and accelerated the secessionist movement in East Timor. Under international pressure, led by Australia and the US, the weakened Indonesian government acquiesced to an independence referendum in East Timor. After a large majority of voters chose independence, attacks against the civilian population by pro-Indonesia militias ensued. The Indonesian military was seen to be at least complicit in the attacks. Eventually, the violence prompted the intervention of a UN peacekeeping force led by the ADF.[369]

The intervention was essentially forced upon the Indonesian government, which in its isolated position and suffering from economic difficulties, had little choice but to acquiesce. As a result, Australia's relations with Indonesia deteriorated and the security treaty between the nations was considered invalidated. Several Asian countries, which had long emphasized non-intervention as the Asian way of conducting international relations, saw the intervention as interference in Indonesian domestic politics by western nations. However, even as regional countries were critical of the intervention, they eventually contributed forces to the peacekeeping operation.[370] Arguably, these events demonstrated the power of the US-led order in the region. Even while the US refrained from direct action, its support carried the day. The Australian leadership was encouraged by the US, which, even while refraining from putting boots to the ground, acted as the guarantor of order by maintaining US Naval presence in the area. While US power was uncontested, its regional allies remained vulnerable. Moreover, US interest in maintaining order was fleeting, as will be discussed below.

368 Anthony J. Regan and R.J. May, "Reassessing Australia's Role in Papua New Guinea and the Island Pacific", in *The National Interests in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 155-156, 167-168.

369 E.g., Michel Wesley, "Australia and the Asian Economic Crisis", in *The National Interests in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-1997*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 301-302.

370 Ibid., 322-323.

The United States Under the Bush and Clinton administrations

While the US emerged from the Cold War as the clear winner, its economic situation seemed dire. The US national debt had doubled during the late Cold War, mostly due to the massive arms build-up of the 1980s. The sustained economic boom of the 1980s ended in recession. The economic downturn, especially in contrast to Japan's seemingly miraculous growth, combined with a general sense of the declining Soviet threat, contributed to increasing pressure to cut defense budgets and scale back the US military presence abroad. While the recession was over by 1992, Americans expected a "peace dividend" and there was a surge in pro-isolationist rhetoric. At the time, the US administration of President George H.W. Bush, was seeking to establish a US-led New World Order, which envisioned an era of global wellbeing brought about by an expansion of liberal markets, the spread of democracy, and a stable international order.[371] This vision of US leadership was tested in the first Gulf War. The victory of the US-led coalition over Saddam Hussein seemed to strengthen the notion of a new era of unified rules-based society of nations.[372]

The Bush administration tried to find a balance between reducing defense costs and maintaining the capabilities required to secure the New World Order through a set of force reductions under the concept of "Base Force."[373] The aim was to substantially reduce the US military "in recognition of the realities of the 1990s," while preserving forward presence, strategic deterrence, and effective crisis response capabilities.[374] The force structure was built around separate force packages for the Atlantic and the Pacific. The Atlantic one remained larger but underwent heavier reductions.[375] Smaller reductions in the Pacific were based on an understanding that regional threats there had not changed as much after the end of the Cold War.[376]

371 See, for example, Martin J. Medhurst, *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H. W. Bush* (Austin: Texas A&M University Press, 2006)

372 For an account of issues and debates concerning US foreign and security policy after the Cold War see, for example, James M. Scott *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

373 For detailed description of Base Force concept see Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin Leuschner, *Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review*, RAND, Project Air Force research report, 2001.

374 The United States' Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, January 1992, 20. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms1992.pdf (Accessed July 31, 2021)

375 Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, *Defense Planning in a Decade of Change,* 17-19.

376 Ibid., 20.

Importantly, it was assumed that the reductions were to be compensated by increased military spending by regional allies.[377]

The New World Order was never popular in the US as large segments of the public were critical of involvement in foreign conflicts. Burdened by the early 1990s recession, the Bush administration's focus on international issues ensured that Bush lost his bid for a second term to Bill Clinton in the 1992 elections. Clinton's catchphrase "it's the economy, stupid" carried the day over the Bush's record on foreign affairs. Hence, when the Clinton administration came to office, the emphasis was on the economy. After taking office, the Clinton administration initiated a new round of force reductions with the so-called "Bottom-up Review," which cut the force levels to 1/3 of 1990 levels in order to "to meet the dangers to American economic prosperity."[378]

The idea behind the Bottom-up Review was to build a more flexible force capable of fighting two nearly simultaneous wars in different regions. This two-front scenario was already at the heart of the first Bush administration's planning, but under the Clinton administration, the mission was to be carried out with less resources. The inherent challenges were to be addressed by technology. As potential fighting was to be carried out by outnumbered forces, the US forces would need to maintain superior military technology to give them an edge over their adversaries.[379] Implications for US alliances included the elevated importance of forward bases and the need for increased technology cooperation, especially with Japan as the Clinton administration sought to benefit from Japanese dual-use technologies.[380] Further, if allied forces were to contribute to US operations, they would have to maintain their forces at a compatible level.[381] Overall, maintaining global leadership with dwindling forces would rely heavily on UN peacekeeping and on US allies.[382]

377 United States Department of State, Embassy cable 11029, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part II*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives,1977-1992.

378 Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993.

379 Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, *Defense Planning in a Decade of Change*, 55.

380 The Report on Bottom-Up Review establishes a 4-phased response to a regional aggression. Especially in the first phase, rapid deployment troops would employ technologically advanced weapon systems e.g., precision-guided munitions and long-range tactical missiles, to grind the attacking forces to a halt and secure access to the phase-2 build-up of forces for the phase-3 counter offensive. Phase-4 was meant for post-conflict stabilization.

381 Neil Renwick, *Japan's Alliance Politics and Defense Production* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 122.

382 White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, July 1994.

The two US administrations shared the key ideas on the roles of US alliances and partnerships abroad. However, while both the Bush and Clinton administrations saw the deployment of multilateral peacekeeping forces as the primary form of response to regional conflicts, the Clinton administration was less willing to commit US troops. The new administration maintained that "like-minded states" should bear the burden for peacekeeping. The Clinton administration even made it a specific policy not to relinquish command of US troops to the UN-led force.[383] After the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, the Clinton administration became even more opposed to sending out US troops and therefore, other states, including US allies, were to take on these responsibilities. [384]

The Clinton administration lasted for the entire economic boom period of the 1990s and the era of uncontested US unipolarity. It could be said that throughout the decade, Clinton's overall approach to foreign and security policy was pragmatic and economically oriented, despite declarations of liberal and democratic values. For example, in the case of China, the Clinton administration prioritized trade over human rights and supported China's ascension to WTO membership despite initially linking economic relations to human rights. Clinton's perceived lack of focus in foreign policy drew criticism from many sides. The administration's failures to prevent atrocities in Rwanda and the Balkans were criticized by those favoring a more humanitarian approach. On the other hand, the scaling down of the US military, as well as the perception that the administration's policies towards potential rivals were soft, invoked ire from conservative observers. While the administration's merits in specific issues are debatable, the main characteristics of its foreign policy remained largely unchanged throughout the 1990s.[385]

This continuity is visible in the National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. The emphasis on the economy is notable in all of the yearly NSSs as is the idea that engagement and trade liberalisation, combined with democratization, were the most effective ways of maintaining international security.[386] The actual use of the US military was consistently considered as a last resort and with an apologetic tone.[387]

383 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Assertive Multilateralism and Post-Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy making," in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. James M. Scott Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 277-304.

384 White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25, *Clinton Administration Policy on reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, February 22, 1996.

385 See, for example, Stephen Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton`s Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.2. (2000).

386 White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000, 2-3.

387 For example, the 2000 document starts the subchapter on the military's role in implementing the national strategy by stating that military action, "…is not, however, a substitute for other forms of engagement, such as diplomatic, economic, scientific,

Word for word, the strategy documents until 1995 are essentially copies of the first one. Even in 1996, changes were mostly in specific wordings, but the fact that these specific changes were made at all implies some changes in how the administration wanted its policy to be presented. For example, the 1996 NSS changed one US military's mission from "enhance global security…"[388] to read as "enhance our security…"[389] It also omitted the strategic goal "to press for open and equal U.S. access to foreign markets,"[390] present in all the previous documents. These changes can be understood as a sign of hardening attitudes towards humanitarian military missions following the failures in Africa and the Balkans.

The initial reluctance to use US forces for humanitarian or peacekeeping missions became a matter of policy in the late 1990s. In the 1996 NSS, peacekeeping was still considered as one possible mission of the US military,[391] but in the 1998 NSS, it was discussed only as the purview of other countries. US forces would only take part in supporting roles.[392] The Republican Party was opposed to UN missions and even drafted a law which would have banned US armed forces from serving in UN PKOs.[393] However, there were two regions deemed important enough that they would require traditional military operations by US forces in the event of conflicts. These were the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. When Security Strategies consistently maintained that US forces should have the capability to counter "…two large-scale, cross-border aggressions in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames," they referred to these two regions.[394]

In the Clinton era, US alliances were to be transformed into tools of non-traditional security burden sharing.[395] The 2001 NSS, which was the final NSS of the Clinton administration and focused on outlining the administration's past

technological, cultural, and educational activities." White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000, 22.

388 White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Years 1994 and 1995.

389 White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996,2

390 White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Year 1994, 4; Year 1995, 7; Year 1996, 4.

391 White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, 13, 22.

392 White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998, 13, 42, 49, 55.

393 E.g., Leon Panetta, *Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).

394 White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000, 5-6.

395 This process was noted by many writers and was arguably the prime driver for the emerging arguments claiming that the nature of security alliances was profoundly changing. See the discussion on alliance debates in chapter 2.

achievements, notes that the administration had sought to transform US alliances into "…proactive instruments for meeting post-Cold War challenges."[396] With regard to alliance cooperation, the main role for allies was to contribute forces and handle "lower-end" missions like peacekeeping. Japan's role as a central axis in the system of bilateral alliances remained the same, albeit in a less pronounced way. However, both the Bush and Clinton administrations also discouraged the Japanese from pursuing an independent security role outside the alliance framework or peacekeeping.[397]

In sum, for the alliances, the shift from the bi-polar world of the Cold War to a US-led global order meant that the demands from the senior ally on Japan and Australia changed as well. While the 1980s was characterized by increasing calls for defense burden sharing in the spirit of the Nixon-doctrine and the second Cold War buildup under the Reagan administration, the post-Cold War US pressure was more about supporting the US-led global agenda. The main actions that were expected from US allies were political support for US initiatives such as the nonproliferation treaty and contributions to international peacekeeping to relieve the need for US troops. Other features included an emphasis on supporting the "technology edge" needed to support the superior performance envisioned in the Base Force concept and the Bottom-Up Review as well as continued support for regionally deployed US forces to ensure rapid response times. However, the overall emphasis on the economy also meant that there was little high-level interest in overseeing this transformation. By the mid-1990s, this resulted in a what some have termed silent crises in the alliances. The so-called Nye initiative was an attempt to readjust US alliances in the Asia-Pacific in the mid-1990s and eventually facilitated the use of these alliances in the War on Terror.[398]

396 White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000, 2.

397 Department of Defense Scope Paper: Japan Visit 22-23 November 1991, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part II, 1977-1992; White House, Memorandum for the President, July 1993. United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000.

398 A declassified brief to the president emphasizes the role of East Asian base structure, especially in Japan, as a key for maintaining forces and access to Asia and the Persian Gulf and further emphasizes that the president needs to actively support the regional alliances. White House, Memorandum for the President, July 1993, 00847. United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000.

Japan in the 1990s: The Lost Decade

In Japan, the boom period of the 1980s also ended in a recession, but unlike the US, Japan failed to rebound and economic troubles continued throughout the decade. The depression coincided with a political crisis following the collapse of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominance. From June 1989 to April 2001, Japan saw nine different Prime Ministers. The collapse of the LDP one-party rule, widely seen as tainted by backroom deals and cronyism, culminated in a breakdown within the LDP in 1993. In the following elections, both the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which was the largest opposition party, lost several seats, demonstrating the crisis of legitimacy facing the entire system. The crisis brought about several reforms of the electoral system in 1994, and the early 1990s have been described as the beginning of a "regime shift" in Japan.[399] Notably, even though the JSP lost most of its seats, it still became the largest party in the new coalition government of seven different smaller parties.[400]

Since the 1950s, the JSP had maintained that both the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the US-Japan alliance were illegal under the Japanese constitution. However, the party abandoned its pledge to dismantle the JSDF and formally acknowledged its legality upon entering the governing coalition. Furthermore, after a deal with the LDP in 1994, JSP leader Tomichi Murayama became the Prime Minister and oversaw the reform of both the alliance and Japanese defense policies.[401] Despite fears among traditional security policymakers and alliance handlers, the Murayama government either did not want to interfere or was simply unable to oppose the reform processes.[402]

These twin crises intertwined with significant shifts in Japan's security policies. Some, like rising LDP star Ichiro Ozawa, believed that Japan should become a "normal nation" and assume a larger security role in Asia and globally.[403] Ozawa and right-wing elements in the LDP pushed for wider participation in the Gulf Crisis and for the adoption of a Peacekeeping operations (PKO) law in 1990. However, the mainstream of Japanese politics resisted any rapid revisions. Further, any discussions about widening security roles or deepening the US-Japan alliance were contested by the left-wing opposition, which still largely opposed the Self-Defense Forces and the

399 E.g., T.J. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 136-138.

400 E.g., Gerald L. Curtis, *The logic of Japanese politics: Leaders Institutions and the Limits of Change* (New York: Columbia University Press 1999), 99-102.

401 E.g., Kevin Cooley, *Japan's Foreign Policy since 1945* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 40-41.

402 Interview with Lieutenant-General Noboru Yamaguchi, July 24, 2012.

403 Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994).

US alliance despite acknowledging their legality in 1994. The actual events of the time eventually overrode some of the resistance and Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Gulf and passed the PKO bill in 1992, signaling the emergence of a new mainstream approach, more accommodating to limited military operations abroad.[404]

In January 1994, a commission called the Advisory Group on Defense Issues (also known as the Higuchi commission) was established to develop Japan's security policies and to consider the reformation of the 1976 National Defense Program Outlines. The Commission report, published in August 1994, proposed a new "comprehensive security policy" that included multilateral security cooperation within the UN framework and regional frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The report also recommended the enhancement of the US-Japan alliance as a centerpiece of a new security system in Asia. Lastly, the report suggested re-enforcing and diversifying Japan's domestic defense capabilities. [405] The report did not foresee challengers rising against the established order in the near future. If one were to eventually rise, it would take time to develop, there would be ample time to respond. Notably, the report put multilateral security cooperation ahead of the US-Japan alliance and proposed that the reformation of Japan's defense capabilities for PKO missions should be discussed before further development of the US-Japan alliance. This was thought to signal a change in Japanese priorities in Washington.[406] As a sign of US concerns, there was a backchannel request to change the order of priorities weeks before the report's publication, following a leak of the document from the Japan Defense Agency to the US.[407]

Following the Higuchi report, a new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) document was issued in December 1995.[408] Predictably, it came out in favor of widening the security scope of the JSDF and deepening the US alliance. This document is often regarded as a prelude to US-Japan alliance reaffirmation as the US-side was reportedly involved in its drafting. Correspondingly, the Japanese were consulted regarding the new East Asia Strategic Review in the US.[409] The 1995

404 For a discussion about the evolution of the Japanese political mainstream and alternatives see Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 13-15.

405 Advisory Group on Defense Issues, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*, August 12, 1994. https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/ (Accessed July 31, 2021)

406 E.g., Patrick M. Cronin, and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S. – Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 31, 1994.

407 Interview with Professor Akio Watanabe August 7, 2012. Professor Watanabe served as the secretary of the commission and oversaw the drafting of the document.

408 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/defense96/ (Accessed July 31, 2021)

409 Interview with Professor Akio Watanabe August 7, 2012.

NDPO was the first major post-Cold War strategy review in Japan, but the changes were small. Japan relinquished the Cold War-era thinking that it should have the independent capability to repel limited aggression. Instead, the JSDF should be able to prevent aggression against Japan in cooperation with the US, thus downgrading the JSDF's independent capabilities in favor of acting in collaboration with US forces.[410] The NDPO also explicitly acknowledged the regional role of the alliance and introduced the first official usage of the concept of "situations in areas surrounding Japan," which later became a catchphrase for widening the role of Japanese forces in the alliance.[411]

The accompanying Mid-Term Defense Program established the first clear post-Cold War restructuring of the JSDF, including reductions of heavy weapons including artillery pieces and tanks as well as the overall number of troops.[412] The defense program included the introduction of significant capabilities to facilitate the new JSDF posture. These included AWACS aircraft, Aegis destroyers, and F-2 fighters. To improve the regional reach of the JSDF, the acquisition of mid-flight refueling capability was planned. [413] Another notable acquisition plan to expand the JSDF's reach included the purchase of the new *Hyuga*-class helicopter destroyers, a type of light aircraft carrier (DHH). While these were all compatible with the new division of labor in the alliance, some major acquisitions were also made outside the alliance framework. In December 1998, despite US resistance, the Japanese government decided to introduce indigenous intelligence satellites that could monitor North Korean nuclear and missile activities.[414]

In January 1996, the LDP resumed government leadership. However, there was no return to the single-party system as the LDP now had to rely on other parties to form majority governments. The JSP paid heavily for its premiership of the previous government and lost half of its seats in the October 1996 elections. During the elections, one of the major issues was the reform of the Japanese administration system.[415] The need to strengthen decision-making after the North Korean nuclear

410 E.g., Smith, *The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S. – Japan Alliance*, 85-86.

411 Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 82.

412 Japanese Security Council, On the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-2000), in *Defense of Japan 1996*, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo: Japan Times 1996, Reference 20.

413 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, editions 1995-2001, Tokyo: Japan Times, various years.

414 John Swenson-Wright "The Limits to 'Normalcy'" in *Japan as a 'Normal Country'? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, ed. Yoshihide Soya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welsh (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2011),157.

415 E.g., Tomohito Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics – Institutional Changes and Power Shifts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 60-61.

and the Taiwan Strait crises was also a part of this process.[416] To address the lack of decision-making capability, the Office of Crisis Management was created in the Prime Minister's Office and, in 1999, the revised Cabinet Law reinforced Prime Minister's leadership of decision-making during crises.[417] These reforms would later prove central to the Japanese response after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US.

Another set of reforms were required due to the new roles and missions within the alliance, most of which were completed by the early 2000s.[418] The Obuchi government gathered the necessary support for broadening JSDF roles and for redefining the alliance cooperation guidelines by forming a coalition with the Liberal Party, which was already pro-alliance, and with the Komeito Party, which was traditionally critical of the alliance. Like the JSP before it, Komeito had to yield its position against the expansion of the alliance and acquiesce to the JSDF reform program as part of the bargain for inclusion in the government.[419] After the unexpected passing of Prime Minister Obuchi, his successor, Yoshiro Mori, was elected in a closed-door meeting between major LDP faction leaders, which led to further criticism of the party. This and the previously enacted reforms of the electoral system allowed rising junior members to challenge the old LDP factions and in April 2001, Junichiro Koizumi became the first LDP Prime Minister chosen outside the traditional factions. As a popular Prime Minister, Koizumi brought some stability to Japanese politics and his administration lasted over five years.[420]

Australia in the 1990s: From the Hawke and Keating to Howard administrations

Compared to Japan, Australia was remarkably stable during the 1990s. It did not experience similar recessions in the early 1990s, and the Labor Party's government, in power since the early 1980s, saw only one change of leadership in the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, the Coalition Party secured the government under Prime Minister John Howard, who was to remain in office until the mid-2000s. While there has typically been a bipartisan consensus about the unitality of the ANZUS alliance and the overall direction of security polices in Australia, at the rhetorical level at least, the Labor Party has portrayed itself as more pro-Asia while the Coalition Party has been more pro-US.

416 For the Hashimoto government's administrative reform program see, for example, Ko Mishima, "The Changing Relationship between Japan's LDP and the Bureaucracy – Hashimoto's Administrative Reform Efforts and its Politics," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 1 (1998).
417 Calder, *Pacific Alliance*, 149-150.
418 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2001*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2001.
419 E.g., Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 72-73
420 Ibid., 76 -78.

Still, of the two Labor Party Prime Ministers of the early 1990s, it could be argued that Hawke was more pro-US oriented and actively supported the presence of US bases in Australia.[421] Keating, however, favored regional engagement and relations with Asian countries over the distant US.[422] After his premiership, Keating would continue to be an outspoken critic of what he saw as too US-centric policies.[423]

While the increased focus on Asia was already evident in the early 1980s,[424] the early 1990s Labor governments were the first to actually formulate this line into official policy. In 1989, a report titled *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendency*, was the first official formulation of this policy line.[425] The centerpieces of Australia's "historic shift to Asia" were of an economic-neoliberal policy orientation with an emphasis on multilateral organizations such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).[426] Regionalism was at least partially seen as an alternative to the US. Australia, unlike most countries in the Asia-Pacific, suffered from an increasing trade deficit towards the US throughout the early 1990s, which was larger per capita than the US deficit towards Japan.[427] However, tensions over trade issues never escalated to the type of antagonistic levels characteristic of the US-Japan relations at the time. Still, Prime Minister Hawke suggested that APEC could be used as a counterbalance to US unilateral economic policies and Keating sided with the Japanese on their trade dispute with the US over automobiles.[428]

Focus on Asia was also evident in the security strategy papers. In the prefaces of the 1993 and the 1994 defense White Papers, Minister of Defence Robert Ray mainly spoke of regional engagement and linked it directly to the defense of Australia while

421 Firth, *Australia in International Politics,* 37-40.

422 Bell, *Dependent Ally*,151.

423 E.g., *ABC News*, "Carr Rejects Keating's Indonesia Criticism," November 15, 2012.

424 Review of Fraser government's foreign policies in Alan Renouf, *Malcolm Fraser and Australian foreign policy* (Sydney: Australian Professional Publications, 1986).

425 E.g., John Mckay, "Australia and Northeast Asian Ascendency: Some Commentaries on the Garnaut Report", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 44, no.1 (1990): 1-2; Gerad Henderson, "White Paper Risks Obstructing Long History of Asian Engagement," *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 6, 2012.

426 Prime Minister Keating's repeated theme of historic shift is demonstrated in Anthony Milner, "The Rhetoric of Asia," in *Seeking Asian Engagement; Australia in World Affairs, 1991-95*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997). See also Mark Beeson, "Australia and Asia: The Years of Living Aimlessly," *Southeast Asian Affairs 2001* (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 47-48

427 John Ravenhill, "Australia and the World Economy 1991-1995," in *Seeking Asian Engagement; Australia in World Affairs, 1991-95*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), 95.

428 Allan Rix, "Australia and Japan," in *Seeking Asian Engagement; Australia in World Affairs, 1991-95*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), 137.

"other alliance relations" were only passingly noted. The ANZUS alliance was not directly mentioned at all.[429] The 1994 White Paper only allocated 5 pages to the alliance with the US, while the document itself was 169 pages long. This was a marked departure from the 1987 White Paper, which discussed the US alliance before other defense arrangements and in which Minister of Defence Kim Beazley emphasized the alliance's continued relevance in the preface.[430]

Overall, the defense policies of the early 1990s followed the Defense of Australia doctrine sketched out in the 1987 Dibb report. Despite the end of the Cold War, there was no immediate review of the strategic basis of the earlier reports. The emphasis on self-sufficiency had been initially welcomed by the US side, but by the early 1990s, it had developed into an inward-looking security posture. This in turn prompted discussions about the relevance of ANZUS on both sides of the Pacific.[431] The first document to present a coherent idea of regional security engagement was the *Strategic Review 1993*.[432] The review's preface began by noting that "Readers of this review will appreciate the extent to which Australia's security is linked to that of Australia's region and the importance that the Government attaches to enhancing our security in and with the region."[433] Despite its central role in the security document, regional engagement was not a military effort but concentrated more on diplomatic and economic engagement. It is evident from the 1994 White Paper *Defending Australia* that the military still focused on the self-reliant defense of Australia.[434]

While the strategies discussed self-reliance, few resources were allocated to the kind of build-up. The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) was downsized, and from 1991 to 1995, the overall strength of ADF declined from 68,000 to 56,000.[435] Nonetheless, defense spending remained relatively steady at around 2% of GDP.[436] The main defense expenditures were allocated to the defense of the northern

429 Department of Defence, *Strategic Review 1993* Canberra: Defence Centre, 1993; Department of Defence, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994.

430 Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia 1987*, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1987.

431 Hubbard, *Australian and US Defense Cooperation*, 56-57.

432 Department of Defence, *Strategic Review 1993*, Canberra: Defence Centre, 1993. See also Ball and Kerr *Presumptive Engagement*, 62.

433 Department of Defence, *Strategic Review 1993*, Canberra: Defence Centre, 1993, iii.

434 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994,13.

435 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1990-1991 and 1995-1996 editions (London: Oxford University Press, 1991, 1996).

436 In constant 2009 US Dollars, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (Accessed July 31, 2021)

approaches.[437] Intelligence gathering capabilities were improved with the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network and AWACS aircraft.[438] As the focus was on defending the air-sea gap, ADF land forces were drastically reduced.[439]

In March 1996, thirteen years of Labor Party rule gave away to a Coalition Party government under Prime Minister John Howard. The elections were a landslide victory for the Coalition Party and gave the incoming Howard Government the second largest majority in the history of Australian politics. While Australia's foreign relations were not among the biggest election issues, one point of contention during the campaigns revolved around Australia's place in the world. Prime Minister Keating accused the Coalition Party of not understanding Asia and stated that it could not be trusted to handle these most important of relations. Howard's response was to make the Asian focus a primary foreign policy element in his platform while maintaining that the Labor government had mishandled the all-important US relationship.[440] After the 1996 defeat, the Labor Party regained some of its lost seats in the 1998 federal election but was unable to challenge Coalition Party rule. Therefore, the Howard government enjoyed a relatively stable and strong position of governance throughout the period.

The Howard government came into office with an agenda to re-elevate US-relations to the center of Australian foreign policy while still benefiting from Asian regionalism. As noted, both the US alliance and the engagement with a rising Asia enjoyed bipartisan support. Therefore, the shift in foreign and security policy was more of a re-ordering of existing issues.[441] Howard's foreign policy was described in the *In the National Interest* White Paper.[442] What set this paper apart from earlier documents was its emphasis on bilateralism, realism, and national interest, in contrast to ideals such as good international citizenship, associated with the Labor government.[443] The paper condemned "grand constructs" and offered the "hard-

437 Grey, *A Military History of Australia,* 256-257.

438 Ibid., 257

439 E.g., Peter Leahy, "The Medium-Weight Force: Lessons Learned and Future Contributions to Coalition Operations," in *Australian Army Journal* 3, no.2 (2004): 19-24.

440 E.g., Colin Brown, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: January – June 1996," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 42, no. 3 (1996).

441 E.g., Alexander Downer, "Australia's Place in the World" (Speech, Sydney, November 26, 1996).

442 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia 1997.

443 David Goldsworthy, "An Overview," in *The National Interest in a Global Era; Australia in World Affairs, 1996-2000*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 10-11.

headed pursuit" of interests, defined as the "security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living."[444]

Howard's security strategy was described in 1997's *Australia's Strategic Policy*, which declared the US alliance to be Australia's most important strategic relation.[445] The document emphasized that the alliance is meant to "complement and enforce Australian engagement with East Asia" and to ensure continued US engagement in the region.[446] According to several sources, the classified version of *Australia's Strategic Policy* included a plan called "Forward Response" to deploy the ADF abroad in response to regional contingencies and even to Northeast Asia in support of US forces.[447] As any suggestions of sending Australian land forces to fight in foreign wars would have been controversial, Howard was wary of having any references to expeditionary operations included in the defense documents.[448] However, the existence of such a doctrine was confirmed by administration officials.[449] Whether an actual preplanned doctrine or not, by 1999, Australian troops were deployed to East Timor in large numbers.

Based on lessons learned in the Persian Gulf and East Timor, a parliamentary Joint Committee reported in 1999 that the self-reliance doctrine had degraded the Army's capabilities.[450] Still, the defense White Paper, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force,* followed its predecessors on self-reliance.[451] However, the document makes a radical departure from the past by stating that the ADF should be ready for operations in Australia's immediate region and "...if asked, to help our neighbors defend themselves."[452] The White Paper directed the ADF to expand its land forces

444 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia 1997, 1-2

445 Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*, Commonwealth of Australia 1997, 8-10, 13,14.

446 Ibid., 58.

447 Graeme Cheeseman, "Facing an Uncertain Future: Defence and Security under the Howard Government," in *The National Interest in a Global Era; Australia in World Affairs, 1996-2000*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, 195-212). pp. 211.

448 Interview with Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, February 17, 2014. According to Leahy, who served as the Chief of the Army, the Howard government stopped the publication of an army manual that included a chapter referring to "expeditionary operations" as late as 2000.

449 Interview with Peter Jennings February 28, 2014.

450 Parliament of Australia Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Effective and Efficient Army*, Committee Inquiry Report 4, September 2000. Chapter 2.

451 Department of Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000.

452 Ibid., 46-48.

to be able to deploy one brigade and one battalion of combat groups simultaneously to expeditionary operations.[453] These forces should be able to respond with a "clear predominance of force" and "ample firepower" to restore peace in conflict areas.[454] Defense spending was increased by over 23 billion AUSD over the next decade to fund the acquisitions of necessary capabilities including helicopters and armored vehicles.[455] For the Navy, acquisitions emphasized the need to be able to work together with US forces and to operate in the "high capability operational environment in the Asia-Pacific region." This section envisioned the acquisition of air warfare destroyers equipped with Aegis combat systems, already suggesting intent to participate in a ballistic missile defense.[456]

Overall, it can be argued that during the 1990s, Australian defense strategy evolved from a kind isolationism, which was not as much an affirmed policy as a matter of political inability to play an active role in security operation in the decades following the Vietnam War. This was coupled with Australia's poor capacity to act as a guarantor of regional stability and a potential US partner on a global scale. The expansion of Australia's security strategy from the Defence of Australia (DoA) to include the nearby islands or "Australia's Area of Critical Security Interests,", was later labeled as DoA+.[457] Within a few years, it would broaden far beyond nearby interest areas. The process with which the alliance itself was developed to facilitate this evolution is discussed next.

One specific feature that emerged during the late 1990s, was Australia's balancing act between China and the US. By the end of the 1990s, China's relative economic weight was increasing as Asia's other rising economies struggled with financial crises. Sino-Australian relations suffered during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, but after Howard's 1997 visit to China, it seemed that relations were again improving. China even supported Australian-led UN action in East Timor, although it typically opposes foreign interventions. Economic interdependence between the two countries further deepened when China signed a deal to purchase natural gas from Australia. Further, in July 1999, new terms of bilateral trade were announced in preparation of China's WTO membership. The fact that US-China relations were

453 Leahy, *The Medium-Weight Force*, 23-24.

454 It should be further noted that while the 1997 strategic policy document discussed land forces as the last of the four development priorities, the 2000 White Paper has raised land forces as the top development priority. Department of Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, 50, 82-83.

455 Department of Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000. XVII.

456 Ibid., 85-90, 88.

457 Interview with Peter Jennings February 28, 2014

at a low point after bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, is an interesting contrast.[458]

Even while seemingly successful, difficulties ensued again in early 2000 as Beijing issued a White Paper expanding the circumstances under which it would use force against Taiwan. Australia summoned the Chinese ambassador over the matter and the Australian domestic debate about China heated up again. The US side added more fuel to the flames when Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State for the incoming Bush administration, noted bluntly that the US would expect Australian military support in any US-China conflict over Taiwan.[459] Overall, the assertive views of the incoming Bush administration were a cause of concern for regional diplomats at the time.[460] As the alliance could have proved a liability in the sense of entrapment, Australia's position on China and the US has been described as one of deliberate "strategic ambiguity."[461]

4.2 Alliance reaffirmations

As discussed, the US alliances in the immediate post-Cold War Asia-Pacific were somewhat adrift: Japan and the US were almost seen as enemies and decision-makers on both sides of the Pacific were largely indifferent towards ANZUS. Trade conflicts, and the feeling that US allies were free riding on US security guarantees created an unfavorable mood towards allies in the US Congress. On the other hand, the withdrawal of US forces from Asia-Pacific and attempts to link alliance issues to acrimonious trade negotiations gave the impression that the US administration no longer valued its allies. Further, the ejection of New Zealand from ANZUS and the collapse of the US-Philippines alliance in 1991-1992 demonstrated that alliance with the US could not be taken for granted.

The souring of US-Japan relations was also visible in popular sentiments. A Yomiuri/Gallup poll registered that the number of Americans having good impression of Japan fell from around 50% in 1990 to less than 30% in 1992. The

458 E.g., Henry S. Albinski, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 1999," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 46, no.2 (2000): 204-205, 211-212.

459 Mohan Malik, "Australia and China: Divergence and Convergence of Interests," in *The National Interests in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-1997*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 118-119.

460 Interview with Richard Bush, February 5, 2014; Interview with Hugh White, February 19, 2014. Bush worked as the managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan at the time and White then served as the deputy secretary for strategy in the Australian Department of Defence.

461 E.g., William Tow, "Australia and the United States," in *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-1997*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 178-179.

share of those holding an outright bad impression respectively rose from less than 10% to 20%. On the Japanese side, the share of those holding good impression of the US fell from around 45% to 35% and the share of those with negative impression rose from below 20% to 25%.[462] The relationship between the US and Australia did not suffer from similar issues. As mentioned, the overall relations between the two English-speaking countries have long been amicable and the alliance enjoyed consistent 80% support among Australians in the early 1990s.[463] However, the lack of interest in the alliances was evident in the highest levels. Between 1989 and 1995, the AUSMIN meeting took place only three times: in 1990, -92, and -95 – each time on US soil even though the tradition had been to alternate yearly between the US and Australia.[464] By the mid-1990s, the idea that ANZUS was just a "consultative framework" had become an accepted reality in many circles.[465]

As Australia was actively pursuing self-sufficient defense capabilities, other aspects of the alliance were being questioned as well. Even the deeply institutionalized signals intelligence cooperation was changing as the North West Cape signals station lost its significance due to the retirement of the Polaris submarines. Developing technologies also made the Nurrungar facility obsolete in the early 1990s.[466] Therefore, in the 1990s, only the Pine Gap facility retained its significance.[467] Overall, the alliance was not a very high priority for either side as Australia concentrated on its neighbors, while there were open suggestions in the US that the ANZUS was no longer relevant to the US military.[468]

A similar lack of interest was also apparent in the Japan-US alliance. The Security Consultative Committee was finally, after repeated requests from Japan,

462 Yomiuri/Gallup poll cited in, Steven K. Vogel, "Introduction: San Francisco System at Fifty" in *U.S. – Japan Relation in a Changing World*, ed. Steven K. Vogel (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,2002), 1-8, 7.

463 Ball, *The US – Australian Alliance*, 271.

464 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *AUSMIN - Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations*, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations (Accessed August 8, 2021).

465 Roger Bell, "Reassessed: Australia's Relationship with the United States," in *Seeking Asian Engagement; Australia in World Affairs, 1991-95*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997): 223-224.

466 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement to further amend the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of United States of America relating to the Establishment of a United States Naval Communications Station in Australia of 9 May 1963 as amended (North West Cape)*, Canberra, May 8, 1992, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992.

467 Ball, *The US – Australian Alliance*, 258.

468 Bell, *Reassessed: Australia's Relationship with the United States*, 223.

upgraded into a 2+2 ministerial format in 1990. The US had been unwilling to upgrade the SCC to a ministerial level, but as Japan had evolved from a client state to being the second largest economy in the world, the Bush administration had agreed to the request in order to improve bilateral ties.[469] However, there was little interest in following through with this and the full ministerial-level SCC only convened for the first time in September 1995.[470] The lack of interest was also evident in military relations. The number of US-Japan bilateral exercises was drastically reduced, and major joint exercises were set to take place only once every two years.[471] Similar reductions did not take place in ANZUS exercises, but these were smaller-scale activities to begin with. However, ADF multinational training activities were increasing at the time and by 1995, the ADF was conducting more training exercises with Singapore than with the US.[472]

The Japan-US the alliance faced a real crisis when a group of US Marines raped a Japanese schoolgirl in Okinawa in 1995. The ensuing protests and media attention elevated the issue to the highest levels in both the US and Japan. After the mishandling of the incident, the Commander of the US Forces in the Pacific was forced to resign, but this did not quell the protesters' demands to withdraw US forces from Okinawa. In the aftermath, some polls suggested that over half of the Japanese population would support ending the bilateral security arrangement.[473] As this crisis was happening at a time when the Japanese government was in the hands of a Prime Minister from the Japan Socialist Party, this could have been the time for breaking down the alliance.

Changing directions of US policy in Asia

In the 1990s, the US strategy for the Asia-Pacific was outlined in a series of reports, the first of which was the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI I) published in 1990.[474] In

469 Department of Defense, *Japan Desk report on Odawa Visit and the next SCC, 1991*. United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000.Department of Defense, Additional Notes for visiting Defense Agency 1991. United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000.

470 Department of Defense, *Additional Notes for visiting Defense Agency 1991*. United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000.

471 *Japan Times*, "Japan, U.S. to reduce joint military exercises," January 19, 1991.

472 Ball and Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement*, 64.

473 Anthony DiFilippo, *The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement* (New York: M.E. Sharpe 2002), 37.

474 The first of these, usually termed EASI-I, was the 1990 report *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century*. The second one, or EASI-II, was a follow up report to the first and was submitted to the US Congress in 1992. The

accordance with the overall post-Cold War policy discussed above, the report outlined a plan of limited reductions in the US presence in Asia-Pacific. The US forces in Japan would remain largely untouched, while forces in the Korean peninsula would be minimized. The US military presence in East Asia was to act as a security guarantor and ensure that no regional state could challenge the prevailing order.[475] In 1992, the EASI II report maintained this basic approach and emphasized Japan's geographically advantageous position as a platform for responding to regional contingencies and noted that the US presence in Japan was considered permanent for this purpose. In contrast, the US forces in South Korea were there only to deter DPRK aggression.[476]

Problems in the US alliances – and especially in the Japan-US alliance – were already recognized by the Bush administration. This prompted an initiative to remodel US alliances under the New World Order concept, which envisioned a network of partnerships and alliances to maintain the liberal international order. The problems with Japan were to be addressed with a new Global Partnership initiative, declared in January 1992. However, the new partnership got off to a rough start as the state visit by President Bush to Japan was far from successful.[477] The partnership was to be cemented with a new agreement that would create a cooperation framework to replace the ad hoc manner in which political issues were coordinated in the past.[478] In the end, however, the agreement focused mostly on bilateral trade relations and specifically on the automotive industry.[479] After the inauguration of the Clinton administration, the New World Order, and along with it the Global Partnership, faded from the US agenda.

EASR or *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* of 1995, also known as the Nye Report in reference to Joseph Nye, a prominent IR scholar who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense, is rather confusingly sometimes also referred to as EASI-III, while the earlier reports are also sometimes referred to as EASR. However, the 1995 report was meant to supersede the previous ones so it will be dealt with separately. All these reports are in essence periodic reports to the US Congress, based on legislation dating back to the 1980s. Following what seems to be in line with the majority practice, this work will refer to the first ones, issued under the Bush administration, as EASI and the latter ones issued under the Clinton administration as EASR.

475 Martin L. Lasater, *The New Pacific Community: U.S. Strategic Options in Asia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996),18-19.

476 Ibid., 20-21.

477 The visit was apparently plagued with difficulties, which culminated in President Bush vomiting and fainting next to Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa. For a firsthand account of the visit and the formulation of the 'Global Partnership' see Michael H. Armacost, *Friends or Rivals? Insider's Account of U.S. – Japan Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 161-170.

478 Ibid., 129-130.

479 Tokyo Declaration on the U.S. – Japan Global Partnership, January 9, 1992, Delivered by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Japan. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1992-book1/html/PPP-1992-book1-doc-pg59.htm (accessed August 1, 2021)

To the relief of US allies in Asia, the Clinton administration's Bottom-Up Review reaffirmed the US commitment to maintain around 100,000-strong US forces in Northeastern Asia.[480] However, in Asia as in other regions, the Clinton administration's main focus was on the economy. [481] In regard to Japan, the continued frictions in bilateral relations cast doubts over the future of the alliance. In the early 1990s, the Clinton administration did little do dissipate these worries. The 1994 National Security Strategy made only a passing mid-text reference to US alliances in the Pacific and talked of Japan only in relation to trade frictions. Overall, Japan was discussed more like an adversary than an ally.[482] There were clear concerns that the bilateral tensions might eventually break down the alliance.[483]

The so-called Nye initiative of 1994, named after Professor Joseph S. Nye of Harvard University, was the first high-level effort to reconstruct US alliances in the Pacific. By that time, the sense of crisis over the state of the US security presence in the Pacific reached high enough levels to prompt action.[484] According to Nye, the US had become too focused on economics and risked unintentionally endangering its core security interests in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, US strategy required "a healthy dose of Realism."[485] This thinking set the stage for the new East Asia strategy White Paper. While the previous EASI-reports had arguably been addressed to the US domestic audience with the purpose of explaining why the US was spending money in Asia, one of the main motivations behind the Nye Report – officially called the United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region (EASR I) – was to

480 Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993, 23.

481 The linking of the stability provided and access to markets, for example, President Clinton's remarks in relation to the Seattle APEC meeting; William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Seattle APEC Host Committee" (Speech, November 19, 1993). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ (Accessed August 1, 2021)

482 The one-paragraph note mentioning that "security comes first" and listing U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific follows several pages of talk on issues like macroeconomic cooperation. White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, July 1994, 16-17, 23-24.

483 An authoritative report by Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, argued that the perceived lack of clarity and coherence in US policies towards the alliance combined with increasing emphasis on the economic side of the bilateral relations has begun to erode the alliance contact networks and has led Japan to increasingly turn towards United Nations, regional multilateral institutions, and the development of independent capabilities as a hedge against the possible erosion of U.S. commitment. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S. –Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, Washington D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Studies, 1994.

484 E.g., Michael J. Green, "Balance of Power", in *U.S. – Japan Relation in a Changing World*, ed. Steven K. Vogel (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

485 Joseph S. Nye, "The Nye Report: Six years later," *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 1, no.1, (2001): 95-103.

convince US allies and other states in the Asia-Pacific that the US was still committed to the region.[486]

Unlike most Clinton administration security documents, the EASR I is overwhelmingly focused on security. The pinnacle of US strategy in the Pacific is formed around a strong military presence on the Japanese islands, which ensures a strong deterrence against the DPRK in the Korean Peninsula and continued access to Southeast Asia.[487] Notably, Australia, which was not even mentioned in the previous Clinton-era documents, has more paragraphs dedicated to it than Japan or South Korea. Breaking with the earlier EASI-reports, EASR I reaffirmed the continuity of the US presence instead of further reductions. Even the emphasis on the symbolic number of 100,000 US troops in Asia-Pacific was chosen to communicate a sort of psychological "line in the sand."[488]

The main beneficiary of the Nye initiative was the US-Japan alliance. The Japanese were consulted on the draft text before its publication and were also coordinated with in the revision of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) with the EASR, which was not the typical practice before. The sense of crisis in the relations drove the work forward rapidly. In Japan, the mass demonstrations following the Okinawa rape incident, along with the newly inaugurated JSP Prime Minister's threat to dismantle the alliance, ensured that the reaffirmation of the partnership became the highest priority in the relevant ministries. The reaffirmation process was formalized by the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, which was signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto during Clinton's visit to Tokyo in April 1996.[489] The process of reaffirming the ANZUS alliance was less dramatic but still involved the highest levels of decision making. In November 1996, Clinton presided over the AUSMIN consultations in Sydney, which issued a joint statement, later referred to as the Sydney Statement.

Japan-US alliance: From global partnership to Tokyo Declaration

Attempts to address the challenges in the Japan-US alliance already began in the late 1980s. Among other things, new guidelines for Japan-US defense cooperation were already being planned and the relocation of the Futenma Air base, which was to become a trouble spot for the alliance after the mid-1990s, was already being

486 E.g., Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999),248-250.

487 Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, February 1995, 10-11, 25-28.

488 Paul Giarra, Andrew Bennet and William Perry cited in Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 249-251.

489 Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 266-267.

discussed.[490] However, after the Tokyo Declaration for Global Partnership, little progress was made as the Bush administration did not take up the Japanese offer to initiate a new dialogue, while the incoming Clinton administration, for its part, disregarded the initiative entirely.[491] The Clinton administration's first priority in relations with Japan were the trade disputes but problems extended beyond them. In addition to the Gulf Crisis, attitudes towards China and Russia were changing as the US was more accommodating towards Russia and less forgiving about Chinese human rights records.[492] Alternatively, the Japanese had difficulties in their territorial dispute with Russia and were less willing to push against China.[493] Initially, the approach towards North Korea diverged as well, but the Korean crisis eventually became a wake-up call for the alliance. Crisis simulations and war games ran at the time showed that Japanese had difficulties accommodating US access to air- and seaport facilities, and in providing transport capabilities for non-combatant evacuations.[494]

The shortcomings in operational cooperation were also indicative of the lack of focus for the alliance at the strategic level. In other words, as there was no guiding vision for what the alliance was meant to do, operational cooperation could not be effectively planned. The Nye initiative was meant to bring that vision back to the US alliances, particularly to the Japan-US alliance. The highpoint of the initiative was the summit-level signing of the so-called "Tokyo Declaration" in 1996. This document reaffirmed the two countries' mutual support for the alliance and the continued presence of US forces in Japan. Significantly, the declaration stated that the scope of the alliance included the entire Asia-Pacific region, as well as the defense of Japan, and announced that the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation would be redrawn with a specific focus on cooperation during "situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan."[495]

Several working-level processes were initiated to put this strategic guidance in effect. A Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established under direct ministerial-level guidance to ameliorate the burden of US forces on local communities.[496] The SACO final report, issued in December 1996, reaffirmed the

490 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1992*, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1992.
491 Armacost, *Friends or Rivals*, 161-170.
492 E.g., Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 110-114.
493 E.g., Armacost, *Friends or Rivals*, 189-190.
494 Interview with Lieutenant-General Noboru Yamaguchi, July 24, 2012.
495 *Japan - U.S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century*, April 17, 1996. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (Accessed August 1, 2021)
496 Security Consultative Committee, *The SACO Final Report*, December 2, 1996. Available online at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html (Accessed August 1, 2021)

planned return of the Futenma Air Station along with 20 percent of the US-held areas in Okinawa to Japanese administration. The plan also involved reductions in training activities and the withdrawal of some military assets. The implementation of the plan was delegated to the Joint Committee and the work was to be overseen by the Security Subcommittee. Hence, the reduction of the alliance burden was effectively moved from cabinet-level oversight to a subcommittee level, which had already been dealing with the same issues for years, if not decades, without major progress.[497] Notably, the SCC, which had just been elevated to ministerial level, approved the final report one member short of the 2+2 framework as the US Secretary of State did not attend.

The high-level focus on the alliance, although fleeting, gave the necessary push for operational and working-level cooperation to increase rapidly. According to a senior JSDF officer, the plans made during the North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s were used as a planning model and informed the preparation for future contingencies. While the Cabinet Legal Office was heavily involved in planning, defense officials and military officers, previously sidelined from strategic-level planning, were able to participate extensively in the process, thanks to the sense of crisis prompted by the failures during the Korean crisis and the Gulf War.[498] New plans were quickly operationalized in training, and this was evident in the increased number and scope of exercises. By the mid-1990s, the number of annual bilateral exercises had dropped to around 15 a year. However, the first full combined joint bilateral exercise (involving all three JSDF branches and their US counterparts), which had already been envisioned in the late 1980s, took place on November 1998 on Iwo Jima. After 1998, the number of bilateral exercises settled to 20 exercises annually and full combined joint exercises took place biannually, alternating with a bilateral joint command post exercise.[499]

The new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, agreed upon in the Tokyo Declaration, were approved in September 1997.[500] The new guidelines envisioned cooperation under three different conditions: "cooperation under normal circumstances," "response to armed attack against Japan," and the "situation in areas surrounding Japan". Under "normal circumstances" the two sides were set to

497 Department of Defense, *Memorandum on Meeting on January 8, 1993*. United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000.

498 Interview with Lieutenant-General Noboru Yamaguchi, July 24, 2012.

499 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, editions 1995-2001, Tokyo: Urban Connections, various years.

500 Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, *The Interim Report on The Review of The Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation*, June 7, 1997; Joint Statement U.S – Japan Security Consultative Committee "Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation", New York September 23, 1997. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/defense.html (Accessed August 1, 2021)

increase cooperation in intelligence sharing, arms control, peacekeeping operations, and disaster response. In the event of an "armed attack against Japan," the JSDF would defend Japan and its surrounding waters, while US forces would supplement the JSDF's capabilities and conduct strikes against the aggressor outside Japan's territory. The US side would also introduce reinforcements if needed, while Japan would maintain bases to facilitate these forces. In the event of "guerilla-commando type attacks," US forces would support the JSDF in "appropriate ways."

Cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan was the biggest new development. Three different cooperation frameworks were identified for this, the first of which was the "cooperation in activities initiated by either government." This framework dealt mostly with cooperation in the case of a massive influx of refugees during a conflict and with providing transport, material, and medical assistance. Further, the two sides agreed to cooperate in establishing possible economic sanctions against the offending state and to share information and conduct the maritime inspections of ships when necessary.[501] The second and third frameworks – "Japan's support for U.S. Forces' activities" and "U.S.-Japan operational cooperation"' – dealt with military operations. It was agreed that the Japanese side would provide necessary supplies and both JSDF and civilian facilities for US forces if these were to engage in military operations against an aggressor. Japan would also repair, refuel, and supply US aircrafts and vessels at JSDF bases as well as provide transportation for US forces. If necessary, the JSDF would also provide security for US facilities in Japan and Japanese vessels would conduct surveillance and minesweeping operations in seas around Japan to cover US forces.

Alliance coordination was strengthened by establishing a "comprehensive mechanism" which included a Bilateral Planning Committee to conduct military-level planning for the first time. The guidelines also established a separate "coordination mechanism," which included officials on both national and regional levels.[502] Lastly, a system of "bilateral coordination centers" was established for coordinating US forces and the JSDF on an operational level. These bodies were to be established as needed with military personnel from the US Forces in Japan Headquarters and from the Japanese Joint Staff Council. However, even several years after the guidelines, questions remained about the character of these centers.

501 It has been argued that the vagueness of the definition is deliberate and necessary for the purpose of including items that are not possible to include in the official documents. E.g., Yoshihide Soeya, "A 'Normal' Middle Power: Interpreting Changes in Japanese Security Policy in the 1990s and After," in *Japan as a 'Normal Country'? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, ed. Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welsh (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2011), 84-85.

502 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2001*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2001,172.

An actual bilateral coordination center was established for the first time following the great East Japan earthquake in March 2011.[503]

The Acquisitions and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), initially signed in early 1996, was to facilitate the envisioned Japanese support for US forces.[504] But as the alliance reforms progressed, the first agreement proved too narrow. Hence, a new amendment was signed in May 1999.[505] Newly included paragraphs specified the possibility of providing Japanese logistical support such as fuels and other material support to US forces when responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan.[506]

Even though the guidelines specifically mentioned that there was no obligation to undertake any legislative measures on either side, the scope of the activities presupposed legislative changes on the Japanese side. This was a politically sensitive issue as the guidelines expanded Japan's role in the US alliance system and specifically required the JSDF to be deployed outside Japan in certain events. Further, it was not immediately clear that the necessary legislation would be passed as polls showed that only 9 percent of the population fully approved of the legislation when it was introduced.[507] However, the initial resistance largely melted away and a 1997 poll by *Yomiuri Shimbun* found over 60% support for the review of the defense guidelines and 65% support for the idea that JSDF would support US forces in the case of a conflict on the Korean peninsula.[508]

Even with increased popularity, the new legislation had to wait out the elections of July 1998. At the time, the LDP lost several seats and the following LDP government was in weak position and had to rely on the Liberal Party and the pacifist Komeito party to maintain a stable government. Despite its weakened position, the Obuchi government submitted the three pieces of legislation necessary for the implementation of the alliance guidelines in late 1998. These were the Law Concerning the Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in

503 Interview with a senior official in the Japan Ministry of Defense July 25, 2012.

504 It should be noted that this agreement was already first proposed by the US in 1988. The text of the agreement in Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1996*, Tokyo: Japan Times 1996, Reference 30.

505 Giarra and Nagashima, *Managing the New U.S - Japan Security Alliance*, 94-113. 100.

506 Agreement Amending the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Serviced Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan ant the Armed Forces of the United States of America. April 28, 1998.

507 Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 103-104.

508 *Yomiuri Shimbun* Poll cited in Christopher B. Johnstone, "Strained Alliance: US - Japan Diplomacy in the Asian Financial Crisis," *Survival* 41, no. 2 (1999): 123-124.

Areas Surrounding Japan, the agreement to amend the ACSA, and the amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law. [509]

The law concerning Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was particularly significant as it allowed the JSDF to provide logistic support to US forces in Japanese territory, including the maritime domain and exclusive economic zone as well as the corresponding airspace.[510] The law provided for the possibility of initiating activities without prior approval by the Diet but required that approval must be sought afterwards in these cases. The law further required local governmental bodies to cooperate with the central government in the implementation of these actions. This last part was included as some local governments had passed resolutions effectively barring US ships from their ports.[511] For its part, the amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law allowed the JSDF to be used in non-combatant evacuations outside Japan in cooperation with US forces. A fourth bill concerning ship inspection operations was submitted in October 2000 and passed a month later in November.[512] The ship inspections law allowed the JSDF to undertake inspection activities as far as the "surrounding high seas" of Japan if such operations were based on UN Security Council resolutions. The JSDF were also allowed to request a ship to change course and to attempt to "persuade" said ship to comply with these requests. The use of weapons was strictly limited to self-defense.[513]

The new guidelines clearly broadened the range of issues in which the alliance relation would apply. The "situations in areas surrounding Japan" now fell under the alliance framework and included specifically designated issues that had been found

509 E.g., Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 71.

510 An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is defined by the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea as an area of no more than 200 nautical miles from the baseline beach where the sovereign state has rights to economic interest but limited rights to govern the passage of maritime vessels or activities.

511 In late 1990s, some local governmental bodies had taken steps to limit their exposure to US warships by requiring the vessels to announce that they were not carrying any nuclear weapons. As the longstanding US policy has been to refrain from confirming or denying whether any particular vessel was carrying nuclear weapons this essentially amounted to a ban on US warships. A similar issue had been at the core of the US - New Zealand drift during the late 1980s. These kinds of decrees by local governments potentially pitted local-level politicians against the central government. The Japanese MOFA renounced these moves as illegal, and this debate can be seen behind the legislation specifically requiring local governmental cooperation. For a discussion about the impacts of sub-national Governmental bodies on Japanese foreign policies see Purnendra Jain, "Emerging Foreign Policy Actors: Subnational Governments and Nongovernmental Organizations," *Japanese Foreign Policy Today*, ed. Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

512 E.g., National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2000*, 121.

513 Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 82-83.

lacking during the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, there were no provisions stating when such support would be obligatory, and therefore, the decision would always rest on the political decision makers. Any actions would need to be approved by the Diet, which could also reject Japanese participation in US operations. However, this legislation made the alliance cooperation commensurate to any other JSDF combat operations which could be initiated by the cabinet but needed to be approved by the Diet beforehand or immediately after.[514] Overall, the tools provided by the guidelines and the new legislation, as well as the new ACSA, were clear advances in the cooperation frameworks. The new guidelines also stipulated that there would be a review "in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the U.S.-Japan security relationship occur."[515] However, the next review was to materialize more than 15 years later.

Sydney Statement and the ANZUS alliance

While the Japan-US alliance was the clear main aim of the 1996 EASR-I initiative, the profile of ANZUS was also elevated to levels not achieved since the 1970s. Working-level discussions to increase bilateral cooperation and exercises were already underway in 1995, but the reaffirmation process did not receive political attention before the 1996 elections in Australia. During the run-up to the elections, Howard proposed enhancing the alliance through four specific actions: the Coalition Party government would extend bilateral training opportunities, expand cooperative research and development, provide greater access of Australian facilities to US forces, and US defense equipment would be prepositioned in Australia.[516] After winning the elections, the Howard government set out to reaffirm the alliance as quickly as possible and to implement his plan to expand US presence in Australia. While these initiatives did not produce immediate results, a leadership dialogue in Washington was arranged in June 1996.[517]

514 A discussion about the implications and limitations of the 1997 guidelines in Michael J. Green, "The Challenges of Managing the U.S. – Japan Security Relations After the Cold War," in *New Perspectives on U.S. – Japan Relations*, ed. Gerald Curtis (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000).

515 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The 1997 Guidelines for Japan - U.S. Defense Cooperation*. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html (Accessed August 1, 2021)

516 Colin Brown, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: July – December 1995," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 42, no.2 (1996): 156.

517 Ibid., 139.

The July 1996 AUSMIN talks resulted in the Joint Security Declaration (Sydney Statement).[518] The statement specifically notes that Australia would provide more training opportunities for US forces and refers to the upcoming joint exercise, Tandem Thrust, scheduled for March 1997. This exercise is sometimes noted as a significant development resulting from the 1996 AUSMIN.[519] However, Tandem Thrust exercises had already been staged in the early 1990s, and the 1997 exercise been planned before the Howard government came to office.[520] Nonetheless, the elevation of the exercises into a regular biannual event can be seen as a major development in the alliance framework.[521]

The AUSMIN talks were followed by President Clinton's visit to Australia in November 1996. Clinton's speech in the Australian Parliament echoed the themes of his government's ongoing engagement effort with the Asia-Pacific, but overall, the main theme turned out to be more about trade. At the time, the most significant trade issues related to Australian leather imports for the US car industry and US agricultural export subsidies.[522] There were also diverging ideas on how to respond to the financial crisis in Indonesia and Malaysia. The US supported a tougher line on policy reforms as a prerequisite for IMF financial assistance. The Australian government, mindful the of dangers of government collapse in Indonesia, alternatively sought softer terms. While the security focus did not last long, the situation in the late 1990s was better than earlier as AUSMIN meetings were now held regularly. As noted, the ANZUS alliance itself did not include complex cooperation arrangements and Australia did not have a similar need for legislative reforms as Japan did. Cooperation between the two counties in the Middle East and in other areas provided a clear sign that the alliance itself was now on a more secure footing, even though the relationship between the Howard and Clinton administrations was sometimes troubled. [523]

The fact that Howard's relations with the Clinton administration were not entirely comfortable was obvious when Howard openly endorsed George W. Bush

518 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia – United States: A Strategic Partnership for the Twenty-First Century*, July 1996.

519 E.g., Malcolm Roberts, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: July-December 1996," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 43, no.3 (1997): 112-113.

520 E.g., Thomas-Durell Young "The Australian-United States Security Alliance," in *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Mohan Malik (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 59-60.

521 Rawdon Dalrymple, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 1996," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51, no.2 (1997): 252-253.

522 Malcolm Roberts, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: July-December 1996," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 43, no.3 (1997): 113.

523 Shirley Scott, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: January to June 1998," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 44, no. 4 (1998): 554 -555.

during the presidential election race in 2000.[524] The return of the Republican Party administration brought many policy makers familiar to Australians back to the US administration. The prospects for increased future cooperation appeared promising when the incoming Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to Australian leadership and guidance when dealing with Southeast Asian issues.[525] In the end, however, there were few actual new developments in the Australia-US alliance.[526]

Aftermath and explanations of the reaffirmations

It has been argued that after the short period of emphasis on US alliances, the Clinton administration again lost interest and returned to its previous economy-first mindset particularly after the 1996 elections.[527] For its part, the Asian financial crisis also helped to shift the focus back to the economy. Declassified documents from 1997 show that after the 1996 security reaffirmation, high-level meetings focused almost exclusively on the financial crisis. When Prime Minister Hashimoto made references to the developments in the alliance during a meeting with President Clinton in November 1997, Clinton responded with a long talk on financial difficulties without even mentioning the alliance.[528]

Clinton's 1998 visit to the Western Pacific has often been raised as an example of neglect of US Pacific allies: the list of places the President visited on that trip included China and Hong Kong but not Japan or South Korea. This gave birth to the catchphrase "Japan passing," often used in the Japanese press for describing Clinton's Asia policy.[529] And it was not only Japan that the Clinton administration passed over. The president failed to show up at the APEC summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1998, just five years after declaring the birth of a new Pacific Community during

524 Paul Kelly, *Howard's Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reprisal* (Canberra: Lowy institute, 2006), 48.

525 Rod Lyon, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: January to June 2001," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 47, no.4, (2001): 517.

526 David Goldsworthy, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 2000," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 47, no.2, (2001): 225.

527 There is a general agreement among scholars that the drive behind the alliance reform was lost after the mid-1990s. Only the seriousness and timing of the lapse are matters of discussion. See, for example, Green, *Balance of Power*, 9-34. 27-28; Kurt M. Campbell, "Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 4 (2000), 125-134.

528 Clinton Presidential Library, Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, Vancouver Canada, November 24, 1997.

529 Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov, *The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 107-109.

the 1993 APEC meeting in Seattle. This left some US allies wondering about the US willingness to lead in the Pacific.[530]

In October 2000, just before the US presidential elections, the Institute for National Strategic Studies published a report titled *The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership*.[531] Authored by a bipartisan commission including many senior administration officials behind the Nye initiative in the early 1990s, as well as several Republican Party experts soon to be in officials of the Bush administration, the report presented itself as a bipartisan consensus view of the alliance. The report specifically notes that the mid-1990s reaffirmation had been a passing phase, after which China had become the sole focal point of US foreign policy in Asia. Specifically, the report argued that the redefinition efforts of the mid-1990s had been forsaken without sustained high-level attention or follow-through.[532]

The reaffirmation process demonstrates how the senior ally set the pace of the alliance development almost unilaterally. Japan had sought to develop the alliance frameworks, from at least the late 1980s onwards, whereas Australia displayed little interest in the alliance before the 1996 elections. Reaffirmations were initiated firstly by the Bush administration, but this effort, along with the associated declarations, was largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Consequently, none of the reforms were implemented before 1996. Despite Japanese requests, alliance development only got back on track after US policymakers took up these issues. Notably, the high-profile Okinawa rape incident drew executive attention to the problems associated with the US bases in Okinawa, and this became one of the main points of the reaffirmation in the US-Japan alliance. While it had been discussed previously, Okinawa had not drawn this level of attention since the islands were returned to Japan in the 1970s.

In Australia, we can observe a similar lack of results when the junior ally sought to induce increased alliance cooperation. The Howard government tried to ride the ongoing Nye-initiative during the elections and after assuming office. Howard aggressively branded himself as the pro-alliance candidate and the Coalition Party had its own blueprint of what the alliance reaffirmation would include. However, most of Howard's initiatives received little support from the US side. The main concrete outcome of the reaffirmation was the increased tempo of bilateral military exercises, even though this had actually been prepared and agreed upon during the previous administration.

530 E.g., Sheridan, *The Partnership*, 32-33.

531 Institute for National Strategic Studies, *The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership*, INSS Special Report, October 11, 2000.

532 Ibid., 3-4.

Therefore, it can be clearly observed that the alliance developments followed the lead of the senior ally. The timing, tempo, and agenda of these efforts were set in Washington and the decisionmakers in Tokyo and Canberra had to wait for the US administration to take the lead. The scope of what was accomplished was limited to what the US policymakers wanted. The reaffirmations were implemented against politically unfavorable circumstances in Japan and were not carried as far as the Howard administration would have wanted in Australia.

Threats also played a role. The Japan-US alliance was the focus point of the Nye-initiative, and the subsequent reforms in the alliance were largely directed to possible contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. It is difficult to assess if the Chinese threat towards Taiwan would also have been included in the planning for these reforms, but as the Clinton administration was more focused on economic opportunities in China, and as the reforms were well underway before the Taiwan strait crisis took place, it is difficult to argue that China would have been the main target. Australia, on the other hand, faced fewer threats than Japan and its use as a base for US forces in the event of a major conflict was not seriously considered, as is evident from the lack of interest in deploying troops there. This could also be used to explain why the reaffirmation of the ANZUS alliance resulted in fewer concrete actions. The increasing regional instability in the late 1990s can also be used to explain Australian willingness to strengthen the alliance, as well as US reluctance to do so as the US side was becoming increasingly wary of taking part in regional conflicts.

If we look at the reaffirmations from the perspective of the domestic politics of the junior allies, it is quite clear that their role was limited. The developments began with high-level focus from central figures in the US administration and went ahead despite turmoil in Japanese politics and the change of leadership in Australia. Lapses in the process coincide with a change of leadership or lapse of the focus on the US side. These facts discount domestic politics in Japan or Australia as a necessary variable for these developments. Even though Australian leadership did try to claim credit for the Sydney statement, it is clear that the Nye-initiative, which produced the statement and increased US presence in the region, was underway before Australian elections in 1996. Furthermore, most of the things Howard was seeking actually failed to materialize.

4.3 International operations, Persian Gulf and the Middle East

The post-Cold War situation brought new expectations to the Pacific alliances and reshaped some of the old issues. As successive US governments sought to cut back on defense spending and overseas deployments, allies were expected to contribute to international stability by lending their military forces to international operations

and peacekeeping missions. Contributions to the Middle East were especially demanded. The watershed moment was the Persian Gulf War, fought during the first years of the 1990s. Both Australia and Japan sent forces to the Persian Gulf when requested, even though this was a difficult process for Japan. It should be remembered that sending forces to the Persian Gulf had already been discussed in the 1980s in both Japan and Australia. The roots of these developments can be traced back at least to the Carter Doctrine, which specifically "demands participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East."[533] Throughout the 1980s, the US demand for contributions to the Gulf had been specifically directed to its Pacific allies.[534] The Gulf War also served as a kind of catalyst for other international military operations, and the following proliferation of UN peacekeeping missions was a notable departure from the 1980s. For Japan, this was a new experience also requiring new legislation. For Australia, it meant re-establishing the tradition of small UN deployments dating back several decades but which had been allowed to dwindle away during the post-Vietnam era.

The Persian Gulf War and the first engagements in the Middle East

The crisis in the Persian Gulf began with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The War was hailed as a decisive victory for the new US-led world order. As noted earlier, the US side, and especially the US Congress, were very keen for its allies to bear a significant part of the costs of war and to send troops to support the effort. Japan and Australia had different staring points in the crisis due to historical and political reasons, and neither party was directly threatened by the events in the Middle East; nonetheless, both faced pressures to contribute. The Australian contribution was swift and uncontroversial, and the Australian government came out of the war more confident in its own security outlook and its alliance with the US. The Japanese response, however, was criticized as inadequate in the US and, more importantly, by the Japanese themselves, who often refer to this as "Japan's defeat in the Gulf War." [535]

533 James Carter, 'The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," (Speech, Washington D.C., January 23, 1980). https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/app-categories/spoken-addresses-and-remarks/presidential/state-the-union-addresses (accessed June 18, 2021)

534 Interview with Hugh White, February 19, 2014. White served in the labor administration as a Senior Adviser to the Prime Minister from 1985 until 1991.

535 Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 77.

The Japanese contribution and its shortcomings

In the 1980s, the Japanese government attempted to send minesweepers and military personnel to the Gulf, but the initiative was defeated before even reaching parliamentary debate. In 1990, the US side again requested Japanese minesweepers, which the Japanese side initially refused. Instead, Japan offered financial assistance. At the start of the conflict, Iraqi forces had taken more than 300 Japanese civilians as hostages along with a large number of European and US citizens. Japan was seen to be still dragging its feet in joining the coalition to oppose Iraqi aggression while there was a common threat against civilians, which further irritated the US Congress – hostile towards Japan to begin with.[536] In August 1990, in the face of increasing pressure, Japan offered to send medical personnel, supplies, and transportation support. However, Japan's failure to meet the request for minesweepers and its refusal to transport military equipment only contributed to further resentment. Japan's cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and its initial refusal to allow Japanese transportation to be used by refugees invoked further ire.[537] In September, the US Congress intervened by making continued US military presence in Japan conditional on Japanese contribution to the Gulf and by passing a separate resolution that threatened to downgrade relations with any ally who failed to make satisfactory contributions to the war effort.[538]

Japan still tried to buy its way out, only to find that no amount of money seemed to satisfy its critics. In September of 1990, Japan raised its financial contribution to 4 billion USD and increased its Host Nation Support (HNS) payments for US troops in Japan. However, the US Congress responded by demanding the withdrawal of US troops from Japan if it failed to bear the full costs of their upkeep.[539] As a consequence, another HNS agreement was signed in January 1991, in which Japan agreed to pay for all the utilities and Japanese worker's wages on US bases.[540]

Under pressure, Prime Minister Kaifu attempted to rush through legislation allowing Japanese troops to take part in international peacekeeping operations (PKO). However, the PKO bill, initially proposed in September 1990, faced an uphill

536 E.g., Kenichi Ito, "Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis," in *Journal of Japanese Studies* 17, no. 2 (1991).

537 Participating diplomat's account of the painstaking Japanese participation in the crisis in Armacost, *Friends or Rivals,* 105-109.

538 United States Congress, House of Representatives, *House Amendment 712,* (1990); 101st United States Congress *House Resolution 366,* (1990).

539 E.g., 102nd Congress, House Resolution H.R.377.IH, "To require that the President negotiate with Japan an agreement whereby Japan reimburses the United States for a portion of the costs the United States incurs in providing military…", January 1991.

540 The text of the agreement in Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1991*, Tokyo: Japan Times 1991, Reference 24.

battle from the start and failed to satisfy any of the parties. The suggestion that JSDF elements could use weapons under the UN flag was declined by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) and the resulting watered-down bill was resisted by hawkish members of the LDP. For most of the opposition parties, the general idea of participating in a coalition planning to use force was unacceptable.[541] The proposal was withdrawn without a vote in November of 1990 due to the rising controversy related to the use of force.[542]

The uncertain fate of about 300 Japanese hostages held by the Iraqi regime caused further complications. The Iraqi announcement that Japanese financial contributions to a possible war effort was enough to justify the targeting of Japanese citizens as hostages, even if Japan did not contribute combat troops, shocked the pacifist-minded parties and further complicated the debates on Japan's policy response.[543] Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone traveled to Iraq under his own initiative in November 1990 and secured the release of 78 Japanese hostages along with some Europeans. The US opposed such trips on the grounds that they would further encourage Iraqis to make further demands and several Japanese officials criticized Nakasone's trip over its possible implications for the already tense US-Japan relations.[544]

After combat operation began in January 1991, the US issued a demand for additional contributions from Japan. Having learned a lesson from its earlier slow responses, Japan promptly agreed to provide almost 9 billion USD more.[545] To pay for this, Japan even had to raise domestic taxes. While the US Congress remained unappeased, Japanese contributions were acknowledged by President Bush when he promised to schedule a visit to Japan for the fall of 1991. [546] In the end, Japan paid over 13 billion USD for the war effort (not counting the increased HNS), more than any other country aside from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Further, Japan finally managed to end its aversion to sending JSDF personnel abroad and dispatched a flotilla of minesweepers to the Gulf in April of 1991. Notably, after legislative efforts to send troops had failed, this action was taken

541 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 66-67.

542 Shigeru Kozai. "UN Peace-Keeping and Japan: Problems and Prospects," in *Japan and International Law: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Nitsuke Ando (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 33.

543 E.g., Kenichi Ito, "Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 17, no. 2 (1991).

544 E.g., *New York Times*, "Mideast Tensions; Baghdad Says It Will Free 78 of 305 Japanese Held," November 7, 1990.

545 Courtney Purrington, "Tokyo's Policy Responses during the Gulf Crisis," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 4 (1991): 311.

546 Armacost, *Friends or Rivals*, 121 -122.

without any new legislation.[547] The mounting criticism and direct accusations of Japanese freeriding had taken a toll on the opposition and the ships were dispatched under the guise of ensuring the freedom of navigation without notable opposition from the Diet nor the public. Yet the significance of this act was not so much in its novelty, as Japanese mine clearing vessels had also served in the Korean War, and the idea of dispatching these same vessels to the Gulf had already been debated in the late 1980s. Rather, the significance was in the fact that the pressure to contribute was finally enough to force this limited gesture from Japan.[548]

The war also had lasting economic effects on the alliance. As a result of the altered HNS agreement, Japan bore 25% of the wages of Japanese working for the US Forces in Japan in 1991 and 1992. In 1993, this rose to 50%, in 1994 to 75%, and in 1995, Japan assumed the full costs of wages for the Japanese workers. In addition, Japan funded several projects to improve US basing facilities such as expanding housing for US personnel. As the burden on the local populace was becoming an ever larger issue, especially near military airfields, the Japanese government tried to address these concerns by providing alternative training areas and even agreed to move the runway of the Iwakuni airfield 1km east in order to reduce the noise effects on local residents.[549]

The effects of the Gulf War on the US-Japan alliance have often been portrayed as negative. In the US popular discourse, Japan's contribution was seen to have been "too little, too late."[550] On the Japanese side, there was resentment over the lack of appreciation for Japan's massive financial contribution and over what was viewed as extensive pressure from the US in the face of traditional Japanese sensitivities.[551] In parts of Japan's political elite, the Gulf Crisis prompted a sense of crisis over the perceived damage to US-Japan relations. The sense of crisis was accentuated by the realization of how poorly Japan was prepared to handle crises in the post-Cold War world.[552] However, the US administration was less critical of the overall results and was clearly conscious of the need to reassure their Japanese partner about the

547 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, "burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War" *International Organization* 48, no.1 (1994).

548 Armacost, *Friends or Rivals*, 124.

549 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1995*, Tokyo: Japan Times 1995, Reference 24.

550 Purrington, *Tokyo's Policy Responses during the Gulf Crisis*, 322.

551 Notably, the term *Gaiatsu* also often includes the idea that domestic elites use the foreign pressure as an effective tool to overcome domestic opposition. E.g., Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 77-78.

552 Courtney Purrington, "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the 'Iraqi Shock' in Japan," *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 2 (1992).

stability of the alliance.[553] Even more interestingly, Japan's sense of failure was seen as an opportunity to gain more from the alliance. [554] Especially the inaugural out-of-area deployment of Japanese forces to support US operations was welcomed, and US officials sought to ensure that these would also be forthcoming in future contingents.[555] The alliance handlers in the Bush administration sought to use this momentum to write new alliance guidelines in 1991,[556] but this effort faltered due to US domestic politics.[557]

Australian engagement in the Gulf

The dispatch of Australian forces to the Gulf did not arouse significant opposition as bipartisan support for deployments had already been tested during the Tanker War.[558] The experience of sending clearance divers to the Gulf in 1988 was a pattern-setting event that also made it easier to deploy forces there in the early 1990s.[559] Furthermore, in 1987 there was already an understanding that the demand for deploying forces to the Gulf was at least partially intended as a test of the Australian commitment to the alliance.[560] In addition to the Gulf, Australia had also sent monitors to the Iran-Iraq border after the peace treaty was reached in the late 1980s.

553 Department of Defense Scope Paper: Japan Visit 22-23 November 1991, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part II, 1977-1992.

554 Kazuhiko Togo, who was a Japanese diplomat at the time, describes the relations as heavily damaged, while Michael H. Armacost, who served as US ambassador to Japan, states that "the experience also left scars on both sides," but assumes a basic attitude that the crisis was more an incentive to further develop the relations. Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 125-127.

555 United States Department of Defense, Themes for USDP visit to Japan, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part II*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1977-1992.

556 United States Department of State, Embassy cable 01680, 1991/03/14, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part II,* United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1977-1992.

557 *New York Times*, "Japan's Chief Regrets Scrapping of Bush Trip," November 7, 1991.

558 David Horner, *Australia and the 'New World Order': From Peacekeeping to Enforcement 1988-1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),162, 166-168.

559 David Horner, "Australian Peacekeeping and the New World Order", in *Australian Peacekeeping; Sixty Years in the Field*, ed. David Horner, Peter Londey & Jean Boy (Cambridge MT: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 44.

560 Interview with Hugh White on February 19, 2014. White served as an advisor to the Prime Minister at the time; Serving Minister of Defence Kim Beazley himself made this point in Kim Beazley, "Diplomacy and Strategy: an Opposition Perspective," in *Australian-American Relations; Looking towards the Next Century,* ed. William T. Tow (Canberra: St Martins Press, 1998), 41.

Therefore, Australia had plenty of experience in military deployments to the region.[561]

As US forces were establishing a naval blockade of Iraq in the summer of 1990, Prime Minister Hawke committed two Royal Australian Navy (RAN) frigates to the force without consulting the parliament.[562] Even while the Labor Party's electoral platforms in the 1980s had consistently stated that it would only consider overseas military deployments if there was a clear threat to Australia, the decision was not seriously challenged.[563] While breaking with Labor Party traditions, the successful war boosted the ailing popularity of the Prime Minister, although it was not enough for him to hold on to power much longer.[564] It is a notable sign of the Hawke government's attitude towards the US alliance that Australia first committed the RAN frigates to the US task force, and only later redefined the dispatch as a commitment to the UN operation.[565]

After the initial deployment, questions regarding how the RAN vessels were to be supplied arose, and Australia's policy of conducting self-sustained operations within alliance frameworks was tested. While RAN did manage to implement its own support scheme, the Cooperative Defense Logistics Agreement with the US, signed in 1989, provided the necessary support. The fact that a new Cross Servicing Agreement between the US and Australia was pushed through to reinforce this support mechanism is a clear indication that Australian forces needed US support.[566] The Australian task force began its operation in early September in close cooperation with the USS Independence Carrier Battle Group. On September 17, Australia further dispatched two surgical teams to work on a US medical ship in the area. In exchange, medical services would also be available to Australian personnel under the new cross-servicing agreement. The deployment of Australian medical personnel can be understood as a token effort of self-reliance.[567]

The second deployment, consisting of a frigate and a destroyer, arrived in the area in early December.[568] The Hawke government further added two more medical teams to the Australian contribution and announced that the new ships would be put

561 David Horner, Peter Londey & Jean Boy ed. *Australian Peacekeeping; Sixty Years in the Field* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Appendix.

562 Australian Prime Ministers had early on established the tradition of committing troops without ant parliamentary debate. Bell, *Dependent Ally,* 161.

563 Horner, *Australia and the 'New World Order',* 293 -294.

564 *Sydney Morning Herald*, "Gulf War Boosts Govt, but Coalition Still Ahead," March 8, 1993; Frank G. Clarke, *The History of Australia* (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 182 -183.

565 Firth, *Australia in International Politics,* 39 -40.

566 Horner, *Australia and the 'New World Order',*.162, 335-336.

567 Ibid., 162, 347-348.

568 Grey, *A Military History of Australia,* 260-261.

under US operational command. RAN ships would be allowed to take part in combat actions with the understanding that the ships would mainly be used for aerial defense.[569] Additionally, after the air war began, the joint operation facilities in Australia were used to detect Iraqi missile launches.[570]

Further, despite Hawke's previous pronouncements not to send any more troops, Australia dispatched another mine clearance diving team to the area in January 1991.[571] This team was meant to assist in a planned amphibious landing for the US Marines and would have hence taken part in the actual fighting had the planned landing taken place. Even though the landing was cancelled, the dispatch of front-line combat troops was a significant show of commitment. After the war, mine clearing became a central activity for coalition forces and the Australian team operated in the area until April. All the original Australian forces departed from the Gulf area by May.[572] One RAN frigate would continue to serve in the UN Maritime Interception Force from then on.[573]

Popular opinion in Australia also supported these deployments. It is likely that the success of the deployment facilitated the maintenance of a continued presence in the area after the war as RAN frigates were the beginning of a continuous Australian military presence. Australia maintained the vessels in the region almost continuously for a decade, usually in the form of a single frigate for escort duties and interception missions related to the sanctions against Iraq.[574]

The Gulf War was a turning point for Australian security strategy, which had been built around self-reliance and the strict Defence of Australia doctrine. It showed that international deployments could again be acceptable missions for the ADF and demonstrated the relevance of the US alliance to the Australian public.[575] Changing attitudes towards Australian overseas commitment are evident from the following proliferation of Australian participation in international peacekeeping operations, discussed later. As the number of overseas operations increased, the focus of defense policy had to expand from the self-sustained defense of the northern sea-air gap.[576]

569 Horner, *Australia and the 'New World Order',*.393, 401.
570 *The Sun Herald*, "Government will face US pressure on Star Wars," February 3, 1991.
571 *Sydney Morning Herald, "*'No More Forces', Then Divers Sent," January 26, 1991.
572 Horner, *Australia and the 'New World Order',*.487, 490.
573 Grey, *A Military History of Australia,* 261-262.
574 For details on the Australian deployments in the Middle East see, for example, Australian War Memorial: https://www.awm.gov.au/visit/research-at-the-memorial (Accessed August 1, 2021)
575 E.g., Richard Leaver, "Australia and the New World Order," in *Australia's Gulf War*, ed. Murray Goot and Rodney Tiffen (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992).
576 David Horner, Peter Londey & Jean Boy eds., *Australian Peacekeeping; Sixty Years in the Field* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). pp. 51-53, 276-279.

Australian willingness to send troops and equipment in support of US actions in the Middle East was again tested in the late 1990s as tensions between US forces and Saddam Hussein's regime persisted. It was widely perceived that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction and hindering the work of the UN inspections teams. As tensions rose, there was a sizable build-up of coalition forces in the spring of 1998 in preparation for a second invasion. Australia sent a 100-strong SAS force, scores of liaison and intelligence officers, and two aerial refueling planes along with their ground crews to participate in the attack — a force clearly more combat oriented than during the first Gulf War. The forces remained in the area for some months, but most were called back by May 1998 as no invasion materialized.[577] According to the Australian Department of Defence, forces were to be maintained in readiness in Australia and redeployed if needed.[578] However, once the fighting began in December 1998, Operation Desert Fox lasted only four days. Therefore, the contribution ended up being a failure due to the fact that Australia did not have the ability to maintain military assets abroad for extended periods or to redeploy them fast enough. To address these issues, the Howard government and the Department of Defence began considering ways to ensure more rapid deployment capability for future operations.[579]

The redeployment of Australian forces to the Persian Gulf was not a significant event in Australia. The authoritative five-yearly academic publication of Australia's international relations, covering the period from 1996 until 2000, does not make a single reference to the affair and it is challenging to find any information on the topic.[580] Neither did the deployment make waves in the Australian Parliament. The initial bill to send forces was praised by both the opposition and the government.[581] While Australian support did receive thanks from the US,[582] it was speculated that support for the US actions in 1996 might have lost Australia its bid for a seat in the UN Security Council for 1997-1998.[583]

577 Gary Smith, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 1998," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. 53, no. 2, (1999).

578 Office of the Minister of Defence. Media Release. Friday, 8 May 1998.

579 E.g., Karen Middleton, *Unwinnable War: Australia in Afghanistan* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2011), 39-40

580 James Cotton and John Ravenhill, eds., *The National Interest in a Global Era; Australia in World Affairs, 1996-2000* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001).

581 Shirley Scott, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: January to June 1998," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 44, no. 4, (1998) 553-565.

582 *Reuters*, "Clinton Thanks Canada, Australia for Iraq Support" Tuesday, February 10, 1998.

583 Malcolm Roberts, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: July – December 1996," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 43, no. 2 (1997)

Nevertheless, the operations in the Gulf had some clear benefits for the ANZUS alliance. Australian ships functioned in close coordination with a US Carrier Battle Group and were one of the few non-NATO forces to be integrated into the NATO communication networks. Later, Australian ships were put under US operational command, thus cementing the cooperative framework. Elements of the support services were also integrated, and Australian medical teams served on a US medical ship. Wartime cooperation at this level had not been exercised since the Vietnam War, and the integration of Australian forces into NATO structures was a beneficial test of compatibility across different US alliances. [584]

For both alliances, the Gulf War signaled the beginning of a new kind of cooperation. While international operations were not officially part of the alliances until the alliance reaffirmations of the mid-1990s, the increasing tempo of international operations was evident immediately after the Gulf War. For Japan, even while the JSDF did not return to the Middle East for ten years, this meant the beginning of a tedious process of making international operations a normal part of its military missions. For Australia, this meant a return to UN peacekeeping operations in both regional and global contexts and marked the beginning of decades of deployments to the Middle East alongside US forces.

Expansion of International Peacekeeping

The end of the Cold War left unresolved conflicts simmering in the developing world and former Eastern Bloc, a number of which threatened to create regions of lawlessness in the peripheral areas of the New World Order. In Asia, Cambodia was still in a post-conflict state and there were several other unstable areas in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. US governments had been averse towards UN peacekeeping missions since the bombing of a US Marine's barracks in Beirut in 1983. However, after a brief period of flirting with UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), the Clinton administration reversed its course after the 1992 debacle in Mogadishu. Throughout the 1990s, there was significant pressure placed on US allies to bear the burden of PKOs in place of US forces. Both Japan and Australia already made inroads in international PKOs in the late 1980s, but it was only after the Gulf War that these operations increased dramatically.

The beginning of Japanese peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations in their modern form under the United Nations flag began in the 1950s, and most of the UN member states have sent soldiers on peacekeeping

584 David Horner, *Australia and the 'New World Order',* 458 – 459.

missions to different parts of the world. Japan however, refrained from sending its military abroad until the early 1990s. This was partially due to legal questions related to the Japanese Constitution and partially because of popular resistance to military activities. Japan was first asked to provide troops to PKOs in the 1950s, but all initiatives to do so failed in the face of popular opposition. However, this aversion gradually eroded. In the late 1980s, Japan sent civilians to UN operations in Afghanistan and to the Iran-Iraq border as well as election observers to Namibia in 1990, but no military personnel were deployed.[585]

The Gulf crisis accelerated this process of erosion dramatically. There had already been earlier discussions about legislating a framework for UN PKOs, but the first time this legislation was actually drafted was at the height of the crisis in 1991. The sense of urgency was evident from the fact that the first bill was rushed to the parliament before proper preparations and largely failed for this reason. The rewritten bill was eventually passed in 1992, even though it was already too late for the Gulf War. The impact of increased pressure for contributions is evident from the fact that the eventual deployment of JSDF minesweepers to the Gulf in 1991 was approved even without legislative framework.[586]

The first official PKO for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces was the UNTAC operation in Cambodia. Japan's first deployment was also its largest single PKO deployment to date and included 75 police officers, several military observers, and an engineer battalion of 600 soldiers. The mission laste over a year and the last Japanese soldiers were withdrawn in 1993. A Japanese diplomat served as the head of mission, with an Australian General acting as the commander of the military component. Japan suffered two casualties on this mission. As peacekeeping operations were not associated with combat, the first two casualties, one being a civilian, resulted in calls for withdrawal, and the experience tempered Japanese participation in coming operations.[587] In the early 1990s, Japan also sent troops to Mozambique from May 1993 to January 1995, and to the refugee-relief operation in Rwanda from June to December 1994.

There was no US participation or US-Japan coordination in these operations besides an unsuccessful initiative to have US military transports provide airlift for GSDF troops to Rwanda.[588] Notably, some of these deployments were actually humanitarian operations and not peacekeeping as such. The distinction is important

585 E.g., William L. Heinrich, Akiho Shibata and Yoshihide Soeya, *UN Peace-Keeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Policies* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999), 8-10, 18.

586 E.g., Hugo Dobson, *Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

587 Ibid., 122-123.

588 Giarra, and Nagashima, *Managing the New U.S, - Japan Security Alliance*, 103.

as the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (originally enacted in September 1987) was amended in June 1992 to enable the JSDF to participate in international disaster response activities. As disaster relief has been one of the central missions of the JSDF since its founding, expanding its disaster response missions to cover disasters abroad was a convenient way to expand JSDF activities. Since the enactment of the amendment, the JSDF has maintained readiness to send medical officers, helicopters, C-130 transport planes, and several landing ships to humanitarian missions on short notice.[589]

As noted, the first PKO casualties in Cambodia caused controversy. New PKOs were suspended several times in the 1990s for legislative reviews. In 1996, Japan sent troops to the Golan Heights. This was the first Japanese participation in a traditional PKO separating two belligerent states. While this was again a new departure for the JSDF, it was also the only PKO for Japanese armed forces in the late 1990s before East Timor. Most of the JSDF's international deployments after the early 1990s were humanitarian or disaster relief missions. The JSDF deployed relief teams to Honduras in 1998, to Turkey in 1999, and to India in February 2001. [590]

The revised PKO legislation was adopted in June 1998.[591] The use of weapons by JSDF personnel participating in PKO operations proved to be the most difficult part of the revision. According to the new law, an individual soldier was allowed to use weapons to defend against direct and imminent threat; however, any collective use of weapons was only allowed if the senior officer on the scene commanded so. Even then, the use of force could only be allowed as a form of collective self-defense.[592] This topic would be revisited several times during the next decades and it demonstrates how uncomfortable Japan still is about sending its military abroad.

Australian international operations in the 1990s

UN PKOs were a feature of the ADF's activities early on. However, these operations were cut in the post-Vietnam period, and in the 1980s, the Australian contribution to international peacekeeping was miniscule. In 1987, Australia had only 13 of its 70,000-strong armed forces personnel deployed in PKOs.[593] This number was remarkably low for a western country. In comparison, Canada had around 900

589 E.g., Glenn D. Hook and Son Key-Young, "Transposition in Japanese state identities: overseas troop dispatches and the emergence of a humanitarian power?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 67, no.1 (2013): 35-54.

590 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, editions 1995-2001. Tokyo: Urban Connections, various years.

591 Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 390-391.

592 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2000*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2001.

593 John C. Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, 76-77.

peacekeepers abroad out of armed forces of 85,0000, Ireland had 775 out of 13,000, and even New Zealand had 35 peacekeepers from its armed forces of 12,600 deployed in PKOs.[594] Australia had been one of the first nations to deploy peacekeepers in the 1950s, but this had been part of the forward engagement strategy that had culminated in its participation in the unpopular war in Vietnam. Accordingly, as Australia abandoned the forward engagement strategy, it also withdrew from peacekeeping operations.[595] This all changed during the first half of the 1990s when Australia sent troops to 17 different international operations.[596]

After the Gulf War, Australia took the leading role in the UNTAC operation in Cambodia along with Japan, from mid-1991 until 1993. Australia, which had been diplomatically active in solving the conflict, ended up sending approximately 600 soldiers to the mission. This contribution, along with active diplomacy, gave Australia the command of the military component of the operation.[597] Interestingly, this largest ADF peacekeeping deployment in several decades was initially opposed by the opposition Coalition Party and supported by the governing Labor Party, which was traditionally averse to sending Australian troops abroad.[598] However, after the bipartisan support for participating in PKOs had been established, party politics seem to have featured little in the following deployments, and criticism was usually more over inaction rather than participation.[599]

While still active in Cambodia, the ADF was dispatched to another large PKO in Somalia in January 1993. Even though this was a UN operation, the deployment followed a direct US request. Australia deployed a battalion group of approximately 1,000 personnel. The time limit for the operation was 17 weeks and the troops were withdrawn after the period.[600] After the operation, ADF capabilities to operate in several theaters and in high-threat environments were publicly criticized as inadequate.[601] While there had been no casualties, the criticism, together with widely publicized images of US soldier's bodies being mutilated after the battle of

594 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1986 - 1988* (London: Brassey's, 1988).

595 E.g., David Horner, *Australian Peacekeeping and the New World Order*, 43-44.

596 Horner, Londey and Boy, eds., *Australian Peacekeeping*, Appendix.

597 John Connor, "Intervention and Domestic Politics," in *Australian Peacekeeping; Sixty Years in the Field*, ed. David Horner, Peter Londey and Jean Boy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 64-68.

598 The same Coalition party members, however, were very keen to send Australian troops abroad later and on more dangerous missions. Therefore, party politics rather than actual opposition to the operation might be seen to have been more reflected in the political debates.

599 Connor, *Intervention and Domestic Politics*, 65-67, 70-71, 81-83.

600 Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 263

601 Leahy, *The Medium-Weight Force*, 19-24.

Mogadishu a few months after Australian withdrawal, had the effect of slowing down further operations. The ADF sent military officers to UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, Guatemala, and Mozambique. Larger deployments included a truce-monitoring mission and disaster relief missions in Papua New Guinea in 1997 and 1998, as well as Haiti and Rwanda in 1994 and 1995, but not on the scale seen in Cambodia and Somalia.[602] However, at the end of the 1990s, Australia engaged in its largest PKO, which took place right next to Australia.

The East Timor crisis

East Timor had been a volatile and secessionist area ever since Indonesia took over from the Portuguese, and heavy-handed crackdowns by the Indonesian government were a point of friction for Australia-Indonesia relations since the 1970s. After the fall of the Suharto regime during the Asian financial crisis, the security situation in East Timor deteriorated into widespread violence by the pro-Indonesia militias. The new president suggested that East Timor might be granted autonomy, apparently in order to appease the international community on which the Indonesian economy was dependent, as much as to ease the burden of maintaining the territory. By the end of the decade, the conflict endangered regional stability and threatened to create an ungoverned state just across the sea from Australia. Controlling the situation became an urgent security issue and, as a US ally, Australia also expected support from the Clinton administration.[603]

In early 1999, Portugal and Indonesia reached an agreement that a referendum would be held to consult the East Timorese about the prospects of autonomy under Indonesia. It was agreed that a UN presence would be required to support such a vote and Australia indicated that it was willing to lead the operation. An ADF brigade in Darwin was placed on standby in March 1999. The resulting UNAMET mission was mostly staffed and funded by Australia. The security was, however, still in Indonesian hands and violence was widespread during the referendum. After the vote turned out in favor of East Timorese independence, the violence and atrocities escalated. The UNAMET came under attack by the militias and the ADF had to evacuate UN personnel. However, the violence kept spreading and pressure for a UN military intervention grew rapidly. [604]

602 Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, 124, 132.

603 Hugh White, "The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor, December 1998-September 1999," in *Security Challenges* 4, no. 1 (2008): 69-87; James Cotton, "The East Timor Commitment and Its Consequences," in *The National Interest in a Global Era; Australia in World Affairs, 1996-2000*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, 213-234), 214-215

604 White, *The Road to INTERFET*, 77-78.

Australia proposed that an international interim security force should be deployed to re-establish security, and the UN asked Australia to assume leadership of the mission. International pressure forced President Habibie to concede handing over East Timor's security to UN forces, but the pro-Indonesian militias, which had been armed by the retreating Indonesian Army, were expected to resist. As the threat was considered high, the ADF deployed to the island in force and secured the capital by the end of September. Most of the militias fled and fought only a few skirmishes with the UN forces. The ADF forces consisted of 5,500 soldiers, supported by other UN troops. Australia also deployed 9 RAN combat ships, as well as RAAF fighters, to deter hostile actions by the Indonesian Army. In February 2000, the number of Australian forces was scaled down to 1,500.[605]

As the crisis began, Australia sought the support of its most important ally, the US. However, as discussed, US policymakers were hostile to peacekeeping operations and the request was rebuffed by the Clinton administration. US unwillingness to support Australians was a controversial issue at the time. The disappointment was noted by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer on CNN. According to Prime Minister Howard, the general sense on the Australian side was that while Australia had sent troops to support the US whenever asked, the US side did not reciprocate the one time when Australia was asking for support.[606] Eventually, the US provided logistics support for the operation and deployed an amphibious assault group, along with a Marine battalion, to deter Indonesian forces. The US side also provided a large part of the INTERFET airlift capability as well as communications and intelligence support. However, no US forces were deployed to East Timor itself.[607]

The success of these contributions also demonstrated the high level of interoperability between Australian and US forces.[608] While there were conflicts between the allies, the INTERFET operation provided the US with a new model student in Australia. The incoming US Secretary of State Colin Powell praised Australian willingness to take the lead in its own region and hinted that this was also expected from other US allies. However, as a result, some regional states became wary of the Australian portrayal as a US "deputy sheriff" in Southeast Asia.[609]

605 Ibid., 81-82.

606 Howard, *Lazarus Rising*, 405-407.

607 J.R. Ballard, "Mastering Coalition Command in Modern Peace Operations: Operation 'Stabilize' in East Timor," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 13, no.1 (2002): 83-101.

608 Thea Clark and Terry Moon, "Interoperability for Joint and Coalition Operations," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 151 (2002): 23-36.

609 Rod Lyon, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: January to June 2001," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 47, no.4 (2001): 522-523.

Aftermath and explanations

The end of the US-Soviet confrontation left the US as the sole superpower in charge of the global order but lacking the domestic support to maintain and police this order. Despite the success of the Gulf War, all subsequent military deployments were controversial in the US as there were rising calls to cut down on global engagement and reduce the burden on US taxpayers. At the same time, dormant conflicts erupted and needed to be addressed by the UN. The number of major UN military peacekeeping operations rose from around 5 in the late 1980s to 20 by the late 1990s. The number of soldiers serving on these missions rose from around 10,000 to 80,000 by the mid-1990s.[610]

At the same time, military operations by US forces increased as operations in the Persian Gulf continued and NATO undertook a peacekeeping role in the former Yugoslavia. As the US was unwilling to shoulder the burden of UN peacekeeping and expected its allies to bring more forces to other operations as well, this meant increasing pressure for allied contributions. The pressure was sometimes very direct and threatening, like when the US Congress threatened to withdraw US forces from allied countries that failed to contribute. The Clinton administration's defense strategies consistently noted that US forces were not to be dispatched to PKOs but that allied nations were expected to conduct these missions. Therefore, both Japan and Australia were under similar expectations from the US. During the Gulf War, this was evident from the fact that although the US congress bills enacted to force allied contributions usually referred to US allies in general, the main thrust was directed to Japan. In regard to both alliances, the Gulf War clearly began a series of Middle Eastern engagements and international activism.

The Gulf War was a clear case of asymmetric bargaining and pressure. Neither Australia nor Japan had security interests in the Gulf, even though they dependent on oil from the region. Saddam Hussein was not threatening to stop selling oil; rather, he wanted Iraq to sell more of it. Further, as Iraqi forces demonstrated when they took Australian and Japanese civilians hostage, supporting the operation made both Japanese and Australian citizens target of reprisals. For Japan, the domestic costs were significant as the LDP government had to fight to dispatch forces and had to raise taxes to pay for the war. Therefore, domestic politics alone cannot account for the contributions, only for the delays and political battles around the contributions. The US demand for contributions and the threats to withdraw forces from allied countries are the dominate theme and fit best to both the asymmetric alliance and alliance security dilemma frameworks.

610 Peacekeeping data from the United Nations. http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/ (Accessed August 2, 2021).

For Australia, domestic politics hardly played any role in the Gulf War. The Labor Party had been hostile to foreign military deployments and had declared that it would not send troops abroad unless Australia was threatened. However, the Labor government had dispatched forces to the Gulf in the late 1980s, and the deployments in the 1990s passed through the parliament without significant debate. It should also be noted that Australia maintained a RAN flotilla in the Gulf after the War and throughout the 1990s, even though there were significant disturbances in Australia's immediate region. Further, the dispatch of significant military resources to the Gulf in response to the increasing tensions in 1998, ran the risk of overstretching ADF resources as the Solomon Islands and Fiji were dangerously unstable, and the ADF was demonstrably short on resources.

David Horner, a prominent Australian military historian, points out that a pattern of Australian military commitment to the Middle East can be seen emerging from the Tanker War in the 1980s and the Gulf War in 1991. The regional presence that was established then continues to this day as the ADF has been continuously deployed in numerous operations ever since. Most of these deployments have been under US command, and both contributions in the late 1980s and early 1990s were initiated by US request. Therefore, the asymmetric alliance framework corresponds strongly to this outcome. [611] In a sense, if not in official doctrines, the early 1990s saw Australia return, to its traditional forward engagement policy after a period of limited engagement brought upon by the Vietnam War.[612]

Both Australia and Japan increased the tempo of their peacekeeping contributions drastically after the Gulf War. For Japan, this development was causally linked to the Gulf War as the first PKO bill was drafted in direct response to the conflict. For Australia, the link is less clear, but the trend corresponds with Japan's behavior and US pressure. The clearest example is the largest Australian PKO deployment outside Asia to Somalia, which followed a direct US request. Mostly, major PKOs for Australia, and to some extent for Japan, took place in Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands and could therefore also be understood as a response to the threat of instability.

4.4 Increased focus on tech and the rebirth of missile defense

The final aspect of alliance concerns technology cooperation. The US maintained that technological superiority was the key to maintaining its military superiority and this became a pressing need under the Clinton administration, which cut defense

611 Horner, *Australia and the 'New World Order',* 270-275.
612 E.g., Ball and Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement*, 9-10.

expenditures even further while increasing the demands on the US military. To accomplish this goal, various US administrations sought to augment its military edge through cooperation with advanced allies. Japan was a natural source of advanced technologies, but the challenges were significant, even though progress had been made in the 1980s. A much smaller Australian technology base would not have so significantly figured in the alliance but for the presence of the satellite ground stations on Australian territory.

Japanese technological support for the US military

In the Japan-US alliance, technology cooperation, which had begun haltingly in the late 1980s, proceeded slowly in the early 1990s despite US efforts to boost exchanges.[613] Technology featured prominently in the 1992 Global Partnership Plan of Action, which detailed 6 projects for joint development.[614] From 1993 onwards, the Clinton administration increased diplomatic pressure for access to Japanese technology, and the issue remained a constant topic in bilateral meetings on various levels.[615] The pressure resulted in a series of dedicated official meetings, which began in mid-1993 and concluded in late 1994, with a consensus to expand technology exchanges.[616] Despite all these efforts, the first real bilateral defense technology project, related to rocket engines, was only initiated in September 1992. By 1996, technology exchanges had produced only eight major technology transfers from Japan to the US, five of which had taken place after 1990.[617] However, by 2000, five new projects were initiated: the eye-safe laser technology cooperation in September 1996, projects on advanced hybrid propulsion and an advanced ejection seat in 1998, a cooperative project on sea acoustics in 1999, and joint development

613 United States Department of State, Embassy Cable on Joint Staff Briefing, November 1991, 11029, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part II*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1977-1992.

614 Tokyo Declaration on Global Partnership, January 9, 1992. https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005589.asp (Accessed August 4, 2021).

615 United States Department of State, Embassy Cable on "Shirt sleeves meeting", January 1993, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1961-2000.; Department of Defense, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, September 1993, 00193 1993/09/23, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1961-2000.

616 Renwick, *Japan's Alliance Politics and Defense Production*, 122.

617 Japan Defense Agency, "Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Industry and Technology", March 18, 1994. Cited in Green, *Arming Japan*, 142-143.

research on artillery gunpowder in early 2000.[618] Therefore, while progress was slow, it was clearly picking up pace in the late 1990s.

In general, while technology cooperation progressed slowly, US technology continued to dominate Japanese foreign defense procurement.[619] However, there were limits to how far the Japanese were willing to depend on the US. The Japanese military leadership was aware that the US side shared only limited intelligence with Japan. After the 1990s crises, Japan sought to increase its intelligence capabilities and established a separate Defense Intelligence Headquarters in 1996. The US intelligence resources, however, dwarfed anything that the Japanese had and hence Japan tried consistently to increase intelligence cooperation with the specific goal of being included in the UKUSA framework. Further, even though intelligence sharing was one of the areas of cooperation set to be reinforced in the 1997 guidelines, the Japanese were not satisfied with the intelligence it received from the US when North Korea launched missiles over Japan in 1998.[620] This perceived lack of access to US intelligence was likely one of the main factors that prompted Japan to intensify its build-up of indigenous intelligence assets. In 1999, Japan launched its indigenous intelligence satellite development against US objections.[621]

Japan's participation in missile defense development

The North Korean missile tests were also a likely driver behind Japanese commitment to US missile defense development. Unlike other technological development projects, missile defense was itself a high-profile issue, not least because of the tremendous costs associated with it. In the late 1980s, Japan had in principle agreed to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative, as the program was then named. After the Cold War, the program's emphasis was redirected to counter shorter-range missiles within a single theater of operations. Potential threats included Scud-missile attacks from Iraq and ongoing missile development in North Korea. This program quickly became a high-profile issue and was taken up at the top levels of leadership.[622] The first proposals for Japanese procurement of the system were

618 Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, editions 1995-2001. Tokyo: Urban Connections, various years.

619 Stockholm Peace Research Institute *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

620 Interview with Vice Admiral Ota Fumio, April 2012.

621 E.g., Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 67.

622 Patrick M. Cronin, Paul S. Giarra, and Michael J. Green, "The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense," in *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 171-173.

presented in April 1993, and the pressure for Japanese participation continued throughout the year.[623] The Clinton administration also tried to link the program to a wider technology exchange initiative to facilitate the transfer of Japanese dual-use technologies to the US arms industry.[624] However, this proposal was dropped because of Japanese opposition.[625]

In 1994, the Higuchi commission report called for Japan to participate in the ballistic missile defense (BMD) program to defend against DPRK missiles.[626] In the same year, the two sides established a bilateral working group to study the possibilities for bilateral development of the system.[627] By 1995, the BMD project was a major part of the reconstruction of the US-Japan alliance framework and was specifically mentioned in the 1996 Tokyo Declaration.[628] The agreement for the joint research of BMD-related technologies was signed in 1999. The timing of the first plans for Japanese participation in the BDM project and the approval of the project in the cabinet coincide fully with the North Korean missile tests in the early and late 1990s.[629] Therefore, it can be argued the while the US side had been pushing the Japanese to participate in the program since the late 1980s, the DPRK missile tests provided the immediate impetus for the agreement. The agreed technology cooperation was to concentrate on the development of the interceptor missile for the system, which was to be used by destroyer-cruiser class missile-carrying naval vessels equipped with the Aegis system.[630]

ANZUS as the guarantor of ADF technological edge

Australia has traditionally relied on its powerful allies, the UK and the US, for military procurement. However, Australia has also filled a small niche role in

623 E.g., *New York Times* "U.S. Presses Japan on Missile Project," November 3, 1993; *New York Times*, "New Missile Defense in Japan Under Discussion with U.S.," September 18, 1993.

624 Department of Defense, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, September 1993, 00193 1993/09/23, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III*, United States Library of Congress, Digital National Security Archives, 1961-2000.

625 Green, *Arming Japan*, 141-142.

626 Japan Defense Agency, "Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Industry and Technology", March 18, 1994.

627 Cronin, Giarra, and Green, *The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense*, 179.

628 E.g., *Japan Times*, "MOFA Plans to Push U.S. -Proposed TMD Project," February 25, 1995.

629 *New York Times*, "North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory," September 1, 1998.

630 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, editions 1995-2001. Tokyo: Urban Connections, various years.

intelligence and sensor technology, partially due to its geographic location. In the early 1990s, agreements between the US and Australia on technical cooperation were largely related to information gathering systems. Examples include the development of a digitized chart of the world,[631] the development of as sensor fusion system,[632] and the development cooperation on radar-related activities in 1992. The last-mentioned agreement was related to the so-called Jindalee over-the-horizon radar, which was to allow the monitoring of the sea-air gap between Australia and Southeast Asia.[633] All these projects were in line with the idea that Australia would benefit most from the US alliance through sensory intelligence development and cooperation.[634]

In 1995, the two sides signed an agreement detailing reciprocal cooperation on defense procurement in order to advance further bilateral purchases.[635] This was an especially beneficial agreement for Australia, which was increasingly reliant on US technologies. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the US was the direct source or licenser of 11 weapons systems transferred to Australia, including variants of H-60 helicopters and different types of missiles for the F/A-18s and the *Adelaide* class

631 It is noteworthy that this was mainly a military undertaking for military purposes and the results would also be extended to Canada and the United Kingdom, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America concerning the Cooperative Development of the Digital Chart of the World*, Washington, June 22, 1990, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

632 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Project Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America concerning Sensor Fusion System Development*, Washington, June 14, 1991, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

633 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America concerning Cooperation in Radar Activities; Project Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America on Residual Clutter Radars; Project Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America on Radar Synoptic Performance Modeling*, Salisbury March 3, 1992, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

634 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America concerning the Exchange of Electronic Warfare Officers between the Department of Defence of Australia and the Department of Defense of United States of America*, Washington, August 26, 1992, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

635 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Australia and United States of America concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement*, Washington, April 19, 1995, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

frigates.[636] The only other defense equipment providers used by Australia were France, Italy, and South Africa, most of whose deliveries were relatively minor compared to those from the US.[637] By the mid-1990s, the US was providing Australia with new C-130J Hercules and P-3 Orion aircraft as well as helicopters. The US provided the main armaments and radars for the new *Anzac* class frigates while other providers – Israel and Sweden – again provided relatively minor deliveries.[638]

Australia saw this acquisition arrangement with its senior ally as mutually beneficial: while Australian acquisitions supported the US defense industry, access to US military hardware guaranteed Australian regional supremacy. In 1997, the Australian Strategic Policy White Paper identified technological superiority and "the knowledge edge" as key factors for Australian defense. Technology and information were necessary for surveillance of the vast maritime domain and would allow small ADF resources to be used effectively.[639] The US alliance was vital for achieving and maintaining this edge due to the massive costs related to defense research and development.[640]

A new technology sharing agreement was signed in July 2000. This agreement was in accordance with new US laws that increased the technologies available for US allies who were facing difficulties in keeping up with US technologies, which in turn could mean problems with compatibility. In return, US defense industry companies were expecting to be given priority in defense acquisitions. In 2001, when Australia was looking for a company to deliver new systems for the *Collins*-class submarine, the tender became an alliance issue when a German company seemed poised to win the contract.[641] In the end, the German company, which had already secured the deal, was passed over in favor of a US company. The agreement with Raytheon was eventually signed in September 2001 at the Pentagon with Prime Minister Howard attending the event.[642]

636 The Royal Australian Navy's Adelaide-class Frigates are basically U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry –class frigates with some modifications. Of the six produced, four were actually constructed in the US and two in Australian shipyards.

637 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmaments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 254-255.

638 Stockholm Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1997: World Armaments and Disarmaments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 323.

639 Australian Department of Defense, *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*, 18.

640 Ball, *The US – Australia Alliance*, 264.

641 Goldsworthy, *Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 2000*, 237.

642 Howard, *Lazarus Rising*, 442-443.

Australia's role in missile defense development

Australian participation in the missile defense program dates back to the 1980s. In order for a missile to be successfully intercepted, it should be detected as early as possible, and the only way to monitor large areas in the Eurasian landmass is to observe launch sites from satellites. As noted, the satellites used for monitoring the Middle East and eastern parts of Russia were linked to the facilities at Nurrungar and Pine Gap. These stations were central downlinks for the early warning and target acquisition of the missile defense system. During the first Gulf War, the stations played an important role in detecting SCUD-missile launches.[643]

Even though its facilities were central to the system, Australia was not officially part of the missile defense program, and the subject was controversial domestically.[644] Despite debates, Australian participation slowly increased during the Labor Party Government, and in April 1995, the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organization and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization officially began cooperation on missile defense research. Initially, cooperation was to involve exchanges of data and personnel as well as bilateral exercises to familiarize the Australian's with the systems.[645]

The process was consolidated in the late 1990s. The facility in Nurrungar was mothballed while Pine Gap was upgraded and became increasingly central to the system.[646] In 1998, the lease for the facility was accordingly extended by ten years.[647] In 1999, Australia formally agreed to participate in technical cooperation on the missile defense.[648] To make things clear, Secretary of Defense Cohen told a press conference in Sydney in July of 2000 that Washington expected the Pine Gap facilities to continue playing a central role in the future missile defense system and that in return, the system would also defend Australia.[649] The agreements for the Pine

643 E.g., Nathan Church, *Ballistic Missile Defence and Australia*, Australian Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, December 19, 2013.

644 E.g., Richard Rabin-Smith, *Australia and Ballistic Missile Defense*, ASPI Strategic Insight, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2004.

645 Parliament of Australia, *Senator Robert Ray answers question by Senator Margetts*, 22 August 1995, Answers to Questions, Strategic Defence Initiative, Question no. 2221, chamber/hansards/1995-08-22/0200.

646 Henry S. Albinski, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 1999," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 46, no.2 (2000): 209.

647 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America to further extend in force the Agreement relating to the Establishment of a Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap of 9 December 1966, as amended*, Canberra, June 4, 1998, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1998.

648 Albinski, *Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 1999*, 210.

649 Goldsworthy, *Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 2000*, 236.

Gap and the Canberra Deep Space Communications Complex were amended in 2000 to facilitate the easier introduction of new US equipment and technologies and to hasten the development of the facilities.[650]

Evaluating technology cooperation in the 1990s

Both Japan and Australia maintained a special relationship with US military technology and industry. Japan, while maintaining a significant domestic defense industry base, had only a limited military technological base. Thus, most Japanese high-end military hardware was either procured or manufactured under license from US defense companies. Australia was largely in the same situation but with a significantly smaller domestic industry base, which left it even more reliant on acquisitions both for bulk military material and for the high-end capabilities that allowed it to maintain control over its maritime domain. Both Japan and Australia also dealt with European defense companies, but acquisitions from Europe were limited compared to those from the US. As shown, the US side was also willing to use political pressure to protect its military industry markets in Asia-Pacific from European competitors. The markets for US military industry companies themselves also supported the US technological edge as more trade meant more resources for research and development.

Aside from markets, the US had specific interests in regard to each of its allies. Japan was a source of technological support due to its advanced civilian science and technology base that could be used as a provider of dual-purpose items such as semi-conductors among other things. For missile defense, Japan was a desirable partner due to its location and as it also had its own strategic interest to develop defenses against missile attacks from North Korea. Australia on the other hand was needed for its signals intelligence and communications stations, which were vital to the system in its early years.

The push to expand Japanese cooperation in the BMD project was vigorously adopted by the Clinton administration after the DPRK nuclear crisis. The Japanese were also looking for missile defense solutions, as noted by the Higuchi commission report, and in that sense, this technology cooperation directly corresponds to the emerging threats. The threat of a growing North Korean missile inventory can easily be seen as a direct reason for joining the missile defense

650 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America to further amend and extend the Agreement concerning Space Vehicle Tracking and Communication Facilities of 29 May 1980, as amended*, Canberra, October 26, 2000, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

program. There had been resistance to Japanese participation in foreign military technology development ventures, but there were also voices of support from Japanese industry, looking out for potential gains from technology transfers. The Higuchi commission had also recommended an overall increase in technology cooperation with the US. Increased technology cooperation could be understood as a form of increased burden sharing similar to Japan's Gulf deployments and PKOs. There was also a clear push by the US for increased technology cooperation, which suggests that the asymmetric alliance framework provides a strong explanation for this outcome.

The fact that the rise of an actual threat made Japan less willing to follow the US-lead on indigenous satellite capability is an interesting one. The need for satellite capability to be able to observe North Korean missile deployments is a clear response to a developing threat. Nothing further needs to be said on that. However, the fact that the Japanese side wanted to build this capability, which was already available from its US ally, and even to do it in the face of explicit US objections, demonstrates that the Japanese did not trust that the US would always provide them with the data they needed. It is unlikely that the Japanese government would have wanted to build domestic satellites in order to support Japanese industry as the Japanese space industry was already one of the most advanced in the world.

For Australia, technology cooperation was largely uncontroversial. Significant deals concerned Australia's ability to maintain its technological edge over its neighborhood and the surveillance of the sea-air gap. The alliance was a central part of its ability to do so. The US side clearly used its position as the senior ally to ensure that Australia selected US contractors to build its defense systems, an arrangement that was institutionalized in the form of the technology sharing agreement of 2000. The use of satellite sensors, and through them the contribution to the anti-ballistic missile program, were debated, but Australia had not yet committed itself to other parts of the project. Still, comments from the US partners clearly suggest that Australia was expected to join the program as its facilities were already part of it. It is difficult to see what threats Australia would have needed the system for. Therefore, the case for joining could only be made through alliance contribution.

4.5 Evaluating the period of unipolarity

Before moving on to the 2000s, we will evaluate how the 1990s' developments fit the theoretical frameworks. The events and their circumstances were described in the preceding parts of this chapter – the causal relations and their meanings will be evaluated next. The discussion here will follow the framework introduced in Chapter 2. Firstly, the limits of balancing against threats as an explanatory model under the

unipolar conditions of the 1990s Asia-Pacific will be discussed. Secondly, we will discuss how the alliance security dilemma framework can explain the observations. I consider it beneficial to discuss the alliance security dilemma after the threats as this framework works with the concept of threats but has little relation to the domestic political framework. The third part will focus on domestic political factors as explanatory and intervening variables for alliance outcomes, and the fourth section will demonstrate how the asymmetric alliance framework fits the events.

Balancing against threats

The alliances discussed here were founded on the logic of global confrontation between two opposing poles. By the early 1990s, it was clear that this foundational rationale was no longer valid. Therefore, according to threat-based theories, the logic on which the alliances had been established and managed since the early 1950s had essentially disappeared. The classic formulation of the balance of threats theory, as presented in Chapter 2, would lead us to expect that the alliances would begin to unravel as a result.[651] According to basic threat-based theories, smaller allies should weaken their alliance commitments when there are no direct threats. Further, under unipolar conditions, the structural incentive should be for smaller states to try to form alliances to restrain the power of the unipole.[652]

This was not the case with the two alliances under scrutiny. However, if we pursue Stephen Walt's more refined argument, we expect that smaller states operating within a regional-level scope would focus on threats in the regional setting and attempt to use the extra-regional superpower as a balancer against these threats. If necessary, smaller states would try to use soft balancing through diplomatic and other non-conventional means against the superpower, as military balancing would be impossible.[653] However, the basic premise is that lesser threats should result in declining alliance commitments.

As the US was too far away and too powerful, none of the threats discussed here directly threatened its security. However, its position as the global unipolar power

651 It should be noted that several Realist writers have argued that this process should take more time and would not necessarily take place during the first decade following the end of the Cold War. However, we are not looking at the changes in the overall balance of power but rather at singular symptoms of this trend. See, for example, Randall Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," in *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4, (1997); Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," in *International Security* 25, no.1, (2000).

652 See Chapter 2, 27-29; 40-41.

653 Stephen Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World" in *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009), 97.

meant that it defined its interests globally and actively sought to maintain the global international order it had secured after the fall of the Soviet Union. The threat of a North Korean attack against South Korea or Japan would have had significant consequences for the international order as well as a massive economic impact globally. The US would have been immediately involved through its forces stationed in South Korea.[654] Instability in the Pacific Islands, on the other hand, could be understood as purely sub-regional matters that would have had marginal impact. Walt argued that this kind of logic would negatively affect alliance credibility as different regional threats and allies would have to compete for the attention of the superpower.[655] The Japanese project to build independent intelligence satellite capabilities contrary to US wishes could be seen as a clear case of a lack of credibility.

Overall, we can see that threat-based theories can be used to provide satisfactory explanations for certain developments during the period. Taken separately, the alliance reaffirmation between Japan and the US focused on addressing issues that had been identified during the North Korean nuclear crisis. Technology cooperation could in many cases be directly connected to threats: Japan very clearly had a specific threat in mind when joining the missile defense project. Also, Australian projects to increase its surveillance capabilities towards the sea-air gap through technology cooperation and direct acquisitions from the US served a very particular and clearly identified purpose. On the other hand, besides missile defense, Japanese defense technology cooperation seemed to have little to do with any particular threat. Australian entrance into the missile defense project can even be argued to go directly against threats as the use of Australian assets for global missile defense would make Australians a likely target of enemy missiles that would have had few reasons to target Australia otherwise.

As for the more complex events, a simple threats-based framework offers limited value in explaining some of the major developments in the 1990s. The Gulf War, the PKOs of the early 1990s, and the overall process of alliance reaffirmations are difficult to fit into threat-based frameworks. The crisis in the Persian Gulf had no direct bearing on Japanese or Australian security. To begin with, Japan was more than happy not to get involved while Australia immediately committed to the deployment of its forces. If we assume that regional threats would have prompted Japan and Australia to increase their overall alliance commitments, we expect that Japan would have been the party more eager to send forces. Instead, Australia, which faced little or no threats in its region, was more eager to support the war effort. Of course, we can argue that Japan faced political restraints on the deployment of troops,

654 See Chapter 3, 49 and Chapter 4, 85-87.
655 Walt, *Alliances in a Unipolar World*, 99-100.

but then we would be already making an argument from another theoretical framework. Similar observations can be made with regards to the PKOs in the early 1990s. Of course, some of the deployments were to contain regional crises, as in Cambodia and later, East Timor. These were especially pressing for Australia and the PKOs can be seen as responses to threats to regional stability. However, numerically speaking, most deployments were made to regions outside the Asia-Pacific and places such as Somalia had little bearing on Australia security.

Looking at the alliance reaffirmation processes throughout the 1990s, threat-based explanations fit some of the outcomes, and indeed seem able to explain their overall timing. The Global Partnership initiative was launched in 1992 and the lack of immediate threats could explain why it failed soon after its initiation. But here, as elsewhere, several details, including why the initiative was launched in the first place, are difficult to cover with threat-explanations. Notably, the question as to why the Japanese side was willing to make large concessions on trade issues in the partnership agreement, which was meant to focus on alliance cooperation, is difficult to account for within the threat framework. After all, the basic expectation would be that Japan, in the absence of threats, would seek to loosen its alliance commitments instead of sacrificing other interests to strengthen them. After all, at the time, North Korea was by all accounts expected to soon normalize its relations with the West. The DPRK had even joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and the associated nuclear safeguards agreement along with the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections came into effect in 1992. However, the first signs of trouble emerged only at the end of the year. Correspondingly, the US had withdrawn its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1991 and Japan was in the process of rapidly normalizing its relations with the DPRK.[656]

The North Korean Nuclear crisis that followed lasted until the mid-1990s. The Nye-initiative and the following reaffirmation process of the Japan-US alliance addressed several of the issues that had been raised when the allies were preparing for a potential conflict during the crisis. The evolution of the imminent threats can easily explain a large part of the Japan-US alliance reaffirmation. However, the Okinawa issue and the lack of progress in resolving it, as well as the entire process of reaffirmation of ANZUS, are difficult to account for through the threat framework. Therefore, significant aspects of the reaffirmation escape the explanatory scope of threat-based theories.

In sum, the threat-based explanatory framework clearly works in several outcomes and has much to say in most outcomes. Even so, on its own it can exhaustively explain only a few developments. Satisfactory explanations seem to

656 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going Critical*, 10; Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 184-186.

require the introduction of significant intervening variables, such as domestic politics or the fear of abandonment. These will of course be discussed under corresponding topics. While some might argue that these are just derivates of threat-based theories, in our framework we have made the decision to approach them separately in order to test the explanatory reach of every approach, which we will do in the following sections.

Alliance security dilemma

This part will assess how well the alliance security dilemma framework fits the alliance developments of the 1990s. As discussed in Chapter 2, the alliance security dilemma framework adds complexity and explanatory power to the basic threats-based model and takes into consideration states' reluctance to engage in conflicts that do not directly affect their interests. It further considers the threat that an alliance might dissolve as a result of one party refusing to support the other to avoid unwanted conflicts. As the basic threat model suggests, when threats diminish, returns that a nation gains from its alliance diminish and there will be an excess of security relative to other interests. In the language of the alliance security dilemma, the lack of threats decreases the fear of abandonment. As a result, states should seek to loosen their alliance commitments as the fear of entrapment becomes stronger. The question is whether states prefer avoiding conflicts so much that they would risk the dissolution of the alliance. [657]

To be clear, the alliance security dilemma itself does not suggest that states should seek to disband their alliances when threats are fewer. According to the framework, alliance actions in any specific event are determined by dependence and commitment to the alliance as well as their interests in the issue at hand. Naturally, when threats are fewer, dependence decreases but changes in commitments do not necessarily follow if they are not actively reworked. If a state's interests are not served by the alliance, it should seek to weaken its commitments, thus reducing the danger of being entrapped in conflicts that it does not want to be engaged in.[658] Changes in dependence directly influence alliance outcomes as alliance partners' bargaining positions are determined by how much they need the benefits that the alliance offers. The more dependent one's partner is, the greater the power to extract favorable outcomes from the alliance becomes. Inversely, less dependence means a better bargaining position.[659]

657 See above Chapter 2, pp. 28-29.
658 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 315-315.
659 Ibid., 168-169, 180-181.

If the threats facing a state decrease, its security arrangements enacted during a more threatening period will create an excess of security for that state. As its dependence on its alliance decreases as well, it becomes less willing to surrender its freedom of action or to commit resources to the alliance. However, previous commitments will increase incentives to follow an alliance partner's policies even if they are not directly in the state's interest. This is so because of the potential costs incurred for reneging on commitments, such as the breakdown of the alliance or the loss of credibility.[660] Different types of commitments involve different kinds of costs and there can be several forms of obligations in an alliance. These commitments can include written alliance agreements, which can state when and how allies are supposed to support each other, those made over particular issues, or general expectations of diplomatic or military support in instances of conflicting interests between different states. Depending on the situation, allies are generally expected to support each other in a variety of situations, even though this support might be unwritten in alliance agreements. However, refusing to support one's ally in a matter that is peripheral to the original purpose of the alliance would not have similar reputational costs as refusing to honor explicit alliance commitments.[661]

Therefore, when we assess how the alliance developments of the 1990s fit the alliance security dilemma, we must begin by assessing Japan's and Australia's levels of dependence and commitment to their alliances. These need to be weighed against the interests that each side has at stake in any particular line of development. In an ideal setting, when allies' interests are opposed, the alliance outcome is determined by the relative strengths of their bargaining positions.[662] This kind of framework could be used to analyze how the US-Japan alliance operated during the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula. But as we assess long-term developments of the alliances themselves, we must contrast how much Japan and Australia depend on their alliances for their other interests. According to the framework, excess security should translate into allied states seeking increased autonomy to pursue their other interests. Thus, states should seek to decrease their commitments in order to gain more freedom of action in the future. In other words, they should be less afraid of being abandoned and more wary of being entrapped, especially if the US side engages in otherwise bellicose actions.

Looking at Japan and Australia in the early 1990s, neither could be said to be overly dependent on their alliances with the US and, compared to the Cold War, the overall dependency, along with the general threat levels, were clearly declining. As discussed earlier, for Japan, the situation changed after 1992 when details of the

660 Ibid., 313-314.
661 Ibid., 169-170, 182.
662 Ibid., 177.

North Korean nuclear program and its non-compliance with the non-proliferation safeguards agreement were reported. China was not seen as a major threat in the 1990s despite its aggressive actions in the mid-1990s towards Taiwan.[663] No serious threats towards Australia emerged during the period aside from regional instability, which was an increasing worry at the end of the period. Notably, US support was not forthcoming in the East Timor crisis, resulting in a perception of abandonment in Australia. On the other hand, the operation in East Timor demonstrated that the Australian armed forces could deal with such contingencies with little support from its senior ally. Therefore, at least for the earliest parts of the 1990s, Japan and Australia had a clear excess of security and hence less dependence on their alliances. Excess security would have been at least slightly diminished by the North Korean belligerency toward Japan in the early 90s, and by the regional instability in the South Pacific for Australia in the late 90s; however, neither of these events were comparable to the threat levels of the global Cold War.

Neither Japan nor Australia sought to degrade their alliance commitments even while they had an excess of security. On the contrary, while the threat-levels were declining during the early 1990s, both Japan and Australia accepted the US interpretation that their alliances committed them to the support of US policies in the Persian Gulf. This meant the commitment of both military capabilities and financial support. Japan even initiated new legislation to allow its military to deploy abroad in response to growing US demands. Broadening the Japanese Self-Defense Forces' capability to contribute to military operations in different regions had been on US policymakers agenda ever since the 1950s, and the constant pressure on Japan in this regard is well known and documented as discussed earlier.[664] In particular, the fact that Japanese policymakers began a frantic scramble to deploy military forces abroad in response to US demands at the time when Japan itself was more capable than ever of defending itself is difficult to account for with the alliance security dilemma framework.[665] The same difficulty applies to Australia, albeit with less pronounced contradictions.

The same issues apply to international operations in the early 1990s. Neither Japan nor Australia had previous commitments to deploy forces and their need for US security guarantees was diminishing. On the other hand, the fear of entrapment

663 It should nonetheless be noted that the lack of threats was still at least somewhat dependent on US military presence in the region. For a discussion on the general dynamics of emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific in the late 1990s, see, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," in *International Security* 23, no.4 (1999).

664 See Chapter 3, 53, 57. See also Michael Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japan Alliance*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

665 See Chapter 3, 50.

in unwanted conflicts would have provided a clear motivation to decline requests to deploy troops abroad. It can be argued, however, that Japanese and Australian interests were compatible with the US pressure to deploy forces to international operations, but this of course would mean that the deployments were less related to the alliances than we assumed. Either way, the alliance security dilemma hardly matches the facts. On the other hand, the US refusal to deploy forces to support Australian actions in East Timor demonstrates classic signs of a fear of entrapment: Australia was going to engage in a military operation and the US side initially refused all support and only later, after a period of bargaining, relented to providing support outside the area of operations.[666] But the fact that Australia was partially abandoned by its ally did not significantly downgrade the alliance, as will be demonstrated by the Australian reaction following the 9/11 attacks.

The concrete alliance commitments were reaffirmed with the alliance declarations in 1996. As discussed above, the Japan-US alliance reaffirmation included several new commitments regarding Japanese support for US forces in incidents in the areas surrounding Japan. Most of the items outlined in the declaration and the following Guidelines for Defense Cooperation can be traced back to the plans developed for contingencies in the Korean Peninsula.[667] While other items included unspecified mentions of cooperation in international peace and security, the immediate causes behind the reaffirmation process in the Japan-US alliance can be explained though several frameworks and, therefore, the process itself is arguably overdetermined by several factors.

The ANZUS alliance reaffirmation, on the other hand, does not seem to fit this model. The Sydney statement of 1996 focuses on existing arrangements and general topics without actually offering anything new.[668] Further, there are no immediate threats that would have been addressed by the limited items outlined in the joint declaration. We could, however, argue that the absence of threats and resulting lack of dependency and commitment could have prompted both sides to fear that their ally would not be available in possible future conflicts, leading to a fear of abandonment. As there were very few contradictory interests, the fear of

666 For a discussion on the impact that the abandonment had on Australia-US relations see Iain Henry, "Adapt or atrophy? The Australia-U.S. alliance in an age of power transition," in *Contemporary Politics* 26, no.4 (2020).

667 See Chapter 4, 85-86, 110-111.

668 Although it has been argued that the statement and the preceding consultations served to re-focus the ANZUS alliance better towards post-Cold War realities, actual events, such as the Gulf War and the intensification of intelligence cooperation, had already taken place before the Statement was issued. For arguments on the relevance see Mark Lockhart, "The continuing relevance of the ANZUS treaty." In *Australian Defense Force Journal*, no. 138 (1999).

abandonment, while low due to a lack of direct threats, could have been a valid cause for reaffirming the existing commitments. Granted, this line of argument does require a bit of explaining at the expense of parsimony.

One specific set of alliance commitments that kept expanding during this period was technology development. A significant number of technical agreements, including specific commitments, were signed between the allies. Further, technology cooperation also made the allies more dependent on each other. Several of the more advanced systems were dependent on supplies and support from US manufacturers and this, of course, made Japan and Australia more dependent on the US. On the other hand, both Japan and Australia have such a highly developed technological industry bases that they could, given time, service and supply all but the most complicated US products themselves. Nevertheless, the technological dependency in key systems –missile defense for example – increased as a result of cooperation. Notably, in the field of missile defense, Japan became more dependent on other US systems as well as it lacked the intelligence and attack capabilities necessary to take full advantage of the system. It did nevertheless seek to decrease its dependency by developing indigenous systems. Other than the Australian decision to participate in the missile defense program, which made it more committed and dependent on US while increasing the threat of entrapment without addressing any perceived threat to Australia, these developments fit quite neatly in the alliance security dilemma framework.

In the end, the alliance security dilemma framework provides at best partial explanations for the events of the 1990s. In several fields, such as technology cooperation and the US-Japan alliance reaffirmation, it seems to be enough to cover all the events and provide satisfactory explanations for the causes and processes that led to a given development. Other issues, such as international operations, the Gulf War, and general Australian alliance policies, seem difficult to account for within this framework. Of course, it is only to be expected that one theoretical approach does not cover every event. Therefore, we will move on to the next theoretical approach and examine how domestic political landscapes can explain the events.

Domestic politics in explaining alliance outcomes

For Neoclassical Realists, domestic politics form the prism though which international relations are filtered when a state forms its policies. For those focused on domestic political-level explanations, the inputs from the international system do not themselves mean anything before they are interpreted through the process of domestic policymaking. Even though some action might clearly be the best way forward, the domestic political situation might prevent the policymakers from

conducting best-possible foreign and security policies.[669] On the other hand, a state's political elites might attempt to use foreign policy as a means to achieve domestic political goals by seeking allies abroad or enhancing their own political standing through aggressive nationalist policies.[670]

According to the model of domestic political explanations, the domestic sphere is the central intervening variable without which the changes in the international systemic balance of power do not have any explanatory power. Further, states are not rational unitary actors, and the coherence or incoherence of their domestic political structures necessarily affects their decision-making.[671] According to this model, states' domestic structures and interests are formulated by policy elites and determine how states ally or behave in an alliance. Hence, threats are not necessarily the only or even the main determinants of alliance behavior as states can also pursue other interests through alliances.[672] Notably, even threat perceptions can vary depending on the ideas held by domestic policy elites and therefore, the simple aggregation of capabilities and intentions of pre-determined hostile states does not mean that all actors see threats similarly. These are always based on ideas that are held by the people who interpret them.[673]

Four main factors determine how domestic politics translate into alliance outcomes: consensus or disagreement among decisionmakers on national interest, including threats and how to counter them; cohesion and the decision-making ability of the policymakers; social cohesion of the state itself; and, lastly, the vulnerability of the ruling regime.[674] Therefore, when we assess how domestic politics models explain alliance outcomes, we must identify what the platforms were that the Japanese and Australian ruling parties pursued and how these relate to the actual outcomes. This assessment must consider if the outcome was controversial among domestic policymaking elites and how strong or vulnerable the position of the ruling elites was. The population at large must also be factored in if the outcomes faced

669 It has also been argued that Neoclassical Realism is especially well suited for Asia-Pacific threat-based explanations. See Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea," in *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000).

670 See Chapter 2, 30-31.

671 E.g., James D. Fearon, "Domestic politics, foreign politics, and theories of international relations," in *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, 1998.

672 See, for example, Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, "Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992," in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no.2, 2000.

673 On threat formation perception and misperception in domestic politics see Janice G. Stein, "Threat perception in international relations," in *The Oxford handbook of political psychology*, ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013).

674 Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, 66-67.

widespread resistance among the general population and aroused strong opposition as, for example, the Vietnam War had done in the 1970s.

The domestic political landscapes of Japan and Australia were different in the early 1990s. Japan had been governed by the conservative LDP for almost five decades, but this ended with the economic downturn of the early 1990s. From 1993 until 1996, Japan was briefly governed by newly formed left-leaning parties and the period culminated in the socialist-led government from 1995-1996. After January 1996, the LDP resumed government leadership for the next decade or so. Australia, on the other hand, was governed by the center-left elements of the Labor Party until the mid-1990s. The Labor Party lost the premiership to the conservative Coalition Party with John Howard serving as the Prime Minister from 1996 until 2007. So, while the governments of the early 1990s were relatively ambiguous, and sometimes even hostile towards their alliances with the US, after 1996, both Japan and Australia were headed by pro-alliance governments.

The Japanese ruling coalitions of the early 1990s were unstable and there were five different Prime Ministers from four different parties in the first five years of the decade. Further, two of the ruling parties had been established less than a year before assuming premiership. The only traditional party in power during the interval between LDP governments was the Socialist Party, which had never before held the government in its 50-year history and disbanded after the fall of its only premiership.[675] The LDP was still plagued by short-lived governments, yet the party regime persisted until the end of the decade. In sum, the Japanese governments in the early 1990s were fragmented and insecure, and although the LDP managed to instill stability in the late 1990s, it lacked the cohesion needed to maintain a unitary government under a single Prime Minister.[676]

The LDP and its different fractions were at minimum pro-alliance or outright hawkish, like the aforementioned Ichiro Ozawa, in the sense that they sought to expand Japanese military power to match its position as the second-most powerful nation in the world at the time. The LDP consensus was heavily challenged during the weak governments of the early 1990s. In the late 1990s, the rapid succession of short-lived Prime Ministers continued. The LDP held the Prime Minister's post but

675 On the LDP system see also Chapter 3, 55-56.

676 It is worth noting in comparison that LDP Prime Ministers since the 1950s usually served between two to seven years in office. From 1948 to 1989, Japan had 14 different Prime Ministers. In contrast, from 1989 until 2001, there were 10 different Prime Ministers, five of whom served after 1995. See, for example, Elise K. Tipton, *Modern Japan: A Social and Political History*, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2008).

was forced to ally with the pacifist Komeito, and its leadership was continuously contested.[677]

Therefore, the expansion of Japanese military activities to include deployments to the Persian Gulf and international operations under the UN flag are difficult to explain through domestic politics. There was no consensus behind these policies and the weak leaders of incohesive governing coalitions spent valuable political capital to get these policies implemented. The Socialist Party even broke down as a result. Especially the alliance reaffirmation, which was overseen by a socialist Prime Minister against the backdrop of the largest anti-alliance demonstrations in decades, is difficult to account for considering the domestic political situation. If anything, this should have been a period of rapid deterioration of the alliance instead of the broadening and reinforcement that occurred. However, the incoherent and halting way in which the broadening of JSDF international operations and the Gulf deployment were done is easy enough to attribute to the weakness of the ruling governments and domestic opposition.[678]

Australia, on the other hand, was stable and governed by long-serving Prime Ministers. The only upheaval was the landslide victory of the Coalition Party in 1996, and even this resulted in a majority government that lasted for over a decade. As discussed, segments of the Australian Labor Party had been suspicious of the US alliance since the Vietnam War, and the party platforms had specifically ruled out dispatching forces to US-led wars outside Australia. Further, the strategy documents of the late 1980s and early 1990s, emphasized that Australian security policies should be focused on Australia and its imminent surroundings. Nevertheless, Australia was relatively active in contributing forces to the Persian Gulf and Somalia after requests from the US to do so. Notably, these deployments were not contested by the opposition as the Coalition Party had always been in favor of more proactive defense policies and military deployments. The only challenges came from within the governing party as these decisions actually went against the announced party line.[679] However, Australia has traditionally supported all US military actions abroad with troops, so the outcome could hardly be seen as

677 On different parties' attitudes towards the US see, for example, Michael J. Green, "The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 37, no.1. (2011).

678 Even the strongly positioned Nakasone government had failed at this task in the mid-1980s and, therefore, the fact that the weak governments of the early 1990s struggled with sending forces to the Gulf is not surprising. See Chapter 3, 57-58.

679 For an interpretation of the developments of Australia's security policies in the early 1990s see, for example, Brian Galligan, Ian McAllister and John Ravenhill, *New Developments in Australian Politics*, (Melbourne: Macmillian Education Australia, 1997).

surprising. Rather, it can be argued that Australian daily politics do not feature in these events at all.

The ANZUS alliance reaffirmation was presented as an achievement of the newly elected Coalition Party. Prime Minister Howard had made improving relations with the US one of the key issues in his electoral platform and the reaffirmation fits well into this narrative.[680] However, as the US focus on the Asia-Pacific was ongoing since 1995, and a similar alliance reaffirmation was followed by a state visit by the US President, which took place in Japan and South Korea at the same time, the fact that this also happened with Australia can hardly be attributed to the newly-elected government. Further, the initiatives sought by Howard and listed in the electoral platform, such as prepositioning US military equipment in Australia, were rejected by the US side. Therefore, Australian domestic politics could not have been a particularly important factor in the ANZUS alliance reaffirmation. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the Howard government failed to pursue closer alliance relations after the initial reaffirmations were completed.

Defense technology has often been associated with domestic politics.[681] The conflicts over joint technology projects between the US and Japan provide a clear case of this.[682] The fact that the 1991 Global Partnership Declaration included cooperation related to the automobile industry is a solid example of how domestic politics influenced alliance cooperation, at least in regard to US domestic politics. Arguably, the same dynamics were visible when the US forced out a German contractor from the Australian submarine deal.[683] However, the majority of technology cooperation issues in ANZUS do not seem to be linked to Australian domestic politics. One exception to this rule was the missile defense project. Although this project had its share of controversies and was at the time seen by many as waste of resources, the conservative governments of the late 1990s, in both Japan

680 After the 1996 elections, the Howard government was heavily focused on foreign policy issues so the opportunity to tie the ongoing Nye initiative to Howard's foreign policy was naturally seized. As to how much the Howard government was able to influence the outcomes of the reaffirmation is debatable, but it is clear that the US agenda dominated the process. For an account of Howard's foreign policy focus see, for example, Roy Campbell McDowall, *Howard's Long March: The Strategic Depiction of China in Howard Government Policy 1996–2006* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2009).

681 The most studied example of how the military industry operates in domestic politics is the US military-industrial complex itself. For a discussion on the topic see, for example, Rebecca Thorpe, *The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).

682 Most notably, the Japanese fighter acquisitions were heavily influenced by domestic politics in both the US and Japan. See Chapter 3, 60-61.

683 See above, 137.

and Australia, gradually pushed their countries to participate. In Japan, the result also benefitted local industry as the technological development would also increase the technological capabilities of Japanese aerospace companies, which have traditionally struggled to build up competitive capabilities in the associated field.[684]

In sum, the domestic politics model can clearly contribute to explanations on how specific events were managed and how they played out. However, most of the events and developments are difficult to explain through Japanese or Australian domestic politics, and sometimes it seems that the outcomes expected from a domestic political perspective are unequivocally the opposite of what actually happened. Therefore, while there is no denying that domestic politics influenced several of the outcomes, this was mostly applicable to US domestic politics. How US domestic politics would translate into alliance outcomes is, however, already in the field of the asymmetric alliance theory.

Asymmetric alliances under unipolarity

The framework of asymmetric alliances focuses on power relations between allied states. As discussed in Chapter 2, the theory proposes that states gain security by relinquishing part of their freedom of action and the more security they gain, the more sovereignty they relinquish.[685] The outcomes of different events are determined by the relative bargaining positions determined by asymmetric power relations. As we have determined that the 1990s represent a period of unipolar power distribution, the power relations in these alliances are asymmetric by definition: the unipolar state does not need smaller states to increase its own security as no other state in the system can threaten it. Further, the dominant state in the unipolar system can, on its own, provide security to the entire system and can offer nearly absolute security to its allied states (absolute in the sense that no other state can threaten its ally's existence or territorial integrity). As smaller states cannot further increase the security of the unipolar state, their contribution to the alliance consists mainly of other kinds of input, mainly the provision of support and granting freedom of action to the unipolar state.

On the other hand, as the unipole secures the entire system, threats diminish drastically and, according to threat-based theory, there should be a tendency to freeride among smaller states, as discussed in Chapter 2.[686] However, according to the asymmetric alliance model, while smaller alliance partners may invest less in

684 E.g., Green, *Arming Japan*, 154-157.
685 See Chapter 2, 33-34, 42.
686 For a thorough discussion on this topic, see Birthe Hansen, *Unipolarity and World Politics: A theory and its implications* (London: Routledge, 2011).

their own security as the alliance provides an abundance of security in the system, the level of sovereignty they have will further diminish as they become less able to fend for themselves. The alliance security dilemma framework predicts that when an excess of security makes states less dependent on their allies, states will be less willing to commit resources or relinquish their freedom of action. The asymmetric alliance framework, on the contrary, suggests that if the excess security is provided by the asymmetrically more powerful ally, its position of power in the alliance will allow it to wield even more influence over its ally.[687] As the alliance with the unipole grants far more security than anything else in the system, there is no alternative to the level of security gained from the alliance.

According to the asymmetric alliance model, the alliance developments and outcomes of any particular event are determined by the demands of the asymmetrically more powerful ally as well as the relative power discrepancy between allies. Therefore, an assessment of the asymmetric alliance model against the observed events must firstly take into account the relative power of the US in comparison to its allies and, secondly, consider what the demands made by US policymakers were and how forcefully these were made.[688] As the relative US military and economic power was at its height in the immediate post-Cold War period of the 1990s, its bargaining position towards its allies should correspondingly be dominant.

Observing, firstly the Gulf War, the asymmetrical alliance framework seems to fit nicely with the outcomes. The expectation that US allies in Asia-Pacific were to contribute to any major US operations in the Persian Gulf had been established in the 1980s. The Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations had all clearly signaled that US allies would be expected to contribute. Both Japan and Australia had already been pressured to send forces during the Iran-Iraq War.[689] In the late 1980s, Australia promptly sent forces to the Gulf and was praised for doing so. It had been previously suggested that the US request for forces made to the Hawke administration had been understood as a test of Australian willingness to maintain its role in the ANZUS alliance. In the early 1990s, the Hawke government's initial response was almost identical to the previous dispatch of forces and, therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the processes behind the dispatch were also similar. This suggests that the prompt dispatch of forces was due to the Australian understanding of what was expected of it in the ANZUS alliance. This interpretation is further supported by the

687 For a discussion on how asymmetric power relations have worked US alliances with Canada and UK see Stéfanie von Hlatky, *American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

688 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 905-906.

689 See Chapter 3, 57, 71.

fact that Australia forces initially dispatched to UN operations were swiftly reassigned to US command when asked to do so.

The Japanese contribution to the Guld War was more cumbersome and even more illustrative of how the asymmetric alliance framework can be used to explain the events. Like Australia, Japan had already been pressured to support US operations in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. Even then, the Nakasone administration made the effort to send military forces as requested. However, even the long-established LDP-government under a strong Prime Minister like Yasuhiro Nakasone, failed to send the requested forces. Interestingly, a weakened LDP-government, on its way to losing its dominance of Japanese politics for the first time since the 1950s, managed to do what Nakasone had failed to accomplish. At a time when there was no great power confrontation and the Cold War had just ended, Japan sent forces abroad to the Gulf to support an alliance that was no longer needed to defend against threats from the Soviet Union or a communist bloc. From the point of view of the asymmetric alliance framework, this is easily explained.[690] At the time, the US was by far the greatest military or economic power on the globe and after the fall of Soviet Union, it was the one dominant military force. Therefore, it had even less need for allies in their traditional military roles and could therefore demand far more concessions from its allies.

A similar dynamic can be used to explain the proliferation of the PKOs. Before the end of the Cold War, neither country was interested in PKOs. It was only after the Gulf War and demands from the US that the peacekeeping deployments began. In Japan, the passage of the PKO bill was linked to the nation's perceived failure to act as it was expected to during the Gulf War. The asymmetric alliance framework applies to this outcome as there was a clear demand for US allies to bear the burden for PKOs, a demand repeated throughout the period by different US administrations. The passing of the PKO bill immediately after the Gulf War was a direct result of heavy US pressure to enhance the Japanese role in the alliance.[691] As for Australia, the causal process is not as clear, but some Australian PKO deployments, such as those to the Persian Gulf area and to Somalia, were made in direct response to US requests. Thus, the dynamic suggested by the asymmetric alliance framework is clearly present. Even the operations in Australia's nearby region could be seen in this light as the US side actively pushed its regional allies to take the lead in their own areas and lauded the Australian performance as its "deputy sheriff" in Southeast Asia.

690 This line of argument was already referred to in the theoretical chapter. See Bennett, Lepgold and Unger, *Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War*.

691 This link is also clearly demonstrated in Hugo Dobson, *Japan and UN Peacekeeping: New Pressures and New Responses* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 62-64.

Alliance affirmations in the mid-1990s also directly followed the US agenda. The most progress in the affirmations was achieved when cabinet-level officials were directly involved in the mid-1990s. The early 1990s and the lapse of Global Partnership initiative, as well as the period of the late 1990s, showed slow progress in implementing the agreed reforms and illustrates that major changes and developments in alliance structures were clearly dependent on continued focus by US decisionmakers. The asymmetric alliance model fits well to the developments that took place. The fact that the pace of the developments corresponds best to the priorities of the US administration, rather than threats or domestic politics, strongly supports this conclusion.

Even technology cooperation followed the patterns set out in US strategies. The use of allies to partner up on advanced defense technologies was a clear priority for the post-Cold War US administrations, which corresponds with the accelerating research partnerships with Japan in particular. As the US alliance with Australia was focused on satellite ground stations and signals intelligence, most defense technology cooperation was in these fields. Notably, the US side actively pushed European competitors out of its allies' procurement competition. One marked departure from this dynamic was the Japanese program for indigenous intelligence satellites. The US side resisted the idea of an independent Japanese capability without US input. However, this too can be seen in terms of security-sovereignty exchange: the Japanese felt that the US was not providing enough security against the threat of DPRK missiles, which were becoming a real concern in the late 1990s.[692] Therefore, it could be argued that they were less willing to yield on their sovereign decision to develop their own satellites as they did not see the other side providing what was needed to fulfill the basic premises of the asymmetric alliance. This is also a foretaste of what is expected in this framework if the security guarantee provided by the senior ally begins losing value later.

Overall, all the outcomes observed during this period match almost perfectly to the expectations of the asymmetric alliance theory. The United States was at the height of its relative power and therefore its demands clearly dominated alliance agendas. This seems so clear that emphasizing it seems almost trivial. While other frameworks also fit several outcomes, none seem to cover the developments as well as the asymmetric alliance framework. However, this is only the first part of the study. The next two chapters show distinctive changes to this dynamic and arguably demonstrate that a change of dynamics is causally linked to the changes in the relative power positions of the main players in Asia-Pacific over the next two decades.

692 This dynamic has been discussed in Christopher W. Hughes, "" Super-Sizing" the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea," *Asian Survey* 49, no.2 (2009).

5 Alliances During the War on Terror Era

This chapter will discuss the development of the alliances in the early 2000s. The single most significant event, which is often understood as the defining event of the decade, was the 9/11 terror attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The resulting War on Terror has been present, in one way or the other, in US security strategies ever since; for a decade, it even seemed that it was the only issue considered by US policymakers. However, while the 9/11 attacks clearly defined the international relations of the early 2000s, it is possible that the effects of this single day are sometimes overemphasized. There had already been attempts to bomb the WTC in 1993 and the bombing of US Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 is still the deadliest terror attack against US armed forces.[693] Counterterrorism was therefore not a new policy. Both alliances had cooperated in this field prior to 9/11 but not on the scale that was seen after the attacks.[694]

While the War on Terror dominated the early 2000s, terrorism itself had little direct impact in the Asia-Pacific as traditional security was still prominent in its strategic landscape. The rise of China could not be ignored, and the specter of confrontation lifted its head at regular intervals. In the US, the Bush administration initially adopted a confrontational attitude towards China but soon saw it as a partner in the War on Terror. The same applied to Russia but not North Korea. The delicate truce with the DPRK, achieved under the Clinton administration, was already unraveling and in the early days of the War on Terror, North Korea was bundled up with Iran and Iraq into Bush's "Axis of Evil." In the Southern Pacific, the continued fragmentation of the small states increased regional instability, but this had little relevance to the War on Terror. Indonesia had active terrorist elements, but these did not pose a threat to overall regional stability.

During this period, US policies resulted in a clear set of demands for its allies: US partners were urged to contribute to the War on Terror with military means and to provide political support for US action. Failure by some allies to do so resulted in markedly deteriorating relations. Washington's demands for allies to send forces to UN PKOs diminished as the Bush administration adopted a negative view of multilateral security organizations such as the UN and focused almost solely on the War on Terror. Simultaneously, Bush also sought to strengthen traditional alliances

693 The first bombing of the WTC buildings took place in 1993. On the bombing in Beirut see, for example, *CNN*, "Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing Fast Facts," October 6, 2020. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/13/world/meast/beirut-marine-barracks-bombing-fast-facts/ (Accessed August 17, 2021).

694 E.g., Jeffery D. Brake, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background Process, and Issues*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington D.C., June 21, 2001.

and encourage the involvement of Pacific allies in the missile defense project, on which he placed a greater emphasis than Clinton. Notably, all three countries had stable and continuous governments during this period. Further, both Japan and Australia were governed by relatively strong pro-US governments who represented conservative hawkish party factions and enjoyed widely publicized good relations with the Bush administration.

As before, the chapter will begin with an overview of the Asia-Pacific security issues of the time and the then-US policies in the area. It will then discuss alliance developments in Japan and Australia during the period. The actual alliance developments will again be analyzed under specific sub-chapters, and the chapter will conclude with an overview of the analytical results.

5.1 The United States and the Asia-Pacific in the Early 2000s

The Asia-Pacific region was growing in economic importance and by the beginning of the new millennium, it was clear that despite the economic crisis of the 1990s, Asian economic giants would overtake Europe. However, due to the events in September 2001, military rivalries, which were already rising in the early 2000s and had come to define the strategic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific in the late 2010s, were largely set aside. The US administration under George W. Bush focused on the Middle East instead, which even allowed China to become a strategic partner of sorts in the War on Terror. This also enabled US allies in the Pacific alliances to momentarily ignore the inherent contradiction between the regional economy, increasingly centered on China, and the regional security structure, still overwhelmingly dominated by the US, while benefiting from both Chinese economic opportunities and US military alliance. While Washington's focus was directed to the Middle East, China was seen as just another state to be partnered with during the War on Terror. While occasional incidents did occur to cause alarm among those tasked with observing the Asia-Pacific strategic situation, none of these events caused persistent concern among US policymakers.

Regional states did, however, have other concerns in addition to the Middle East. While China's rise was accompanied by dramatic increases in military spending, overall, it was still mostly seen in peaceful terms. However, several smaller threats evolved into crises in the region. After the failure of the Agreed Framework, further attempts to restrain North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs through economic sanctions failed and by the end of the decade, the DPRK had crossed the threshold to become a de-facto nuclear weapons state. The Australian region was also markedly unstable during this period and the ADF had to be deployed multiple

times to the nearby islands. There were also several terrorist bombings in Indonesia, which resulted in multiple Australian casualties.

While the US decisionmakers' focus was on the Middle East, it still remained the prominent military force in the Pacific. While elements of the US forces in South Korea and Japan at some point rotated to the Middle East, the overall numbers remained stable. When forces were withdrawn from South Korea, the number of US forces in Japan were reduced by only a few thousand troops.[695] Notably, the Marines of the III MEF in Okinawa also deployed to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which affected the overall number of troops in Okinawa until at least 2012.[696] However, as noted, the overall posture of the US forces in the Western Pacific, including the US 5th Air Force and 7th Fleet in Japan, remained unchanged.[697] It was only during the mid-2000s that changes began to be planned, adjustments that would affect both Japan and Australia.

China as a partner and an emerging military challenge in the beginning of the new millennia

At the beginning of the 2000s, it seemed that US relations with China were not going to be problematic despite conflicting interests regarding Taiwan and North Korea, in addition to other smaller issues. It seemed that for the time being, common interests were overriding potential conflict points. China's ascension to full WTO membership in 2001, and measures to open its economy to outside investment, were rapidly integrating China into the international economic networks. The common wisdom was that economic integration would make states less belligerent in their foreign policies. China was also actively broadening its own access to regional developing economies. China's "charm offensive" towards Southeast Asia, which began in the late 1990s, resulted in a series of trade agreements between China and the ten ASEAN countries in 2004. By 2006, some observers speculated that China might replace the US as the partner of choice for the regional countries and that Beijing would likely become a responsible stakeholder in the region.[698] China's

695 Data on US military personnel from United States Department of Defense: https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports (Accessed June 18, 2021)

696 E.g., *Stars and Stripes* "US to beef up Marine presence in Okinawa before drawdown," June 12, 2012.

697 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, editions 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 2006 (the marking of the title year for the publication was changed after the 2005-2006 edition).

698 E.g., Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). See also Joshua Kurlantzick,

relations with Taiwan were improved as well: direct commercial and travel links between the two were allowed in 2001, and in 2003, the first commercial flight between the countries took place. Easing tensions, combined with the US War on Terror, ensured that US-China relations also improved. By the mid-2000s, US-China cooperation had reached unprecedented levels and the relations continued to improve.[699]

At the same time, China's military modernization proceeded rapidly. China's defense expenditures doubled between 2000 and 2005, and by the end of the decade, China's military budget was twice the size of Japan's. While the People's Liberation Army (PLA) possessed an increasing number of advanced weapons, the bulk of its equipment was still nearly obsolete. Therefore, the PLA's reach, even in its own region, remained limited. The PLA Navy did not possess modern destroyers in significant numbers and the PLA Air Force had only a few modern fighter aircraft purchased mostly from Russia.[700] Probably the most significant arm of the PLA was its missile forces, which could inflict significant damage throughout the region.

After decades of investment, deficiencies in the PLA's air and maritime forces were only beginning to be effectively addressed in the early 2000s. The indigenous Chinese production of advanced fighter aircraft started in 2002 with the production of the 4th generation fighter, Shenyang J-11, several hundreds of which would form the backbone of the PLA Air Force for the coming decades. The advances in indigenous technology in the 2000s enabled China to begin its 5th generation stealth fighter programs by the end of the 2010s. The lack of advanced destroyers was first addressed with the acquisition of four Soviet-built *Sovremenny*-class destroyers between 1999 and 2006.[701] By the mid-2000s, several models of advanced destroyers were under construction in Chinese shipyards, and China was refitting an old Soviet-built aircraft carrier to serve as a testbed for its future aircraft carrier force.[702] By 2008, the PLA Navy's power projection capabilities had grown enough for it to deploy an anti-piracy task force of two missile destroyers and a supply

"China's Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia," in *Current History* 105, no.692 (2006): 276-277.

699 E.g., Gilbert Rozman, *Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), 110-112.

700 SIPRI data on world military spending 2000–2009. https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/05/appendix5A (Accessed August 7, 2021).

701 David Shambaugh, "China's Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress," in *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Ear of Uncertainty*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 81, 91, 96-97.

702 United States Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Peoples Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, US Navy 2009, 19.

ship, along with embarked marine special forces and attack helicopters, to the Gulf of Aden.[703]

While China's rising power did not cause significant alarm in the region at the time, there were hints of more assertive Chinese policies by the mid-2000s. In 2004, the Chinese defense White Paper stated that the China would use force as a response to Taiwanese independence, and in 2005, the China's People's Congress passed a bill authorizing the PLA to stop Taiwanese secession by force.[704] In response, the US and Japan issued a joint statement to "encourage the peaceful resolution" of the issues between China and Taiwan.[705]

China's relations with Japan also suffered from sporadic tensions. Tensions over oil exploration in the East China Sea between China and Japan were increasingly common by the mid-2000s, and in the spring of 2005, there were a number of protests in China over the way the Japanese occupation was represented in Japanese school history books. At the same time, PLA Navy research ships were increasingly deployed to areas around Japan, which led to a number of encounters between Japanese and Chinese vessels and aircraft near Japanese islands and in the disputed areas around the Senkaku islands.[706] Japanese defense White Papers began to list encounters with Chinese vessels from 2001 onwards, much in the same way that Soviet and Russian military movements had been reported up until the mid-1990s.[707] By 2004, scenarios involving a Chinese invasion of the offshore islands, especially the disputed ones off Okinawa, were reportedly considered by Japanese defense planners.[708] However, defense personnel exchanges, multilateral military exercises, and other trust and confidence building measures increased between Japan and China as well as with US and other regional states. These include, for example, the multilateral Pacific Reach 2002 submarine rescue exercise, which was the first multilateral military exercise ever hosted by the JSDF, as well as training under the

703 *Shanghai Daily*, "China to add special forces, helicopters to fight pirates," December 23, 2008.

704 For an English language translation of the Anti-Secession Law, see for example Third Session of the 10th National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm (Accessed August 7, 2021).

705 U.S. – Japan Security Consultative Committee Join Statement, Washington D.C., February 19, 2005. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html (Accessed August 7, 2021).

706 E.g., Christopher W. Huges, "Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a 'Normal' Security Role", in *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 108-109.

707 Japan Defense Agency *Defense of Japan*, 2000 and 2001 editions, Tokyo: Urban Connections 2000 and 2001.

708 Huges, *Japanese Military Modernization*,110-111.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched in May 2003, which became a major venue for regional cooperative exercises.[709]

Australian relations with China, however, were increasingly close. In 2003, the Howard government announced a new "strategic economic partnership" with China and in October 2003, President Hu Jintao became the first Asian head of state to address the Australian Parliament, just one day after President Bush.[710] Chinese trade with Australia had by this time grown 17% a year on average since 1997.[711] The Howard government made particular efforts to prevent human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan issues from entering the agenda, even barring some members of Australian Parliament from the session. This approach was fruitful as several trade agreements related to energy exports, including uranium, to China were signed in the early 2000s.[712] Australian successes with China were partially achieved at the price of its relations with the US.[713] In 2004, Alexander Downer, while visiting China, stated in a press conference that Australia would not necessarily support the US in a conflict over Taiwan. Downer further suggested that the ANZUS alliance was largely symbolic and would apply only in a situation in which one party would be under direct attack.[714] The comments resulted in hurried exchanges between the US embassy in Canberra and the Australian government, which was required to make some clarifications about the Foreign Minister's views.[715] Downer's comments which, according to some polls were supported by 79 % of Australians, are usually cited as evidence of Australia's increasing accommodation of China relative to its US alliance.[716] Even though both Howard and Downer downplayed the implications,[717] Downer went on to emphasize the "Australia-China strategic relationship" in other forums as well.[718] In another sign of dissonance between

709 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006*, Tokyo: Fujisho, 322-324, 328.
710 McDowall, *Howard's Long March,* 37-38.
711 Brendon O'Connor, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2003," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, no.2 (2004): 215-216.
712 Frank Frost, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2006," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.3 (2007): 404-405.
713 E.g., Joseph M. Siracausa, "John Howard, Australia and the Coalition of the Willing," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 1, no.2 (2006): 39-49.
714 Alexander Downer sited in *The Age*, "Downer flags China shift," August 18, 2004. www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/08/17/1092508475187.html (Accessed August 7, 2021).
715 *Sydney Morning Herald* "US took Downer to task over China, cables show," May 17, 2006.
716 E.g., Gill Bates, *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 152-153; McDowall, *Howard's Long March,* 33-35.
717 Ibid., 36 -37.
718 Alexander Downer, "Australia and China's Shared Strategic Interests – Security and Strategic Dimension" (Speech, Sydney, August 13, 2004).

Australia and the US, Australia did not join the US in opposing the EU initiative to lift the arms embargo against China, in place since the late 1980s.[719] Howard even declined to join security discussions with other English-speaking countries and Japan concerning China, despite an invitation from Washington.[720]

It is easy to conclude that while it was not seen as an urgent security threat, the emerging Chinese power was becoming an increasingly central feature of the Asia-Pacific during this period, which posed a dilemma for both regional states and the US. On the one hand, Chinese industrial potential and its steadily rising middle class made it an increasingly vital trade partner regionally and globally, but on the other hand, its emerging military power came with traces of assertive policies and the frictions created between it and its immediate neighbors such as Vietnam and Japan. But the territorial conflicts over islands only really emerged in the 2010s, hence China's rise was not yet causing widespread alarm. The Bush administration was initially more hostile to China than its predecessors, but this changed as China's emerging challenge was largely forgotten after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Thus, the Asia-Pacific littoral states were pressured to increase their military commitments to their alliances with the US by the War on Terror, even while their economies were increasingly centered on China.

North Korean relapse and the failure of the six-party talks

While relations between the great powers in Asia seemed amicable, trouble with North Korea (DPRK) persisted throughout the period. The tentative agreement reached after the crisis in the mid-1990s had been fragile from the start. The DPRK leadership had again agreed to halt its long-range missile tests in 1999, but tensions over the implementation of the Agreed Framework persisted. In December 2001, a North Korean spy boat was sunk by the Japanese Coast Guard after it had opened fire on a Coast Guard vessel. The boat, which had the appearance of a fishing trawler, was later recovered and found to have been heavily modified with weapons, including a 20mm anti-aircraft cannon.[721]

To ease the situation, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea in 2002 after the DPRK regime had approached Japan about normalizing mutual relations. During the visit, the DPRK leadership acknowledged the abductions of Japanese citizens, and the five still-living abductees were allowed to

719 Maryanne Kelton, "Perspectives on Australian foreign policy 2005," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no.2 (2006): 230-231.

720 Jian Zhang, "Australia and China: Towards a Strategic Partnership?" in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006),108.

721 Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 188-189.

visit Japan. However, the initiative backfired on the relationship: the abductees did not wish to return to North Korea and the Japanese public became increasingly hostile towards the regime as details surrounding the abductions became available. Further, in late 2002, North Korea admitted to having continued uranium enrichment projects in violation of the 1994 agreement and announced that it would resume the construction of nuclear facilities. The IAEA inspectors were told to leave the country soon after. Therefore, while the world was focused on the imminent US invasion of Iraq in early 2003, there was real potential for nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia.[722]

The DPRK officially withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in early 2003. To stabilize the situation, a diplomatic initiative was undertaken to bring all the stakeholders, including the US, China, Japan, Russia, and both Koreas, to the negotiation table. The so-called "six-party talks" were set to take place in Beijing with the aim of renegotiating the previous agreement or to find another suitable framework for denuclearization. The talks were meant to include light-water reactors and peaceful nuclear energy for the DPRK as well as the return of IAEA inspectors to North Korea. The DPRK demanded the normalization of economic and diplomatic relations in return as well as security guarantees that it would not suffer the same fate as Iraq. The talks began in August 2003 and by 2006, the fifth round of negotiations were underway. Despite initial progress, the talks stalled and in July 2006, the DPRK launched a series of missile tests, once again raising tensions. Following the tests, the Japanese government submitted its first ever draft resolution to the UN Security Council, which was then approved with the support of the US and UK. Even China, which initially had reservations, supported the resolution.[723]

In October 2006, the DPRK detonated its first nuclear device and in January 2007, the DPRK regime announced that it was in possession of nuclear weapons. Despite this, the six-party talks continued in 2007, but although the parties managed to agree on an action plan for denuclearization, including decommissioning the DPRK's main nuclear site by December 2007, the implementation talks soon broke down. The failure of the talks was sealed when the DPRK conducted its second nuclear detonation in 2009. Unlike in the 1990s, no serious threat of military action against the DPRK regime was made and it seems no one seriously thought that the US would forcibly stop the DPRK nuclear program.[724] Hence, by the end of the first

722 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 104-105.
723 Ibid., 106-107.
724 John S. Park "Nuclear Ambition and Tension on the Korean Peninsula", in *Asia in the Second Nuclear Age*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2013).

decade of the 2000s, there was a nuclear-armed rogue state right next to the Asian economic and industrial heartland, which posed a real threat to cities like Tokyo.

Ongoing instability in the South-Pacific and Southeast Asia

While Northeast Asia was becoming hostage to the DPRK nuclear program, Southeast Asia was still more or less isolated as China was still far from capable of projecting real military power beyond its immediate area. However, the local problems in Australia's immediate region escalated during the first decade of the 2000s. Both the Solomon Islands and Fiji suffered military coups in 2000, and both Bougainville and Samoa experienced political unrest and violence. Further, the threat of international terrorism reached Southeast Asia with the bombing of a tourist area in Bali in October 2002. This was followed by the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, and another bombing in Bali in October 2005.[725] As the sea lines connecting the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia to Australia are difficult to control and heavily trafficked, regional instability was also seen to pose a direct threat to Australia.

The War on Terror and other issues also caused tensions among regional states. Refugee and migrant flows through Southeast Asia to Australia were increasing and this created political problems for Australia. The so-called *Tampa* affair in 2001, involved a conflict over a Norwegian freighter carrying refugees rescued from the Timor Sea, which was not allowed to come to port in Australia. At the same time, Australia openly endorsed the pre-emptive use of military force in third countries against terrorist organizations, advocated by the Bush administration as part of the War on Terror. Prime Minister Howard even suggested that this might also apply to the Australian use of force against terrorists in neighboring countries, which resulted in objections from Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, all of which had their own terrorist movements to deal with. Hostile attitudes towards asylums seekers, together with what was seen as military interventionism following the operations in East Timor, increased hostility towards Australia. The fact that Howard openly declared Australia to be the US's "deputy sheriff" in the Southern Pacific only increased this sentiment.[726]

Despite a somewhat stormy relationship, the regional integration progressed. Australia was invited to participate in the ASEAN leader's summit in 2004. As a prerequisite for participation, Australia was also required to join the ASEAN Treaty

[725] Hugh White, "Security, Defense, and Terrorism", in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 174, 179.

[726] E.g., Siracausa, *John Howard, Australia and the Coalition of the Willing*, 39-49.

of Amity and Cooperation. Australia initially declined after a debate about whether this treaty would conflict with the ANZUS agreement through its non-intervention clauses. However, in December 2005, Australia signed the Treaty and was also included in the inaugural East Asia Summit in 2005, which notably included nearly all the regional states and Russia, while excluding the US.[727] By 2006, Australian relations with Indonesia had again improved to a point where they were able to sign a new security treaty to replace the one lapsed after the East Timor intervention. This treaty further expanded the scope of security cooperation by including a wide range of issues from counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation to law enforcement and aviation safety.[728] In a way, Australia was welcomed back to regional frameworks after a brief period of being frozen out following its close association with the War on Terror, while the US was simultaneously kept at arm's length.

The United States under the Bush Administration

The Clinton administration, which had guided US policies for most of the 1990s, ended with the inauguration of the George W. Bush in January 2001. The preceding presidential election was contested between George Walker Bush, the son of George Herbert Bush, who had served as the president from1988-1992, and Al Gore, the serving Vice President of the Clinton administration. While domestic issues dominated the campaigns, there was also a clear difference in foreign and security policy platforms. The Bush team, which was largely composed of officials with long experience in Republican Party administrations, attacked several of Clinton's foreign policies. The main points of critique were on Clinton's multilateral emphasis, which was seen to restrict US freedom of action as well as its perceived willingness to accommodate states potentially hostile to the US. In the early stages of his presidency, Bush specifically referred to China as a strategic competitor rather than strategic partner as it was referred to during Clinton's term. The Bush administration also explicitly sought to strengthen pre-existing US alliances and specifically criticized Clinton's "Japan passing."[729] The countries the Bush administration initially identified as potential rivals were China and Russia, in addition to "rogue states" such as North Korea and Iraq.[730]

727 Kelton, *Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2005*, 232-233.

728 Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation, Lombok, November 13, 2006. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/nia/2006/43.html (Accessed August 7, 2021).

729 E.g., James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).

730 E.g., Dietrich, John W., ed. *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 14-16.

During the campaign, Bush was especially critical of the Clinton-era defense reductions, and one of the main security elements in his platform was reversing this decline.[731] Bush and his advisors also opposed using military resources for humanitarian operations. Donald Rumsfeld, the incoming Secretary of Defense, had long been a critic of using US forces in UN PKOs and had advocated barring US forces from UN peacekeeping altogether.[732] As president, Bush himself was critical of the UN and thought it to be "cumbersome, bureaucratic, and inefficient."[733] The main message was that under Clinton, the US military was underfinanced, overstretched by misguided peacekeeping operations, and still organized along out-of-date Cold War principles.[734]

The Bush administration set out with the intent to increase and refocus US defense spending and reassert US dominance in traditional hard military-centered security. Interestingly, when the Bush administration first came to office, the new administration also adopted an isolationist undertone, which meant that the US would not engage in operations that were not directly in its interest but would rather focus on confronting those it viewed as enemies, including China and Russia.[735] The 9/11 terrorist attacks – the clear defining event for the Bush administration – redirected this emphasis to terrorist organizations and the states supporting them. The resulting overriding focus on non-traditional enemies set the main tone for US security policies over the following decade. Although the targets of the War on Terror were dispersed networks based in minor states, the intensity of their pursuit meant that the war had implications for all US allies. In effect, all nations, and especially those allied to US, were expected to contribute to the war or be perceived as opponents.

As with its predecessors, the Bush administration continued to emphasize advanced military technologies, especially the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept, which was to serve as a basis of the holistic restructuring of the US armed forces.[736] During his campaign, Bush had already advocated the idea that warfare had been dramatically changed by the information age and that the US military would have to be transformed to rely more on technological superiority and Special

731 E.g., Keith L. Shimko, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 131.

732 Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 12-13

733 George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown Publishers 2011), 336.

734 Shimko, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution*, 131-132.

735 E.g., Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000 –Promoting National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.1 (2000).

736 Bush, *Decision Points*, 83-84. See also Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor Jr., Michael J. Meese, and Suzanne C. Nielsen *American National Security*, 6th edition, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 317-318.

Forces. These capabilities would be used to achieve decisive goals in short and intensive campaigns.[737] They would not be deployed for vague and indefinite peacekeeping missions for which they were clearly unsuited.[738] However, it should be remembered that the Clinton administration had already made it a point of policy not to send US ground troops to PKOs and to let other allied states conduct these operations. If there was a difference between these two approaches, it was found in the fact that while the Clinton administration had actively pushed for its allies to conduct PKOs, the Bush administration was keener on its advanced and military capable allies sending their forces to the intensely fought operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. PKOs were left to developing nations that would not be able to participate in high intensity operations. Another difference was that the Bush administration specifically wanted to increase spending on missile defense and promised to develop and deploy functioning defense systems on both regional and national scales. Again, this meant increased pressure for allied nations to contribute.[739]

The Bush administration's security policies were first outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001.[740] The report was initially anticipated to face heavy resistance from the Congress and the military, but once published, just after 9/11, it faced little opposition.[741] Some have claimed that the report reflects the altered situation after 9/11, but as it was published two weeks after the event, there is no plausible way that the it could have been significantly altered after the attacks.[742] Hence, the fact that the 2001 QDR fits the situation after 9/11 is proof that the main elements of post-9/11 strategic thinking were formed before the event.[743] A major part of the 2001 QDR deals with what it calls a "paradigm shift in force planning," which meant integrating technological advances into planning to create more efficient military forces.[744] The major transformative initiatives, for which additional resources were to be assigned, included ways to operate in "distant anti-access and area denial environments" as well as "denying enemies sanctuary by

737 Shimko, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution*, 133-134.

738 E.g., Frederick W. Kagan, *Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), 265-268.

739 E.g., George W. Bush, "A Period of Consequences" (Speech, Charleston, September 23, 1999). http://www3.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html (Accessed August 7, 2021)

740 Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001.

741 Dietrich, *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader*,108-109.

742 The document itself notes at the fifth page of the *Foreword*-chapter, that it was written before the 9/11, but also goes on to state that the events actually confirmed the strategic direction and principles of the report. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, V.

743 Ibid., 4-5.

744 Ibid., 17.

persistent surveillance."[745] Strengthening alliances to ensure support for US policies and maintaining access to possible theaters of operations through the forward positioning of forces, as well as ensuring access to allied bases, were also to serve these force planning priorities.[746] Some of these concepts were already put to work in Afghanistan where US forces deployed a large number of unmanned drones to perform surveillance and strike missions.[747]

Coalition-building to support US efforts is specifically mentioned as "critically important" in responding to the 9/11 attacks.[748] However, while coalition and allied support for US actions was demanded, no preconditions or limitations on US freedom of action were to be tolerated.[749] So even while the US wanted to deepen its alliances and broaden its partner network, it was unwilling to compromise on any of its interests. This uncompromising position was clearly spelled out in September 2001 when Bush declared that "Every nation, in every region… -… Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[750] Under the blanket of public outrage and the outpouring of international sympathy, the Bush administration was able to cast the War on Terror in spectacularly black and white terms. In other words, the Bush administration was demanding asymmetric concessions from allies' sovereign choices in exchange for continued security cooperation. While several states followed the US lead almost unconditionally, it is interesting that some of the European states that had little need for additional security guarantees, e.g., France and Germany, were unwilling to support US actions even if it threatened to damage the alliances.

The Bush administration utilized international sympathy by calling, not only on its traditional allies, but on a broader international coalition to support the war efforts. This allowed states like China and Russia to show support for US efforts and facilitated warmer relations between potential competitors.[751] In the 2002 National Security Strategy, China and Russia, previously labeled as strategic competitors,

745 Ibid., 43-44.

746 As noted, the 2001 QDR lists four main goals for US defense policy first of which is to "Assuring allies and friends of the United States steadiness and purpose and capability to fulfill its security commitments.", second is "Dissuading adversaries…-… that could threaten U.S. interests and those of our allies and friends", third is "Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks…", and fourth is to "Decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails." Ibid., III-IV.

747 Shimko, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution*, 136.

748 Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001, 5.

749 E.g., Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 50-51.

750 George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation" (Speech, Washington D.C., September 11, 2001).

751 Shimko, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution*, 144-145.

were both described as "partner(s) in the war on terror."[752] This demonstrated how much the War on Terror overrode other considerations at this point. As part of the War on Terror, the Bush administration reinvigorated counter-proliferation measures such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for which Bush sought expanded funding after the 9/11 attacks.[753] The Bush administration also began a new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for cooperation in intercepting WMD materials. [754] The missile defense project was also linked to this narrative and the program's budget was increased dramatically in 2001.[755] Emphasis was placed on sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in their boost phase. This sort of system could also secure allies with little additional effort.[756] Additionally, for this reason, the Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.[757]

Overall, the security strategy documents of the Bush administration are much heavier on ideological content than the Clinton-era documents. One major difference is that these documents speak more about allies and coalitions, mostly within the context of defeating terrorists.[758] Notably, when the 2002 strategy discusses regional conflicts, not a single mention is made of East Asia and only the regions linked to terrorist activities are noted.[759] The Global Posture Review of 2004, which was meant as an operationalization of the strategy put forth in 2002, continued these trends and announced the reduction of US forces from Cold War frontiers to more deployable positions. The main reductions were from South Korea and central Europe, consisting of 70,000 US personnel overall. This translated into a reduction of US troops in East Asia by around 10,000, thus breaking the symbolic number of 100,000 troops in Asia set during the Clinton administration.[760]

Therefore, while the Bush administration initially seemed to focus more on Asia-Pacific and China, and in 2001, even approved the largest arms sale to Taiwan since the Cold War, this focus was overturned after 9/11. After 9/11, the Bush administration's policies towards China fell largely in line with Clinton's

752 White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, iv.
753 Dietrich, *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader*,117-119.
754 E.g., Feith, *War and Decision*, 113-114.
755 E.g., Philip H. Gordon, "Bush, Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance," *Survival* 43, no.1 (2001): 21-22.
756 E.g., Lars Assmann, *Theater Missile Defense in East Asia: Implications for Beijing and Tokyo* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 141-142.
757 *CNN*, "U.S. quits ABM treaty," December 13, 2001.
758 White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, 5-7.
759 Ibid., 9-11.
760 United States 108th Congress Senate Armed Service Committee, *The Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed Overseas*, 23 September 2004.

pragmatism and the initially confrontational attitude was abandoned.[761] But China was not fully forgotten and was still monitored by the administration.[762] Continued low level emphasis can be seen from the yearly threat assessments such as the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's reports published from 2002 onwards.[763] The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China by the Department of Defense and mandated by the congress in 2000, also listed China in a similar manner.[764] There were also continued disagreements over Taiwan, human rights, Chinese exports of missile technology, and trade imbalances.[765]

Another state that the Bush administration initially listed on top of its list of enemies was North Korea. [766] Unlike China and Russia, the DPRK stayed on the list after 9/11 and was named as part of the "axis of evil" and declared a state sponsor of terrorism.[767] But even while tensions rose over the DPRK's nuclear enrichment, the Bush administration followed its tough rhetoric with little action aside from cutting back previously agreed-upon fuel shipments. The fact that the DPRK was allowed to cross the nuclear threshold and that the six-party talks involved both Koreas and Japan, as well as Russia and China, further indicates how much the US was willing to accommodate its previously hard position towards its competitors in Asia while the War on Terror was going on elsewhere.[768]

In a sense, during the first term of the Bush presidency, the War on Terror became a kind of organizing principle that the US security strategy had lacked since the end of the Cold War. It also ended the sense of indifference that had previously

761 E.g., Robert M. Hathaway, "Introduction," in *George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment*, ed. Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 2005), 5.

762 Interview with Richard C. Bush III, February 5, 2014. Richard Bush was the Chairman of the Board and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan of the American Institute in Taiwan 1997-2003.

763 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission annual reports to Congress. https://www.uscc.gov/annual-reports (Accessed August 7, 2021).

764 United States Department of Defense, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China,* 2000. https://archive.defense.gov/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm (Accessed August 7, 2021).

765 E.g., Congressional Research Service, *China – U.S. Relations*, Library of Congress, January 31, 2003, 4-5, 10-11.

766 George W. Bush, "State of the Union" (Speech, Washington D.C. January 29, 2002).

767 Dietrich, *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader,* 121.

768 Jia Qingguo, "Partners or Competitors: A Choice to be Made," in *George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment*, ed. Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 2005), 122-123.

characterized US posture towards Asia.[769] But while the 9/11 attacks did not concretely change much in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment, except the US attitude, it gave many states the opportunity to increase their cooperation and improve their relations with the Bush administration. Most regional states in Asia count that period as one of significantly improving relations with the US. However, terrorism was not a significant threat for regional states and hence the transformed US attitude was what really mattered. [770] The War on Terror allowed the US and China to build cooperative frameworks, while allies like Japan and Australia could contribute forces to operations abroad and thus develop their military cooperation structures without antagonizing China.[771]

The next presidential elections in the US were held in 2004, and this time, unusually for US elections, foreign and security politics were a hot topic with the two wars being waged at the time. Bush won the election and, although there was significant criticism of the how the war was being handled, the election victory nonetheless vindicated the War on Terror and offered the administration an even stronger mandate for the war.[772] After the election, the increased focus on terrorism was clear, and the QDR of 2006 focused almost exclusively on terrorism.[773] The first sentence in the Bush administration's 2006 National Security Strategy reads dramatically: "America is at War." The second Bush administration also embraced increasingly ideologically colored terms for its strategy and framed strategic goals in terms such as "Support democratic movements…-… in every nation and culture" and "ending tyranny in our world."[774]

As the National Security Strategy of 2006 demonstrates, non-proliferation efforts were now almost exclusively linked to the War on Terror, with only a short note made about North Korea, which was just about to cross the nuclear threshold. Pointedly, suspicions about the Iranian nuclear program are emphasized more often than the far more advanced DPRK program. The paper even noted that Iran might

769 E.g., Catharin E. Dalpino, "Bush in Southeast Asia: Widening Gyres", in Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee (eds.), *George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment*, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 2005).

770 E.g., Robert M. Hathaway, "Introduction", in Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee (eds.), *George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment* (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 2005), 4-5.

771 Qingguo, *Partners or Competitors*, 117-119, 122-123.

772 George W. Bush, "Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention" (Speech, Cincinnati, August 16, 2004).

773 United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006.

774 White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, I, 1.

be the greatest security challenge to the US.[775] The idea that a middle-sized state in the Middle East might be a more serious challenge than a nuclear armed DPRK, rising China, or revisionist Russia, clearly demonstrated the priorities of the Bush administration. This clear discrepancy between rhetoric and reality was eventually noted at the end of the Bush presidency, and in its final years, the Bush administration became more active in Asia. Concrete results of this shift included the signing of a Free Trade Agreements with Singapore and multilateral US-ASEAN meetings during the annual APEC summits.[776] In regard to China, after the improvement of relations seen in the early 2000s, the Bush administration maintained generally cooperative and pragmatic relations.[777] This line was maintained despite occasional indications of conflicting interest over Taiwan and China's rapidly expanding new military capabilities in maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.[778]

In 2007, the CSIS published a report titled *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020*.[779] The previous report of the series had been published during the Clinton administration and the writers included authors from both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Other participants, such as Kurt Campbell, became influential figures in the following Obama administration. While the report is just one publication among others, due to its bi-partisan and authoritative nature, it provides a window into how US policy elites saw Asia-Pacific at the time. The report notes the "profound transformation" of China as the single most significant issue in Asia and also notes that the "inevitable" unification of Korea will reshape Northeast Asia in the future. Regarding Taiwan, the paper notes the role of the US-Japan alliance in maintaining the balance of peace, thus implicitly raising Taiwan's security as an objective for the alliance.[780] This, combined with the pessimistic view that the report has towards how peaceful China's rise is or is not, clearly shows that while the Bush administration focused on anti-terrorism efforts, policy experts on Asia were beginning to worry about the region's future.

As is typical of these reports, there is also a shopping list of recommended actions. For Japan, these include strengthening the administrative functions for

775 Ibid., 19-24.

776 Robert G. Sutter, *The United States in Asia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 115-116

777 For an analysis on Bush administration successes in Asia in the latter part of the 2000s see for example Victor D. Cha "Winning Asia: Washington's Untold Success Story," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 6 (2007).

778 E.g., Michael J. Green, "The United States and Asia after Bush," *The Pacific Review* 21, no.5 (2008): 585-586.

779 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, "The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020", Center of Strategic and International Studies 2007.

780 Ibid., 7-12.

security decision making, constitutional reform to allow wider security policies, legislative reform for facilitating overseas deployment of the JSDF, increasing defense expenditure, and the expansion of Japan's participation in global security issues. Specifically, Japan was encouraged to improve its missile defense and enhance its capabilities for joint command, control communications, and intelligence (C3ISR) as well as to "take greater responsibility for its own defense."[781] In regard to the alliance, the report encourages strengthening bilateral cooperation, and negotiating and implementing a bilateral FTA.[782] Lastly, the report lists practical advice for measures to strengthen the alliance in the short term such as utilizing the Bilateral Joint Coordination Center framework on an operational level, increasing intelligence sharing, and instituting a regular review of the alliance.[783]

Another 2007 publication, albeit not quite as prestigious as the CSIS report, was written by a panel convened in the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute, which notes similar expectations for the Australia-US alliance. While Australia's role in contributing to Southeast Asian stability is noted for its beneficial effects, this report focuses mostly on the military side of the alliance. Noticeably, most scenarios focus on China instead of the War on Terror, in which Australia was heavily involved. The Taiwan Strait scenario and Australia's role in a possible conflict are the foremost issues. It also noted that the joint operation facilities in Australia would be linked to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait through existing intelligence arrangements, even if Australia did not directly take part in the fighting. However, the use of the Royal Australian Navy in the case of a conflict is clearly expected. The second military role for the alliance is maintaining a continued US presence in the area if US forces are forced to withdraw from Northeast Asia. As discussed in part 2 of Chapter 3, Australia was already used as a strategic fallback position and launching pad for US power projection to retake North Asia during WWII.[784]

Overall, it can be argued that while the Bush administration generally sought stronger alliance relations in the Asia-Pacific in the latter half of the 2000s, its overall focus on terrorism left the US without a coherent strategy for Asia. Regional states were left with a lingering sense that the US was distracted by the War on Terror.[785] Southeast Asia in particular was neglected, with Secretary of State Rice attending

781 Ibid., 19-20.
782 Ibid., 23.
783 Ibid., Annex.
784 Andrew Scobell, "The Alliance and the Asia-Pacific Region: An American Perspective," in *The Other Special Relationship: The United States and Australia at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffery D. McCausland, Douglas T. Stuart, William Tow and Michael Wesley (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 89-91. 99-101.
785 E.g., Michael J. Green, "The Iraq war and Asia: assessing legacy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2008, 181-200.

only two ASEAN Regional Forum meetings, Bush himself attended an ASEAN summit for the first time in 2007.[786] The Bush administration reached its maximum of two terms in January 2009. During the 2008 election, it seemed that for whoever won the elections, the main priority would be to scale down US involvement in the Middle East.[787] The importance of the War on Terror is further evident in the fact that a foreign policy platform was again a central point of contest in the elections, even after the onset of the global financial crisis. The unpopular war and the economic downturn gave an edge to the Democratic Party, and its candidate, Barack Obama, won with an agenda centered on social equality and health care reform.

Recovering Japan

For Japan, the early and mid-2000s proved to be a period of stability. The Koizumi government was popular, the economy seemed to be on track to recovery after the preceding "lost decade," and aside from periodic North Korean belligerency, there was little sense of an outside threat towards Japan. The threat of Islamic terrorism held little direct bearing on Japan. While Japanese citizens faced similar threats as others when abroad, Japan itself has a small minority of resident foreigners and an even smaller minority of these could potentially be recruited to carry out terror attacks. Granted, Japan has experienced acts of terror against its citizens abroad as well as domestically, however, none of these attacks were related to the War on Terror. While the threat of North Korean missiles and China's military build-up were increasing, these aroused little alarm as the regional situation seemed stable. Even with slowly increasing Chinese power looming in the distance, for the first time since the 1980s, the Japanese government seemed to be strong enough answer challenges. However, the stability of the Koizumi era could not be replicated by his successors and his five stable years were followed with a return to short-term governments as the following six years, from 2006 until 2012, saw six Prime Ministers from two different parties.

The Koizumi government, elected to office in April 2001, had a strong popular mandate that largely stemmed from the fact that Koizumi himself was an outsider to the party politics seen by many Japanese as corrupt. This allowed his administration to carry out reforms and pass legislation even in the face of opposition from significant parts of the LDP. Koizumi also actively strengthened his own executive

786 E.g., Jeffery A. Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 1-2.

787 E.g., Ashley J. Tellis, "Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States", in *Strategic Asia 2008-09: Challenges and Choices*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo and Andrew Marble (Washington: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2008), 20-21.

powers. Koizumi revised the Cabinet Law to improve the Prime Ministers Office's leadership over policymaking by allowing it to plan and initiate policies from the top down, independently of other ministries.[788] The fact that Koizumi managed to carry the 2005 election with one of the largest parliamentary majorities in Japan's history after four years of divisive reform politics is a clear indication of the strength of Koizumi's mandate. Notably, Koizumi was also considered a right-wing conservative, hawkish on security and pro-US, which allowed him to enjoy markedly good relations with the Bush administration.[789]

Structural reforms allowed Koizumi to act decisively in security and foreign policies.[790] In response to the 9/11 attacks, the Koizumi administration altered the traditional policy-making process by focusing the planning of the response to the Cabinet Secretariat in the Prime Minister's office (often referred to by the name of the Prime Minister's official residence, Kantei). In the response plan, two pieces of legislation were required, one allowing the JSDF to secure US bases without an armed attack occurring in Japan, and the other allowing logistic support for US forces in the Indian Ocean. Both were readjustments of the legislation passed in the late 1990s as part of the alliance reaffirmation. The cabinet Secretariat task force used a similar strategy again to enact the Iraq Special Measures Law, which allowed the JSDF to deploy forces to Iraq in 2004.[791]

Several of the measures taken after 9/11 stemmed from the reaffirmation process began in the mid-1990s. These had largely been completed by the early 2000s, allowing Koizumi to use them as the responses to 9/11 were being planned. As these laws had only recently been enacted, there were no established procedures for their use, and Koizumi was able to seize the initiative from the entrenched bureaucracies for his newly reinforced Kantei.[792] Further, after 9/11, the Koizumi administration initiated a new cycle of defense revisions, and a new Defense Posture Review Board was already established in in September 2001. The final report of the review, titled "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures," was approved in December 2003.[793] This report concentrated on the "new threats" including WMD and missile proliferation as well as terrorist activities around the

788 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 79.

789 E.g., Ray Christensen "An analysis of the 2005 Japanese General Elections," *Asian Survey* 46, no.4 (2006): 497-516.

790 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics,* 83-84, 92-93.

791 Ibid., 100-103.

792 E.g., Tomohito Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*, (Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press, 2009).

793 Defense Posture Review Board, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures", December 2003. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html (Accessed August 7, 2021)

world. The report also implied substantial restructuring and streamlining of the JSDF as part of the overall posture review.

The Koizumi administration also announced that it would replace the 1995 NDPO and established a special council to review the options for future Japanese defense (the so-called "Araki Commission").[794] The commission issued its report in October 2004,[795] which endorsed an integrated security strategy to defend Japan and its interests abroad and called for active international cooperation to enhance Japanese security. The report sought the improvement of domestic intelligence capabilities and the concentration of Japan's security policymaking under a US-style National Security Council. Reinforcing centralized authority over security issues was emphasized throughout the report.[796] According to the report, the JSDF should maintain the bare minimum capability to counter traditional large-scale aggression and instead concentrate on the defense of offshore islands, countering special operations forces, and maintaining counterterrorism capabilities.[797] Overall, the idea behind the commission was that Prime Minister Koizumi wanted to overhaul Japan's old political structures, and this entailed the consolidation of security policies under a Security Council headed by the Prime Minister.[798]

The New National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) were approved in December 2004.[799] War on Terror-era thinking is evident in the document as terrorism is noted eight times, while China and North Korea are only mentioned twice in the 12-page document. This is a remarkable demonstration of how much the US-narrative dominated its allies security thinking at the time: Japan has never been targeted by Islamist terrorism and its one domestic terrorist attack was perpetrated by a domestic sect. Nor had there been any assessments that Japan would be targeted

794 The use of a civilian working group made up of prominent Japanese public figures from business, politics and academia had been established in the mid-1990s (the Higuchi commission) and would be a permanent feature of defense policy reviews in the future as well.

795 Foreign Press Center Japan, *Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Submits Report to Prime Minister Koizumi*, October 13, 2004.

796 Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, *The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report: Japan's Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities*, October 2004. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/dai13/13siryou.pdf (Accessed August 7, 2021)

797 Ibid., 22, 27-29.

798 Interview with Professor Yumi Hitawari, July 13, 2012. Professor Hitawari served as a member of the Araki Commission.

799 The 1995 defense document was called National Defense Program Outlines in English, whereas the 2004 document and later documents are referred to as National Defense Program Guidelines.

by Al Qaida.[800] Arguably, as Japan dispatched forces to take part in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and provided funds for the War on Terror, it made Japanese citizens more prone to attacks abroad.

The new NDPG also differed from previous defense papers in its international and regional outlook. Unlike previous documents, it specifically notes that "the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia" was now critical to Japan. Specific tasks set out by the Guidelines are in line with the Araki Commission report as Japan began to reduce its heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery. Instead of relying on these, the JSDF was to concentrate on developing its capabilities in the field of command and control as well as rapid reaction forces. These were to be complemented with better intelligence capabilities and technology. The final part of the reforms was to concentrate on improving interoperability with US forces as well as UN forces during peacekeeping operations.[801]

To "build a nation that is strong in emergencies" Koizumi consolidated the Kantei's authority over security issues with three new laws introduced in 2002.[802] These aimed at clarifying procedures for responding to crisis situations and to ensure that the government had the authority to respond. Among other issues, they established a Japanese Security Council, specified the process of formulating a response in contingencies, and defined the measures that the JSDF could take to protect Japanese citizens in crisis situations. Under the new legislation, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet would, in the case of a threatening situation, form a "Basic Response Plan" that would guide the JSDF and other relevant agencies addressing the situation. This plan would be submitted to the Diet, which could either approve or reject the initiative. [803]

After the government decision-making process had been legislated, seven further bills were drafted in 2004 to increase the government's powers. The bills included issues such as the authority to restrict marine transportation and the appropriate facilities in the event of an armed attack. Most significantly, the bills also included measures to facilitate US military activities in Japan. The Basic Response Plan could now also cover US military actions and a Cabinet Task Force, established under the Prime Minister during emergencies, could specifically coordinate directly with the

800 E.g., Rohan Gunaratna "Aum Shinrikyo's Rise, Fall and Revival," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 10, no. 8 (2018): 1-6.

801 Security Council and the Cabinet *National Defense Program Guidelines FY 2005*, December 2004. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html (Accessed August 7, 2021)

802 Junichiro Koizumi, "Speech to the 154th Ordinary Session of the Diet" (Speech, Tokyo, February 4, 2002). http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/speech0204.html (Accessed August 7, 2021)

803 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 100-101.

US military. Further, the Prime Minister would have the authority to appropriate buildings and land for the use of US forces. In June 2004, the Diet ratified a package of international treaties to conform to the emergency legislation. One of these included the further expansion of the Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreement with the US to include anti-terrorism measures and situations of imminent armed attack. Together with the three laws enacted in 2002, these new laws constituted the first full emergency legislation to respond to armed attacks against Japan since 1945.[804] These laws were to effectively enable Japan to finally respond to crises, and especially to North Korean crises, in a manner that was missing in the early 1990s.[805] Consecutive US administrations had been pushing for similar reforms for decades.[806]

At the same time, several previously secondary missions of the JSDF were raised to primary missions. Among them, operations relating to the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and operations in "Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan" were raised to the same level as the traditional defense of Japan itself.[807] Further amendments to JSDF law in 2005 enabled ballistic missile defense systems to engage incoming missiles without prior political process. [808] The command to prepare missile defense systems was to be given by the Director-General of the Defense Agency with the approval of the Prime Minister, and the permission to fire would be given by the Director-General. Notably, this order could be given beforehand.[809] Hence, for the first time since WWII, a JDSF commander now had a framework, backed by legislation, for actually engaging incoming threats. As if to finalize these reforms, the Japanese Defense Agency was elevated to a full Ministry of Defense in January 2007.[810]

While Koizumi had managed to implement some of the most radical reforms in several decades, these came at a price to the LDP. In August 2005, the Koizumi government, somewhat bruised by a controversial pension reform and the privatization of the Japanese postal system, called for snap elections, which he won by a landslide. Before the elections, Koizumi increased his ailing popularity numbers by conducting another purge of LDP dissidents and by pitting his own candidates against LDP establishment candidates, thus ensuring his own LDP faction's

804 E.g., Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, 74-75.
805 E.g., *Japan Times*, "Diet enacts laws to augment war-contingency measures," June 15, 2004.
806 Institute for National Strategic Studies, *The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership*, INSS Special Report, October 11, 2000.
807 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006*, Tokyo: Fujisho, 2006, 138-140.
808 Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 102
809 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006*, Tokyo: Fujisho, 2006, 160.
810 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 112-113.

influence after he himself stepped down from the post of Prime Minister.[811] However, fractured by internal dispute, the post-Koizumi LDP could not stabilize its leadership. The Koizumi government was followed by three successive LDP Prime Ministers until the LDP was defeated by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009. None of his successors until Shinzo Abe's second term could maintain their hold on the premiership for much longer than a year. The resulting instability even directly influenced the alliance operations as the Diet failed to ratify an extension of the JSDF mission to the Indian ocean and the operation had to be paused.[812]

Therefore, it can be said that until 2007, Japanese domestic politics were conductive to the development of the alliance. In addition to the successful reforms, the LDP Defense Policy Subcommittee had hoped to lift the arms export ban, self-imposed by the Japanese government of the 1970s, to facilitate joint technology development and the sales of Japanese military products. This was also advocated by several powerful ministries. The initiative as well as the GSDF acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles were, however, heavily opposed by the New Komeito party and were postponed for almost a decade.[813] Despite some small setbacks, it is abundantly clear that the Koizumi administration held a position of strength not seen since the Cold War. It was also clearly orientated towards the US alliance and security reforms. Correspondently, the role of Koizumi and his personal agendas, as well as his close relationship with the Bush presidency, often feature prominently in explaining what happened to the US-Japan alliance after 9/11. However, as will be demonstrated, while these explanations offer valuable insights, they can only explain some aspects of the developments.

Australia between emerging China and the US

For Australia, this same period was characterized by increasing security challenges and an abundance of global and regional military operations. The nearby islands were in a constant state of turmoil, threatening to create an area of instability and lawlessness close to Australia. This, together bombings in Bali and Jakarta, demonstrated that it was not immune to the kinds of attacks that had struck the US. However, it remains debatable whether these attacks were prompted by Australian involvement in the War on Terror in the first place. Australia's relations with China were increasingly friendly during the period. Notably, while the US and Japan

811 Christensen, *An analysis of the 2005 Japanese General Elections*, 514-516.
812 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 123-124.
813 Hughes, *Japanese Military Modernization*, 122-123.

reacted to Chinese assertiveness with a joint statement, Australia distanced itself from the US.[814]

Although the US and Australia disagreed over China, the War on Terror brought them closer together. Prime Minister John Howard was in Washington during the 9/11 attacks and was one of the first foreign leaders to personally express his support for the US afterwards. Like with Japan, 9/11 had a clear impact on how Australia's security policies developed during the period, but, again as with Japan, these developments went beyond participation in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia's strategic position between China and the US was increasingly challenging. For its part, the War on Terror provided the Howard administration opportunities to strengthen the US alliance, increase its ties to Japan, while still bringing Australia closer to China.[815] This has been noted as one great successes of the Howard administration, which maintained its stable, if sometimes controversial, hold of Australian politics until late 2007.[816] The price for this balancing act was the deployment of Australian forces to two wars, one of which was deeply unpopular. But even while the war in Iraq was controversial, the decision to send Australian troops passed easily through the parliament and the domestic political costs were borne by the Howard government relatively easily compared to some other countries that sent troops there.

After six years in office, the Howard administration was reinforced by success in the 2001 Australian federal elections. Held just two months after 9/11, security issues were unusually prominent during the 2001 election campaign, with both parties enthusiastically supporting Australian participation in the War on Terror. However, both parties were similarly criticized for not providing any choices in foreign policy, aside from some rather narrow rhetorical differences.[817] Following the election, the Howard government released a new foreign policy White Paper titled *Advancing the National Interest*, which notably emphasized building "…strategic economic partnership with China similar to those Australia has established with Japan and Korea."[818] The question of how this would affect

814 See above page 161.

815 E.g., James Cotton and John Ravenhill, "Trading on Alliance Security: Foreign Policy in the Post-11 September Era," in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001 – 2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5.

816 E.g., William Tow, *Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2008.

817 Daniel Flitton¸ "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2002," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, no.1 (2003).

818 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 2003*, Commonwealth of Australia 2003, 79.

Australia's security posture was largely bypassed as no new defense White Papers were produced. Instead, two short updates were issued, but these did not markedly differ from the Defence of Australia+ approach presented in the 2000 White Paper. While there was little immediate change in the policy papers, the 9/11 attacks reinvigorated debates about Australian defense posture.[819]

The different sides of the debates were recognizable from similar debates in the 1980s and 1970s. On the one side, authors such as Allan Dupont argued that Australia had no reason to prioritize its immediate region in the globalized world.[820] According to Michael Evans, Australia should embrace the legacy of the "Australian way of war," embodied in the doctrines of Imperial Defence and Forward Defence, and assume a global agenda to counter emerging threats.[821] On the other end, writers like Paul Dibb, author of the original Dibb-report, argued that the 9/11 attacks had not changed any of the fundamentals of Australia's security posture and that the basics were still geographically determined. For the most part, those associated with this line of reasoning argued for the continued prioritization of the defense of Australia and engagement in the nearby region.[822]

These debates reached all the way to the ministerial level as a new defense strategy was discussed. Robert Hill, then Minister for Defence, supported the notion that international contributions to coalition operations should increasingly replace the old-fashioned logic of the Defence of Australia doctrine. Howard, on the other hand, did not want to make radical departures from the doctrinal outlines made in the 2000 White Paper and due to the prevailing ambiguity in Australia's security political debates, no new White Papers were issued. [823] Instead, two smaller Defence Updates were issued in 2003 and 2005. [824] While these repeatedly refer to global terrorism and the increased significance of global security, most space is still

819 E.g., Christian Hirst "Reformers and Defenders: Perceptions of Change in Australian Defence Strategy since 11 September 2001," *Australian Army Journal* 3, no.1 (2004).

820 Allan Dupont, "Transformation or Stagnation: Rethinking Australian Defence," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, no. 1 (2003).

821 Michael Evans," Security and Defense aspects of the Special Relationship: Australian Perspective," in *The Other Special Relationship: The United States and Australia at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland, Douglas T. Stuart, William T. Tow and Michael Wesley (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 281- 282

822 Paul Dibb, "Is strategic geography relevant to Australia's current defence policy?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no.2 (2006).

823 Interview with Peter Jennings, February 28, 2014.

824 E.g., Evans, *Security and Defense Aspects of the Special Relationship*.

afforded to instability in Southeast Asia and the defense of Australia's immediate region.[825]

The concrete defense acquisitions presented in the update documents also had little relevance to terrorism. The acquisition of 60 M-1 Abrams main battle tanks seems to be especially at odds with the stated purpose of versatility in complex operational environments, especially at a time when most western armies were moving away from such capabilities. Further, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was to acquire two over 20,000-ton *Canberra*-class amphibious assault ships in order to carry these forces. Additional modern navy and air force capabilities, such as advanced SM2 missiles and new AWACS aircraft follow the same logic.[826] The purpose of these capabilities was not fully explained in the updates, but some commentators noted these could only be of use in US-led combat operations against a major state-adversary in the Asia-Pacific.[827]

It could be said that these force structure issues were at the core of the debate, but as the basic questions remained unsolved, the result was an acquisition program that seemed to follow a strange logic.[828] This was especially visible in the Australian Army, which was heavily engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army's most expensive acquisition were the M1 main battle tanks, which were ill-suited for counterinsurgency operations and whose acquisition had been specifically ruled out in 2000 White Paper.[829] These tanks were nevertheless acquired, arguably for the purpose of participating in large scale coalition warfare.[830] The tanks have since been mothballed and were never actually deployed anywhere, but they still played an important role in influencing the acquisitions of the aerial and maritime transports that were needed to accommodate them, including huge C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters.[831]

825 Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003*, Commonwealth of Australia 2003; Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005*, Commonwealth of Australia 2005.

826 Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005*, Commonwealth of Australia 2005.

827 Hugh White "Australian Strategic Policy" in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis (eds.), *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005). pp. 313-314.

828 Hugh White, "Australian Strategic Policy" in *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 313-314.

829 Interview with Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, February 17, 2014.

830 Peter Leahy, "The Medium-Weight Force – Lessons Learned and Future Contributions to Coalition Operations," *Australian Army Journal* 3, no. 2 (2006).

831 Interview with Professor Demond Ball, February 26, 2014.

During its last year in office, 2007, the Howard Government released its final defense update.[832] This update continued the same line taken in the previous two updates in the sense that regardless of its discussion of globalization, global terrorism, and the proliferation of WMDs, Australia's security focus is still on its immediate region and the Australian armed forces are tasked to maintain the ability to defend Australia independently.[833] Hence, at the end of the Howard administration, the frameworks set out in the 1987 Dibb report and the following White Papers still remained at the core of Australian security policies. However, by this time, many commentators from both ends of the Australian security debate noted the apparent discrepancies between the articulated policies and the ad hoc restructuring of the Australian Defence Forces.[834] The Army's capabilities were in particular seen as having developed into something not envisaged in any of the strategy documents.[835] Arguably, while the Howard government had, early on in its administration, tried to enhance Australian defense focus beyond the Defence of Australia -doctrine, the crises and following deployments to INTERFET and other operations caused a shift in defense priorities. [836]

Despite inconsistencies in strategy documents and defense posture, and possibly because of the ambiguities in Howard's strategic line, Australia managed to benefit from friendly relations with both China and the US. Australian domestic interest in good relations clearly contributed to the conciliatory stance taken towards China, but the Howard administration nonetheless managed to come out strongly in defense of the ANZUS alliance. Further, Howard's policies were legitimized with consecutive electoral victories. It has also been often noted that Howard enjoyed markedly friendly relations with the Bush administration. Several authors such as Greg

832 Australian Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2007*, Commonwealth of Australia 2007.

833 Ibid., 26.

834 Examples of arguments can be found in several publications by prominent Australian security scholars and practitioners. See for example Paul Dibb, "Is strategic geography relevant to Australia's current defence policy?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no.2 (2006): 247-264; Michael Evans, "Towards an Australian National Security Strategy: A Conceptual analysis," *Security Challenges* 3, no.4 (2007).

835 As previously mentioned, the effects that the increased operational tempo, especially the perception of actually fighting a war in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed the army to push for additional equipment. Some experts have argued that almost a decade of operations in the Afghan mountains has somewhat distorted the force structure and techniques the Australian Army is using and training (interviews with Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, February 17, 2014, and Professor Desmond Ball, February 26, 2014).

836 For more on the expansion of Australian security, role of army and 'Forward Defence' see Hugh White, "Australian Defence and the Possibility of War," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 56, no.2 (2002).

Sheridan have emphasized the role of these personal relations in the achievements reached in bilateral relations at the time, including the signing of the Australia-US free trade agreement in 2004.[837] Therefore, the Howard administration was then in a particularly advantageous position to develop US-Australia relations. Despite apparent inconsistencies in defense policy, the US alliance was always emphasized, even if it was downplayed when talking about China.

5.2 War on terror and other international operations

In many ways, the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001, defined the first decade of the new millennium. While the immediate effects were limited, the ensuring consequences were felt worldwide. The resulting wars, as well as the culture of perpetual warfare, would continue beyond the first decade of the 2000s. The immediate impact on the international system resulted largely from the US administration's single-minded and assertive pursuit of the perpetrators. Traditional friends and foes alike were seen as being either for or against the US in the resulting War on Terror. For US allies and partners, participation in the War on Terror offered a change to improve and deepen their cooperation with the US. However, allies who failed to support US actions quickly found themselves facing outright hostility from the US administration.[838]

The two wars, both of which seemed successful after their first phases – Iraq was overrun in a matter of days and the Taliban regime fell two months after 9/11 – later became quagmires of insurrections and sectarian violence, which neither the US nor the international community have not been able suppress ever since. At first, the US leadership sought to avoid the complexities of alliance operations, but when the invasions turned into open-ended occupations, the danger of overstretching US forces was obvious and allied contributions were thus called upon. At the height of these conflicts, approximately 100,000 US troops were deployed in Afghanistan and 200,000 in Iraq after the initial invasions. The number of allied troops, local Afghan and Iraqi forces, and military contractors could have easily been twice as high. While the brunt of the combat operations, as well as most casualties, were borne by locals and US forces, the majority of contributing allies also suffered some casualties.[839] Consequently, little attention was given to PKOs outside the War on Terror framework.

837 Sheridan, *The Partnership*.

838 E.g. *BBC News*, "US Congress opts for freedom fries," March 12, 2003.

839 Heidi M. Peters, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington D.C., May 10, 2019.

The beginning of War on Terror

When the airplanes hit New York and Washington, world leaders were quick to offer their support. The UN Security council condemned the attacks the following day and the NATO collective defense clause was invoked for the first time in its history. However, the US was determined not to be bound by international organizations or traditional alliances in its pursuit of terrorists or its actions against the states seen to be supporting them. Instead, the US chose to assemble an informal "Coalition of the Willing," which was open to almost any state willing to support the War on Terror. As discussed before, this meant that the US administration would accept support from traditional allies as well as states like China and Russia but would not accept constrains on its freedom of action from anyone.[840]

Soon after the attacks, US intelligence traced the origin of the attackers to Al-Qaida operatives working from Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Taliban government refused to hand over the leader of Al-Qaida or its members, thus prompting a US special forces-led operation that ousted the Taliban with the support of competing Afghan warlords. However, the leaders of neither Al-Qaida nor the Taliban leaders were killed or captured, and the resulting war turned out to be the longest war in US history. The war itself was initially waged mostly by Afghan forces supported by US special forces and airpower, but as the fighting dragged on and changed from simple regime change to a protracted counter-insurgency campaign, allies were called upon. By the end of 2001, the UN Security Council mandated the creation of an International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan under US and NATO leadership to re-establish order in the country. The US-led operations, including ISAF, would eventually consist of almost 150,000 troops from more than 25 nations.[841]

The war in Iraq

The US invasion of Iraq, reportedly already planned immediately after 9/11, was heavily debated in the US at the end of the 2002 and the beginning of 2003.[842] The US Congress authorized the invasion in October 2002, but despite dramatic testimony by Secretary of State Colin Powell, the US failed to gain a UN resolution to support the invasion. The UK, Poland, Italy, Australia, Denmark, Japan, and Spain

840 For an overall account of the early years of the War on Terror, see for example James F. Hoge Jr. and Gideon Rose eds., *Understanding the War on Terror* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 2005).

841 Peters, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018*.

842 For an account on policymaking after 9/11 see Feith, *War and Decision.*

co-sponsored the resolution, but other European nations and Russia were opposed. The immediate reasons for the invasion are not entirely clear to this day. The link between Iraq and Al Qaida was weak at best and although Iraq under Saddam Hussein likely supported some international terrorist organizations, it is quite clear that many other Middle Eastern states did so as well, including several regional US allies. Consequently, numerous US allies in Europe refused to support the war. Even Turkey, a NATO-ally sharing a border with Iraq, banned the use of military bases in Turkey for the invasion. The only US allies that took part on the actual invasion were the UK, Australia, and Poland with the Netherlands, Canada, and Italy providing rear-area support.[843]

The invasion, initiated in March 2003, was rapid. Iraqi troops were routed by superior US forces preceded by a "shock and awe" campaign of massive bombardment. However, as with Afghanistan, the quick victory was followed by widespread instability. The sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims exacerbated the situation dramatically and the US forces were ill-prepared to deal with the ensuing chaos. Further, as Iraqi WMDs, cited as one of the most important justifications for the war, were never found, criticism against the war and the Bush administration mounted. Nevertheless, the US needed allies to support the reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations. The Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) eventually included troops from almost 40 nations, including traditional allies like Australia and Japan as well as non-traditional ones such as Mongolia and Ukraine. Several of these allied nations suffered casualties during the war and some, such as Spain and the UK, suffered terrorist attacks at home as an apparent consequence. The 2004 Madrid train bombing, which killed almost 200 people, was an important factor in Spain's decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq almost immediately afterwards. As with the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq has dragged on with varying intensity to this day. As noted, the Bush administration in particular was heavily focused on these wars and none of the following US administrations so far have been able to escape their repercussions. However, in 2007-2008, after a surge of US troops to Iraq, the situation seemed to calm down and several US allies used this respite to withdraw forces from the country.

843 For a narrational account of the war, see for example Nir Rose, *Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World: The Death of Iraq and the Birth of the New Middle East* (New York: Nation Books, 2009).

Japanese contributions to War on Terror

The Japanese response to the 9/11 attacks

The Japanese response to the 9/11 attacks was nothing like its indecisive response to the first Gulf War. The Koizumi government announced Japan's support for the US on September 19th, established emergency anti-terrorism headquarters in early October, and pushed through a special Anti-Terrorism Law and an amendment to the JSDF Law by the end of that same month. Following the passage of the bills, the Koizumi cabinet made the formal decision to support US efforts in Afghanistan in November. Japanese support would consist mainly of a maritime resupply mission to support US operations in Afghanistan and additional support for US forces in Japan to release them to other missions. Immediately after the first response plan was formed, a special coordination committee was established to coordinate Japanese support. This committee functioned until late 2001, and its meetings produced the input for the Cabinet Secretariat that formed the Basic Response Plan. The Basic Plan was submitted to the Diet in mid-November and the associated implementation plan was submitted on November 20th, both were approved by the end of the same month.[844] The Basic Plan was revised 9 times by 2006 as JSDF support of the War on Terror gradually broadened to include new areas of cooperation.[845] Notably, the Koizumi administration took an active role in amassing a large international financial aid package for Afghanistan.[846]

The first MSDF vessels, including two destroyers and one supply ship, set sail towards the Indian Ocean on November 9th and began supplying US vessels on December 2nd. The second flotilla, consisting of a destroyer and two supply ships, followed on November 25th. Of the six vessels, two of the destroyers and two supply ships were to support US operations in Afghanistan. Another supply ship and one destroyer were restricted to humanitarian assistance. While the MSDF operation was initially limited to providing fuel and supplies to US ships, the practical need of the complex operations forced Japan to constantly broaden its abilities to provide services. In 2004, Japanese resupplying support was extended to ship-based helicopters and deliveries of fresh water. As other nations were actively participating in the same coalition, it was not politically viable to deny support to these nations as

844 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2003*, Tokyo: Inter Group, 2003, 145-147

845 Michael Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japan Alliance*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

846 Bush, *Decision Points*, 207.

well, and by 2006, Japan was refueling ships and helicopters from 11 different countries.[847]

The Special Measures Law concerning MSDF vessels was set to expire in November 2007. However, because of the upheaval in the cabinet after the resignation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the law could not be extended in time and hence, the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean was suspended. The incoming Fukuda administration immediately reintroduced legislation to return the ships to work, but this proposal was opposed by DPJ president Ichiro Ozawa, a former LDP hawk who wanted to send Japanese troops to participate in operations inside Afghanistan. While Ozawa's suggestion was opposed by even his own party, the negotiations took time, and the Diet session was even extended to allow the proper procedures to take place. The law was eventually passed by a two-thirds majority in the lower house, which allowed the restart of refueling operations without upper house approval. The operation was resumed in February 2008 after Japanese vessels had been absent from the mission for almost three months. Despite similar difficulties, the following administration of Prime Minister Taro Aso continued the refueling mission in 2009. The replenishment mission ended in January 2010 when the legislation was allowed to lapse by the newly elected DPJ government.[848]

Besides maritime resupply, the Special Measures Law included a series of measures to support US forces. In Japan, GSDF forces were deployed to secure US facilities, thus releasing US forces from regular security duties. Armed security duties by the JSDF required an amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law, which was passed at the same time as the Special Measures Law. These kinds of base security operations were soon confirmed as one of basic operative missions for Japanese forces and by 2004, the GSDF had conducted 6 major exercises on implementing these tasks in different situations.[849] Japanese military cargo aircraft were also used to transport US forces in Japan and Guam. This, like most of the other support measures, followed the planning established in the Defense Cooperation Guidelines of 1997.[850]

847 For an account of the Japan Maritime Defense Forces mission in Indian Ocean, see, for example, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, "Don't Expect Much from Japan in the Indian Ocean," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 13, no.2 (2011): 1-3.

848 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 115-116.

849 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2004*, Tokyo: Inter Group, 2004, 183-184.

850 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Measures in Response to the Terrorist Attacks in the United States, November 2001.http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/policy/measure.html (Accessed August 7, 2021)

JSDF deployment to Iraq

The Bush administration already sought Koizumi's support for the invasion in 2002, but JSDF participation in the actual fighting would have been beyond the authority of the Japanese Prime Minister to provide.[851] However, the Koizumi administration faced few difficulties in providing troops for later reconstruction efforts. A special Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities in Iraq and the associated Basic Plan were approved by the Diet for a period of four years in December 2003, and the first Japanese troops were sent to Iraq almost immediately. The main force arrived in January 2004 and consisted of around 600 troops who were to engage in reconstruction efforts in the relatively peaceful Al-Muthanna province. The security in the province and for the Japanese contingent was provided first by Dutch troops and later by British and Australian forces. The Japanese ASDF participated in separate airlift duties with three C-130 transport aircraft and around 200 personnel in Baghdad and Erbil. The GSDF mission ended in June 2006 and the final GSDF elements were withdrawn by July that year. The ASDF, however, continued to fly in Iraq and this mission was extended in 2007. The remaining Japanese forces left Iraq in December 2008.[852]

Even though Japanese military contributions were in rear area support and humanitarian reconstruction, the dispatch of JSDF forces to these operations was quite revolutionary. The financial support provided for the US operations and associated humanitarian efforts represented the traditional Japanese approach, but this time it was the presence of JSDF elements that made the Japanese contribution successful. However, even though these deployments were unprecedented, their real utility was questioned in both Japan and the US as JSDF forces engaged mostly in reconstruction projects such as school-building and their security had to be covered by other allied forces, some of whom also questioned the value of military forces who acted like non-combatants.[853] Japan also suffered some diplomatic costs in its relations among regional Arab states, most of which opposed the invasion of Iraq.[854] Therefore, it is safe to argue that the actual utility of this deployment was to strengthen the US-Japan alliance as well as create a precedent for JSDF deployment in non-UN missions. This deployment was also a victory for the Koizumi administration who finally succeeded in sending ground forces to the Middle East where several LDP administrations since the mid-1980s had failed to do so.

851 Bush, *Decision Points*, 233.
852 E.g., Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japan Alliance*.
853 Interview with Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, February 17, 2014.
854 E.g., Calder, *Pacific Alliance,* 139-140.

Other international operations

After the initial burst of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, interest in new UN peacekeeping missions was modest. The Japanese Diet had approved the new the PKO Law in December 2001, which included the possibility for JSDF members to use weapons for the defense of those under JSDF command and allowed the JSDF to better participate in core UN peacekeeping missions e.g., monitoring ceasefires. However, the only major JSDF PKO at the time was the UN operation in Syria where Japan had maintained troops in the Golan Heights since 1996. After the enactment of the new legislation, the JASF dispatched 680 engineering troops to East Timor to take part in the operation itself. The Japanese East Timor operation was maintained until June 2004, afterwards Japanese participation in PKOs in Southeast Asia dwindled away.[855] So, while the legal framework for PKOs expanded and there were no parliamentary obstacles for new operations, few new operations in the UN PKO framework were initiated at that time.

Unlike PKO's, Japanese contributions to disaster relief operations increased in the early 2000s. Between 2001-2006, the JSDF supported relief operations related to the 2001 Indian earthquake, the Iranian and Sumatran earthquakes in 2003-2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004-2005, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and the central Java earthquake in early 2006. Notably, the Japanese response to the humanitarian catastrophe following the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004 was the largest JSDF deployment to date. It involved redirecting MSDF vessels returning from the Indian Ocean as well as the dispatch of an *Osumi* class helicopter carrier to the area. Overall, 1,500 JSDF personnel were deployed.[856] The MSDF also dispatched ships to participate in the rescue efforts of a Russian submarine off the coast of Kamchatka in August 2005. As already noted, after the late 1990s, disaster relief had become the most common framework for the SDF's international dispatches.[857]

In sum, it can be observed that the while the legal framework allowing the JSDF to deploy to international operations of different kinds was maturing, the focus moved away from traditional PKOs to operations associated with the US alliance. The case can be made that this was a natural continuation of the process initiated in the 1980s as the PKO bill had originally been legislated in response to the US demands for contributions to the first Gulf War.

855 E.g., Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 394-395.
856 E.g., Hughes, *Japanese Military Modernization*, 113-114.
857 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006*, Tokyo: Inter Group, 2006, 303-305.

Australia and the War on Terror

Australian response to 9/11 and participation in the war in Afghanistan

On September 14, John Howard announced that Australia would consider the 9/11 attacks to fall under Article IV of the ANZUS treaty and hence invoked its common defense clause for the first time. Article IV had not been needed for any previous deployments of Australian forces to US wars and hence should not have been needed this time either. The decision to invoke Article IV was likely an outcome of many factors. NATO had already invoked Article V of the NATO treaty earlier that day, thus implying that the attack constituted an act of war against a member state. Further, as previously noted, Howard was in Washington at the time for the commemoration ceremony of the 50th year of ANZUS and, therefore, was well placed to take the initiative.[858] However, the idea of invoking the ANSUZ treaty came at least partially from the White House when it was clear that military action would be taken.[859] Invoking the treaty also served to set a precedent that, like NATO, the ANZUS alliance involved military assistance upon the attack on a member state. While this might seem self-evident, the subject has often been debated in Australia. By invoking ANZUS in concert with NATO, Howard created an association of common defense to ANZUS as well.[860]

After consulting with the US Department of Defense, Australia initially deployed around 150 Australian SAS soldiers to the US Special Operations Task Force in Afghanistan in late October.[861] By the end of 2001, four RAAF F/A-18 hornets along with ground personnel were conducting combat support operations in Afghanistan from the island of Diego Garcia, and by April 2002, a pair of RAAF tanker aircraft were operating out of the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, Australian liaison officers were deployed to CENTOM HQ in Tampa, Florida. Australian SAS operators took part in fighting all over Afghanistan and suffered casualties early on. After three rotations, the main elements of the Australian contribution were withdrawn by the end of 2002, and from 2003 until 2005, the Australian contingent

858 Sheridan, *The Partnership*, 35-38; John Howard himself deals with the events for almost ten pages in his memoirs. Howard, *Lazarus Rising*, 241-252.

859 E.g., Karen Middleton, *Unwinnable War: Australia in Afghanistan* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2011), 32-33.

860 Interview with Hugh White, February 19, 2014; Interview with Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, February 14, 2014.

861 Middleton, *Unwinnable War: Australia in Afghanistan*.

in Afghanistan consisted of just two officers serving under the UN mine clearance mission.[862]

In 2005, as fighting in Afghanistan intensified again, the US government requested more troops. In early 2006, Australia sent another 150-strong contingent from the Australian SAS, which was later reinforced by a detachment of Chinook helicopters. In September 2006, a 400-strong reconstruction task force was deployed to central Afghanistan. By 2008, the Australian military presence in Afghanistan also included instructors and a diverse variety of logistics, air control, and command elements. Altogether, these included more than 1,000 soldiers, making Australia the largest troop contributing country outside NATO.[863] Notably, Australia also reintroduced forces to Iraq in 2005, but while Australians saw little action in Iraq, Australian forces in Afghanistan were increasingly targeted as the security situation deteriorated.[864]

Australia and the war in Iraq

Before the war, the Howard government was one of the relatively few governments that openly supported the US-led invasion of Iraq.[865] The Australian populace was more critical of the war and, according to polls, most Australians would only support an invasion if it had a UN mandate. The fact that Iraq annually imported Australian wheat at a sum of 600-800 million AUD added a powerful agricultural lobby to the anti-war voices. The opposition Labor Party had specifically announced that it would support the war only if there was clear evidence of Iraqi support for terrorists or WMD development. Still, most of the Labor Party went along with the decision to participate in the war.[866] Hence, partisan politics had a limited impact on the decision to deploy forces as long as the general citizenry thought the war justified.[867]

To secure domestic backing, Howard pressed the Bush administration to seek a UN Security Council resolution,[868] even as the Australian government maintained

862 Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, *Australia's military involvement in Afghanistan since 2001: a chronology*, Background Note, 16 July 2010. www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bn/fads/militaryinvolvement_afghanistan.pdf (Accessed August 7, 2021)

863 Ibid.

864 Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, 256-258.

865 This was increasingly clear after President Bush delivered his famous "axis of evil" speech in January 2002 with specific emphasis on Iraq. George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address" (Speech, Washington, January 29, 2002).

866 Flitton¸ *Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2002*, 47 – 48.

867 June Verrier, "Parliament and Foreign Policy," in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006 pp.173-191), 320-321.

868 Siracausa, *John Howard, Australia and the Coalition of the Willing*, 39-49.

that such a resolution was not a prerequisite for the invasion.[869] President Bush later noted that Howard had influenced the decision to present the case to the Security Council before the invasion.[870] However, as Howard later confirmed, the primary concern for the Australian government was the maintenance of its relations with the US and the ANZUS alliance. This meant that Australia would support US actions with or without a UN mandate.[871] As was typical for Australia, the Howard government's decision to deploy forces was done without prior consultation from the parliament. However, considering the debates at the time, it is reasonable to assume that parliament would have voted in favor anyway.[872] Indeed, it is likely that the decision to participate in the war, with or without a UN mandate, had been made several months prior. Australian Armed Forces personnel stationed at US CENTOM had been involved in the planning of the invasion since at least summer 2002 and were also privy to the US intelligence products used for future operations. Reportedly, Australian participation was included in the operational planning since at least September 2002 and the Howard administration was well aware of this.[873]

On the day of the invasion, March 18, 2003, Howard announced Australian support for the war.[874] Australian forces had been deployed to the area during January and February, and two Australian frigates were already in the area as part of the Multinational Interception Force meant to enforce UN sanctions on Iraq.[875] In addition, an amphibious landing platform ship with a contingent of landing craft, helicopters, a bomb disposal team, clearance diver team, and air defense elements, was deployed to the Gulf. Australian army units included a special forces group consisting of SAS operators, commando elements from the Royal Australian Regiment, one nuclear/chemical response team, and three CH47 helicopters. From the Royal Australian Air force, two P3 Orion surveillance aircraft, 14 F/A-18 fighters, and three C-130 cargo aircraft along with their support elements were deployed. Altogether, the Australian forces in the Gulf area amounted to around

869 E.g., *Sydney Morning Herald*, "Bush will call in Australian Troops," September 9, 2002.
870 Bush, *Decision Points*, 237-238.
871 John Howard, "Iraq 2003: A retrospective" (Speech, Sydney, April 2013).
872 Verrier, *Parliament and Foreign Policy*, 322.
873 James Cotton, "After the Flood: Foreign Policy and the Management of Intelligence", in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 338.
874 John Howard, "address to the National Press Club" (Speech, Canberra, March 2003).
875 Australian Department of Defense, *The War in Iraq: ADF operations in the Middle East in 2003*, Canberra, 2003. https://www.defence.gov.au/publications/lessons.pdf (Accessed August 12, 2021)

2,000 personnel.[876] Australian forces participated in the invasion but suffered no casualties even though SAS troops reportedly saw heavy fighting during the initial days of the war.[877]

Although Australia's participation in the war faced little resistance, questions were raised when no WMDs were found. The existence of Iraq's WMD program had been the main justification for the invasion and the US had presented evidence in the UN Security Council. Similar arguments had been made to domestic audiences in Australia with the assumption that the existence of the WMDs had been verified by Australian intelligence agencies. However, when no WMD's were found, the question became: had the intelligence services provided false information or had the government manipulated the intelligence for its own purposes?[878] Special committees were established to investigate the issue and found severe faults in the verification of the intelligence provided by the US.[879] The so-called Flood report found that the Office of National Assessments (ONA) had changed its estimate to correspond with US estimates even though the Australian intelligence services were consistently more reserved in their estimates.[880] The issue was intensely debated in the parliament and media, and the Howard government was accused of compromising the Australian intelligence services for political reasons.[881]

Despite the controversy, the Howard government faced few serious challenges. Nor was the US alliance seriously questioned, as it had been during the Vietnam War. The War on Terror divided the Australians in some respects, but polls taken in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings demonstrate that Australian public support for the War on Terror increased after large scale terror attacks such as these but was

876 Parliament of Australia, "Brigadier Mike Hannan provides an overview and update on the Australian defence force's contribution to global operations," Canberra, Press Conference Transcript, February 21, 2003.

877 Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, 223-224.

878 For some of the issues relating to the so called "intelligence failure" see, for example, Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no.2 (2006).

879 E.g., Cotton, *After the Flood*, 333-334.

880 Commonwealth of Australia, *Report of the Inquiry into Australian intelligence agencies*, July 2004, 28-29. https://www.fas.org/irp/world/australia/flood.pdf (Accessed August 7, 2021)

881 The specific set of accusations came from a former ADF intelligence officer who worked on the INTERFET-operation. Lieutenant Colonel Collins claimed that the biased attitudes of some personnel in the managing the intelligence during the INTERFET had led to serious intelligence failures similar to the Iraq WMD issue. Collins also cited examples relating to the Bali bombings and Sandline affair, For the arguments by Lance Collins see Lance Collins and Warren Reed, *Plunging Point: Intelligence Failures, Cover-ups and Consequences* (Sydney: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006).

prone to wane soon after. In 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, polls showed that Australian participation in the War was supported by almost 60% of the populace, but as the war dragged on, support subsequently diminished. By the beginning of 2006, polls showed only 35 % supported the war, while 59% opposed it.[882] Nonetheless, during the 2004 elections, the majority of Australians rallied behind their troops and supported Howard in maintaining Australian forces in Iraq "until the job is done." This was partially achieved by framing the war in Iraq in terms of the ANZUS alliance, which typically enjoys support among Australians. [883]

The controversy seemed to have little influence on Australia's participation in the wars. Australian forces began to withdraw from Iraq soon after the fall of Baghdad and most had left by the end of May 2003. Only smaller elements, including one frigate, transport aircraft, and P3 Orion surveillance planes, remained in the area.[884] A detachment of around 100 soldiers from the regular Australian Army remained in Baghdad as a security element for the Australian embassy.[885] Thus, Australia effectively participated in the successful invasion phase and withdrew before occupation operations began. When the situation took a turn for the worst in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Australia redeployed forces to both countries in 2005. Starting from February 2005, Australian forces took over security tasks related to the Japanese deployment in the Al Muthanna province in Iraq, sending a detachment of 450 soldiers. Through 2005 and 2006, the total number of Australians involved in the Iraqi theatre was around 1,300, half of whom were based outside Iraq in support roles. In 2006, as the Japanese were withdrawn, Australians were redeployed to the neighboring province and from then on served alongside the British forces in the area. The number of Australian troops was increased to approximately 550 in September 2006 to correspond with the more battle-oriented missions they now faced. However, these forces were pulled out by the Rudd administration in 2008. [886]

One of the factors that allowed Australian forces to be simultaneously redeployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq was the 2004 downscaling of operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. However, the situation in Australia's immediate neighborhood worsened again in 2006. The fact that the original troops

882 Matt McDonald, "Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2004," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59, no.2 (2005):161-163.

883 Murray Goot, "Neither Entirely Comfortable nor Wholly Relaxed: Public Opinion, Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy", in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 260,272, 275-277.

884 Australian Department of Defence, *The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003*, Commonwealth of Australia 2004.

885 Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, 232-233.

886 Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, 238-240.

had been withdrawn to such an extent from Iraq, only to be redeployed just a few years later might be taken as a sign of lack of strategic planning for international operations. This is supported by the fact that the equipment acquisitions for these deployments were made hastily outside the normal planning frameworks and had not originally included equipment necessary for prolonged counterinsurgency warfare.[887]

Other international operations

The Pacific Islands were a hotbed of activity during most of the decade. The security situation in East Timor remained precarious, while other states were also on the brink of collapse. In 2003, Australia led an international response force to restore stability to the Solomon Islands. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) became the largest military operation in the Pacific Islands since the Second World War and was the largest Australian peacekeeping operations at the time. By the mid-2000s, it seemed that the operations had been largely successful. However, old crises reignited, and new ones soon broke out, causing significant strains on Australian military resources.[888]

In Fiji, frictions between leaders escalated in a military coup in 2006. Australia and New Zealand declined a request for support from the civilian leadership and instead issued sanctions against the Fijian military. The Fijian military leadership responded by threatening to go to China for assistance. At the same time, riots broke out in Tonga, resulting in the widespread destruction of infrastructure in the capital city and prompting Australia and New Zealand to send a 150-strong force to restore order.[889] To make matters even worse, fighting and unrest broke again out in both East Timor and the Solomon Islands. In East Timor, local security forces clashed over issues of preferential treatment and the situation escalated into general rioting, prompting local officials to request assistance. Australia led another multinational force to the country in May 2006 to restore order. The force was mainly comprised of 1,300 ADF personnel.[890] In the Solomon Islands, the situation turned worse after the April 2006 elections and riots ensued after accusations of electoral fraud. Chinese business owners were accused of buying votes and several Chinese businesses were attacked, forcing most of the Chinese community to flee. RAMSI had to be reinforced with 220 Australian Army personnel to help calm the situation.[891]

887 Interview with Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, February 19, 2014.
888 Frank Frost, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2006," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.3 (2007): 411.
889 Ibid., 412 -413.
890 Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, 198-200.
891 Ibid., 201.

ADF personnel were also deployed in limited numbers to Sierra Leone from 2000 to 2003, Ethiopia in 2001-2005, and to Sudan from 2006. These deployments, however, numbered only a few individual soldiers. Additionally, the ADF sent humanitarian support and rescue aid in the form of personnel and equipment to Indonesia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, as well as to Iran and Pakistan after major earthquakes there in 2003 and 2006, respectively. Notably, ADF medical personnel and transport equipment elements were also deployed to Bali in 2002 and 2004 in the wake of the bombings.[892] Not counting deployments to the War on Terror, Australian forces' international operations were increasingly concentrated in its near abroad. Clearly the consecutive deployments to regional flareups proved a strain on ADF resources, but despite this, there seems to have been little talk about withdrawing from Iraq or Afghanistan before 2007-2008, despite both of these operations being a serious drain on the manpower of the Australian Army, the main instrument needed for regional missions. [893] It could therefore be argued that contributions to US-led operations compromised Australia's own security as its ability to respond to crises in its own region suffered. Still, after the withdrawal of Australian contingents from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003, Australian contributions were criticized both in Australia and the US. However, Howard noted in his memoirs that Bush did not directly ask for Australian troops in Iraq because "this would go against the original understanding" that Australian forces would only be involved in the invasion phase. But the request eventually came from "other coalition partners" to support the Japanese contingent in Iraq.[894] Only later was there a "military level" request from the US for Australian troops to be redeployed to Afghanistan.[895]

Observations and explanations

The War on Terror-era saw an increase in the international activities conducted by the ADF and JSDF. For the ADF, the period was one of consecutive, and often coinciding, regional crisis management and War on Terror operations. The JSDF, on the other hand, concentrated on US-led operations, even though legislative developments would have allowed for an increased focus on UN peacekeeping. Notably, there are clear parallels between the early 2000s and early 1990s. Both periods began with a US-led large-scale military action in the wider Middle East: in the Persian Gulf in the 1990s and in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s. The

892 Ibid., 290-300.
893 Ibid., 346-347.
894 Howard, *Lazarus Rising*, 535-536.
895 Roger Bell, "Extreme Allies: Australia and the USA," in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006),30.

difference is that after the first Persian Gulf War and throughout the 1990s, the US administration emphasized that its allies were to bear the brunt of regional crisis management and UN peacekeeping around the world. During the War on Terror, UN PKOs were hardly mentioned by the Bush administration as it focused on its war against terrorists. The ultimatum for friend and foe alike was clear when Bush announced that everyone was either with the US or with the terrorists in this war. Correspondingly, US allies became less focused on UN PKOs and made more efforts to deploy forces to assist in the War on Terror.

It is worth noting that the US had, since the 1970s, consistently sought allied support to maintain its hold on the greater Middle East. Allied contributions to the area have gradually evolved as the US has demanded contributions to help deal with various crises. The Japanese government had attempted to send military forces to the Gulf since the 1980s and had consistently been more and more successful in responding to US demands. One could also make the argument that the first precedent was set when the US government pressured Japan to send minesweepers to take part in the Korean War in the 1950s. Japan had initially failed to send minesweepers to the Gulf in the 1980s and made other efforts to offset that failure. In the early 1990s, Japan again faced an uphill battle to send forces, but having already begun the process of expanding JSDF activities in response to the pressure faced during the 1980s and mounting demands from the US – then at the height of its power, Japan managed to send the vessels and adopted legislation for the JSDF to be sent abroad. The development of these frameworks continued throughout the 1990s, sometimes haltingly, but nevertheless consistently, and together with the alliance reaffirmation process, had been largely completed by the early 2000s.

The institutional developments of the late 1990s played a large role in determining Japanese support for the US after 9/11. The plan to support the US forces in the Indian Ocean, which the MSDF presented to the Cabinet when asked for options, was essentially the same they had developed as a result of the 1997 guidelines for supporting US operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.[896] The protection of US bases by GSDF personnel was conducted according to the previously established plans, including the increased counter-terrorist exercises, which have been mentioned as a direct result of 9/11,[897] but had been ongoing since the late 1990s.[898] It was therefore the maturation of these processes that made Japanese contributions to the War on Terror possible.

[896] E.g., Sheila A. Smith, *Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 87-89.

[897] Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World*, 26.

[898] Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2001*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2001, 128.

From the point of view of our theoretical frameworks, participation in the War on Terror did not address the immediate threat posed by North Korean activities or the eventual rise of Chinese military power. As these potential threats were mounting, the US support was becoming increasingly central to Japan. Therefore, while US focus was being directed elsewhere, the alliance security dilemma framework can explain the eventual outcomes. The use of newly-established cooperation guidelines can be seen as an effort to strengthen their value as alliance commitments. The domestic political situation in Japan was conductive to alliance operations, but it is difficult see what domestic interests the deployments served. Hence domestic explanations provide only a possible and partial explanation. Thus, the asymmetric alliance theory provides an especially strong explanation as there was a clear "you are either with us or against us" -type of demand from the US to send forces.

The relative decline of other international operations corresponds to the same factors, and this supports the argument that these operations were related to US demands for allies' contributions to PKOs in the 1990s. As the US no longer demanded this kind of involvement from its allies, it is only natural that they too would change their focus. In the case of Japan, this was not a matter of resources as Japan had significant forces to send and had just revised the required legislation for PKOs. Arguably, since the Koizumi administration had spent political capital in pushing through the PKO bill, it would even seem that there would have also been a domestic political motivation to expand these operations. As the US pressure for PKO deployments eased and was replaced by the War on Terror, the asymmetric framework clearly leads to the outcome whereby War on Terror deployments are prioritized over PKO deployments.

As with Japan, the Australian pattern for deploying forces to the wider Middle East had already been established during the 1980s. The Labor Party government of the 1980s and 1990s had dispatched forces to the Gulf. Even the forces that the ADF deployed were the same that had been in the area during the previous decades. Australian frigates, tanker aircraft, and SAS troops were already a familiar feature in the Middle East as they had all been deployed there in 1998 and even earlier. Only the addition of specialized surveillance aircraft was a new contribution absent from previous Australian deployments.[899]

Politically, the decision to send Australian troops to the War on Terror was a foregone conclusion. It is questionable if a Labor Party government would have acted any differently. The examples from Australian history, the fact that it would have been the first major US war without Australian contribution, and the reality that

899 E.g., Siracausa, *John Howard, Australia and the Coalition of the Willing*, 39-49.

the UK under Labor Party rule sent a significantly larger contribution to the war, all suggest otherwise.[900] Furthermore, whatever intelligence the Howard government had available on Iraq came almost exclusively from the UKUSA framework and hence, from the US and UK. Labor Party leaders would have had the same information, right or wrong.[901] The deployment to Iraq, as well as the return of Australian troops to Iraq and Afghanistan after they had already been once withdrawn—albeit with less public support, were more controversial, but initially the segments of the Labor Party opposing these actions were marginal.

Again, threat-based theories cannot in themselves explain why Australia would fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of directly increasing Australian security, the effect was actually the opposite as deployments strained the ADF's ability to effectively respond to crises in Australia's immediate region. Further, terrorist attacks against Australians took place after the deployments and most observers maintained that Australian involvement in War on Terror increased the risk of further attacks. As with Japan, it could be argued that, as predicted by the alliance security dilemma framework, Australia would have sought to increase its commitments to alliance operations in order to secure US support in the event of any future conflict with China. In this regard, it can be argued that the War on Terror-related deployments gave Australia the opportunity to increase its alliance commitments without endangering its relations with its major trading partner. Invoking the ANZUS treaty also set a precedent for sending military forces to support an ally, which fits well with the alliance security dilemma framework by reinforcing alliance commitments in the face of an uncertain security environment. The next chapter will demonstrate how the formal alliances and the commitments made to the alliances developed during the period.

5.3 New reaffirmations of the alliances and new directions for cooperation

The development of the alliances envisioned in the 1990s had largely been completed by the early 2000s. This process is more pronounced in the Japan-US alliance as ANZUS does not have a similar institutional structure or extensive US bases. In the 1990s, alliance development initiatives emphasized intelligence and technology cooperation, international operations around the globe, and lessons learned from North Korean nuclear crisis, specifically for the Japan-US alliance.

900 Interview with Peter Jennings, February 28, 2014.

901 E.g., Alan Doig, James P. Pfiffner, Mark Phythian and Rodney Tiffen, "Marching in time: alliance politics, synchrony and the case for war in Iraq, 2002–2003," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.1 (2007): 23-40.

From the US-side, War on Terror-era priorities for Asia-Pacific cooperation were set out in the US Department of Defense's 2004 Global Posture Review of US Military Forces Stationed Overseas. These measures included optimizing US basing arrangements for the faster and more dynamic movement of US forces. For US alliance partners, this essentially meant the consolidation of bases and ensuring the flexible capability to rapidly reinforce forces anywhere they would be needed. In practice, this meant that fewer US forces would be stationed in the Western Pacific and that obsolete bases would be handed back to regional allies.[902]

In addition to the almost single-minded focus on the War on Terror, the US administration's focus on building coalitions of like-minded nations manifested in new multilateral security frameworks. The US-Japan-Australia trilateral forum was one such initiative and took place several times during the early 2000s. The trilateral dialogue was first convened at a senior official level in 2002, and in May 2005, trilateral consultations were elevated into a regular ministerial-level meeting. US interests in having Japan and Australia come together for closer cooperation were the main driver behind the framework, which was even stated by the US ambassador to Japan.[903] However, the expansion of this framework to include India met with resistance from China and was then played down in Australia. This so-called quadrilateral strategic dialogue disappeared for almost a decade due to a seeming lack of interest.[904] Another example of new multilateralism was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched in May 2003. This included most US allies as well as other regional states. PSI exercises, which usually involved training for the interception and boarding of commercial shipping to check for WMD material, were organized in different countries, including Australia and Japan.[905]

Realignment of the Japan - US alliance

As discussed before, the cooperation structures envisioned in the 1997 alliance guidelines were fully implemented by the early 2000s. The structures planned under the revision, including elements of the "Comprehensive Mechanism" and the "Coordination Mechanism" had been established and corresponding legislative

902 United States 108th Congress Senate Armed Service Committee, *The Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed Overseas*, September 23, 2004.

903 David Walton, "Australia and Japan: Challenges and Opportunities," in *Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 82-83.

904 E.g., William Tow, *The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: Facilitating Community-Building or Revisiting Containment?* National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report, December 2008.

905 Walton, *Australia and Japan: Challenges and Opportunities*, 82.

reforms in Japan had been implemented.[906] To further develop the alliance, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) announced the intensification of the bilateral consultation at the working level in December 2002.[907] In May 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi and President G.W. Bush announced that the aim would be to enhance the alliance to work in a "global context."[908] The preparatory work was undertaken in 2003 and 2004 at a sub-committee level, and from 2005 onward, the work was taken up at the ministerial level. From January 2005 to June 2006, the full SCC met three times and the defense ministers, five times.[909] In February 2005, the SCC issued a statement announcing the Common Strategic Objectives for the US-Japan alliance.[910] The objectives outlined by the document included, not only the security of Japan but also the resolution of issues related to the peaceful reunification of Korea, the peaceful resolution of the issues in Taiwan Straits, and even the resolution of the Japan-Russia territorial disputes. The specific inclusions of trouble spots like Taiwan and the Korean peninsula to the alliance objectives was a clear departure from the past and prompted objections from China.[911]

In October 2005, the SCC released a document titled "Japan-U.S. alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future."[912] The development of the alliance posture was linked to Japan's new NDPG of 2004 and the implementation of the US Global Posture Review. The further development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems and Japan's legislative reforms were also included as necessary prerequisites for the future "realignment" of the alliance. According to the plan, the alliance would take on new roles in the "Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan," and make "efforts to improve international security environment proactively." The basics remained the same in the sense that Japan would be primarily responsible for the defense of its own area while US forces would deal with the

906 E.g., Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2002,* Tokyo: Fujisho, 2002, 103.

907 Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2002.

908 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Overview of Japan – U.S. Summit Meeting", May 23, 2003. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv0305/overview.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

909 Security Consultative Committee meetings after 2000, as well as for the joint statements issued after each meeting, see Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

910 Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement: U.S. – Japan Security Consultative Committee, February 19, 2005.

911 On Chinese objections see, for example, Robert G. Sutter, *Foreign Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constrains of China's International Politics Since 1949* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 167-168.

912 Security Consultative Committee, Japan-U.S. alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, October 29, 2005. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

aggressor beyond Japan. However, the new roles included new JSDF activities in areas surrounding Japan when defending against ballistic missiles, attacks by guerilla- and special forces, and invasions of remote islands. The activities in areas surrounding Japan, as with the defense of Japan itself, were to be conducted under the same alliance framework to create a consistent method of response to various situations that might change rapidly. This "consistency" arguably blurred distinctions between different aspects of the alliance. As the NDPG of 2004 also moved from traditional defense towards a more flexible response to various contingencies, it seems clear that this represents a consistent widening of the Japanese defense posture.

The "Japan - U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation," published by the SCC in May 2006, was the final product of this round of development and outlines the concrete steps to be taken based on the previous documents.[913] The Roadmap includes a sizable reduction and repositioning of US forces in Japan as well as the further integration of US and JSDF facilities and operations in order to optimize the use of different facilities. Most importantly, a large part of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was to be withdrawn from Okinawa and moved to Guam to make them more easily deployable and less vulnerable to attacks from mainland Asia. The plan also included changes in JSDF posture to complement these moves. The plan also allowed the US footprint in Okinawa to be reduced and thus further addressed local sensitivities. Other burden-easing measures included moving the Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni and the partial return of the Yokota air traffic area to Japanese civilian air control.[914]

The relocation of the Futenma Air Base to Camp Schawb, was a central piece of the burden-easing measures in Okinawa and was set to take place by 2013. The plan called for reclaiming parts of the adjacent coastal waters to build the necessary airstrips. The costs of relocation were to be borne by the Japanese government. Following this, 8,000 marines from the 3rd MEF were to be relocated to Guam by 2014. The Japanese side was set to bear some 6.1 billion USD of the entire estimated cost of 10.3 billion for the relocation, which was made dependent on the progress of relocating the Futenma facility as well as on Japanese financial contributions to the construction of the replacement facilities on Guam.[915]

Planning and operational cooperation was to be improved by moving the headquarters of the US Army in Japan and Japanese GSDF to a shared facility in

913 Security Consultative Committee, "United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment," May 1, 2006. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

914 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006*, Tokyo: Fujisho, 2006, 234-235.

915 Security Consultative Committee, "United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment," May 1, 2006.

Zama and the relocation of the headquarters of the US 5th Air Force and Japanese ASDF to Yokota. Most of the realignment plans were set to be completed between 2010 and 2014. Interoperability and joint training were set to be enhanced through the joint use of airbases as well as moving much of the training of the 5th Air Force to Japanese bases. Deterrence and missile defense capabilities were to be enhanced by the deployments of related US capabilities such as X-band radar to the ASDF base in Shariki and deploying patriot missiles to US facilities in Japan.[916]

Other developments included an expansion of the Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreement in 2004 to include disaster relief operations, the transport of civilians, humanitarian reconstruction operations in Iraq, anti-terrorism operations, and armed attack situations. Significantly, ammunitions were now included, and the agreement was amended with the phrase "and other operations," making it possible to broadly interpret the situations in which support was given.[917] Notably, even though the number of US forces in Japan decreased, the number of yearly bilateral exercises increased from around 20 major annual exercises in the late 1990s to 24-26 a year in the mid-2000s.[918]

The Japanese government formally approved the implementation of the roadmap in May 2006, affirming Japanese commitment to the plan. A special council was established to oversee the relocation of the Futenma Air Station with the same decision.[919] The Bush-Koizumi summit in June 2006 finalized the realignment and strategic initiatives by announcing the "Japan-U.S. alliance of the new century."[920] The following year, the Security Consultative Committee gathered the results of the realignment process in a single document titled "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation," which also included the advancement US- Japan – Australia trilateral relations, as well as relations with India and NATO, in the alliance objectives.[921]

916 Ibid.

917 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Agreement Amending the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of United States of America*, February 27, 2004. http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2004/2/0227.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

918 Japan Defense Agency *Defense of Japan*, 2001-2006 editions. Tokyo: Urban Connections, various years.

919 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006*, Tokyo: Fujisho, 2006, 248.

920 The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century, Washington D.C., June 29, 2006. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/68464.htm (Accessed August 8, 2021).

921 Joint Announcement Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation", May 1, 2007. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

In sum, the developments of the US-Japan alliance during this period mostly included practical arrangements in line with the restructuring of the US global posture. They were meant for the most part to facilitate the faster and more dynamic movement of forces around different parts of the globe. In the Asia-Pacific, this meant that US forces were pulled farther away from possible vulnerable positions in the case of conflict. Forces in Okinawa and South Korea, for example, were after all easily targeted by hundreds of relatively cheap missiles from China or North Korea. Joint basing arrangements – meaning that allied bases were made available for US forces if needed – were established to ensure that US forces would still have rapid access to possible conflict areas if needed.

Developments in the ANZUS

The invocation of the ANZUS alliance after the 9/11 attacks was the first time the alliance had been called upon for common military action under its own articles. The contributions Australia sent to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2001, 2003, and 2005 were relatively small, but nonetheless consisted of all service branches. The main contributions were the "boots on the ground" that were always at least a few hundred-strong. While the War on Terror undoubtedly intensified the security relations between Australia and the US, the Bush administration had already initiated closer defense consultations in early 2001. Howard had supported Bush's candidacy during the elections and the two administrations established contacts early on. The first official announcement on development of ANZUS was given in the AUSMIN meeting in July 2001. The points of development included increased intelligence sharing, increasing bilateral training, and increasing interoperability between ADF and US forces.[922]

The first concrete outcome of the alliance development was the signing of the updated intelligence sharing agreement in November 2002.[923] The new agreement allowed Australian access to US information at a level previously granted only to the UK.[924] The improvements in bilateral training took longer to establish and it was

922 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2001*, Canberra, July 30, 2001. http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-joint-communique-2001.aspx (Accessed August 8, 2021).

923 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Information, Canberra, June 25, 2002. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/25.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

924 Walton, *Australia and Japan: Challenges and Opportunities*, 83.

only in December 2005 that the parties agreed to establish joint training facilities.[925] These include sizable areas in the Shoalwater Bay in Queensland and weapons training areas in the Northern Territories. The facilities were to be linked to US training centers and were to allow for sizable joint exercises by the ADF and US forces. These facilities were set to be tested in the newly established Talisman Saber biannual exercise in 2007.[926] A new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Initiative was also signed in 2007. The terms of this initiative included increased cooperation in disaster relief, new intelligence and reconnaissance cooperation, and the continued development of Joint Training Capability. Most notably, the agreement included granting access to US forces, including strategic bombers, to bases in Australia.[927]

The development of the alliance was a constant topic in the ministerial level meetings. Usually, the yearly communiques affirmed progresses made during the previous years in intelligence sharing and bilateral training. In 2004, the AUSMIN communique also included the agreement for Australian participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense program.[928] The 2006 AUSMIN declaration again noted the intensified cooperation in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, including in the context of acquisitions, and boldly stated that the "alliance between the two countries has never been stronger."[929]

It has been argued that the completion of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, which had been unsuccessfully pursued since the mid-1990s, was one of the rewards granted to the Howard administration for reinforcing the alliance and participating in the War on Terror.[930] The official FTA negotiations began in mid-

925 United States Department of State, *Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Department of Defence of Australia Concerning Joint Combined Training Center*, Adelaide, November 18, 2005.

926 Australian Department of Defence, Australia-US joint combined training centre, July 8, 2004.

927 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Commonwealth of Australia 2009, 94

928 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2004*, Washington, July 7, 2004. http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-joint-communique-2004.aspx (Accessed August 8, 2021).

929 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2006*, Washington, December 12, 2006.http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-joint-communique-2006.aspx (Accessed August 8, 2021).

930 Cotton and Ravenhill, *Trading on Alliance Security: Foreign Policy in the Post-11 September Era*, 15.

2003, and the agreement was passed in both US and Australian legislative bodies in August 2004. Notably, the US House of Representatives passed the bill with a margin of 200 votes and during the House Debates, the agreement was presented as a reward to a faithful ally. The actual utility of the FTA has been questioned, but the treaty itself was something the Howard administration had been pursuing for a number of years.[931] As was previously discussed, Australian relations with China and the effects of Australian dependence on Chinese trade were a constant topic among strategists at the time. While there were several cases of diverging perspectives on how China should be viewed, these seemed to have had few concrete impacts on US-Australia relations or the alliance itself. The management of these differences, while still managing to strengthen US-Australia relations and ANZUS in particular, have been cited as one of the significant successes of the Howard Administration.[932]

Observations and explanations

Both the Japan-US alliance and ANZUS were actively developed during this period, both achieving concrete results. Arguably, the reason for these concrete results was the reposturing of US forces in the Asia-Pacific, to which the alliances were made to adjust. While scaling down the number of troops permanently stationed in the Western Pacific, the US diversified its options by seeking access to allied bases, including for the first time since the Cold War, in Australia. The training areas in Australia offset the training grounds that US forces had lost in Okinawa and Japan. From the US point of view, the rigid commitment to maintain 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific meant that it had less flexibility to rotate troops to Afghanistan and Iraq where its forces were already overextended. Consolidating US forces into fewer bases provided US planners the more dynamic use of their resources. Further, US forces rigidly stationed near the Chinese mainland could be easily targeted by the Chinese or North Koreans. Whatever the calculus on the US-side, it is quite clear that the pace and aims of the reposturing was determined by US choices and its allies would have to accommodate.

For US allies, the readjustment and downscaling of US forces would have been a different matter. For the Koizumi administration in Japan, the relocation of sizable elements of US Marines to Guam offered domestic political advantages even though the relocation of Futenma remained controversial. On the other hand, Japan agreed to pay for moving US forces back to US territory, which in itself could have angered some constituencies. Considering the overall numbers, the withdrawal of 8,000

931 Matt McDonald, Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2004, 155-156.

932 E.g., Roy Campbell McDowall, *The Strategic Depiction of China in Howard Government Policy, 1996–2006* (Canberra: ANU University Press, 2009), 48-50.

marines would have not made a large difference as the number of US forces in Japan was still more than 30,000. The repositioning and sharing of facilities, as well as co-locating the operational headquarters of different forces, would have more than made up for this. Therefore, it is unlikely that Japan would have seen these measures as increasing its risk of abandonment. Even better, the co-location of headquarters, positioning US anti-ballistic missile radars to Japanese bases, and increasing intelligence-sharing directly addressed the imminent threat of DPRK missiles.

Australia gained more of a US troop presence as it allowed access to some of its bases and training areas for US forces. If Australia ever assessed that China might become a threat sometime in the future, this could arguably be used to explain how Australia could benefit from the US presence. On the other hand, as Australia was balancing between its trade with China and its security relation with the US – a classic case of the alliance security dilemma – it also risked its trade relations if, for example, the US bombers flying from Australian bases took part in some escalation in the South China Sea. Australia had already gained credibility from the US through its loyal participation in the War on Terror, as was noted by the US congress when it passed the aforementioned Australia-US Free Trade Agreement. Therefore, there was hardly any need to seek even more favors by allowing more US forces to train in Australia. Overall, it seems that for Australia, there were few costs and significant benefits for these developments, so the outcomes fit most of the theoretical frameworks.

The focus on multilateral frameworks for security cooperation was a newly emerging feature during this period. Frameworks such as the PSI and new trilateral forums emerged outside the traditional UN structures and more closely resembled coalitions of like-minded states. Some of these were driven by US interests, but some, such as ASEAN and its expanded meeting formats, were driven by regional states. Even the Howard administration, which had initially spurned multilateral frameworks, preferring instead bilateral ones, was compelled to embrace different Asia-Pacific gatherings as well as the US-centered ones. Notably, Japan and Australia were also growing closer and their bilateral security relationship, as well as other alternative security frameworks were sometimes seen as alternative to the US-centered hub-and-spokes system – a form of hedging against a possible future when the US might no longer be the center of Asia-Pacific security.[933]

933 Thomas S Wilkins, "Towards a "Trilateral Alliance?" Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations," *Asian Security* 3, no.3 (2007).

5.4 Maturing missile defense as the overriding focus of technology cooperation

For the US, and especially for the advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept in the Bush administration, the military technological advantage over possible opponents was the key element that secured US supremacy over its potential opponents. This thinking was the basis of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and formed a central part of the 2002 National Security Strategy.[934] While this thinking had already been around since the Clinton administration, the Bush administration's focus on traditional military security and rebuilding the US military brought new weight to the focus on technology. For Australia, the idea of technology cooperation being at the core of the alliance was already accepted in the early 1990s, as was discussed earlier. Even then, Australia already acknowledged that the alliance with the US served to maintain its technological superiority in its own region. Japan, on the other hand, was seen as a source of support for the US technological advantage – a role with which Japan had not always been comfortable.

The Bush administration had already emphasized the role of missile defense in its electoral platform and defending the US homeland against possible missile attacks was a key part of the 2002 National Security Strategy.[935] After the 9/11 attacks, the ballistic missile defense project (BMD) was increasingly associated with so-called "rogue states" and terrorism in general. Arguably, this made sense as the system was not generally seen as capable of defending against hundreds of sophisticated missiles as fielded by Russia and China but could still very plausibly be useful against less sophisticated missiles arriving in a smaller number. Both Japan and Australia had already been involved in the BMD development in the 1990s and now, as the system was becoming operational, it was time to start building the actual operational structures to use it. As the full capabilities of the system were heavily dependent on the intelligence and sensors that only the US had, this meant that the full use of the system was essentially an alliance matter.

Japan-US technology cooperation and Japan's commitment to BMD

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the first cooperative technology projects between Japan and the US were being completed. The first such project, aimed at developing new kinds of ducted rocket engines, was completed in January 1999. Several other projects such as laser radar development, advanced steels, ceramic vehicle

934 White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.
935 Ibid.

propulsion systems, and shallow water acoustic technology, began in the mid-1990s. As technology cooperation arrangements were maturing and began bearing fruit, more projects were thus undertaken. Two projects concerning the development of radio software and onboard avionics for P-3C follow-on aircraft, commenced in March 2002. Cooperation on stealthy ship hull materials and design began in April 2005, and in April 2006, technology cooperation started on the advancement of sea-based phased array radar technology, used among other things for missile detection. All told, by the mid-2000s, 14 projects had been initiated under the 1983 Transfer of Military Technologies agreement, eight of which had been completed. In May 2003, the two allies signed a new agreement on the Engineers and Scientists Exchange Program to further facilitate contacts between research personnel.[936] Notably, the FS-X project, which had had a very rocky start, produced its first fighters, which arrived at the Misawa airbase in September 2000.[937] Even a controversial project such as the FS-X was ultimately successfully concluded and did not cause any real damage to the alliance relations. Therefore, it is safe to say that bilateral technology cooperation structures had matured by this time.

As technology cooperation was becoming almost a mundane part of the alliance's everyday work, most of the projects were not even noted in the domestic political landscape in Japan. Missile defense, on the other hand, was often scrutinized by the press and aroused interest in the highest levels of government. In June 2006, Japan and the US concluded a new Exchange of Notes Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America to replace the previous Exchange of Notes dating from 1981. The new document was significant as it dealt primarily with issues related to the joint development of BMD interceptors, which were to be the most significant US weapon system ever developed in cooperation with Japan.[938]

After Japan had formally joined the program in late-1990, it also needed to acquire the necessary capabilities to participate in its use. A major part of Japan's technological contribution was to come from the joint development of the ship-launched interceptor called the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). In December 2003, Japan purchased Patriot PAC-III missiles, which formed the land-based part of the defense as well as the Aegis system for its new destroyers. The plan was to have the Patriot missiles and first Aegis-destroyer operational by 2007. Six more destroyers were set

936 Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2006*, Tokyo: Fujisho, 2006, 267-268.
937 E.g., *Japan Times*, "First F-2 fighter delivered to ASDF," September 26, 2000.
938 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America*, June 23, 2006. http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0623-2.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

to be ready by 2011. The 2004 NDPG confirmed the continued development of the missile system and in 2005, a special law was enacted for the deployment and use of the system.[939]

The BMD system was in many ways connected to the alliance itself. Still, the Koizumi government announced that when the system became operational in Japan, the Japanese government would operate the system independently, based on its independent judgement.[940] However, the effective use of the system required advanced intelligence gathering capabilities for identifying launch preparations and actual launches in order for missile interceptors to be deployed in time. At the time, this kind of sensory intelligence could only be provided by the US and therefore the system could not be effectively operated by Japan independent of US support. To remedy this, Japan continued its pursuit of independent intelligence capabilities, which began in the late 1990s despite US opposition. Japan's first military intelligence satellites were launched in March 2003 and became operational in April 2004. The second launch failed in November 2003. At the same year, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries began producing Patriot missiles in its factories in Japan.[941] These efforts were clearly meant to build Japan's independent capability to use the missile defense system it had invested significant money in. But, while Japan was trying to limit its dependence on the US in missile defense, the establishment of combined JSDF and USFJ facilities, the deployment of a US X-band radar to Shariki, and especially co-locating the 5th US Air Force and ASDF headquarters to Yokota, further integrated the command and intelligence functions necessary for the system.[942]

Australia as a BMD partner and other Technology Cooperation

Until the early 2000s, Australia was a passive participant in the BMD-project. Australian scientists and defense technology institutions could take part in related research and facilities located in Australia and were used to relay information to BMD-operations. In December 2003, the Howard government announced that Australia would become an active participant in the program and the official

939 Christopher W. Hughes, "Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a 'Normal' Security Role", in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005). pp. 127-128.

940 Prime Minister's Cabinet, *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary*, December 19, 2003. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

941 Hughes, *Japanese Military Modernization*, 127-128.

942 Ibid., 125.

negotiations to that end commenced in January 2004. The memorandum of understanding was signed in July 2004 and committed the parties to cooperation in the development of related advanced radar technology over a period of 25 years.[943] Radar development seems to have been a natural field for the Australian contribution as Australia-US research links in this field had already been established during the development of the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Further, Australia had a natural interest in the development of long-range detection technologies based on the huge swathes of ocean to be monitored in its northern approaches. At the time, Australia had no systems capable of operating the SM3 interceptor missiles or platforms equipped with the Aegis system. However, the acquisition of Aegis-capable vessels had been already discussed in the late 1990s and by 2004, Australia decided to acquire three Aegis-equipped vessels under the Air Warfare Destroyer program.[944] These vessels were to be compatible with the BMD systems and were set to enter service in 2014-2015.[945]

Another significant project that Australian signed up for was the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, which Australia initially committed to in 2002.[946] Accordingly, Australia was among the first signatories of the memorandum of understanding for the production, sustainment, and follow-on development of the fighter in 2006.[947] It is worth noting that the Australian armed forces were increasingly attempting to implement a revolution in its military affairs thinking and placed emphasis on high-tech systems. This included increased focus on network centric warfare, which consists of sharing information between multiple platforms and sophisticated sensor capabilities, such as over-the-horizon radars, and strike capabilities, e.g., F-35s, in the future. As these concepts, as well as the relevant systems, relied heavily on US technology and capabilities, this also meant increased reliance on interoperability and rapid information sharing with US forces.[948]

943 Matt McDonald, "Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2004," *Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no.2 (2005): 156-167*.

944 E.g., Richard Brabin-Smith, "Australia and Ballistic Missile Defence: Our Policy choices," *Strategic Insights*, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2004.

945 E.g., Hugh White "Australian Strategic Policy" in *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 314.

946 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2002,* Washington, October 29, 2002. http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-joint-communique-2002.aspx (Accessed August 8, 2021).

947 Memorandum of Understanding on Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development of the Joint Strike Fighter, Various signatories, January 2007.

948 White, *Australian Strategic Policy*, 316-317.

Evaluating technology cooperation

Alliance cooperation in defense technology seems to have been a straightforward matter during the early 2000s. During the 1980s and 1990s, it had been debated more and, in the case of Japan, needed to be legislated, which caused further controversy. However, by the mid-2000s, most of the technology projects had become business as usual in both alliances and, therefore, these projects roused little domestic political debates. Japan's participation was still limited by legislation and its self-imposed limits on foreign weapons sales meant that the jointly developed technologies could not be sold to third parties. However, some of the high-profile areas of cooperation, like the BMD-project, still needed special legislation. Correspondingly, only the BMD-project rose to the level of significant political debates, but even this faced little actual resistance.

For Japan, the BMD-project responded to a clear danger posed by DPRK missile and nuclear development. The fact that these missiles were at least partially directed at Japan was clearly indicated by the tests launches, which often flew towards Tokyo and regularly landed near Japanese territorial waters. The decision to invest in expensive Aegis-equipped destroyers and interceptor missiles can therefore be seen as a clear response to an evolving threat environment. For Australia, on the other hand, this line of explanation fits rather poorly. There were very few potentially belligerent countries who could threaten Australia with ballistic missiles and even fewer that could do so with any plausible ability to hit the key centers on the continent. Naturally, Australians could gain technical knowledge from working with the radar development, but it is unclear what direct benefits this would offer outside the BMD-project. The BMD-project, as well as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, were extremely high technology programs that held little or no utility in any missions that the ADF had undertaken since the early 1990s. Even the heavy battle tanks, bought for the ADF, were unsuitable for use on the small islands in Australia's region.

From the point of view of the alliance security dilemma framework, technology cooperation, especially the BMD, made the allies more dependent on each other. If US allies wanted the US to be more committed to their defense, increased dependence through the integration of technological systems would have been in their interest. At the same time, participation in certain programs made the allies more likely targets in any attacks against the US as the systems components are largely shared. Thus, Australia actually increased its threat of entrapment. Of course, a similar argument had already been made during the Cold War in regard to the signals facilities used to detect Soviet missiles. For Japan, the fear of abandonment also explains its increased efforts to gain independent capabilities within the system as a form of insurance. To simplify the most obvious lines, the US became more dependent of Australia, and Japan became more dependent on the US. Australia, on

the one hand, seemed to increase its threat of entrapment while Japan sought indigenous capabilities to ameliorate its threat of abandonment and increase it overall dependence, on the other.

The asymmetric alliance theory also fits strongly as the US side was now, as strongly as ever, emphasizing the edge offered by technology. This was articulated in the quadrennial defense reviews as well as security strategies and translated into direct expectations for allied cooperation in technology development. Notably, in order to maintain their status as full-fledged US allies, smaller states needed to maintain their ability to integrate their militaries with US forces, which required a certain level of technological development. Especially highest-end systems such as the BMD and F-35 fighters require the technological capacity to network information processing and fire control systems at the same level as the US military. Notably, sizable investments in these systems by Australia suggest that they were intended for alliance operations as Australia had few regional military challenges that could be addressed with these capabilities. However, these investments would enable Australian forces to effectively participate in US-operations against conventional military challengers.

5.5 Evaluating the era of War on Terror

In the early- and mid-2000s, the US-led War on Terror dominated security policies. The overriding emphasis on a single non-traditional security issue, which had little direct bearing on most US allies, demonstrates how much the hegemonic unipole could dictate, not only the terms of alliance cooperation, but also the way in which allied countries talked about security. It could be argued that the US security thinking dominated its allies' security discourses similarly to how its technology and requirements of interoperability determined what kind of defense procurements its allies needed to make. However, in hindsight, it is clear that the biggest security issues in Asia-Pacific had little to do with the War on Terror and hence most of its effects in the region were indirect. Correspondingly, while changes in the alliances during this time seemed far reaching to many observers, attributing too much explanatory power to any single variable risks overlooking many of the developments that had taken place during previous decades. Some of these arguments were discussed in the literature review in Chapter 3.[949] Arguably, the idea that traditional alliances had become altogether obsolete, as discussed in Chapter 2, was also linked to the idea that traditional geopolitical rivalry between states had been surpassed by non-traditional conflicts.[950]

949 See, Chapter 3, 64-66, 76-77.
950 See, Chapter 2, 14-15.

This section will demonstrate that explanations relying on single factors cannot plausibly discount previous developments as some have argued. Domestic conditions and the alignment of domestic political interests between like-minded, security-oriented conservative administrations in Japan, Australia, and the US have often been emphasized as the most important security variable of this period.[951] Interestingly, the War on Terror, which has also been cited as key factor behind the development of the alliances in this period, has limited value as a threat-based explanation since none of the regional states faced significant threats from Islamist terrorists. Rather, as discussed below, threats must be filtered through asymmetric alliance or alliance security dilemma frameworks to provide plausible explanations. Regional threat environments or domestic political landscapes evolved but were still constrained and partially determined by pre-existing conditions. More advanced models of alliance cooperation – alliance security dilemma and asymmetric alliance models – can both plausibly apply to most outcomes, albeit with different premises and introducing varying kinds of implications.

As increasing threats, domestic political situations, and US demands and posture were all conductive to alliance developments in several areas, the observed outcomes during this period are arguably overdetermined with several possible explanatory factors. For example, the deployments to War on Terror operations, are clearly not explainable by direct threats but still fit domestic political explanations as well as alliance security dilemma and asymmetric alliance frameworks. Other outcomes are equally explainable within several frameworks. However, contrasting the developments to other periods still provides interesting insights.

Balancing against threats

At the beginning of the new millennium, the regional threat environment was clearly unstable in both the northern and southern ends of the Pacific, even if China was not yet able to pose a direct conventional threat to US allies. Australia especially would have been outside its ability to project any meaningful power. At the beginning of the decade, Japanese defense spending still surpassed China's defense spending by a comfortable margin and China's growing, yet nonetheless smaller economic and technological base, meant that it was years away from becoming a first-rate military power: It was still decades behind in the advanced capabilities needed for projecting

951 E.g., Gavan McCormack, "Koizumi's Japan in Bush's World: After 9/11," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 2, no.12 (2004); Donald A. Debats, Tim McDonald and Margaret-Ann Williams, "Mr Howard Goes to Washington: September 11, the Australian–American Relationship and Attributes of Leadership," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 42, no.2 (2007)

power in the maritime Asia-Pacific. By the mid-2000s, Chinese defense spending overtook Japan's and, for anyone professionally following Asia-Pacific security issues, it would have been clear by then that China would be able to seriously challenge US allies in the near future.[952] However, North Korea, in the northern Pacific, combined with unstable island states in the South Pacific, still posed a more immediate threat to their respective regions. While some writers might have posited that North Korea was only being used as an excuse for Japan and the US to build up their military capabilities vis-à-vis China, there are few signs of this kind of thinking in any publications.[953]

With the exception of the small Islamic insurgencies in the Philippines and Indonesia, none of these threats had any direct relevance to the US-led War on Terror. Therefore, alliance developments taking place in the War on Terror framework could not be explained by direct threats against Japan or Australia. Participation in War on Terror operations had little bearing on the Asia-Pacific strategic environment. Further, deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq increased threats against Australians and Japanese abroad, as was demonstrated by the Bali bombings, primarily targeted at Australians, and the later kidnappings of both Australian and Japanese nationals. The numbers of other international deployments declined while War on Terror operations rose in the early 2000s. Notably, Australia risked significant overstretch of its army's limited resources as it needed to address threats in its immediate region while it was maintaining military presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another notable feature in Australia's security choices is apparent in its procurement decisions. As previously noted, even while it risked overstretching its army in several simultaneous operations, Australia's major decisions for its future defense spending included Aegis-equipped air warfare destroyers and F-35 fighters, which would be needed to integrate into sophisticated US combat networks in high-end warfare, although there was little need for them in the ongoing conflicts. Even the US-made M1 Abrams main battle tanks had little use in the kinds of missions the ADF was undertaking. Nonetheless, the tanks were still purchased along with the heavy air cargo planes needed for flying these large machines to potential operating areas. For Japan, participating in the BMD project directly addressed the threat posed by North Korean missiles. However, for Australia, the threats that these capabilities could be used to address would be far in the future as there were no adversaries

952 E.g., David Shambaugh, "China's Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress", in *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Ear of Uncertainty*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005).

953 Linus Hagstrom and Christian Turesson, "Among threats and 'perfect excuse': Understanding change in Japanese foreign security policy," in *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21, no.3 (2009)

nearby in possession of similar capabilities. Development of international operations, technology, and cooperative frameworks better fit the threat environment if observed through the alliance security dilemma framework.

Alliance security dilemma

The alliance security dilemma framework assumes that the increase of threats should lead states to increase their commitments to their alliances and thus decrease their fear of abandonment. This model would seem to fit a large part of the observed outcomes during this period, provided that we accept that both Japan and Australia faced rising threats, at least in the long term. As the alliance security dilemma suggests that states will seek to find the best possible balance between entrapment and abandonment in any situation, the ideal outcome for a state would be that it could increase alliance commitments and thus lessen its risk of abandonment without increasing the threat of entrapment. From this perspective, it can be argued that the War on Terror offered US allies a chance to increase their alliance commitments in actual conflicts, while expecting that the US would reciprocate these commitments.[954] At the same time, they were able to avoid unnecessary antagonism that closer alliance relations focused on Asia-Pacific threats would have necessarily aroused in China, which was an increasingly important economic partner for all US allies in the area.

Several details support this kind of explanation. Both Japan and Australia used pre-existing alliance commitments: Japan by expanding the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan -framework all the way to the Indian Ocean; and Australia by invoking the common defense clause of the ANZUS treaty. By invoking the same alliance clauses that would be used in case of attacks against themselves, they strengthen their expectations that the US would in its turn be obligated to come to their aid if the clauses were invoked under different circumstances. After all, alliances in this framework are based on reciprocal security benefits and it is easy to see how the use of alliance frameworks to respond to an attack against the US homeland would create a reciprocal expectation of support in a situation in which a US ally is attacked.[955]

From the perspective of the abandonment vs. entrapment dilemma, technology cooperation during the period can be seen as a double-edged sword. The BMD project would make allies more dependent on US intelligence and technological support, but, on the other hand, by integrating their capabilities with US systems, allies could also increase their own utility and thus US dependence on them. For example, the use of signal stations in Australia and technology cooperation with Japan could also

954 E.g., Daniel Bryan, "Remaking alliances for the war on terrorism," in *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no.5 (2006)

955 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 358-359.

be understood as attempts to make US missile defense system more dependent on its allies' contributions. Naturally, the acquisition of Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with interceptor missiles meant that Japanese and Australian vessels could also better defend US forces. In the case of Japan, these same systems meant for the defense of Japan would necessarily cover US forces in Japan as the US-Japan alliance division of labor entails. Further, Japanese capabilities could even theoretically be used to shoot down North Korean missiles aimed at North America.

Thus, US allies could increase their own utility but their own dependence on the US would similarly increase. Japan, at least, seems to have been conscious of this dilemma as it took steps to lessen its dependency on the US though its own indigenous missile and intelligence satellite production. From the US perspective, it was only natural to oppose Japanese indigenous intelligence satellite capabilities as it diminished its control over its ally, and this increased its threat of abandonment as Japan could judge threats more independently. Thus, the more independently Japan could use these capabilities, the less able the US would be to control or restrain Japan in the case of conflict.[956] As the US side engaged in restructuring its posture in the Asia-Pacific, it also withdrew forces from the Korean Peninsula and Japan, which would have made the possibility of abandonment for Japan more likely than ever. Australia, on the other hand, was arguably less dependent on US support for these advanced capabilities as it was very unlikely to be targeted. Therefore, its dependence on US support for these systems was a moot question as they would mostly be used in alliance operations anyway. However, Australia's threat of entrapment arguably still increased as its facilities were used for these systems.

Trilateral and multilateral frameworks, combined with the increasing security ties between Australia and Japan, were encouraged by the US. From the alliance security dilemma's point of view, multilateral alliance arrangements could be seen as way to increase the senior ally's commitments and thus decrease the threat of abandonment. However, an alternative explanation could be that the threat of abandonment would also drive regional countries to seek alternative security frameworks. Therefore, the proliferation of multilateral security frameworks could serve as a way to hedge against the possibility that a US-centered security format would prove inadequate in the future. [957] This is arguably a problem for the alliance security dilemma model: it needs additional assumptions about states' motivations to work and possibly provides several alternative explanations for observed outcomes.

In sum, allied participation in the War on Terror, fits the alliance security dilemma framework because it lessened the likelihood of entrapment as the US was engaged elsewhere and would not draw its allies into an unwanted conflict with

956 Ibid., 320.
957 Ibid., 183-184.

China. This also applies to the likelihood of abandonment, as the War on Terror created a precedent for the alliance use of military power to defend a member. Technology cooperation also fits this framework but from a different angle. By increased interdependency, thus the costs involved in abandonment for all parties, technology cooperation decreased the likelihood of abandonment for all parties. However, interdependencies also increased the likelihood of entrapment as different connected parts of the system could not be easily separated or separately targeted by attackers. Overall, the alliance security dilemma explains most of the developments. However, it can be criticized for requiring many different assumptions to be made regarding actors' motivations and notably different dynamics can offer varying explanations as seen above. Several events could be attributed to different explanatory variables, some of which could even be explained by both fear of entrapment and the fear of abandonment dynamics. Further, as seen when contrasting War on Terror and technology cooperation, different kinds of logic need to be used for different events taking place at the same time. When one must constantly bring more factors into play, the model loses in parsimony, and for this reason, threats, or domestic politics-based explanations could provide better accounts of reality.

Domestic politics in Japan and Australia

The domestic political environments in both Australia and Japan were highly conductive to alliance development and military operations within alliance frameworks. The amicable relations were reciprocated by the Bush administration, even on a personal level, and these relations, as well as Koizumi's and Howard's personal efforts, have often been used to explain observed outcomes for this period. However, the actions of contemporary political leaders tend to gain significant contemporary attention through media coverage, and it could simply be that those covering these issues close to an actual event overemphasize these easily observable factors.[958] Notably, it is also in the nature of political leaders to emphasize their own influence and achievements.[959] For those looking at the longer term, these types of "great man in history" -explanations are less appealing.

That being said, the facts are that major alliance issues including the development of the alliance relations, deployments of Australian and Japanese militaries to

958 Gregg Sheridan, *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US – Australia Alliance under Howard and Bush* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006); Daniel A, Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik,* (Washington D.C: CSIS Press, 2006).

959 E.g., Bert Alan Spector, "Carlyle, Freud, and the Great Man Theory more fully considered," in *Leadership* 12, no.2 (2016)

support US-led operations in different theaters, and advanced technology cooperation all were part of both Howard's and Koizumi's political agendas. Further, each of these administrations were exceptionally well placed to further these agendas. Howard headed a coherent and stable government, which until the late-2000s, consistently secured strong public support in parliamentary elections and had a relatively low turnover in ministerial positions. Alexander Downer, for example, served as the Foreign Minister throughout Howard's premiership. Koizumi on the other hand, enjoyed such popularity and strong support from his own party faction that he could effectively push out his rivals in the LDP. Both Howard and Koizumi were politically close to the Bush administration's thinking as both represented their countries mainstream conservatives. To make it even easier, US alliances enjoyed a surge of popular support in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, it is clear that domestic political conditions were extremely favorable for the observed alliance outcomes, and these clearly fit the agendas of the ruling elites.

While a comparison between the two cases will not provide many insights as both outcomes and explanatory conditions are similar for this period, some insight can be gained by examining the earlier period. After all, in the early 2000s, the political conditions in Japan and Australia were almost the opposite of those observed in the early 1990s when both countries endured troubled relationships with the US administration. Further, the outcomes, dispatch of military forces to US-led operations in the Middle East, and development of the two alliance relations, were, in general, quite similar.

Looking at the latter part of the 1990s, it is clear that the Howard administration's domestic position was basically similar in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the time, Australia had already presented several propositions for the further development of the ANZUS alliance, but these lapsed due to a lack of interest from the US side. Japan, on the other hand, had weak governments yet still managed to laboriously implement the alliance reforms that facilitated the JSDF deployments of the early 2000s. Therefore, it is easy to see that one-sided interest, even if supported by a strong domestic base, would not lead to the desired development if the stronger ally is disinterested. Notably, the expanded US-troop presence and prepositioning of US military material to Australia, which had already been on Howard's agenda in the late-1990s, still failed to materialize even though all the political factors seemed to align. Further, during the post-9/11 period, there were several countries, the UK for example, that were under non-conservative administrations and still were considered extremely close US allies during the War on Terror. The Blair administration in UK was a strong supporter of the US-led war, even though Tony Blair himself enjoyed a conspicuously friendly relationship with the

Clinton administration.[960] While these facts cannot be taken as conclusive evidence, they do point to the limits of domestic politics in explaining the above-described developments.

Asymmetric alliances during the war on terror

During the initial period of the War on Terror, US power was still unmatched by any plausible competitor. Its allies in the Asia-Pacific, especially Japan, seemed to be declining as their economies stuttered, while the US and China were growing yearly. Further, the 9/11 attacks did little lasting damage and US military power seemed to grow disproportionally as a consequence as its resources grew and technological capabilities continuously outpaced all other countries in the world. After several years of lean defense budgets, the War on Terror meant that US defense budgets kept outpacing other countries' military spending throughout the decade. In 2009, the US still spent approximately six times more on its military than the next biggest spender, China.[961] Therefore, the US was in an extraordinarily powerful position and the US administration was clear on what contributions it expected from its allies. According to the asymmetric alliance framework, this made its bargaining position exceptionally strong vis-à-vis its allies and could therefore expect significant concessions in return for the security it provided.[962] It could even be argued that this dynamic extended far beyond alliances as countries. The War on Terror seemed to override traditional lines of division in international relations. Countries that had never been US allies, were keen to contribute forces to support US operations.

The War on Terror is a clear example of how the asymmetric nature of military alliances can be used to understand alliance outcomes. Neither direct threats nor domestic factors alone can provide plausible explanations for why Australia or Japan sent their militaries to Afghanistan or Iraq. The demand that US allies should do so was explicitly made, even though the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington did not fall within treaty obligations – treaties clearly speak of events in the Pacific or Far East. Both Japan and Australia actively used treaty frameworks in their responses and there were indications that the US side was actively encouraging this.[963] Both Australia and Japan diplomatically supported US actions in the UN

960 E.g., Richard Carr, *March of the Moderates: Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and the Rebirth of Progressive Politics* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2019).

961 SIPRI data on world military spending 2000-2009. https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/05/appendix5A (Accessed August 7, 2021).

962 Christopher Gelpi, "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Alliance Control," in *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallander (New York: Oxford University Press 1999), 118.

963 See above, 184, 186.

before and after the US-led invasion of Iraq, despite the fact that several European peer states actively opposed it. The relative decline of other UN PKOs abroad also fits this framework as these were clearly now missing from the US agenda and were not even mentioned in most US strategy documents.

Australia redeployed forces to both Iraq and Afghanistan after initially withdrawing them in accordance with the previous agreement made with the US. As during the Vietnam War, redeployments were officially requested by the local government and other US allies, but it was abundantly clear that the originator of these requests was the US government. Notably, while Australian military crisis management operations to several Pacific Island states clearly served Australia's own regional security, they were still sometimes portrayed in terms of the US alliance.[964] Australia's portrayal as the US's "deputy sheriff" in the southern Pacific clearly implied political support, even implicit direction, from the US for Australia's regional policing activities. While the deputy sheriff narrative itself provides no conclusive evidence in support of any alliance theory, it nonetheless implies how certain elites saw the relationship. Further, Australia prioritized US-led operations to the extent that it risked overextending its forces during deployments to nearby islands, which clearly demonstrates how important participating in alliance operations was seen.

Technology cooperation was already a central feature of the US agenda during the previous decade. But in the 2000s, these were amplified by the additional focus on military modernization, especially missile defense-related projects. The BMD project was a constant feature of US security strategies. As expected by the asymmetric alliance Framework, both Japan and Australia participated in related projects, and both invested in technologies that allowed them to be integrated into the system. In Japan's case, this can be explained straightforwardly by the threats facing Japan. However, for Australia, their investment in capabilities to counter threats that did not exist in Australia's region is more difficult to explain through threats-based theories. On the other hand, Japan's quest for independent technological capabilities related to missile defense does seem to pose a problem for this framework in the short-term and would seem to be better explained within the alliance security dilemma framework. However, this could also be seen as internal balancing, which is typically understood as more of an option for a nation when its ally is not seen to be dependable.[965]

Comparing the events of the early 2000s with those of the early 1990s, as we did when discussing domestic politics, we observe that the outcomes are quite similar

964 E.g., *The Telegraph*, "Bush entrusts 'deputy sheriff' Howard with Pacific policing role," August 15, 2003.

965 Morrow, *Arms versus allies: trade-offs in search for security*.

during both periods. In many ways, the invasion of Iraq was a continuation of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, while the following surge in international peacekeeping operations was now replaced by deployments to the War on Terror. US power and the continuous demands for allied contributions to the Middle East were also consistent across both periods. Afghanistan, which strategically falls between the Middle East, Central, and South Asia fits well into this. Arguably, the dispatch of Japanese and Australian forces to support operations in this geostrategic region can be seen as the culmination of a process that had been ongoing since at least since the 1970s Oil Crisis. As we observed in the previous section, the conditions of domestic politics, and arguably those of threats as well, were clearly different in the early 1990s and early 2000s. However, the outcomes were quite similar in the sense that both Australia and Japan supported US actions and sent military forces to the region. For Japan, both of these deployments were seen as unprecedented at the time, but clearly, considering the past two chapters, these developments were part of the same unitary line of development that had seen Japan more and more willing to militarily support US actions. The earlier discussed development of Japan becoming a "normal country," can easily be seen as part of this same process.[966]

As discussed earlier, the alliance security dilemma framework can explain these outcomes in a satisfactory manner, in many ways providing explanations that seem intuitively correct. However, it lacks the coherence in its explanatory variables and assumptions of motives that need to be made in explaining each outcome. The asymmetric alliance framework does not suffer from the same challenge as most of the events fit nicely into the framework of power asymmetry and the demands of the powerful ally. However, as already noted, it seemed that the stars were aligned for most of the outcomes observed during for this period. For most events, it seems that both threats and domestic politics fit the outcomes and that both the alliance security dilemma and asymmetric alliance frameworks can be plausibly applied. If anything, this demonstrates the limits of using theoretical frameworks to explain a limited number of events from a short-term time perspective. The sources of change and continuity, as well as the awareness of how much change and continuity there actually is, can only be accurately assessed from a long-term perspective. For this purpose, these topics will be taken up and thoroughly examined in the final part.

966 See Chapter 3, 62-63.

6 Rise of new rivalry and end of unipolarity in Asia (from 2008 onwards)

While the early 2000s were characterized by the seeming convergence of interests between the US and its potential rivals, the end of the first decade of the new millennium saw much of these cooperative arrangements unravel. While the War on Terror certainly did not end in the late 2000s – in many ways it is still ongoing in early 2020s – it was doubtlessly increasingly overshadowed by other events. The new Democratic Party President Barack Obama had campaigned on a platform calling for an end to the wasteful wars in the wider Middle East region and US forces in Iraq were consequently soon withdrawn. At the same time, the global economy entered a severe recession and, by the time western economies started to recover in the early 2010s, China had overtaken Japan as the second-largest economy in the world. These developments coincided with increasingly bellicose behavior from China in the Asian littoral regions. Further, Russia's 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine and its seizure of the Crimean Peninsula made it definitively clear that the post-Cold War unipolar period was over. By the end of the 2010s, talk of possible armed conflicts among large powers became common. In Realist terminology, it was clear that US hegemony was now over. Its unipolar position in the Asia-Pacific was challenged by China, and its old rival – in the form of an autocratic Russia instead of USSR – was increasingly pushing back against US influence in Europe and the Middle East.

Regarding US allies in the Asia-Pacific, this period was one of increasing uncertainty. The North Korean nuclear arsenal kept growing, along with other military capabilities, and its actions were increasingly antagonistic. China's relations with both Japan and Australia worsened as its rising economic and military power was accompanied by increasingly assertive security policies. The domestic politics of Japan and Australia again became quite similar. The strong administrations of the mid-2000s gave way to opposition parties who were thought to be less pro-alliance and less pro-U.S. These administrations suffered from infighting in both Japan and Australia and were again replaced by conservative governments by the early 2010s. Since this period, both governments have been relatively stable but have witnessed periodic crises, most of which had no bearing on their respective alliances with the US.

The outcomes of this period included the withdrawal from US operations in Middle East, and in Australia's case, the redeployment of their troops after the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist organization. Other international security operations declined to extremely modest levels, especially with regards to Australia. Technology cooperation integrated both Japan and Australia further into the missile defense systems and other fields, while other developments in the alliances were related to the redeployment of US forces in the Asia-Pacific. This meant fewer US

forces in Japan but more in Australia. Both Australia and Japan further developed their alliances via new forms of cooperation farther away from their own areas. In Japan, the relocation of US forces was presented as a way to ease the controversies surrounding US bases on Okinawa, but the strategic rationale, as described in the US Department of Defense strategy papers, was an adjustment to growing Chinese power. US forces in Okinawa were increasingly vulnerable to powerful Chinese and North Korean missile forces that could easily target the whole of Japan, too.

This will be the final chapter describing alliance developments before moving forward with an analysis of the theoretical implications of the observed events. The final time period of our study provides a vital testing ground for several of our independent variables. Firstly, the focus of US security thinking began to move from away from the Middle East back towards Asia-Pacific; secondly, the political landscape changed again as the parties in power for most of the late 1990s and early 2000s lost elections to their rivals; thirdly, the Asia-Pacific region became increasingly volatile as territorial disputes and other issues became increasingly contentious. Hence, we can observe the alliance outcomes, including their continuity and change over time, in contrast to these recent changes for a fuller understanding of their drivers. The global financial crisis also brought home the fact that the US could no longer consider itself as the sole chief economic engine of the world economy. Arguably, it was China, and not the US, that seemed to come out stronger as the economic crisis began to fade. From the point of view of alliance theories, it can be observed that the security guarantees provided by the US to its junior allies were no longer absolute in the sense that China could now perceivably challenge its access to the Western Pacific. At the same time, however, the threats facing US allies, especially Japan, were increasingly severe.

6.1 The United States and the Asia-Pacific in the late 2000s and early 2010s

The Northeast of Asia was increasingly unstable with North Korean nuclear and missile tests as well as several instances of shooting exchanges with South Korean vessels. China's military buildup was increasingly accompanied by assertive policies and small-scale confrontations over disputed islands. Notably, China was also increasingly active in the southern part of the Pacific, with confrontations over South China Sea islets. However, China's influence in the waters near Australia were still extremely limited and the immediate region near Australia was stabilized to a great extent. At the same time, the US presence in the area was going through some changes. The ongoing conflicts meant that US forces were concentrated in the Middle East until the early part of the 2010s. As part of the overall posture change, some elements previously located in Japan were redeployed to Guam and Hawaii.

After the reductions of the mid 2000s, the number of US troops in Japan was slightly over 35,000.[967] Most significantly, despite declarations of a "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia by the Obama administration, the mounting challenges in the Middle East and Europe, as well as continued fiscal challenges, were clearly occupying most the US focus, thus eroding the credibility of the pivot, especially as China's relative power grew every year.[968]

China as a global and regional power

By the end of 2010s, it was increasingly clear that China had become the most powerful regional state in the Asia-Pacific. The economic crisis of 2008 had hit the US and its allies hard, but China managed to maintain a relatively steady GDP growth throughout the crisis and emerged as a global economic engine.[969] At the beginning of the 2010s, China's relations with its neighbors were mainly amicable. Bilateral relations between China and Japan were stable and there were even projects to mutually examine controversial historical issues between the two nations.[970] However, by middle part of the decade, relations had begun to suffer, and China was increasingly seen as a threatening force in Japan and elsewhere. China's military spending had surpassed Japanese defense expenditures in 2005, and by 2010, China was spending more than twice the amount of Japan.[971] Already in 2010, a US Department of Defense report to Congress noted that China's increasing capabilities could plausibly be used to deny US access to key areas in the East and South China Seas. By the middle of the decade, it was clear that China's missile forces, supported by increasingly numerous submarines and long-range-capable air forces could seriously threaten any US or Japanese vessels operating further away, even all the way to Guam and the Mariana Islands. China's

967 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, editions 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.

968 E.g., Nicholas Szechenyi, "The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Prospects to Strengthen the Asia-Pacific Order," in *U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power* ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Greg Chaffin (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2015), 41.

969 E.g., William H. Overholt, "China in the Global Financial Crisis: Rising Influence, Rising Challenges," in *Washington Quarterly* 33, no.1 (2010).

970 James J. Przystup, *Japan-China Relations 2005–2010: Managing Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, October 2012.

971 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (Accessed August 8, 2021)

strategic capabilities in nuclear, space, and information domains could disrupt its opponents even farther away.[972]

In the early 2010s, the Chinese began to show increased assertiveness in contested maritime areas. In the East China Sea, China's relations with Japan deteriorated rapidly after an incident in which a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in a disputed area northeast of Okinawa. The arrest of the trawler's crew by the Japanese Coast Guard prompted a diplomatic incident and led to anti-Japanese street protests in China. Relations worsened yet again after the ownership of some of the contested islands was transferred to the Japanese central government from a private owner in 2012. On this occasion, street protests in China turned violent and several Japanese-owned businesses were attacked. Escalating tensions were accompanied by an increase in Chinese naval and air activities near the Japanese islands and several tense encounters between Chinese and Japanese military vessels took place.[973] China's continued growth, its yearly double-digit increase in military spending, and its increasingly aggressive foreign policies were correspondingly noted in the threat evaluations of the regional states.[974]

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea soon became increasingly acrimonious as well. China's territorial claim in the region expands all the way down to the Indonesian coast and includes most of the South China Sea. This claim overlaps with claims made by Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei. Initially, the developments followed patterns similar to those occurring in the East China Sea, including the use of "maritime militia" in the form of fishing boats manned by personnel granted semi-official militia status. These "little blue men" would impede other countries' fishing activities while official military vessels would be on stand-by farther away.[975] The unorthodox use of military and pseudo-military power posed a challenge, especially to the traditional Japanese Self-defense Forces. After the early 2010s, China's approach in the South China Sea became increasingly militarized and it began to artificially enlarge several of its islets in the area. By the middle of the decade, it had transformed several reefs into military outposts through massive land reclamation and infrastructure building projects. By that time, at least four of its 27

972 United States Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018, Annual Report 2018.

973 E.g., *BBC News*, "How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties," November 10, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139 (Accessed August 8, 2021).

974 Smith, *Japan Rearmed*, 109-110.

975 E.g., *Defensenews* "China's 'Little Blue Men' Take Navy's Place in Disputes," November 2, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/11/02/china-lassen-destroyer-spratly-islands-south-china-sea-andrew-erickson-naval-war-college-militia-coast-guard-navy-confrontation-territorial-dispute/75070058/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

outposts in the Spratly and Paracel islands, had functional military bases, including airfields, deep-water ports as well as extensive fortifications. Granted, almost all claimants had by that time engaged in artificial "island building" in the area, but none of these efforts were comparable to China's massive projects.[976]

Australia's relations with the rising power remained relatively amiable in the mid-2010s. Chinese military power was still far away as neither its naval nor airpower had developed the reach to effectively work beyond its immediate region. On the other hand, Chinese immigrants were becoming a more prominent part of Australian society and Chinese trade with Australia continued to grow.[977] Nonetheless, in 2013, the incoming Coalition Party Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced a program to make Australia less reliant on China by favoring Japan and other trade partners. Despite the rhetoric, Australia's strategic partnership with China, established by the previous government, was actively upheld and the Coalition Party government actively pursued a FTA with China, which was eventually signed in 2015.[978]

The 2013 Australian security strategy document notes that the main security risks for Australia did not include a direct attack but rather indirect consequences from a possible conflict between other states. This can be seen as a clear reference to potential conflict between the United States and China.[979] Even though still distant, the creeping spread of Chinese military influence was brought home to Australian general awareness in 2014 when a Chinese naval flotilla of three warships sailed to the air-sea gap through the Sunda Strait and conducted highly publicized live-fire exercises south of Java Island.[980] In 2013, China sent a nuclear submarine to the Indian Ocean and in 2015, PLAN vessels even sailed to the US coast.[981] So arguably,

976 Center for Security and International Studies maintains an online archive of satellite images tracing the island-building projects in the area under the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

977 E.g., Andrew S. Erickson, "China's Modernization of its Naval and Air Power Capabilities", in *China's Military Challenge*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (eds.), (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2012), 78-79.

978 Bates Gill, "The U.S. – Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia," in *U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power*, ed. Ashley, J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Greg Chaffin (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2015), 101.

979 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security*. Commonwealth of Australia, 2013.

980 E.g., *ABC News*, "RAAF monitored Chinese military exercises in waters between Christmas Island and Indonesia," February 13, 2014.

981 E.g., *The Wall Street Journal*, "Chinese Navy Ships Came Within 12 Nautical Miles of U.S. Coast," September 4, 2015.

while China was still distant, there was no question that some perceived its activities as constituting a threat to Australian interest and even security over the long term.

PLA military developments in the early 2010s

In 2008, China's Defense White Paper announced that China's defense policy aim was to protect national security and unity, and to guard China's national development. China would seek to develop its military capabilities for this purpose and pursue a defensive nuclear policy. The main threats facing China were seen to be secessionism by separatists forces in places such as Taiwan. The paper also noted that the US supported these forces by selling arms to Taiwan. According to paper, the US was pursuing militaristic hegemony, which it increasingly supported through military means. While the paper emphasized the strictly defensive role of the PLA, it also noted that countering the threats facing China required a concept of active defense. This was to be achieved through, among other things, the active pursuit of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics, the aim of which was to fully modernize its forces by the mid-21st century.[982] While military modernization is commonplace throughout the world, China's build-up was increasingly worrisome considering its advancing missile and maritime force projection capabilities, combined with its often-cited lack of transparency.[983]

Already in 2010, it was estimated that China's active defense would rely on projecting power within the island chains surrounding China's coast to prevent the US from controlling these areas.[984] According to US estimates, this would include disrupting (anti-access) US forces inside the second island chain running from central Honshu to Saipan and Guam by engaging vessels and installations with long range missiles, submarines, and bombers armed with cruise missiles. Forces coming within the first island chain running from the southern Japanese islands through Okinawa and Taiwan to the South China Sea would be defeated (area denial) by naval forces, cruise missiles, and the PLA Air Forces. The PLA Navy has specifically invested in advanced frigate-sized vessels that would be ideally suited

982 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defense in 2008*, Beijing. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2009-01/21/content_17162870.htm (Accessed August 8, 2021)

983 Japan Ministry of Defense, *National defense program guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond*, Tokyo, 2010.

984 United States Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*, Annual Report to Congress, 2010.

for controlling the shallower waters in the East and South China Seas.[985] Local information superiority in these areas would be achieved via anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare.[986] While this type of layered defense could be understood as purely defensive, all of the disputed territories, as well as Taiwan and the southern Japanese islands, fall within the inner defense layer. In this sense, active defense can be seen as an aggressive posture.

Anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies are based on advanced technological and operational capabilities. Advanced sensors, as well command and control of information, are needed to target approaching enemy forces hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away. Advanced weapons are also required to strike these forces. Therefore, Chinese development programs have included enhanced C4SIR capabilities for target acquisition such as over-the-horizon radars. The ability to strike at and disable potential enemy bases within range of the Chinese coast is seen to be one important part of this strategy. In the beginning of the 2010s, China had already developed a way to effectively deter US power projection by developing and fielding an anti-ship ballistic missile DF-21D, which was referred to in the media as the "Carrier killer" missile.[987] By the middle of the decade, China's aircraft development programs included stealth fighters as well as advanced carrier-borne fighters and long-range bombers. These assets would provide China with extended reach into US or allied-controlled areas and disrupt operations ever farther away from China. While advanced weapons could disrupt US operations far away, large numbers of conventional missiles would be used to target US bases in Japan and Guam, thus making these bases vulnerable.[988]

On the other hand, China was building more capabilities that could be employed for power projection and even to occupy contested areas. At sea, China's most high-profile project was the establishment of an aircraft carrier force, which began with the retrofitting of an old Soviet-built carrier hull. China had covertly begun its carrier program in the early part of the century and its first vessel was ready to sail in the beginning of the following decade.[989] By 2011, China acquired 50 SU-33 fighters from Russia that were fitted for carriers, although these were set to be later replaced

985 E.g., Andrew S. Erickson, "China's Modernization of its Naval and Air Power Capabilities", in *China's Military Challenge,* ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2012), 68-69.

986 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *Why Air Sea Battle*, Washington, 2010.

987 United States Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*, Annual Report to Congress 2010, 29-31.

988 Erickson, *China's Modernization of its Naval and Air Power Capabilities*, 71-73.

989 United States Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, *Peoples Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics*, US Navy, 2009, 19.

by Chinese-made fighters.[990] The first carrier would serve as a testbed for China's indigenously built carrier force, which in the late 2010s, had produced its first vessel with a further three scheduled by the middle of the following decade.[991] In addition to aircraft carriers, China's naval build-up program included nuclear submarines and at least eight modern amphibious assault vessels. By 2020, China had acquired two of these ships capable of carrying and launching at least thirty helicopters and landing crafts, and was in the process of building even larger vessels of the same type.[992] Used together in conjunction with aircraft carriers, land-based aircraft, and other naval forces, these kinds of ships could be used to land troops and occupy islands even under attack from opposing military forces.[993] The development of these capabilities has been observed with increasing alarm in the US Department of Defense reports since 2010.[994] In 2019, it was reported that while China still lacked the capabilities needed for a direct assault on Taiwan, it was training and equipping several brigades of marines for such operations.[995]

China's military advancements, while technical and operational in nature, have a profound impact on the regional dynamics of military power and therefore, on US alliances. As China's reach and power grows, the US and its allies can no longer assume control of Asian littoral areas in the case of armed conflict. US access to the Western Pacific has been essentially uncontested ever since the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy. However, since the beginning of the 2010s, it is clear that Chinese missile- and air forces can strike and disable US bases all the way to Guam and thus seriously undermine the US ability to secure its interests and allies in the case of confrontation. In other words, US allies could not count on the US ability to prevent an attack against them. As will be discussed later, in order to respond to this new reality, US military doctrine began to focus on striking and attacking across the Pacific from bases all the way in Hawaii and the US west coast. For US allies, this of course means that they would potentially be left to fend for themselves until such time as US forces could regain the initiative in any conflict. Taking into account historical examples, it is worth remembering that a similar assessment of NATO's

990 Some reports can be found from the *Wall Street Journal*, "Chinese Aircraft Carrier Caught on Tape," January 31, 2011; *Reuters*, "China's aircraft carrier ambitions," December 23, 2010.

991 United States Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018*, Annual Report to Congress, 2018.

992 *South China Morning Post*, "Chinese shipbuilder planning advanced amphibious assault ship," July 27, 2020.

993 E.g., Erickson, *China's Modernization of its Naval and Air Power Capabilities*, 69.

994 United States Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*, Annual Report to Congress, 2010.

995 United States Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019*, Annual Report to Congress, 2019, 37, 87-89.

inability to stop the superior numbers of Soviet forces from taking over mainland Europe via conventional means was one of key reasons behind for the French decision to quit NATO and develop its own indigenous nuclear weapons program in the 1960s.[996]

New and old threats (DPRK, regional terrorism)

While by far the biggest changes in the Asia-Pacific came from the ascension of China, smaller threats also persisted and provided a continuous source of instability in the Pacific. The first North Korean nuclear test in 2006 was followed by further test detonations in 2009, 2013, and 2016. These were accompanied by a series of ballistic missile tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. In 2012, the DPRK also attempted a satellite launch that resulted in at least a partially successful orbital insertion. The six party talks, initiated in 2003, held their final meeting in 2007. The talks were officially ended in 2009 as the situation deteriorated and due to an exchange of fire between North and South Korean vessels near the maritime demarcation line. In March 2010, a South Korean corvette was sunk by a DPRK submarine in the same area. In November 2010, the situation culminated in the artillery bombardment of a South Korean-held island and South Korean artillery retaliation against DPRK positions. The death of Kim Jong-Il and the ascension of his son Kim Jong-un was a likely cause for the North's belligerent actions, and the change in leadership introduced an element of uncertainty to the situation. [997] By the end of the decade, only slight progress has been made as promises of amelioration were followed by consecutive crises continuing into the second half of the decade.

It is worth noting that relations among Northeast Asian countries were increasingly difficult at the time. Japan's relations with South Korea suffered from the re-emergence of old war-time issues, and the South Korean government seemed content to divert domestic political discontent towards a popular old enemy. Further, following the Russian annexation of Crimea, Japan joined most western countries in imposing sanctions against it. Notably, South Korea refrained from directly joining these sanctions and thus Japan was increasingly isolated in the region. This was partially offset by Japan's increasing contacts with India and Southeast Asian countries. Japan increased its defense exchanges and transfers of military equipment

996 E.g., Frédéric Bozo, "France, Gaullism, and the Cold War," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Melvyn P. Leffler and Off Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

997 For a general account of the escalating tensions see John S. Park "Nuclear Ambition and Tension on the Korean Peninsula,", in *Asia in the Second Nuclear Age*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2013).

to the Philippines, which was also embroiled in a territorial dispute with China. By 2015, there was even discussion about dispatching Japanese MSDF vessels to the South China Sea to support the US Navy in the area.[998]

Australia's immediate region and the so-called Asia-Pacific "Arc of Instability," consisting of the weak microstates on the South Pacific islands, was relatively calm after the turmoil of mid-2000s, and the RAMSI-mission to Solomon Islands was even successfully concluded by 2013. The relations with Fiji were still poor following the 2006 military takeover, but although Fiji accused Australia of planning a military intervention, there were no indications that Australia would have been preparing for such an action.[999] There was also a minor military mutiny in Papua New Guinea in 2012 but this prompted no military reactions from regional states.[1000] While the region itself was calm, and there were no new terror attacks in Indonesia, new types of terror networks demonstrated their global reach as the first terror attack in Australia took place in December 2014. Three people were killed and several injured in an attack in a Sydney café. This was followed by several terror alerts and the arrest of suspected terrorists in Australia.[1001]

The Lombok Treaty on Security Cooperation with Indonesia, signed in November 2006, was ratified in 2008. This was followed by a joint statement from the heads of the Australian and Indonesian defense forces in January 2009. Australia's 2013 defense White Paper was exceptionally positive in its assessment of Indonesia.[1002] However, relations with Indonesia again soured substantially after revelations of Australian spying on high-level Indonesian officials and politicians came to light in 2013-2014.[1003] Despite these issues, relations with Australia's northern neighbor were generally improving: Indonesia was a clear benefactor of the Gillard government's Asian Century White Paper and, after the Coalition Party again won the premiership, the incoming government maintained these priorities as Prime Minister Abbot's first foreign visit was to Jakarta and second to Bali.[1004]

998 *Mainichi*, "Japan to Mull SDF dispatch to S. China Sea: Abe," November 22, 2015.
999 E.g., *BBC News*, "Australia and NZ expel Fijians", November 4, 2009.
1000 E.g., *BBC News*, "Papua New Guinea mutiny leade arrested", January 29, 2012.
1001 *The Wall Street Journal*, "Australian Police Charge Five Over Sydney Terror Attack Plans," December 10, 2015.
1002 Stephan Fruehling, "The 2013 Defence White Paper: Strategic Guidance Without Strategy," in *Security Challenges* 9, no.2 (2013): 43-50
1003 E.g., *Sydney Morning Herald*, "The raw prawn: Marty Natalegawa takes swipe at Tony Abbot over prawn spying claim," February 17, 2014.
1004 E.g., Gill, *The U.S. – Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia*, 99-100.

The United States and the pivot to Asia

At the end of the 2000s, the US had been increasingly focused on every aspect of its war on terror. When the war in Iraq reached its peak between 2006-2008, and the fighting in Afghanistan reignited, the US found itself involved in two major conflicts while supporting and undertaking several lower-level operations all over the world. When Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert Gates in 2006, the emphasis of his inauguration speech was wholly on the two wars and, as Gates notes in his memoirs, his highest priorities were clear as the US "was engaged in two major wars every single day" of his tenure. In an unusual move, the incoming Obama administration asked Secretary Gates to stay on despite the change to a Democratic Party-led administration, hence Gates continued to serve as Secretary of Defense until 2010.[1005] The fact that someone so focused on Bush administration's trademark wars remained Secretary of Defense is a clear indication of how much these wars weighed on US foreign policy, arguably taking US focus away from other issues and regions.[1006]

The Obama administration, like the Bush administration in 2001, came to office with a stated agenda to change the foreign policies pursued by its predecessor.[1007] However, unlike with first Bush administration, domestic politics, especially the lagging economy, were the driving issues and had significant implications and limitations for the foreign policy during the early years of the new administration.[1008] One notable change, which was immediately visible in US foreign policy documents was the more pragmatic stance on foreign policy, which toned down any idealistic agendas. Themes such as fighting tyranny and championing human freedom, continuously repeated in Bush administration's 2006 NSS, are notable in their absence from Obama's 2010 strategy. In contrast, the 2010 National Security Strategy emphasizes that terrorism is "only one element of our strategic environment and cannot define America's engagement with the world." For the Obama administration, the first objective was to end those wars and focus on rebuilding the US economy.[1009]

1005 Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 11, 25, 29, 335.

1006 See also Barack Obama, *A Promised Land* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2020), 214-215.

1007 E.g., Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 5-6.

1008 Ibid., 8-9.

1009 White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, May 2010.; For detailed analysis on continuities and differences between the strategies of the Bush and Obama administrations see Christopher Hemmer, "Continuity and Change in Obama Administration's National Security Strategy," in *Comparative Strategy* 30 (2011): 268-277.

While distancing itself from the previous Republican Party administration, the Obama administration nonetheless steered clear of the humanitarian multilateralism of the early Clinton era. Rather, it is apparent that the aversion to the use of military force for humanitarian issues was one line of continuity from the late Clinton administration through to the Bush and Obama administrations. Many scholars have noted that it has been difficult to pin down a coherent strategy set out for the Obama administration, aside from a certain pragmatic view of foreign policy as opposed to the Bush-era ideology that guided foreign policy during his tenure.[1010] Stemming from this pragmatism, the Obama administration initially pursued a more lenient approach towards states with questionable democratic or human rights credentials such as China, Russia, and even Iran and North Korea.[1011] One similarity that Obama's security stance shares with the Clinton's administration is the emphasis on economic power and the reduction of wasteful military spending, especially after the economic difficulties of the late 2000s and rising national debts of the early 2010s. After withdrawing from Iraq, one of the key goals for US policy makers was therefore the reduction of budget deficits. The Obama administration announced reductions of around $500 billion in defense budgets over the next decade.[1012]

Secondly, the Obama administration sought to redirect US focus toward the Asia-Pacific. His message was that after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration would focus on the Asia-Pacific region.[1013] Initial concrete measures included joining the East Asian Summit as well as pursuing a set of multilateral free trade arrangements known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).[1014] In order to reinforce its alliances, the US encouraged stronger defense ties between Japan, South Korea, and Australia.[1015] This so-called Pivot to Asia, announced by Secretary of State Clinton in 2011, started out as diplomatic initiative, but was increasingly understood in military strategic terms among US policy elites after China began to assume more aggressive policies in 2011-2012. By that time, the military pivot was increasingly central to US dealings with its allies anxious about Chinese actions.[1016] By the end of 2013, the pivot had been transformed into a "Rebalance to Asia" and

1010 Indyk, Lieberthal and O'Hanlon, *Bending History*, 21-22.
1011 Ibid., 21-22.
1012 E.g., Leon Panetta, *Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 371-374.
1013 E.g., Hillary Clinton, "America`s Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2011.
1014 E.g., Congressional Research Service, *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia,* Report for Congress, March 28, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf (Accessed August 8, 2021).
1015 E.g., United States Congress, *Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense on U.S. Pacific Command Posture*, April 14, 2011, 6-7, 8, 21, 25.
1016 Interview with Zack Cooper, February 7, 2014.

was mainly seen as a set of strategies to prepare for a potential conflict with China. However, whether military or diplomatic – a pivot or a rebalance – by 2014, the credibility of the entire strategy was increasingly questioned among its allies.[1017] The US again became preoccupied with crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe and was constrained by congressional fiscal battles over the massive increase of US government debts.[1018]

After 2010, US military strategies still focused on transition and change, with the expectation that the US presence in the Middle East could be permanently redirected to the Asia-Pacific.[1019] The Obama administration's concrete military strategy for the Asia-Pacific began to form with the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2010. Granted, this document firstly emphasized that the US should focus on "prevailing in today's wars" in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it also dealt with a range of issues that did not appear in the Bush administration's strategies. Most notably, one of the 2010 QDR's main points was that the US must be able to fight "potentially hostile nation-states" that would use anti-access strategies to deny US access to key regions. While Iran and North Korea are mentioned, China is clearly the main focus of this chapter in the document as it calls for establishing an operational air-sea battle concept.[1020]

By the mid-2010s the world had changed, this is also evident in US strategy papers. Reading the 2015 National Security Strategy it seems that the US had been successful in shedding the wars of the previous decade. However, even though the strategy continues to emphasize the administration's rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific, the list of security challenges now includes the ISIS terrorist group in the Middle East, Russian cyberattacks, and aggression in Eastern Europe – even issues as serious as the Ebola pandemic in Africa. Notably, Asia-Pacific and China only appear after these issues.[1021] The 2014 QDR, which is characterized by its focus on budget cuts and savings, presented itself as post-wartime strategy and tried to make a break with more than a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It focused more on the Asia-Pacific and again concentrated on rebalancing US forces.[1022] Although the concept encompasses US forces globally, its focus is clearly on the region. The role

1017 E.g., *The Strait Times* "US pivot unraveling" September 17, 2014.

1018 E.g., Michael McDevitt, "The Origin and Evolution of the Rebalance," in *Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance toward Asia*, ed. Hugo, Meijer (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 31-54.

1019 United States Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012.

1020 United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, 5-7, 31-32.

1021 White House, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015.

1022 United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2014, v–vii.

of US allies in the Asia-Pacific is emphasized. The strategy calls for optimizing allied contributions towards their own security and combining allied activities. The QDR specifically notes allied contributions and especially Japan's role in defending the US homeland from missile attacks.[1023]

US military planning for Asia-Pacific scenarios included several new, or newly rediscovered, elements and, consequently, new requirements for the roles that US allies should play in these plans.[1024] During the early 2010s, the US Department of Defense developed a set of doctrines for fighting against an adversary attempting to deny US forces' access to maritime and littoral areas (A2/AD).[1025] These strategies are commonly referred to as the Air-Sea Battle doctrine (later renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, JAG-GC). As this doctrine was specifically developed with the Western Pacific and Chinese capabilities in mind, it warrants some discussion here. Although the ideas behind these concepts are not entirely new and many of their central elements were already developed during the Cold War, but as the Pacific was a secondary area for the Soviet Union, the US never had to consider how to fight a peer competitor in the Asia-Pacific. The difference in the early 2010s was the presence of a potential peer competitor that would be fighting near its own area while US forces were subject to a so-called "tyranny of distance" and would therefore need to deploy from the eastern Pacific and rely on its allies to maintain a foothold in the western part.[1026]

The first official publication of these plans was the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), published in 2012.[1027] The JOAC begins by noting the vulnerability of forward-deployed forces and bases situated within range of an adversary's weapons. The downsides of permanently forward-deployed forces are further explained by noting that "even longstanding allies may, for political reasons, deny access for a particular operation" and that "In the end, joint forces must be able to gain by force the operational access needed…."[1028] While forward bases remain important, they need to be hardened and dispersed to smaller, preferably temporary, locations. The entire idea revolves around an adversary's ability to strike targets and

1023 Ibid., 32.
1024 E.g., Andrew F. Krepinevich, *Why Air-Sea Battle,* Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2010.
1025 E.g., Jan Van Tol, *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2010.
1026 See, for example, General Norton Schwartz, *Joint CSAF-CNO Discussion on the Air-Sea Battle Concept*, Washington, May 16, 2012. http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/05/16-air-sea-doctrine (Accessed August 8, 2021)
1027 United States Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, January 2012.
1028 Ibid., 8.

disrupt operations in any given area. Hence, US forces will prepare to gain and secure access by striking at the adversary's capabilities and disrupting its reconnaissance and surveillance through superior capabilities in stealth and undersea domains. The main striking power will then "maneuver directly against key operational objectives from strategic distance" – meaning from outside the enemy's weapons range – and strike at an adversary's defenses in its entire depth.[1029] In essence, the main elements of US forces should be kept at a safe distance from the enemy so that once hostilities commence, they could strike from a distance and thus go on the offensive instead of being forced to defend their forward positions close to the attackers' home bases. Smaller forward-deployed elements would only help maintain access to key areas until the adversary could be rolled back by forces operating from farther away.[1030]

The Air-Sea Battle concept of 2013 describes the specific operational demands required.[1031] The concept suggests that US allies should focus on building compatible capabilities and ensuring US access to the necessary facilities.[1032] The associated Joint Concept for Entry Operations notes that operations would most likely be conducted with the support or in support of partner nations. Rotationally, forward-deployed forces provide the flexibility of response and capability to surge the number of forces rapidly if needed. To support the rapid rotation of troops to different locations, the concept suggests establishing a standard coalition system that would facilitate networking and integration with allied forces.[1033] Overall, the Air Sea Battle and its associated concepts describe a force that would increasingly operate from farther away, rely less on forward deployed elements, and depend more on prearranged access to facilities. The idea that allied forces would supplement US forces and that the forward bases should be hardened to withstand area denial attacks is mentioned several times, but overall, the role assigned to allies is left rather ambiguous. As previously mentioned, the Air-Sea Battle was renamed as Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAG-GC) in 2015 to signal its development into a mature doctrine.[1034]

Operational plans were accompanied with several adjustments to US military force posture in the Western Pacific. Notably, the reduction of US Marines from

1029 Ibid., 23-24.
1030 United States Marine Corps Headquarters, *Force Design 2030 (CMC38)*, March 2020.
1031 United States Department of Defense, *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges*, May 2013.
1032 Ibid., 11.
1033 United States Department of Defense, *Joint Concept for Entry Operations*, Aril, 2014.
1034 The concept document itself is classified and therefore not available for citation. For an overview see Michael E. Hutchens, William D. Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Vincent D. Bryant, and Kerry E. Moores, "Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons: A New Joint Operational Concept," in *Joint Force Quarterly* 84, January 27, 2017.

Okinawa, planned since the mid-90s, was concluded under this readjustment. Large elements were moved to Guam, some of whom would be permanently rotated to Northern Australia after 2012. A Marine Air-Ground Task Force would be based on this rotational deployment to operate in Southeast Asia and Oceania.[1035] Perhaps the most concrete part of the overall pivot to Asia was the change in the US Navy's posture, which moved from a 50-50 division of US naval assets between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to a 40-60 division favoring the Pacific. Other significant changes included the permanent station of the US Navy's newly developed littoral combat ships to Singapore, and the prepositions of US military equipment and supplies to northern Australia.[1036]

In January 2017, Donald Trump became the President of the United States and one of the Trump administration's first decisions was to scrap the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Trump also scrapped several other Obama-era policies and several even older policy lines were also discontinued. The Trump administration's 2017 National Security Strategy firstly discusses border security and immigration policy before returning to the old George W. Bush presidency themes of defeating terrorists. Notably, the 2017 NSS even echoes themes from the Clinton era as it elevates economic issues, taking up the second chapter, just after border protection and terrorism.[1037] In a way, the 2017 NSS represented all the ways in which US interests and those of its allies in the Asia-Pacific have been sidelined over the last few decades. Further, as for the TPP during the Trump administration, only the military side of the so-called pivot to Asia had any lasting effects. Especially as the US under Trump administration seemed to be headed for a confrontation with China. In sum, it can be observed that for almost a decade, the US has been searching for an answer to China's rise but has been unable to formulate and follow a coherent strategy to do so. It seems that its political and economic actions have consistently come up short, leaving only the military side of the rebalance.

Japan's resurgence and military revival

In Japan, the 2010s were a period of consecutive crises and several changes in administrations. As noted, after Koizumi, Japan returned to being led by a succession of changing Prime Ministers before a new level of stability was established during Shinzo Abe's second term. At the time, Japan also faced several crises including a

1035 United States Department of Defense, *Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore*, June 2, 2012.

1036 United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2014.

1037 White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017.

devastating tsunami and nuclear accident, as well as diplomatic challenges, including acrimony with China and the deteriorating security situation in the Korean Peninsula. However, during these turbulent years Japan managed to begin several new security initiatives under different governments and ruling parties. After Koizumi, the first administration led by Shinzo Abe lasted from September 2006 until September 2007 and was characterized by a series of scandals and infighting with the government. The LDP eventually lost the elections to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Yukio Hatoyama in August 2009 and the DPJ governance lasted until Shinzo Abe again became Prime Minister in December 2012.[1038]

The 2009 victory of the DPJ and Hatoyama, who was running on a platform critical of US bases in Japan, was seen to herald difficult times for the alliance.[1039] The DPJ election manifesto promised to change the terms of the alliance and, before assuming premiership, Hatoyama published an article in the New York Times titled "A New Path for Japan," which stated that "the era of U.S.-led globalism is coming to an end" and that Japan would now concentrate on its East Asian relations.[1040] To realize this aim, Hatoyama attempted to begin a new East Asian community framework, which however, was never adopted by other Asian nations even though Australia shared similar aspirations at the time.[1041] The Hatoyama government also included the Socialist Party, which had again reaffirmed its opposition to the JSDF and the military alliance. Hatoyama's domestic reform agenda included installing new policymaking processes and doing away with what the DPJ saw as excessive bureaucratic control of policymaking. However, this resulted in difficulties in coordination among different ministries at a time when the government was setting out to make drastic policy changes.[1042]

In September 2009, the Hatoyama government announced that it would seek to change the agreement regarding US bases in Okinawa. This alone alarmed several actors, as the agreement on the relocation, reached in 2006, had been the result of more than a decade of negotiations. The US had invited DPJ representatives to discuss its positions on alliance-related matters when the Hatoyama administration was assuming office, but the consultations failed to produce a common understanding between the governments. Members of the Hatoyama cabinet gave

1038 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 108, 113-114.

1039 E.g., *New York Times*, "Japan's New Leader Reassures U.S. on Alliance," September 3, 2009.

1040 *New York Times*, "A New Path for Japan," August 26, 2009.

1041 E.g., Christopher W. Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (but Failing) Grand Security Strategy: From 'Reluctant Realism' to 'Resentful Realism'?" in *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 38, no.1 (2012)

1042 Frances Rosenbluth, "Japan in 2010: Messy Politics but Healthier Democracy," in *Asian Survey* 51, no. 1 (2011); Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 180-181.

statements to the press, to Okinawans, and to the US side, which conflicted heavily with each other and demonstrated poor coordination within the cabinet.[1043] A bilateral working group on the Futenma Replacement Facility was established in November 2009, only to confirm that past agreements would be maintained. Nonetheless, in December 2009, the Hatoyama administration established a new Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Base Issue within his government. In May 2010, the SCC once again reaffirmed the outlines of the roadmap agreement but agreed to review the details of implementation from the point of view of easing the burdens on Okinawans.[1044]

Hatoyama announced in December of that same year that the decision on Okinawa would be made by the end of May 2010. However, a new mayor was elected for Nago city in Okinawa in January 2010. The incumbent LDP candidate had supported the plan for relocating the Futenma base, while the new DPJ mayor refused to allow the agreed plan to be carried out. Following the elections, the governor of Okinawa also renounced his support for the relocation plan. Hence, the decision to implement the plan was delayed to the point where it was no longer feasible.[1045] In May 2010, Hatoyama reneged on his pledge to relocate the Futenma facility outside of Okinawa and backed the original plan, but now it was too late. In doing so, Hatoyama also lost the support of the Socialist Party and had to dismiss the Socialist Party's cabinet minister Fukushima. Hatoyama was forced to resign in June 2010 due to consecutive failures and was followed as Prime Minister by Naoto Kan.[1046]

Kan became Prime Minister with a split party, as he was opposed by Ichiro Ozawa who narrowly lost the contest for party leadership. The Kan administration reverted to more pro-US policies and initiated negotiations to include Japan in the US-sponsored Tran-Pacific Partnership agreement. Kan also scaled back many of the anti-bureaucratic policies initiated by Hatoyama.[1047] However, the Kan administration was heavily criticized over its handling of the Senkaku trawler incident and this, together with other issues including financing scandals, weakened Kan's and the DPJ's position further. In March 2011, Japan was hit by a massive earthquake followed by a Tsunami which killed tens of thousands of people. These were followed by a nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant. The Kan

1043 Ibid., 168-170, 173-174.

1044 Security Consultative Committee, *Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee*, May 28, 2010. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint1005.html (Accessed August 8, 2021)

1045 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 177-179.

1046 E.g., *BBC News*, "Japanese PM Yukio Hatoyama resigns amid Okinawa row," June 2, 2010.

1047 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 182-183.

administration was again heavily criticized over its handling the disaster and Kan too was forced to resign in August 2011.[1048] However, before resigning, Kan managed to pass a series of bills, including a controversial denuclearization bill.[1049]

The next DPJ Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, initiated a series of reforms to address the deficiencies that had surfaced in the government's handling of the crises. These also included significant departures from Japan's military restrictions. Noda established a new Council for National Strategy and Policy to address Japan's revival and to find ways to revitalize the Japanese economy after two decades of poor performance. In December 2011, already before the council submitted any recommendations, the Noda administration decided to permit the limited sales of Japanese military products abroad.[1050] In early 2012, a subcommittee consisting of four separate panels was established under the Council. One of these was tasked with addressing the issues relating to Japan's future security. The Prime Minister himself was active in this panel, attending several of the meetings in person during the spring of 2012.[1051] In July 2012, after the panel had submitted its report, the DPJ adopted a draft bill allowing Japan to engage in collective self-defense, previously considered unconstitutional.[1052]

Tensions around the disputed Senkaku Islands also affected Japanese politics in the early 2010s. The 2010 trawler incident was followed by recurring smaller-scale incidents, and in 2012, there was a standoff between Chinese and Japanese maritime authorities backed by their respective militaries with warships stationed just beyond the horizon. These events prompted the JSDF to increase its presence in the southern archipelago. Popular awareness of the disputed islands also prompted nationalist protests and antagonism on both sides. In Japan, influential nationalist politician, Shintaro Ishihara, attempted to acquire several of the contested islands from their private owner, prompting the Noda administration to nationalize the islands. The move was generally supported by the Japanese public but prompted angry protests from the Chinese.[1053]

1048 E.g., *New York Times*, "Inquiry Declares Fukushima Crisis a Man-Made Disaster," July 5, 2012. See also Daniel Kaufmann and Veronika Penciakova, *Japan's Triple Disaster: Governance and the Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Crises*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

1049 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics,* 203, 207, 213-214.

1050 E.g., *The Wall Street Journal*, "Japan Lifts Decades-long Ban on Export of Weapons," December 28, 2011.

1051 Japan Prime Minister's Office, *The Prime Minister in Action*, press release, February 1, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/actions/201202/01KAIGI_frontier_e.html; February 7, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/actions/201202/07heiwa_e.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1052 E.g., *Japan Times*, "Panel Seeks Permission for Collective Self-Defense," July 8, 2012.

1053 Smith, *Japan Rearmed,* 120-121.

The DPJ's first and only term in power came to an when it lost the December 2012 elections to the LDP and New Komeito by a landslide – the DPJ itself disbanded in 2016. The newly re-elected head of the LDP, Shinzo Abe, again became Prime Minister. Abe's position was strong as the LDP and New Komeito held a comfortable majority of seats. Another electoral victory in 2013 gave the Abe administration significant majorities in both houses of the Diet while the DPJ suffered devastating losses in both elections.[1054] Therefore, after 2013, the Abe administration was in a strong position, enhanced by the appointment of seasoned LDP leaders such as Taro Aso and Yoshihide Suga to key positions. As a traditionalist and member of the well-established ruling elite, Abe also enjoyed support from the bureaucracy, which had been under significant pressure during the preceding DPJ administrations.[1055] Further, unlike the DPJ administrations, Abe's public approval ratings seemed to climb with each crisis. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll showed that during the ISIS hostage crisis in early 2015, Abe's approval rose from 52% to around 58%. This popularity however began to lapse again as Abe pushed ahead with unpopular security legislation in 2015.[1056]

Security reforms continued during the shifts in the Japanese political landscape, albeit somewhat haltingly at times. The process to review the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), last updated by the Koizumi administration in 2004, was initiated by Prime Minister Aso in February 2009. As usual, a special council was established to draft a report on the strategic requirements for the update.[1057] However, the report written under the LDP was not acceptable to the DPJ administration and a new review was commissioned in early 2010. This council submitted its report to Prime Minister Kan in August 2010.[1058] The reports under the LDP and DPJ were mostly similar in content, their emphasis was placed on "dynamic deterrence" by the JSDF in order to respond to asymmetric challenges posed by the changing regional order. Especially threats presented by missiles, special operations forces or terrorists, and threats to remote islands are mentioned. So-called "grey-zone" events, meaning conflicts that are not yet open warfare but hold the potential of escalation, are specifically noted, along with threats already mentioned in the council's report. The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011-2015), issued along with

1054 Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, 203, 207, 226-227.
1055 Ibid., 203, 207, 230-231, 235.
1056 E.g., *Reuters*, "Abe's approval ratings rise in Japan after hostage crisis," February 8, 2015.
1057 Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, *Executive Summary*, August 2009.
1058 Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, *Japan's Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation*, Tokyo, 2010. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf (Accessed August 8, 2021).

the guidelines, strengthens the southwestern part of the SDF deployment. This is a concrete outcome of the emphasis on disputed "offshore islands" in the reports.[1059] After the LDP returned to power under the second Abe administration, the review processes were begun once again and a new NDPG 2014 was released in December 2013. Again, there were few significant changes. The only notable addition to the previous documents is the discussion about violations of Japanese air and sea areas originating from China. [1060]

The Abe administration began an aggressive drive for other security reforms as well. Along with other documents released in 2013, the Abe administration released Japan's first National Security Strategy with the stated aim of identifying Japan's long-term security interest.[1061] Prime Minister Abe also formally established a National Security Council, which had been on the agenda since the mid-2000s, to oversee national security policy. Next, the Abe administration initiated new security legislation to further relax constrains on collective self-defense.[1062] This reform proved controversial in many ways. On the one hand, the legislation was opposed by popular demonstrations in Japan, and on the other, Japan's neighbors, especially China, framed the legislation as a return to Japanese historical militarism. The Diet session in which the legislation was approved involved fist fights between politicians and the legislation was disputed even after its passing.[1063] The set of bills that controversially broadened the scope in which the JSDF could engage threats against allied forces, eventually passed; however, the process polarized Japan's political parties and cost Abe political capital in terms of public support as his administration was accused of having forced the bills through without proper process.[1064]

The public support for the alliance was fleeting. Following the March 2011 disasters, the alliance was celebrated for the support provided by US forces to Japan. According to a Pew Research Center poll, the percentage of Japanese favorably disposed towards the US increased from around 66% in 2010 to 85% in 2011, and

1059 Japan Ministry of Defense, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond* and *Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2011-FY2015)*, Tokyo, 2010.

1060 *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond* and *Medium-term Defense Program (FY 2014-FY2018)*, Tokyo, 2010.

1061 Japan Prime Minister`s Office, *National Security Strategy*, December 17, 2013. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf (Accessed August 8, 2021)

1062 E.g., Michael J. Green, "Reading Abe's national security strategy," *Lowy Interpreter* 118, December 2013.

1063 E.g., *BBC News*, "Japan's lower house approves change to self-defense law," July 16, 2015.

1064 E.g., Jeffrey W. Hornung, "Abe on His Heels," *Foreign Affairs*, September 18, 2015.

to 72% in 2012.[1065] However, by 2013, US forces in Japan had managed to squander much of this good will as marines in Okinawa received negative press coverage due to several drunken disorderly incidents. The situation was further complicated by the deployment of MV-22 Osprey vertical takeoff and landing aircraft to Okinawa, which was opposed by popular demonstrations. Construction of the Futenma replacement facility in Henoko bay area also ignited some protests on the island. By the end of the 2010s, the costs of the relocation had more than doubled due to delays. A referendum conducted in 2019 shows that over 70% of the local population opposed the plan, even though the work had been ongoing for several years.[1066] However, while controversies persisted, official relations seemed to improve and the readjustment of the new guidelines for the alliance went ahead. In April 2015, Abe became the first Japanese Head of State to address a joint session of the US Congress. During the visit Abe was also hosted in the White House and the visit was preceded by an announcement of the new alliance guidelines.[1067]

Australia in the new Pacific Century

As noted in previous chapters, the rise of China had several different implications for Australia. On one hand, China was clearly the most important trading partner for Australia, while on the other hand, China's challenge to US dominance in the Asia-Pacific was an increasingly clear threat to the founding strategic principles that had governed Australian strategy since its independence. After the relative success of the Coalition Party government under Prime Minister John Howard, several consecutive governments tried to find their own distinctive accords between the two Pacific powers.

The Labor Party, led by Kevin Rudd, took over the Australian government in late 2007. Notably, Rudd was an experienced diplomat fluent in Mandarin Chinese. As Prime Minister, Rudd was deeply involved with foreign and security policy, and he reportedly heavily influenced the 2009 White Paper.[1068] Rudd had also announced during the election that he would pursue independent foreign policies within the context of the US alliance. After assuming office, Rudd signed Australia up to the

1065 Pew Research Center, *Global Attitudes and Trends*, Poll, June 13, 2012. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1066 *Japan Times*, "Work on U.S. base at Henoko in Okinawa to cost nearly triple initial estimate," December 26, 2019.

1067 E.g., *New York Times*, "Japan and U.S. Set New Rules for Military Cooperation," April 27, 2015.

1068 Peter Jennings, "The Politics of Defence White Papers," *Security Challenges* 9, no. 2 (2013), 8.

Kyoto Protocol, opposed by the Bush administration, and set out to withdraw the remaining 550 Australian troops from Iraq.[1069] Rudd also signaled that his security policy priorities would be directed towards non-traditional security issues and into supporting the fragile states in Australia's immediate region.[1070] In a sense, the Rudd administration was creating distance from both regional powers and seeking to more forcefully assert its own status as a middle power. The Rudd government even attempted to launch its own Asia-Pacific Community, similar to the one that the Hatoyama government attempted in Northeast Asia, only to suffer a similar fate due to the lack of support from other regional leaders.[1071]

In December 2008, the Rudd government released a security policy statement that outlined the government's versions of the "enduring principles" for Australia's security. These were self-reliance, the US alliance and regional engagement, multilateralism, and middle-power diplomacy.[1072] Multilateral emphasis, at least partially at the expense of the US alliance, and references to Rudd's Pacific Community initiative set this statement's tone apart from the preceding Howard administration.[1073] While Rudd emphasized non-traditional issues in his 2008 statement, the centrality of increasing military spending in the region and the need for more naval power featured prominently in his other speeches.[1074] In a sense, the concentric circles drawn by the Labor Party government in the 1987 White Paper were still at the center of Rudd's thinking, as is also evident in the 2009 Defense White Paper.

According to the 2009 White Paper, Australia's strategic interests in order of priority were to secure Australia from attack, the security of the immediate region, the stability of the Asia-Pacific, and a stable global order.[1075] As a clear reference to China, the paper notes that one of the main factors in securing Australia's immediate neighborhood is to prevent outside powers' military access to Australia's maritime

1069 E.g., William Tow, *Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008).

1070 Ibid., 6.

1071 Garry Rodan, "Progress and Limits in Regional Cooperation: Australia and Southeast Asia," in *Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006 – 2010*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011),165-166.

1072 Kevin Rudd, *The First National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament*, Canberra, December 4, 2008.

1073 For a dissemination of the topics in the paper see Carl Ungerer and Anthony Bergin, *The devil in the detail: Australia's first National Security Statement* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008)

1074 Jennings, *The Politics of Defence White Papers*, 8-9.

1075 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Commonwealth of Australia 2009, 42-43.

domain.[1076] The ADF force structure was set to be developed based on the idea that a great power war would be possible within the following three decades.[1077] The paper emphasizes that all contributions to US operations would be done only after careful consideration of Australian interests. In a barely veiled reference to war in Iraq, the paper states that Australian troops would not be risked in "distant theatres of war where we have no direct interests at stake."[1078]

The 2009 paper emphasizes the control of Australia's immediate region and specifically distances itself from Middle East deployments.[1079] The ADF would focus on being able to defend Australia's maritime approaches against a major adversary in the event of a "wider conflict in the Asia-Pacific region."[1080] In this "Maritime Strategy," land forces would focus on maintaining order in the South Pacific and East Timor. The naval forces on the other hand, would be enhanced with new submarines, several air warfare destroyers, and large helicopter-carrying landing ships. These were to be funded by increasing the yearly defense funding by 3 percent until 2017 and then by 2.2 percent until 2030.[1081] However, the financial crisis soon prompted cutbacks and the deference of defense costs to the future; the 2012 defense budget was actually cut by 10.5 percent compared to 2011.[1082]

Like in Japan, the period of stable rule by Prime Minister Howard, which lasted more than a decade, did not continue with the following governments. As a former diplomat, Prime Minister Rudd focused on foreign policy and security issues, spending a significant amount of political capital to shape them according to his vision. However, as the economic downturn destroyed Rudd's ambitious build-up plan and his Asia-Pacific Community initiative was ignored by other regional nations, Rudd was ousted by his own party in June 2010 and replaced as Prime Minister by Julia Gillard. Gillard's lack of priorities in foreign and security policies are evident from the fact that Rudd, whom she had ousted as the leader of the Labor Party, stayed on to serve as the Foreign Minister until 2012. The Gillard government nevertheless attempted a bold new departure in 2012 (after Rudd was replaced as the foreign minister) with its "Australia in the Asian Century" concept, focused on the economic aspects of Asia's growth.[1083] Unlike Rudd's 2009 White Paper, the Asian

1076 Ibid., 42.
1077 Ibid., 21-22.
1078 Ibid., 45-47.
1079 Ibid., 56.
1080 Ibid.,.65.
1081 Australian Department of Defence, *The Strategic Reform Program: Making it Happen*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2010.
1082 Australian Strategic Policy Institute *the Cost of Defence: ASPI Budget Brief 2012-2013* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2012).
1083 Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2012.

Century paper viewed the Asia-Pacific's future in optimistic terms and focused on the economic benefits of China's growth.[1084] This tone was repeated in the Gillard administration's national security strategy and Defense White Paper, both of which were published in 2013.[1085]

Interestingly, the 2013 White Paper, while taking a more benign stance on global and regional security, did not alter the acquisition program outlined in 2009 and even added 12 EA-18 Growler electronic attack aircraft to the shopping list.[1086] But on overall spending, the 2013 paper is concise. It only mentions that the "government is committed to increasing defence funding towards a target of 2 percent of GDP."[1087] However, as defense spending had fallen to the post-WWII low of 1.45 percent of GDP during 2012,[1088] and at least 30 billion AUSD had been cut from the overall spending ascribed in the 2009 White Paper, it was unclear how the planned acquisitions could be made with a substantially smaller budget.[1089] Further, there is a clear inconsistency in the fact that the 2013 White Paper, which is in tune with the positive and trade-centered engagement outlook presented in the Asian Century White Paper, still attempts to build the forces outlined in the much more hawkish 2009 White Paper. Notably, when discussing the upcoming new White Paper in March 2014, the Chief of the Australian Defence Force referred only to the 2009 White Paper without any acknowledgement of the 2013 White Paper, which was drafted barely a year earlier.[1090]

The Gillard government fell to another interparty coup and Kevin Rudd briefly became Prime Minister again from June 2013 until September 2013. Rudd's second term as Prime Minister was cut short by a Coalition Party election victory, which brought a new Coalition Party Government into power under Tony Abbot. The Abbot government almost immediately began to write a new defense White Paper and even the "Australia in the Asian Century" website, along with the White Papers of the Gillard government, were removed from Australian government servers two

1084 E.g., Jennings, *The Politics of Defence White Papers*, 10-12.

1085 Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security*. Commonwealth of Australia, 2013; Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, Commonwealth of Australia 2013.

1086 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, Commonwealth of Australia 2013, 77.

1087 Ibid., 72.

1088 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, *The Cost of Defence: ASPI Budget Brief 2012-2013* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2012).

1089 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, *The Cost of Defence: ASPI Budget Brief 2013-2014* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2013).

1090 D.J. Hurley, "Address to the National Security Institute" (Speech, Canberra, March 7, 2014).

days after the Abbot Government assumed office.[1091] Abbott was in turn replaced by Malcolm Turnbull after an interparty challenge in September 2015 due to his continuously declining popularity as well as increasing resistance inside the Coalition Party.[1092]

The new defense White Paper was only completed in 2016. It seemed that the 2013 White Paper was completely forgotten and the fact that it took two years to write a new one is a clear indicator that the repeatedly changing governments were unable to formulate and assert their strategies effectively. This was bound to have negative effects on strategic planning and long-term policymaking.[1093] However, there was still a remarkable amount of continuity in some respects. The published 2014 reform plan echoed the language of the 2009 White Paper and confirmed the continuation of its acquisition program, albeit it with some new elements. The largest acquisitions included the new *Canberra* class helicopter carriers; plans to acquire at least 12 new submarines to replace the *Collins* class vessels; joining the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program; and the construction of three new *Hobart* class air warfare destroyers equipped with Aegis combat systems.[1094] In 2014, the annual defense budget was set to be increased to 2 % of GDP by 2023.[1095] However, the 2016 White Paper, brought this goal forward to 2021 to increase the pace of the naval build-up.[1096]

The Turnbull government's 2016 White Paper, in many ways, echoes the themes already set in the 2009 White Paper. Understandably, as Australia had by now suffered its own terrorist attacks and hundreds of Australian troops were engaged in operations against ISIS in Iraq, the 2016 paper is more favorable towards US-led actions in the Middle East. Nonetheless, these commitments are framed with the same references to core national interests that were used to discount such operations in 2009.[1097] Interestingly, the US and China were discussed in relation to each other,

1091 The archived webpage is available at Australian National Library server at www.pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/133850/201309140122/asiancentuty.dpmc.gov.au/index (Accessed August 8, 2021)

1092 E.g., *Sydney Morning Herald*, "How it happened – the Abbott-Turnbull leadership change" September 16, 2015.

1093 E.g., Michael Wesley, "The Foreign Policy Process," in *Navigating the New International Disorder: Australia in World Affairs 2011 – 2015*, ed. Mark Beeson and Shahar Hameiri. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2017).

1094 E.g., *Australian*, "Abbot government plans a review of defence details," December 2, 2013.

1095 E.g., *Sydney Morning Herald*, "New White Paper urges doubling of defence spending to $50bn," February 27, 2014.

1096 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2016*, Commonwealth of Australia 2016, 10, 181.

1097 For reactions and analysis of the 2016 White Paper see *The Diplomat,* "What Does Australia's Defense White Paper Actually Say," March 5, 2016.

not so much as separate actors, and the focus was heavily on great power rivalry even though a major conflict between the two was still assessed as unlikely.[1098] For the future of the ADF, the concrete centerpiece of the White Paper is the naval buildup and the concrete measures to increase defense spending more rapidly than envisioned in previous plans.[1099]

The two topics – the role of the US in the Asia-Pacific and the purpose of a large naval build-up – thus strongly featured in Australian security policy debates during the mid-2010s.[1100] Both of these issues were now clearly linked to China and the question was what implications this had for Australia's security.[1101] In security policymaking circles, the question essentially came down to familiar questions about where Australia should be defended. Some hoped that the ADF would be modelled after the US Marine Corps, capable of deploying around the world with their American counterparts. Notably, these authors also tended to dismiss suggestions that economic relations with China would matter as much as the traditional US alliance.[1102] Other commentators called for increased efforts to substantiate Australia's capability for sea denial in Australia's approaches, independent of US support. This would also call for an enlarged submarine fleet instead of Air Warfare Destroyers more suitable for sea control.[1103]

The so-called "submarine debate" was an illustrative sideshow of these debates. In this debate, the question about what the 12 submarines would be used for, became linked to questions about who they would be used against and whether they should be used independently or in cooperation with US forces. In effect, the question was: should Australia prioritize alliance contributions farther abroad or in the defense of the maritime approaches north of Australia? Some would argue that these vessels would be used to contribute to the US alliance in contingencies against China in Northeast Asia, or that they should at least be able to blockade the straits around the South China Sea. Some would go as far as to suggest that ADF submarines would be most effectively used to counter PLA Navy ships along the Chinese coastline before they reach the South China Sea. In sum, some argued that the alliance contributions would be the most important roles for the submarine fleet while others

1098 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2016*, 41-42.
1099 Ibid., 68, 83.
1100 E.g., Hugh White, *Power Shift: Australia's Future between Washington and Beijing* (Melbourne: Black ink, 2010).
1101 E.g., Daryl Morini, "Paradigm Shift: China's Rise and the Limits of Realism," *Security Challenges* 7 no.1 (2011).
1102 E.g., Evans, *Security and Defense Aspects of the Special Relationship*, 301-303
1103 E.g., Hugh White, "A Middling Power: Why Australia's defence is all at sea," *The Monthly*, September 2012.

maintained that they should be used to provide the Australian government with the independent capability to counter aggression.[1104]

In a way, it can be argued that the 2009 defense White Paper provided the first coherent strategic vision for Australia's defense since the mid-1990s as well as offering a strategically grounded acquisition program for the ADF. Even though the various economic crises and fragile governments at the turn of the decade stalled the implementation of this vision, its main elements guided Australia's strategy for the 2010s as they were formally adopted by the Coalition Party governments after 2014. The bottom line was that Australia should have a larger and more capable maritime force suited to deny any potential aggressor access to the air-sea gap and to project power to the nearby islands independently. [1105] Despite differing rhetoric, the official line was one of strategic independence.

6.2 New alliance drifts and reaffirmations

In 2012, a bipartisan team of US academics led by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye published a new report on the US-Japan alliance, which began by declaring that the alliance was "at a time of drift" again. [1106] The source of the drift is not explicitly mentioned, but the blueprint for fixing it consists of the usual shopping list of decreasing trade barriers, improving relations with neighboring countries, and expanding Japan's defense activities. Notably, if the Japan-US alliance was drifting in the late 2000s and early 2010s, so arguably was ANZUS. It just so happened that both Japan and Australia had been governed by exceptionally pro-US administration for most of the 2000s and in both cases, these administrations were replaced by a left-leaning parties and premiers whose agendas included loosening their dependence on their US alliances. Again, in both cases, after several failed initiatives, both Prime Ministers were replaced by their own party and a succession of unstable governments ensued until more stable governments were established under conservative leadership. Both Rudd and Hatoyama also withdrew their

[1104] See articles in the Australian Strategic Policy institute blog *The Strategist* in www.aspistrategist.org.au Andrew Davies, "The who, what where and why of the future submarine"; Stephan Fruehling, *Of Australian strategy and submarine design*; Peter Briggs, *Mobility, endurance and payload: lots of each for our submarines*. Some of these writers are also members of the expert panel named to support the creation of the Abbot government's 2014 Defence White Paper. See *Canberra Times*, "Government names panel enlisted to prepare new defence White Paper," February 27, 2014.

[1105] Stephan Fruehling, "The 2013 Defence White Paper" Strategic Guidance Without Strategy," *Security Challenges* 9, no.2 (2013).

[1106] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2012)

remaining forces from US operations in Iraq, albeit just before US troops were to be pulled out as well. Therefore, it is easy to see how, after almost a decade of the War on Terror and pro-US governments, the alliances would seem to have needed a new direction.[1107]

Japan-US alliance: New guidelines and new roles

As discussed in the previous chapter, there had been a round of bilateral planning groups established to enhance and develop the Japan-US alliance in the mid-2000s. As was the case during the previous readjustment round in the mid-1990s, these groups were followed by changes in Japan's own security policies and laws regulating the JSDF. One of the key outcomes was the clarification of which alliance issues were purely military operational matters and which needed to be deferred to political decision-making in the Kantei. These matters were, for the first time, presented in the Defense of Japan 2007 White Paper. Interoperability, bilateral training and the use of facilities, information sharing, and even the introduction of additional US assets to Japan for ballistic missile defense, are listed as pure military issues handled bilaterally between Japanese and US forces.[1108] This was a marked contrast to only a decade earlier when the JSDF's activities with the US side were tightly controlled.

As the JDSF gained more freedom to pursue regular military to military relations, frameworks were expanded to facilitate new forms of cooperation. Bilateral intelligence sharing arrangements were upgraded with the establishment of the Bilateral Information Security Consultation mechanism in March 2010. The two sides also agreed to formally begin conducting the joint analysis of East Asian security issues.[1109] Bilateral military training events increased as well. From 2007 onwards, an annual plan for training relocation, associated with the realignment process, was implemented, and in the late 2000s, the number of bilateral exercises increased markedly. In late 2007, there were 27 bilateral exercises and over 30,000 troops participated in the bi-annual combined joint exercise that year. This was by far the largest number of personnel since these exercises began in the 1980s. In 2010,

1107 E.g., Smith, *Japan Rearmed*, 109–110.

1108 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2007*, Tokyo: Inter Group Corporation, 2007, 282.

1109 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan – U.S. Foreign ministerial Meeting in Hawaii, Summary*, January 2010. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/meet1001.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

more than 44,000 troops participated in the same exercises, numbers that have since been maintained at similar levels.[1110]

Progress was slower on more controversial issues. In 2007, the Council on Measures for the Relocation of the Futenma Air Station confirmed a memorandum of understanding with the Mayor of Nago and the Governor of Okinawa on the Futenma replacement facility. Preliminary work on the construction of the replacement facility adjacent to Camp Schwab began that same year. However, much of this progress was undone in 2009 by the new DPJ administration, causing further controversy and delays. The Guam Agreement, which details the relocation of US forces to Guam, was eventually approved by Japanese Diet in May 2009. However, despite Diet approval, there were unresolved issues regarding how the transfer was to be funded. The debate over the costs aroused tensions, especially as both parties were still suffering the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. According to some sources, these tensions were evident at the highest levels and even threatened to derail an upcoming state visit to the US by Prime Minister Noda. In 2012, the two countries finally agreed that Japan would cover the costs for up to 3.1 billion USD of the estimated total cost of 8.6 billion USD.[1111] Partially due to the construction delays caused on the Japanese side, Japan agreed to share the costs of repair works to the Futenma airport. This also facilitated the deployment of 12 new MV-22 Osprey aircraft to Futenma in July 2012, which in turn sparked the aforementioned protests as the aircraft had a history of fatal crashes.[1112]

In 2013, the Security Consultative Committee formally announced the review of the 1997 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The interim report of the review was released by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation in October 2013, and the process was confirmed at the summit-level during President Obama's state visit to Japan in April the following year. [1113] The bilateral statement linked the reaffirmation of the alliance to the Obama administration's ongoing rebalance to Asia.[1114] Notably, Obama's visit was the first official state visit by a US President to

1110 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2010*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2010, 482; Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2015*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2015, 356-357.

1111 *Mainichi Daily News*, "U.S. Intimidated Japan before making concessions on Guam transfer Costs," April 30, 2012.

1112 *Mainichi Daily News*, "The Planned deployment of Osprey aircraft to Okinawa ser to spark fresh controversy," May 17, 2012.

1113 Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement, *Toward a more Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities*, October 2013.

1114 White House, *U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond*, April 25, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac (Accessed August 8, 2021).

Japan since 1996.[1115] The statement makes note of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Iranian nuclear program, Middle East peace efforts, and Afghanistan before even mentioning China and the East China Sea. But most importantly for Japan, the statement makes it clear that the Japan-US alliance would cover the Senkaku Islands as "territories under the administration of Japan" as stipulated in the treaty. This was also affirmed by President Obama during the following press briefing, albeit with a warning against escalating the dispute, directed at Prime Minister Abe.[1116]

The new guidelines, along with a SCC statement, were released two years later, in April 2015.[1117] They replaced the previously established coordination mechanisms with a single standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism to ensure a flexible response to what the joint statement refers to as a "dynamic security environment." This new mechanism was intended to coordinate alliance activities from peacetime activities to coordinated responses to armed attack. Operations Coordination Centers were set to be established as needed at the field level.[1118]

By far, the most remarkable part of the new Guidelines was the inclusion of military cooperation and actions by the JSDF in response to an attack against a foreign country – the term used by the Guidelines is "a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan." The Guidelines also explicitly stated that this country can be the US but also another third country. In such case, the JSDF could be used to, among other things, defend other countries forces, escort or interdict shipping, clear mines, and intercept ballistic missiles. The guidelines also included joint participation in international and multilateral exercises and increasing trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation, an obvious reference to South Korea, Australia, and India.

While the new guidelines again noted specifically that no legislative action was obligated for either side to act, the extended scope of JSDF activities to include actions to be taken in defense of a third country clearly required legislative reforms in Japan. A similar process had taken place with the 1997 guidelines, which also did not oblige but clearly presupposed, Japanese legislative changes. As noted, the Abe administration implemented this controversial set of bills by the end of 2015 and Japan was henceforth legally able to participate in collective self-defense operation, as agreed in the Guidelines. This framework was tested in 2017 when the MSDF sent

1115 *The Diplomat*, "US-Japan Relations and Obama's Visit to Japan," April 23, 2014.

1116 E.g., *BBC News*, "Obama Asia tour: US-Japan treaty covers disputed islands," April 24, 2014.

1117 Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement, *A Stronger Alliance for A Dynamic Security Environment – The New Guidelines for Japan – U.S. Defense Cooperation*, April 2015.

1118 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016*, Tokyo: Urban connections, 2016, 247-248.

the helicopter carrier *Izumo* to provide escort to the US Navy's *Carl Vinson* carrier strike group vessels operating near the Korean Peninsula.[1119] In a sense, the advancement of the alliance was again largely an expansion of JSDF roles and increased cooperation structures. It is worth noting that many of the legislative reforms could also be understood as part of Japan's overall reactivation as a traditional middle-power.

ANZUS alliance and the arrival of the Marines

The US agenda for ANZUS revolved largely around the pivot to Asia and the related defense reforms. Australia's geographic location makes it ideal for projecting power through Southeast Asia to East Asia, as was already demonstrated during the Second World War. Hence, the US sought access to Australian bases and the support of Australian armed force in operations towards the north. Australia itself was not threatened by regional states, but the threat of terrorism became concrete when ISIS sympathizers carried out terrorist attacks in Australia. However, terrorism was fast fading from the top of the alliance agenda and by the end of 2010s, if not sooner, China had become a central topic of the alliance. While the 2015 AUSMIN statement mentions ISIS and terrorism, by 2018, terrorism had dropped to the bottom of the agenda. Instead, the South China Sea and China dominated the statement.[1120] Accordingly, the alliance itself developed new ways of cooperation as Australia saw a significant number of US armed forces deployed to its area for the first time since the 1940s.

As with the Japan-US alliance, initiatives to increase allied cooperation had been initiated after the mid-2000s. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Initiative between the US and Australia began in 2007 and the goals of this initiative included increased cooperation in disaster relief, new intelligence and reconnaissance cooperation as well the continued development of joint training facilities. This also meant that there would be increased access for US forces, specifically heavy bombers, to train in Australia. [1121] The two sides also signed a new Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty in 2007, intended to enhance and improve defense projects between the two

1119 E.g., *Mainichi*, "Izumo helicopter carrier's escort mission more symbolic than practical," May 2, 2017.

1120 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *AUSMIN - Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations*, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1121 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Commonwealth of Australia 2009, .94.

countries.[1122] These treaties were made under the Howard administration, but the implementation and specifics of the new arrangements were left to the incoming Labor administrations. There were few further developments during the late 2000s. However, with new tensions between China, Japan, and the US, the development of ANZUS was again taken up in the early 2010s.

Enhanced Defense Cooperation was reviewed in 2011, and a bilateral working group was established to develop the alliance force posture.[1123] In November that year, President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard announced that this would include significant increases to the US military presence in Australia. Under the new agreement, a US Marine Air Ground Task Force would be rotationally based in northern Australia. This deployment was linked to the overall adjustment of the US force posture in the Asia-Pacific, coinciding with the withdrawal of marines from Okinawa. Accordingly, the first 200 marines arrived in Darwin in April 2012.[1124] Initially, the US Marine Rotational Force – Darwin was to consist of 1,150 personnel for six months every year, but this number was already increased to 2,500 in 2014. To facilitate the increased US military presence in Australia, the two governments concluded a new force posture agreement during the AUSMIN meeting in August 2014.[1125] According to this agreement, the equipment of a US Marine Task Force was to be permanently stored in Darwin and the facilities at the Robertson Barracks were to be reserved for US forces. Other arrangements included increased US access to Australian naval and air facilities.

More specialized space surveillance radar and telescopes were also deployed to joint signals intelligence facilities in Western Australia.[1126] Corresponding to the deployment of further space assets, both the 2009 and 2013 White Papers noted the continued relevance of joint facilities, especially the Pine Gap facility, for Australian

1122 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Trade Cooperation and Implementing Agreement*, Sydney, September 5, 2007, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

1123 Australian Department of foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations 2011 Joint Communiqué*, San Francisco, September 15, 2011. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1124 Australian Army, *US Marine Corps welcomed to Darwin*, July 25, 2012.

1125 Australian Department of Defense, "Hagel Lauds U.S. – Australia Force Posture Agreement", August 13, 2014. Available online at http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603058/hagel-lauds-us-australia-force-posture-agreement (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1126 Gill, *The U.S. – Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia*, 97-98.

security as well as for the alliance.[1127] In the late 2010s, the use of Australia as a basing area was further planned as it emerged that the US and Australia were discussing basing US Air Force B-52 and B-1 bombers in Australia. While the deployment was not finalized, B-1s have been reportedly conducting training events from RAAF bases in Australia.[1128]

The two allied navies were further integrated by increasing joint operations. In 2013, a frigate, HMAS *Sydney*, was embedded in the USS *George Washington* strike group for three months. Serving under US command and stationed in Yokohama, the Australian vessel served as an escort ship for the USS *George Washington* aircraft carrier. This was only the second time an Australian ship had been directly embedded with the 7th Fleet, after a short deployment in 2011.[1129] This deployment was also an example of the initiatives taken to widen the scope of the alliance to facilitate more tri- and multilateral contacts within the alliance framework. The obvious choice for a third partner was Japan as the trilateral strategic discussions between the US, Japan, and Australia were already upgraded to the ministerial level in 2006. Other potential partners for trilateral arrangements included South Korea, India, and Indonesia, among others.[1130] By the late 2010s, the RAN was sending entire naval task forces, with the helicopter carrier HMAS *Canberra* leading new Aegis-capable destroyers to trilateral training exercises with similar sized Japanese and US task forces in the Northern Pacific.[1131]

Observations and explanations

At the end of the 2000s, both alliances seemed to again suffer from a lack of interest. Changes of government in both Australia and Japan had brought in administrations eager to loosen themselves from alliance constrains. At the same time, Japan and Australia withdrew sizable forces from US operations in the Middle East and Indian Ocean and, in the case of Japan, the newly elected government essentially derailed already agreed-upon parts of the realignment plan. However, by examining this from another angle, the US also had a newly elected administration that came into office

1127 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Commonwealth of Australia 2009; Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, Commonwealth of Australia 2013.

1128 E.g., *Reuters*, "U.S. says in talks to base long-range bombers in Australia," March 9, 2016.

1129 *Stars and Stripes*, "Australian frigate embeds with US Navy at Yokosuka, Japan," May 6, 2013.

1130 Gill, *The U.S. – Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia*, 105-107.

1131 *ABC News*, "Australia joins United States and Japan in naval exercise as concerns grow over China," July 21, 2020.

amid the largest financial downturn since the Great Depression. This fiscal crisis also affected Australia and Japan, so it is understandable that alliance development was not on top of the agenda for any of the respective partners. Further, neither the Rudd nor Hatoyama governments actually halted already agreed-upon development frameworks. Even the Hatoyama administration eventually agreed to the previously established framework for US forces' realignment, granted, only after the damage had already been done.

Their successors from the same party were all too eager to re-embark on alliance development once the Obama administration began its pivot/rebalance to Asia. Further, it was under the DPJ administration that the first initiatives to loosen Japan's constitutional restraints on collective self-defense and to allow the wider export of defense material were made. In Australia, it was the Gillard government, with Kevin Rudd as the Foreign Minister, that signed the agreement allowing US Marines to deploy to Australia, even though the Coalition Party typically tried to position itself as the more pro-alliance party.

For the most part, alliance development in this period seems to have been related to China. The US force realignment was partially changed during the period to move more key assets, such as command functions and bombers farther away from China, leaving them more dispersed throughout the region, including in Australia. There were less discussions about deployments to international operations and more focus on integrating allied functions in the Asia-Pacific. This included pulling Japan and Australia closer to each other, integrating ADF elements to US forces based in Japan, thus essentially basing Australian vessels in Japan for a time, and allowing Japan to also use military force to protect and support other allied forces besides the US. All these measures were directly or indirectly included in the US agenda for its pivot/rebalance to Asia-Pacific, many of which related to the US military planning described in the Joint Operational Access Concept and Air-Sea Battle written in preparation for a possible conflict with China.

6.3 Withdrawal from the War on Terror and the decline of international operations

The ways that Japan and Australia participated and conducted international military operations were changing. The War on Terror, as it had been waged during the Bush administration, was ending and even while old conflicts still simmered and new, even more aggressive, terrorist organizations arose from the expanding Middle East conflict, there was no appetite for US-led large-scale interventions. However, while the War on Terror, which had largely replaced UN PKOs for the Australian Army and the JSDF, seemed to be over, neither Japan, nor especially Australia, returned to large scale UN PKOs. As has been noted, both Australia and Japan withdrew their

forces from the Middle East and the Indian Ocean in the late 2000s. Australia maintained its forces in Afghanistan for a while longer and redeployed to the Middle East to join the coalition against ISIS in 2015. Japan, for its part, did not return to the Middle East after the late 2000s. The few PKOs that Australia deployed troops to were concentrated in its immediate region, while Japan maintained several small consecutive deployments, all of which had their own problems.

End of engagements in the War on Terror

The last Japanese forces were withdrawn from Iraq in 2008, and DPJ legislation allowed the maritime replenishment mission to lapse in 2010. Hence, the beginning of the 2010s marked the end of Japan's military operations in the Middle East and the War on Terror. Although there were still Japanese forces serving with the UN in the Golan Heights, these were part of a separate UN PKO. Notably, there seems to have been little discussion of redeploying forces to the Middle East during the US-led operations against ISIS, even after two Japanese journalists were beheaded by members of the organization. The Islamic State claimed, as did Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991, that the monetary contributions to US-led operations by the Japanese government made Japanese citizens legitimate targets for attack.[1132]

Australian forces began to withdraw from Iraq in 2008 and by the end of the year, only around 1,000 troops remained in the region along with P3-Orions, C130 transport planes, some naval ships and a security detachment for the Australian Embassy in Baghdad. However, these forces no longer engaged in combat operations. After the middle of the following year, only around 200 ADF troops remained in Iraq, most in the embassy security detachment.[1133] The Australian commitment to Afghanistan initially grew under the Labor administration and the war in Afghanistan had been easier to sell to the Australian populace and the Labor Party to begin with, while the war in Iraq proved unpopular. Nonetheless, the Abbott government announced in 2013 that most of the ADF operations in Afghanistan would be concluded by the end of the year. By 2014, the main elements of Australian forces pulled out of Afghanistan with only approximately 400 training and support personnel remaining.[1134]

However, the US withdrawal did not bring peace to Iraq and in August 2014, amid rising humanitarian costs and the advance of the Islamic State, Australian troops returned to Iraq. Australian participation in the anti-ISIS coalition began with

1132 *New York Times*, "ISIS Says it Has Killed 2nd Japanese Hostage," January 31, 2015.
1133 *Sydney Morning Herald*, "Troops pull out of Iraq," June 2, 2008.
1134 E.g., *ABC News*, "Australian soldiers complete withdrawal from Afghanistan's Uruzgan province," December 16, 2013.

humanitarian deliveries via Australian transport planes still in the area. Then, when US forces began striking ISIS targets, it requested allies for support operations. As noted, Australian assets in the area participated in supply drops around mount Sinjar from the beginning of the operation and, following the US request, Australia began redeploying its forces to the region. Significant international media attention and outrage about the brutality of the ISIS ensured that the decision to redeploy the ADF met little resistance. After the deployment of six F-18s fighters, airborne surveillance and control aircraft, tankers, and approximately 400 military personnel and trainers, Australia became, at least temporarily, the second largest contributor of forces to the operations against ISIS.[1135] Unlike the US' European allies, who restricted their operations to Iraq, Australian fighters also began bombing operations against ISIS in Syria after a request by the US government in September 2016.[1136] By the end of 2015, Australia had approximately 1,600 troops deployed to US-led operations, 250 of them in Afghanistan and the remainder deployed to the Middle East and Iraq.[1137] As other international operations were scaled back at the same time, these were now the only large ADF deployments outside Australia.

Limited peacekeeping operations

The international operations conducted by the JSDF decreased significantly after the mid-2000s and only small contingents were maintained in UN PKOs and disaster relief efforts. The deployments themselves were uncontroversial and not widely debated. Disaster relief deployments in particular had become a routine function of the JSDF. During the late 2000s, Japan sent JSDF forces to several disaster relief operations in Southeast Asia, and to Haiti and Pakistan in 2010. The JSDF participated in two major UN PKOs after the late 2000s, including the aforementioned deployment to the Golan Heights, where JSDF troops had been since 1996. That mission was scheduled to last until March 2013, however, due to the escalating conflict in Syria, it was terminated ahead of schedule. From October 2008 onwards, Japan participated in the UN PKO in Sudan with two staff officers. After 2011, Japanese participation was expanded to include a full engineering unit and other staff, consisting of about 400 personnel altogether. South Sudan also became the first UN operation in which the JSDF operated with a wider remit for collective self-defense due to the security laws passed by the Abe administration. The 2016

1135 E.g., *ABC News*, "Fact check: Is Australia's military contribution to the fight against Islamic State the second largest?" December 22, 2015.

1136 E.g., *The Guardian*, "US asks Australia to join air operation against Isis targets in Syria, say reports," August 21, 2015.

1137 Australian Department of Defence, Operations, http://defence.gov.au/Operations/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

rotation was specifically dispatched with a broader mandate to use force in the protection of Japanese nationals or other international actors e.g., NGO members or UN personnel. This new mandate lasted about a year until the JSDF mission to South Sudan ended in 2017.[1138] As this was the first deployment with this kind of mandate, it aroused some debate in the Diet where several lawmakers questioned if the mandate meant that the JSDF would be operating in a war zone.[1139]

In addition to disaster relief and PKOs, maritime policing operations were an entirely new field for the JSDF. In 2009, Japan sent two destroyers to participate in the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations. These began with escort duties in March 2009. In May, two P-3Cs were also sent along with maintenance equipment, GSDF personnel to guard the equipment, and aircraft to transport them. The dispatch was conducted initially under the Prime Minister's directive with cabinet, but not parliamentary approval. The Anti-Piracy Special Measures Law was introduced to the Diet only on June 19th and enacted on July 24th.[1140] Similarly to several other countries participating in the operation, Japanese aircraft and ships have been based in Djibouti ever since and have completed more than 100 escort missions yearly.[1141] In 2017, SDF forces in Djibouti also began training to conduct rescue and protection operations in accordance with the new JSDF law. After the JSDF mission to South Sudan was withdrawn, the deployment to Gulf of Aden became the only significant international JSDF operation. [1142]

Australia's contributions to international peacekeeping operations were also modest during this period. Its largest operation, the regional assistance mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), had been ongoing since 2003 and approximately 220 Australian Army personnel served there after 2007. This operation proved to be relatively successful as it helped prevent further violence and contributed to stabilizing the situation. By the early 2010s, the situation improved enough to allow for the main elements of the peacekeeping force to be withdrawn. Hence, most elements of Australian military personnel withdrew in August 2013. The mission officially ended in 2017.[1143]At that point, notwithstanding the US-led operations in

1138 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2018*, Tokyo: Urban connections, 2018, 255-256, 386.

1139 Smith, *Japan Rearmed*, 148-149, 160-161

1140 Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of Japan, *Annual Report 2012: Japan's Actions against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden*, March 2015. Available online at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/siryou2/counter-piracy2014.pdf (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1141 E.g., Smith, *Japan Rearmed*, 83-83.

1142 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2014, 303-304.

1143 Australian Department of Defence, *Final Solomon Islands infantry rotation return home*, August 6, 2013.

Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, Australia had just 20 soldiers in Sudan, 25 in Egypt, and 11 in Lebanon participating in UN operations. Additionally, some 500 soldiers were deployed to an operation to protect Australia's northern borders against illegal immigration, but this was a domestic operation in support of law enforcement agencies.[1144]

As noted in the previous chapter, after the early 2000s, ADF peacekeeping operations had been concentrated in the trouble spots around the Pacific Islands of Oceania. The relative stability of the microstates in the area following the turbulent period of the early 2000s allowed Australia to withdraw most of its regional PKOs. None of the Australian administrations seemed interested in pursuing peacekeeping operations farther abroad. The defense debates discussed above were concentrated mostly on North- and Southeast Asia, and there appeared little will to tackle global security issues outside the US alliance.

Observations and explanations

In general, it is clear that UN PKOs were no longer a high priority for Japan or Australia. The number of PKO dispatches was low even though the resources and manpower previously employed in the War on Terror and other regional operations would have been available. The international activities of both the ADF and JSDF became more oriented towards traditional threats and regional military cooperation as Japan's and Australia's military focus moved back to their respective home territories. If we consider that both Australia and Japan were at time becoming increasingly concerned about China's influence in the Asia-Pacific, this could easily be construed through a traditional threat-based explanation. On the other hand, the portion of Japan's military serving abroad at any given time was rather miniscule, therefore the argument that these troops would have been needed to stand ready at home is a bit of a stretch. For Australia, the portion of ADF serving abroad has always been much higher, but it is worth noting, China is also much farther away from the Australian mainland.

In the late-2000s, domestic politics could also be used to explain Australia's and Japan's withdrawals from War on Terror-related operations. The parties who had specifically campaigned to stop their countries participation in these operations had won the elections and the Prime Ministers in both Japan and Australia seemed personally invested in this. Still, after these parties lost power, there were no indications that the incoming governments would have considered a return to these

[1144] Australian Department of Defence, Operations, http://defence.gov.au/Operations/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

operations. Australia eventually did sent forces back to Iraq, but this was already sometime later and under a different operational setting.

Further, the parties elected to power in the late 2000s could easily withdraw forces from operations in Iraq as the US itself was continuously withdrawing its forces from the country after 2008. Other countries such as the UK pulled out in 2009, and the last US forces left in 2011. The Obama administration had made it clear that its priorities did not include continuing to wage the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan as much as ending the commitment altogether. Therefore, the US is unlikely to have offered much resistance to smaller allies pulling out as well as these countries would not have the ability to maintain troops in the area after the US left anyway. When Australia did redeploy, it did so only after the US had first done so and specifically requested an ADF contribution. Japan opted to only send money instead of forces as it had done during several previous crises.

6.4 Mature Missile Defense and other Technology Cooperation

While technology cooperation was now an everyday matter and the loosening of Japanese export limitations on military material to third countries made traditional US-Japan defense technology cooperation more mundane than before, it can be observed that the nature and implications of technology cooperation were changing in both alliances. Now, the networks of missile defense sensors, command and control systems, and anti-missile weapons were by their very nature integrating Japan and Australia into the US military structures. Ballistic missile defense networks had evolved to cover all types of sensors and defense against a variety of missiles and aircraft, too. An incident involving missile attacks or the intrusions of other extremely fast-moving targets, would move fast and the decisions to respond would need to be made in minutes for the system to work properly. Even more so, technically speaking, the information shared in these systems would already integrate different allies' systems like never before and would therefore make it all but impossible to maintain neutrality in a possible conflict.[1145]

Japan-US technology cooperation

Japanese technology cooperation was spurred on by the dismantling of legislative blocks that had impeded most exports of Japanese military technology since the 1970s. This also meant that the weapon systems jointly produced by Japanese and

[1145] E.g., Bjørn Grønning," Operational and industrial military integration: extending the frontiers of the Japan–US alliance," *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018).

US companies could now be exported to third countries, and further, weapons systems from third countries could be serviced by Japanese companies. As exports form a large part of the profits for US companies, which in turn feed further weapons technology manufacture and development, the fact that jointly produced systems could now be exported cleared some very real and concrete obstacles for full cooperation. Initially, the relaxing of the ban on technology transfers was directly related to missile defense as the advanced missiles under joint development were meant to be an integral part of the system and were intended to be used by other US allies as well.[1146]

The 2015 alliance cooperation guidelines elevated ballistic missile defense to a central role in the bilateral alliance cooperation. Significant effort had been put into the bilateral development and into integrating the two allies' command and control functions during the late 2000s and early 2010s. By the mid-2010s, the system had been extensively tested by both parties – separately and jointly. So, by the late 2010s, it could be said that the allies had achieved a truly shared capability to use this complex system. [1147] As noted earlier, the nature of this system meant that political decision-makers would be hard pressed to control its use as the situations in which the system would be used would be, by their nature, so fast-paced that the authority to fire would have to be delegated to operational military command.[1148]

Japan had also invested heavily in the system. The Aegis destroyer *Kongo* was first equipped with the SM-3 missile, and it test fired the system in 2007. The destroyer *Chokai* followed suit in 2008, and *Myoko* in 2009. By 2008, four units of the 1st Air Missile Defense Group in Saitama had been equipped with Patriot PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile. [1149] The entire system was officially operational in 2011, which included four operational Japanese Aegis destroyers, 16 Patriot firing units, four FPS-5 radars, and seven improved FPS-3 radars. The system and the alliance cooperation were further reinforced by the deployment of the US X-band radar system in Japan.[1150] Despite considerable advancements in the bilateral operation of

1146 E.g., Nicholas Szechenyi, "The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Prospects to Strengthen the Asia-Pacific Order", in *U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Greg Chaffin (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2015), 42.

1147 Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement, *A Stronger Alliance for A Dynamic Security Environment – The New Guidelines for Japan – U.S. Defense Cooperation*, April 2015.

1148 Szechenyi, *The U.S. – Japan Alliance: Prospects to Strengthen the Asia-Pacific Order*, 44.

1149 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2008*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008, 169.

1150 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2012, 156.

the system, Japan considered acquiring an indigenous strike capability that could be used against platforms in North Korea, independent of US support.[1151] Previously, Japan had trusted the US for this support, therefore this development could be taken as a sign of a lack of full trust between the allies.

Another major technology project that benefitted from the opening-up of Japan's defense industry to foreign exports was the acquisition of the F-35 stealth fighter. At the end of the 2010s, Japan's F-4 Phantom fighters were coming to the end of their effective lifespan, and it asked for US cooperation in finding a suitable replacement in April 2007. Notably, however, the sale of F-22 fighters, which was specifically requested by Japan, was declined by the US. Rebuffed, the Japanese side began to investigate creating an indigenous design for a fifth-generation fighter to be built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The resulting X-2 *Shinshin* project was meant to eventually include sixth-generation capabilities, with initial production estimated to begin in the mid-2020s. As this meant that the first of these fighters would enter service in the late 2020s at the earliest, Japan needed a replacement for the F-4s before that.[1152] The need for a new advanced fighter aircraft was accentuated by reports of a Chinese stealth fighter project, underway before the early 2010s.[1153]

In 2011, Japan decided that 42 F-35s, manufactured by a US-led international corporation with Lockheed Martin on the lead, would replace the F-4s. Several components of the fifth-generation stealth fighter would be manufactured in Japan and in 2014, the US Department of Defense announced that one of the two regional maintenance hubs for the aircraft in Asia-Pacific would be in Japan, the other one being in Australia. This meant that all the operators of F-35s in the area, including South Korea and possible others, would send their fighters to Japan for major services. As the F-35 functions as a hub of different combat sensory and command networks, joining the program would give the JSDF added sensory and shared situational awareness capabilities that would be directly linkable to US armed forces systems.[1154] In a sense, thus, both the F-35 and missile defense projects further integrated Japanese military intelligence and command and control functions with US forces.

1151 E.g., *Japan Times*, "Japan government nixes deadline for decision on strike capability," December 10, 2020.

1152 E.g., Defensenews, "Japan's Fighter Procurement Crunch", June 6, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/06/06/japan-fighter-f35-jasdf-f15-f2-upgrade-situational-awareness-sensors/28379749/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1153 *Defense Industry Daily*, "Japan's Next F-X Fighters: F-35 Wins Round 1," December 04, 2017. https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f22-raptors-to-japan-01909/ (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1154 United States Department of Defense, "Japan, Australia to Provide f-35 Maintenance Sites in Pacific Region", Washington, December 17, 2014.

Notably, aside from 3 or 4 minor projects, most new bilateral technology projects such as sea-based combat system development and new interceptor missile development, were related more or less directly to missile defense, which had clearly become by far the most high-profile technology cooperation project at the time.[1155] As noted, this also had a direct bearing on Japan's weapons export restrictions. The transfer of related missile technology was clearly a major issue behind the decision to lift the arms export ban by the Noda administration in December 2011, and the first technology transfer under the new rules was a missile sale to European countries in 2010.[1156] The Abe administration further loosened restrictions in 2014, and Japanese defense industry giants such as Mitsubishi and Kawasaki, keen to begin exploiting these new opportunities, spearheaded the first Japanese defense industry trade show in July 2015.[1157] However, it would take until the end of the decade for the first large-scale defense exports to materialize.[1158]

ANZUS and the technology edge

As with the Japan-US alliance, the central elements of technology cooperation in ANZUS involved F-35 fighter acquisitions and missile defense technology. The acquisition of new Aegis-equipped destroyers with the ability to launch interceptor missiles, and the network of allied sensors and battle management systems, greatly enhanced Australian capability to take part in US-led operations. Technology cooperation within the alliance was also one the first issues noted in both White Papers published by the successive Labor Party governments. And while the Abbot government White Papers again placed more emphasis on the traditional security aspects of the alliance, the role on technology remained central. It can be said that Australia's defense technology reliance on the US, which had been placed at the center of the alliance in the late 1980s, had remained a constant feature for over three decades. This was possibly even more so in the 2010s as advanced technological capabilities were increasingly available a large number of states. Indonesian

1155 Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2011,* Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2011. pp. 484.

1156 *The Wall Street Journal*, "Japan Lifts Decades Long Ban on Export of Weapons", December 28, 2011.

1157 *New York Times*, "With Ban on Exports Lifted, Japan Arms Makers Cautiously Market Wares Abroad", July 12, 2015.

1158 *Defensenews*, "Japan secures first-ever major defense export with Philippine radar order," August 28, 2020.

cooperation with South Korea in the development of 5th generation fighters comparable to the F-35 is a key example of this.[1159]

Despite the lack of official commitments to missile defense, the topic was constantly present in high-level meetings and was specifically noted at the summit-level meeting between Prime Minister Abbott and President Obama in 2014. The details on how the cooperation was to be furthered were not made public, but in 2014, at the AUSMIN meeting, the two sides agreed to establish a working group to plan for increased cooperation and to find ways to further integrate Australia in multilateral development. The acquisition of the Aegis system for the newly developed *Hobart* class air warfare destroyers enabled several possibilities for this.[1160] The first of the three ships, equipped with the Aegis system and vertical missile launch system necessary for detecting and destroying missiles in mid-flight, was launched in 2015. As mentioned earlier, this would also allow the ships to network with US and compatible allied systems to participate in combined missile and aerial defense.

Other major procurement programs in this period included the already-discussed replacement of the six *Collins* class submarines with 12 new ones and replacing its *Anzac* frigates with a new class of eight frigates optimized for anti-submarine warfare. Notably, the US side was again pushing for US defense contractors to be involved in the submarine production even though the ultimate selection fell to a French company.[1161] In order to be able to project Australian military power farther abroad, the construction of two new flat-decked landing ships (LDH), also capable of launching F-35s, commenced in 2008. The 2009 White Paper also added two large sealift vessels to support this amphibious capability.[1162]

Australia announced its plan to acquire F-35s in the late 2000s. But in order to fill the gap left by retiring older planes and due to delays in F-35 deliveries, the 2009 White Paper planned for Australia's F/A-18s to be reinforced with F/A-18F Super Hornets from 2010, with the option of 12 of these being modified to become EA-18G Growler electronic attack variants. This acquisition was to be augmented by the purchase of guided munitions and the acquisition of land attack cruise missiles for the Navy. The F-35 procurement was later confirmed with expectations that the fifth-generation fighters would number around 100, but not less than 72. The 2013 White Paper maintained all these commitments with the addition of 12 EA-18G Growler

1159 E.g., *Defense Industry Daily*, "KF-X Fighter: Korea's Future Homegrown Jet," April 12, 2018.

1160 Gill, *The U.S. – Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership in Emerging Asia*, 108-109.

1161 Ibid., 110.

1162 Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Capability Plan 2009*, Commonwealth of Australia 2009.

aircraft, all of which were acquired from the US. Further, as with Japan, Australia was chosen to be a maintenance hub for the F-35 fighters operating in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean.[1163]

Evaluating technology cooperation

Defense technology cooperation was remarkably similar in both the Japan-US and Australia-US alliances. Further, both Australia and Japan acquired similar naval systems, as exemplified by the *Izumo*- and *Canberra*-class vessels, each capable of functioning as small aircraft carries for F-35 fighters, again notably acquired by the air forces of both countries. Compared to the situation in early 1990s, it is clear to see that much had changed as Japan's and Australia's acquisition programs and their tech cooperation with the US were quite different 20 to 30 years ago.

It is important to note that the nature of technology cooperation has also changed. In the past, US allies purchased US weapons systems, or those of aligned nations, with the expectation that these would be fully under their own sovereign control. An added bonus would be that said weapons systems would be compatible with allied models. Issues such as maintenance, fuel, and ammunition were also important factors, but these could be addressed domestically. Now, the systems were increasingly reliant on networks of intelligence and command that spanned across alliance boundaries. Consequently, sovereign control was no longer so straightforward. Even maintenance was now interconnected as these systems also relied on complex networked logistics and maintenance information databases that ensured the timely upkeep of key systems across national boundaries. For example, the maintenance of Singaporean F-35s could be carried out in Japan or Australia with spare parts manufactured across the F-35 consortium in North America and Europe. Further, the prompt meeting of the aircraft crew with parts and maintenance personnel at these maintenance hubs would be ensured by information networks overseen by Lockheed in the US and linked to the plane in real time.[1164] As sophisticated as the system is, it is doubtful how long these fighters would function without this system.

On the other hand, Japan also continued to pursue its own indigenous capabilities such as satellite intelligence and conventional land-attack missiles, which would allow it to act independent of the US in case of a missile attack. [1165] This is a clear

[1163] Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Commonwealth of Australia 2009, 94.

[1164] E.g., Stphanie von Hlatky and Jeffrey Rice, "Striking a deal on the F-35: multinational politics and US defence acquisition," *Defence Studies* 18, no. 1 (2018).

[1165] Smith, *Japan Rearmed*, 203-204.

indication that Japanese planners had recognized the fact that while the sophisticated missile defense system could easily handle long-range attacks against the US, it would be insufficient to stop an overwhelming short-range missile salvo fired at Japan from North Korea or China.

In a way, technology development and defense procurement were not only making allied forces more compatible, but they were also directly contributing to US military power. It seems that both Japanese and Australian naval and air forces were developed so that they would complement US military power in the Asia-Pacific, thus supporting continued US supremacy and engagement in the area. In the late 1980s and early 90s, both Japanese and Australian defense policies emphasized the maintenance of independent capabilities to defend their countries. Australia in particular had long viewed its US alliance as way to maintain this ability. By the 2010s, the most expensive procurement decisions seemed to be made to complement US forces in the Asia-Pacific. For Australia, this recalls a hundred-year-old memory of when the Australian navy was originally built-up to be a semi-independent part of the British Royal Navy.

6.5 Evaluating the end of unipolarity in the Asia-Pacific

The title of this sub-chapter can be read two ways: either we are evaluating whether or not the unipolar period has indeed ended in the region, or we are evaluating what is happening as it draws to a close. These two questions are clearly linked to each to other in a way that makes them difficult to discuss as analytically separated ideas. In the traditional Realist view, this would be a simple exercise of evaluating national power based on traditional indicators such as industrial output, military strength, and other geopolitical indicators.[1166] However, unipolarity is arguably as much a function of how states behave as a function of material power. After all, aside from testing the theory out in an all-out war, assessments of power are always partially subjective. There is an objective way to measure, for example, how many Chinese infantry battalions one F-35 is worth, or how much Chinese raw factory output is worth when weighted against the advanced technology base of the US. Assessments are always subjective and whether US unipolarity is ending or not can only be assessed by looking at how regional states behave.

[1166] E.g., Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th Edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006).

If there is one clear indicator that would explain whether a system is uni- or multipolar, it would involve the threats facing the unipole and its allies.[1167] While regional rogue or failed states could disrupt regional security and even threaten unacceptable damages in the event of conflict, these states could not threaten US supremacy or its freedom to operate as it pleased in the Asia-Pacific maritime domain. But by the early 2010s, it became clear that China would be able to contest US control over the Asia-Pacific littoral areas. The fact that Japanese policymakers were openly questioning US willingness and even its ability to defend its allies in the face of growing Chinese power, is as clear indication as any that the unipolar moment had now passed.[1168]

During this period, both alliances were more concentrated on the Asia-Pacific. After having contributed forces to US operations, as well as having had a significant number of forces serving in other operations abroad, both Japan and Australia withdrew from far-away operations and sent fewer personnel to the few remaining ones. Instead, both were further integrated into US planning and defense networks in the Asia-Pacific. The changes in domestic politics had some effects on the alliances in the late 2000s, but while they caused periodic tensions, these disagreements were overcome by the early years of the next decade. Related to these developments, both Japan and Australia made efforts to initiate community building in the Asia-Pacific outside the US alliance, however, both initiatives failed soon after. The main difference in explanatory variables between the cases of Australia and Japan was that while Japan was directly threatened by North Korean missiles and a rising China, these threats were still indirect for Australia, even after its relations with China began to deteriorate in the mid-2010s. The outcomes are, however, largely similar in regard to the alliance development, technology, and international operations. The most significant difference in outcomes is apparent in the Australian participation in operations against the Islamic State in the Middle East after 2015.

Balancing against threats

It is clear that the threat of military force being used in the region was growing. This hazard posed a direct military threat to Japan, which directly neighbors both North Korea and China and is often depicted as an enemy by both countries' leadership. For Australia, these threats were farther away, but China was increasingly seen as a hostile actor and its military and diplomatic intrusions into the Southern Pacific

[1167] As discussed, a unipole is, by definition, theoretically capable of warding off any other state or a possible combination of states threatening it. See Chapter 2, 12-14.

[1168] Smith, *Japan Rearmed*, 175-176.

islands were seen as a threat to Australian regional interest, although not as such a direct military threat to Australia itself. Terrorism, which by now had affected both Japanese and Australian people to differing degrees, was no longer presented as an urgent threat as it had been during the previous period. While threats such as terrorism, regional unrest, or even North Korean belligerence, could plausibly be internally balanced by Japan and Australia, the Chinese military, with its military forces rapidly growing, would by now be difficult to balance against by other regional states using only internal means.[1169]

Regional threats themselves can be used to explain why Japan and Australia would seek to reinforce their alliances. However, from the Japanese perspective, repositioning US forces, which mostly consisted of pulling key forces farther away from China and North Korea, would not have served to lessen these threats.[1170] For Australia, if China was by now its greatest threat, the recent alliance developments worked out quite advantageously as it gained increased US presence in its region and could address a potential Chinese threat by contributing to alliance maritime operations along with US and Japanese vessels farther away from its immediate area. Notably, however, the debates about Australia's role in the alliance indicate that other options were also considered.[1171] In a way, some positions in these debates are closer to the traditional Realist balancing of power concept as opposed to threats. This point of view will be further discussed later in the analysis.

The changing threat environment can also quite easily explain the lack of interest in international peacekeeping among Japan and Australia. It is quite straightforward to argue that, as the level of threats closer to home was rising, contributing to far-away peacekeeping operations was given a lower priority. This argument could be made for both countries and could also be applied to an understanding of their withdrawal from operations in the Middle East in the late 2000s. Australia's immediate neighborhood was relatively calm during this period, which also directly explains why there were fewer ADF operations in any of the Pacific islands. However, the fact that Australia eagerly redeployed its forces back to the Middle East after the rise of the Islamic State speaks against this line of argument.

Technology cooperation, as recently discussed, corresponds to the developments seen in potential enemies as both China and North Korea continued to invest in missile forces and North Korea had, by the mid-2010s at the latest, developed a way

1169 E.g., Jeff M. Smith ed., *Asia's Quest for Balance: China's Rise and Balancing in the Indo-Pacific*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 28-30.

1170 For a discussion on Japan's perspective on the effects of the shifting power in Asia see, for example, Elena Atanassova-Cornelis and Yoichiro Sato, "The US-Japan Alliance Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Rationales and Scope," *The International Spectator* 54, no.4. 2019.

1171 See above, 238.

to equip at least some of its missiles with nuclear warheads. But while a nuclear weapon aimed at the US would likely be intercepted by US and allied missile defenses, Japan was much more vulnerable to such an attack. Chinese development of stealth fighter craft, and the overall proliferation of this kind of technology to other regional states, meant that both Japan and Australia might also need similar capabilities themselves. Therefore, it is understandable that both countries would leverage their US alliance to acquire this kind of technology, even though Japan maintained its indigenous development project. However, the technological integration of forces meant that both Japan and Australia would also more likely become unwilling targets if a conflict broke out. Especially for Australia, the threat of being drawn into a conflict over defense arrangements, technical or political, would be significant as regional threats of conflict have mainly been far away from its immediate territory. But this is already in the field of the alliance security dilemma. Overall, the case could be made that, the more direct the threats facing a country become, the easier it is to use the simple threat framework to explain alliance outcome.

Alliance security dilemma

According to the alliance security dilemma framework, the rise of China as a military threat should lead to an increased need for security from the US alliance for Japan and Australia. Therefore, both countries would be increasingly dependent on the US and, in their calculations, the risks of potential abandonment by the US would increase. Thus, the framework leads us to expect that they would seek to decrease that risk by increasing their support or tightening their ties to their ally.[1172] The primary manner of ensuring this would be to increase bilateral alliance commitments, which both Japan and Australia evidently did in several fields of cooperation.

The increasing commitments by both Japan and Australia are evident in the development of the alliances as both Australia and Japan found new ways of contributing to alliance operations. Their vessels were now periodically integrated into US carrier groups, and technological and institutional cooperation made all the allies better able to undertake common operations. Arguably, the integration of allied military structures and command would clearly be an efficient way to ease the fear of abandonment as all relevant allied forces would be automatically engaged if

[1172] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 307.

attacked.[1173] On the other hand, technology cooperation and political commitments in the field of missile defense also made the US more dependent on Japan and Australia, as their geographical locations were necessary for the system to work successfully. Australia had been a key location for missile defense since the Cold War, but now sensors and missiles placed in Japan were also a key feature in US homeland defense against possible missiles from Northeast Asia. This particular system made the allies more interdependent and therefore lessened the threat of abandonment all around.

Even the Australian redeployment to the Middle East and lack of Japanese contributions there could be interpreted through the alliance security dilemma. For Australia, it could be argued that Australian troops were sent to fight ISIS in order to deepen alliance commitments and therefore lessen the threat of abandonment in the event that antagonistic relations with China were to rise in the future. This is the same argument that was used to explain the Australian and Japanese deployment to the Middle East in the 2000s.[1174] On the other hand, Japan did not deploy troops to support anti-ISIS operations, but this could be explained by stating that it was now focusing on the Chinese threat instead.

However, the effects of the threat of entrapment can also be seen in both Japanese and Australian actions. The Japanese program for indigenous intelligence capabilities provided a clear indication that Japan no longer wanted to be fully reliant on its ally. In the late 2010s, Japanese policymakers were also increasingly discussing the creation of an indigenous capability to strike at possible missile launch sites to prevent and deter an attack against Japan. This was a clear departure from the division of labor put in place in the 1950s and 60s when the US would have provided these kinds of capabilities in the alliance. These fears seemed to have been amplified with the sudden bellicose turn in the Trump administration's attitude towards China. This, along with accelerated US military activities in the region and the unpredictable nature of the new administration, clearly roused some concern that entrapment in an unwanted conflict could be a real possibility. This translated into debates about increasing domestic defense capabilities. In Japan, Trump's demands that Japan pay more for US forces stationed in Japan were met with questions about whether Host Nation Support money might actually be better spent on the JSDF.[1175]

Again, both the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment can be used complementarily to explain outcomes for this region, but as noted earlier, this does

1173 The effects of integrated militaries for alliance security dilemma have been discussed, for example, in Anna Cornelia Beyer, "Abolishing the security dilemma: Why we need to integrate the militaries," *Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2, 2018.

1174 See Chapter 5, 193-194.

1175 E.g., Smith, *Japan Rearmed*, 232-233.

not necessarily indicate the strength of this framework. If a rising threat level, which should be the primary independent variable in the framework, leads to a situation in which either of these dynamics alternately fit the outcomes; and both of these dynamics can be used to explain different kinds of outcomes at the same time without a clear system indicating why either one or the other should be preferred in any situation, the system itself turns out to be purely descriptive and without explanatory power.

Domestic politics in explaining alliance outcomes

From the point of view of domestic politics, the early phases of this period are important. In both Japan and Australia, parties traditionally considered less favorable to the US alliance took over in the late 2000s – but only for a few years. Both the Australian Labor Party and the Japanese Social Democrat Party had campaigned on pledges to withdraw forces from the Middle East and did so during their spells in the government. However, it should also be borne in mind that most European allies, and even the US, were reducing their presence in these theaters at the time. Therefore, the fact that Australia and Japan did so as well is hardly conclusive evidence of the impact of domestic political shifts on the alliances. The signs of US withdrawal were clear by that point and the plan to disengage had already been officially announced in February 2009.[1176] It should also be noted that reductions had already taken place under preceding governments and that Australia maintained its presence in Afghanistan even with this government.

The new left-leaning governments in both Japan and Australia also tried their hand at regional diplomacy, offering similar initiatives for regional community building. The US government supported neither of these initiatives. The initiatives failed. In both cases, their failure has been credited to a lack of interest from the US and China and the failure to account for political realities, as well as improper preparation, which have all been cited as reasons for the failure of these pursuits.[1177] Similar observations can be made regarding the Okinawa debacle in 2008-2009, which partially accounted for Yukio Hatoyama's short term as Prime Minister. From

[1176] E.g., *New York Times*," With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout," February 27, 2009.

[1177] E.g., Gürol Baba and Taylan Özgür Kaya, "Testing the creativity of Kevin Rudd's middle power diplomacy: EU–Australia partnership framework versus the Asia-Pacific community," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14, no.2 (2014): 239–269; Karol Zakowski, Beata Bochorodyczand Marcin Socha, "Hatoyama Administration's East Asian Community Initiative," in *Japan's Foreign Policy Making: Central Government Reforms, Decision-Making Processes, and Diplomacy, ed.* Karol Zakowski (Cham: Springer, 2017), 157-179.

the point of view of our research setting, these developments would have been even more pertinent had they not taken place at a time as most of the other possible explanatory variables were also conducive to these same outcomes.

Failures to prudently conduct their countries international relations and maintain their US alliances contributed to the ouster of both the Rudd and Hatoyama administrations. These leaders were replaced by members from their own political parties and, notably, the issues that had caused frictions in the alliances were quietly buried. It is worth noting that in Japan, the first openings on releasing the arms export bans and prohibitions for collective defense were made by the following SDP administrations. In Australia, the agreement to station US Marines on Australian territory for the first time since the Second World War was also signed by a Labor Party Prime Minister. The changes in party leadership did not help the parties to stay in power for long: both countries witnessed the return of explicitly pro-alliance conservative administrations in the early 2010s.

Considering the domestic politics framework, underbalancing – that is, the failure to counter possible threats by either internal or external balancing – should have resulted from the fact that the governments in both Australia and Japan were fragmented, vulnerable, and unable to form a consensus about the nature of their international surroundings.[1178] However, these shortcomings actually resulted in their rapid demise and the following Labor and Social Democratic Party governments, while not much stronger than their predecessors, successfully implemented alliance reforms – that is, balancing – that were then adopted by the stronger governments that replaced them. In essence, the combination that, according to our domestic politics framework, should have resulted in a failure of balancing, actually resulted in the failure to stop the alliance balancing processes.

Therefore, while it would have seemed at first glance that the changes in government would have had a clear effect on the alliances, it seems that the opposite was the case. The new administrations were unable to build a consensus and forced to abandon their attempts to weaken the alliances. It is also interesting that the following governments, although not much stronger – that much is evident from the brevity of their governance – nonetheless managed to implement policies favorable to the alliances. Therefore, if anything, this period demonstrates the limits of domestic politics as a source of explanations concerning long-term alliance outcomes. While the new administrations made waves for a brief period, they failed to leave any lasting marks in the alliance.

[1178] Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, 11-12.

Asymmetric alliances after unipolarity

For the asymmetric alliance framework, the end of unipolarity is extremely variable as it drastically alters the implications behind the security versus autonomy trade off. Unlike the alliance security dilemma, the asymmetric alliance framework deals primarily with asymmetric power relations between the allies; the relation of this power discrepancy to possible threats is central to this equation. In other words, if the powerful ally is not powerful enough to stave off outside threats, the security it provides for its allies is not worth the concessions of autonomy the less powerful ally makes. However, if the value of the provided security increases, this will create a sort of dilemma for smaller states. The expected outcome would therefore be that smaller states should want more security from the alliance while at the same time be willing to surrender less autonomy in exchange. In essence, this can only mean building alternatives and hedging their bets through internal balancing while still trying to strengthen the alliance. There is a clear difference here to the logic offered by the alliance security dilemma framework, which would lead us to expect that smaller states would seek to increase their commitments to the alliance in this situation without taking into account that the value of security that the powerful ally can offer is simultaneously diminishing. According to the alliance security dilemma, the smaller states would try to strengthen the alliances but at the same time offer less concessions on their own autonomy. The commitments they would offer should therefore decrease in value. Further, the rational way to strengthen alliances in this situation would be to do so while ensuring that this would not leave one too dependent on its ally.[1179]

The causal factors in an asymmetric alliance framework are the demands made by the powerful ally. After the initial enthusiasm for War on Terror passed with the end of the Bush administration, US demands for contributions to the Middle East seemed to also have died down. The new US pivot or rebalance to Asia meant that the US focus was now directed towards China. Notably, while North Korea armed itself with nuclear weapons and even attacked South Korean naval vessels and offshore islands, it did not seem to merit similar attention under the Obama administration as it had received during the Clinton years. Now, it seemed that China was the main security threat and demands for allies' contributions changed accordingly. One notable departure from this was the aforementioned rise of ISIS in the Middle East and the ensuing redeployment of US forces there. Australian forces were the first to follow the US lead, sending a sizable contingent, but there was little talk of Japanese participation despite Japanese hostages being among those murdered by the ISIS.

[1179] Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 916-917.

The Japan-US alliance focused on developing and reinforcing mutual frameworks for responding to contingencies in Northeast Asia and in building up ballistic missile defense capabilities deployed to the Japanese islands. Similar developments were also taking place in the ANZUS alliance. The US also pushed for both Japan and Australia to join the F-35 stealth fighter program, which both of them did even though Japan was more interested in the older and larger F-22s but decided on domestic production as this request was denied. Both Japan and Australia were also chosen as regional support locations for F-35s and invested in limited carrier capability that could be used to carry F-35s. This kind of capability can also be used to augment US carrier forces and even carry US fighters if necessary. Both also invested heavily in Aegis-capable destroyers with the capacity to augment US forces through integrated command and control networks, coupled with F-35s, which also function as networked sensor nodes. The modern battlefield relies on networking, and both Japan and Australia were increasingly part of that network, which made the ADF and JSDF increasingly able to act like extensions of US forces.

These developments clearly fit US demands as it consistently sought greater direct military support from allied nations in the Western Pacific.[1180] In essence, both Japan and Australia were taking related measures to be able to take part in similar US-led operations, relying on analogous US technology for increased interoperability. As the threat environment for Japan and Australia is clearly different and domestic politics do not explain these outcomes, the asymmetric alliance and US demands for optimized alliance contributions are the most obvious answer. The fact that Japan in particular, facing greater threats than Australia, consistently sought to also limit its dependence on the US in regard to missile defense and even strike capability, clearly corresponds to the expectations of the framework.

The decision-making structures of the Japan-US alliance were developed rapidly to keep up with the changing strategic situation. The potential existed for fast-paced escalations inherent in missile technology and small-scale conflicts around disputed areas. Eventually, Japan committed itself to defending the US or even third-party vessels outside its own area, which was a major step away from its previous limitations on alliance cooperation. Even though there was a brief pause in the alliance development at the political level during the Hatoyama government, the following DPJ Prime Ministers immediately sought to limit damage to the alliance and were the first to scale down the arms export restrictions and enable the limited collective self-defense pushed for by the US.[1181] As the failure to manage the alliance

[1180] See above, 227-228.

[1181] Michael J Green, "Reading Abe's national security strategy," *Lowy Interpreter* 118, December 2013.

even resulted in a change in Japan's domestic governance, these developments lend strong support to the asymmetric alliance framework.

Notably, the US also sponsored the increased integration of its bilateral alliances and promoted contributions to their security as is evident in Japan's increasing military contacts with Australia and the Philippines. From the US perspective, this can be seen to reinforce its alliance networks and help it move beyond the traditional hub-and-spokes system, thus making the network more efficient. From the regional states' perspective, a multilateral regional security grouping could, however, be interpreted as hedging against the possible failure of US power or even as a way to balance against US influence in the alliance by banding together. After all, arguably one of the reasons US administrations had avoided multilateral security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War was to avoid tying the US down to multilateral security arrangements that would allow regional states in the Asia-Pacific to limit its freedom of action.[1182]

In summary, an asymmetric alliance framework provides solid explanations of the events observed during this period. Even Okinawa, where the adjustment of US forces is usually attributed to local resistance to their presence, witnessed significant development and reductions in US Marine numbers only when moving them elsewhere was clearly suited to the overall US military strategy. The same is true of Australia's efforts to increase the US presence in Australia – it only took place after the US sought support areas farther away from China. This arguably demonstrates something about the nature of decisions made in these alliances.

[1182] E.g., Kai He and Huiyun Feng, 'Why is there no NATO in Asia?' revisited: Prospect theory, balance of threat, and US alliance strategies," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no.2 (2011)

PART III – Results and Implications

7 Observations and explanations

The third part of the study is divided into three chapters. The first two chapters present the outcomes of this study, and the third will summarize the findings and implications. This chapter focuses on the observed outcomes of alliance cooperation and the following one on the application of the theories to the case studies. The final conclusions will be presented in chapter 9.

This chapter will examine the four lines of development in the alliance relations observed in the case studies. The purpose here is to analyze how the outcomes in each different field form a single coherent and continuous line of development over time. This is done to answer the first research question: "what are the developments in each case" from a full and coherent perspective that spans the entire length of the study. While all the developments discussed here were already presented in the periodic case study chapters, summarizing their lines of development in a single continuous timeline will provide the reader with a more coherent picture of the developments before moving forward to discuss their theoretical implications. The examination will draw on the findings of the preceding chapters to observe the shared factors, as well as discrepancies, in the two alliance relations and to evaluate the shared causes of change and continuity.

Next, these four topics – commitments to US operations in the Greater Middle East, the proliferation and decline of peacekeeping operations, increased focus on technology cooperation, and overall alliance development – will be examined as continuous processes and explained as part of the interplay between different variables. The main source of explanations for the continuity in the lines of development is identified as US policies and posture relating to its alliances. This argument relies entirely on the observations of the previous chapters. The less significant variations are posited to stem from particularities in each case and variations, including issues such as shifts in the regional security environment and domestic politics. However, the major lines of development, as well as their decline and major shifts, all stem from the US side. The theoretical implications of this observation will be assessed in chapter 8.

The long road to the Middle East

The Middle East and especially the Persian Gulf have been on the agendas of these alliances since at least the 1980s, perhaps even longer. During the Oil Crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, the US became increasingly committed to ensuring the stable flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and a large amount of this oil actually fueled its allies' economies.[1183] Therefore, both Japan and Australia have long had their own interests in the Middle East, with Japan being especially reliant on the oil flowing through the Persian Gulf. These interests were also noted in the so-called "Carter Doctrine," articulated in the 1980 State of the Union Address, which committed the US to defending the stability of the Middle East through military means if necessary and that demanded the participation of all US allies in the defense of the region. [1184] This demand became a continuous feature of US alliances during the Reagan administration, while after the end of the Cold War, instability in the region made these demands even more pressing. As Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger note, the fact that the demands were now made by the sole superpower, carried enough weight for the allies to send significant forces.[1185]

As discussed in Chapter 4, the ultimatums issued by the US Congress to its allies for allied contributions clearly demonstrate how the US used its power to pressure its partners.[1186] During the late 1980s and early 1990s, calls for US allies to do more were often more forcefully delivered by the US Congress than by the executive administration. These congressional demands were usually ameliorated by the White House, which had a more conciliatory tone towards its allies. However, after the 9/11 attacks the "with us or against us "-line taken by the Bush administration was again an ultimatum for allied nations to support the US War on Terror. [1187] Following increasing US demands, contributions to the Middle East theater grew, haltingly at first, but gained a more rapid pace during the 1990s, peaking during the War on Terror until the late 2000s. This work has demonstrated that while the specifics of the contributions and situations leading to certain events vary, the most important

1183 E.g., Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview*," Journal of Japanese Studies* 17, no. 2 (1992)

1184 James Carter, 'The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," (Speech, Washington D.C., January 23, 1980). https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/app-categories/spoken-addresses-and-remarks/presidential/state-the-union-addresses (Accessed June 18, 2021)

1185 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War" *International Organization* 48, no.1 (1994).

1186 See Chapter 4, 121-122.

1187 George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation" (Speech, Washington D.C., September 11, 2001).

explanatory variable has been the increasing US commitment to the region and its demand for contributions.

Of course, neither Japan nor Australia was directly threatened by Middle East instability even though they were directly affected by the disruptions to oil flows. But after US demands to contribute armed forces to help secure oil shipments, both Japan and Australia made efforts to fulfill this request in 1980s. Japan failed to do so because of domestic opposition and compensated for this shortcoming through financial aid, while Australia deployed military personnel who, however, did not participate in any significant actions. The continuous push from the senior ally clearly corresponds with the continuously increasing contributions to the area by its junior allies: every time there was a major conflict, Australia and Japan increased their contributions, pushing the limits of what would have never been possible before. This trend, continuing from the early 1980s until late 2000s, demonstrates the continuing trajectory of change in these relations. Further, this continuous change is attributable only to the asymmetric nature of these alliances as it displays continuity despite the changes in every other explanatory variable within other theoretical frameworks.

The Persian Gulf War of 1990 -1991 was in many ways a defining moment for the US and its alliances in the immediate post-Cold War world. It gradually became clear that the bipolar world order would not be followed by a multipolar one, but rather by a unipolar one of US dominance, even though its implications were not yet clear.[1188] Nonetheless, the willingness of the US to act as the military guarantor of the New World Order, combined with the reactions from the US Congress to what it saw as insufficient contributions to the war from allied nations, demonstrated to US allies what was to be expected of them. In Japan, pressure from the US combined with the lack of appreciation for the huge Japanese financial contributions and inefficient crisis management by the Japanese government, have often been described as a defeat for Japan in the Persian Gulf.[1189] The Australian contribution, on the other hand, while small, was appreciated and seen as successful. The lessons learned were still the same in the sense that both allies understood that the contributions to the Gulf, as well as to other international operations, were expected from them as US allies. It can be clearly observed that the US had been pushing for this kind of participation for a decade or more, and it

[1188] For a discussion on the different ways US posture and attitude could have evolved in the early 1990s, see, for example, Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992.

[1189] Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945 – 2009*, 72-73.

only succeeded in eliciting this level of support after it had become the sole remaining superpower.[1190]

The following decade saw continuous US militarily commitments to the Persian Gulf, which also translated into an expectation of alliance contributions. The Australian military presence in the area was almost constant and, during the re-escalation of the conflict in 1998, Australia again sent combat troops to the area. Japan, on the other hand, was still unable to deploy to forces to directly support US operations but deployed forces to the UN PKO in the Golan Heights from 1995 onwards, which could be understood as a kind of surrogate deployment to an area seen as a possible "powder keg."[1191]

The post-9/11 contributions to the Middle East are again a reaction to a new situation, but here, as before, while the specifics vary, the big picture was still the same. The attack against the US prompted Australia to invoke the ANZUS agreement and, while the Japan-US security agreement could be applied,[1192] the application of mechanisms established under the new alliance cooperation guidelines clearly show similar patterns. There were no clear threats to Japan or Australia, or even to their interests. Thus, their contributions to the Middle East must be seen through the lens of the US alliance. The early years of the 2000s saw Japanese and Australian troops and assets deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the surrounding region as well as to the Indian Ocean in support of US operations. It is clear that the Middle East deployments were not a response to threats against Japan or Australia. Indeed, it has been often argued that these contributions actually increased the threat of terrorism for Japan and Australia.[1193]

While domestic politics clearly played a role in these events, they could hardly be understood as a determining variable. Firstly, while Japan and Australia clearly had economic interests in the Middle East, these were not directly threatened as oil was bound to flow, regardless of whoever emerged as the victor of these conflicts. Further, the responses of both Japan and Australia followed similar lines of development overall, despite changes in governments and domestic political

1190 This much was stated directly by the US Congress and even by an administration official visiting in Japan after the Gulf War. See, for example, Nigel Thalakada, *Unipolarity and the Evolution of America's Cold War Alliances* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

1191 E.g., Hugo Dobson, *Japan and UN Peacekeeping: New Pressures and New Responses* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003),137-138.

1192 Article V of the Japan-US Security Treaty specifically deals with an "against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan," and therefore application of this clause would have been difficult. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1193 E.g., Michael Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror, Military Force and Political Pressure in the U.S. – Japan Alliance* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 26-27.

conditions. Australia kept sending forces to the Middle East under several different governments; Japan continued to increase its contributions, following a consistently more permissive line toward military deployments based on ongoing policy and legislative reforms. Even if the domestic politics were permissive toward military deployments in the early 2000s, legal frameworks and precedents for these deployments had already been established under different governments in the 1990s.

The Australian governments who sent forces to the Gulf in the late 1980s and early 1990s were not conservative or even particularly pro-alliance. Further, these deployments took place at a time when the entire validity of ANZUS was being questioned. The Japanese deployment of forces to the Gulf in 1991 clearly demonstrates that despite domestic opposition, the urgency of alliance contribution prevailed. Further, the Japanese PKO deployments to the Middle East, as well as the process for reviewing the alliance guidelines that allowed future contributions, were conducted mostly during a period when the pro-alliance elements in the LDP had been pushed out of the Japanese government. During the crucial phase of the reaffirmation process in 1995, the Prime Minister's position was in the hands of a party that had traditionally questioned the constitutionality of the US alliance and the Japanese SDF.[1194] Therefore, it is clear that domestic politics was at best an intervening variable that did not determine outcomes but could affect how their form as can be understood when comparing Japanese contributions in the early 1990s and early 2000s.

Considering the alliance security dilemma, the idea that the contributions to the Middle East could be attributed to the fear of abandonment dynamic seems straightforward yet still has some weaknesses when observed over the longer-term. If we consider the fact that the significant events in allied contributions to the Middle East took place in the early 1990s and early 2000s, the regional dynamics suggest rather that the threat of entrapment would have been a more prominent factor in the relationships at the time. Especially in the early 1990s, the lack of direct or indirect threats, which would prompt Japan and Australia to increase their commitments to their alliances, lessens the explanatory power of this model.[1195] Even if we assume that the War on Terror deployments in the 2000s were made to ensure US commitments against a rising China or attacks by North Korea, it is difficult to explain why Japan would then decrease its contributions to the War on Terror when these threats were clearly growing at the end of the 2000s and early 2010s. Again, this could be explained by adding more assumptions.[1196] However, as discussed in

1194 See Chapter 4, 94.
1195 See Chapter 2, 21-22, 28.
1196 Chapter 6, 257-258; Chapter 5, 209-210.

Chapter 2, the need to keep adding conditions and assumptions to the framework clearly weakens its plausibility.[1197]

Asymmetric alliance theory explains the long-term commitments of Japan and Australia to the Middle East. The US had consistently demanded more contributions from its allies, and as its power grew, so too did allied contributions. Its successive demands had gradually eroded Japanese political restraints, which ultimately resulted in JSDF ground troops serving in Iraq, while Japanese vessels supplied US forces fighting in Afghanistan. While other explanatory factors such as threats and domestic politics were specifically non-permissive during the early 1990s, the relative power of the United States was at its peak during the time, its military rival had just collapsed and its main economic rival was Japan, which was also in a process of economic meltdown. Therefore, while fear of abandonment might explain the contributions in the late 1980s, and possibly even in the 2000s, in the 1990s, there was arguably no direct or indirect threat to prompt such a dynamic. Notably, as US relative power is in decline, Japan did not resume its military contributions to the Middle East even while the operations there were again a priority for the US.[1198] At the same time, Japanese security threats had grown significantly and, according to the alliance security dilemma, it should follow the fear of abandonment and should seek to increase its support for the alliance.[1199] This clearly did not happen.

This of course begs the question as to why the Middle East trend is still ongoing in Australia-US relations. Using the asymmetric alliance framework, this can be explained by the declining position of the senior ally. The US can no longer guarantee Japan's security in its own region as it once did. The challenge of North Korea and, more importantly, the rise of China as a military challenger, mean that the security provided by US has declined and Japan increasingly needs to do more for its own security. Consequently, the value of the security provided by the US decreases in relation to threats and Japan's own capabilities; therefore, Japan will increase its own autonomy.[1200] On the other hand, the rise of China has by now been recognized as a significant challenge to US dominance in the Pacific; thus Japanese contributions to other areas are no longer pursued as forcefully as can be seen in the White Papers of the 2010s.[1201] In this sense, the logic of the alliance is shifting back towards the Cold War framework where Japan contributed by maintaining forces

1197 Chapter 2, 37-38.

1198 E.g., *Foreign Policy*, "U.S. Pushes Skeptical Allies to Step Up ISIS Fight in Syria," October 28, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/28/isis-syria-baghdadi-raid-united-states/ (Accessed August 8, 2021); *New York Times*, "U.S. Struggles to Keep Allies in Fight Against ISIS in Syria," November 13, 2019.

1199 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 183-184.

1200 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 917.

1201 Chapter 6, 225-226.

capable of countering the Soviet Navy in the Northern Pacific. Australia, on the other hand, is still maintaining far away contributions as its immediate region holds no threats for the US position in the wider Pacific. Understood in this context, the participation of Japanese and Australian troops in the War on Terror was a culmination of a process that spanned three decades. What some saw as drastic changes were therefore a continuation of a long-term process.

International operations as alliance contributions

While the international peacekeeping operations (PKOs) were not explicitly articulated elements of our alliance frameworks, they have clearly been part of the burden sharing efforts related to them. International operations were on the US agenda for its allies since at least the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Australia and Japan initiated a massive expansion of their PKO deployments. The first Bush administration's New World Order, which provided the vision for US strategy in the first years of the 1990s, emphasized PKO operations and demanded allied contributions to these. The Clinton administration also pushed for the PKOs and established a policy of not using US forces for PKOs, specifically with the intention that allies should do so instead while US forces remained in the background to support and guarantee security if needed.[1202] The aversion of using US forces in PKOs was established under the Bush administration and neither the Obama nor Trump administrations have sought to repeal this, which is nowadays a standing operating procedure. The expansion of PKOs was a development that was shared in both the cases, and international operations have been framed as an exercise of alliance burden sharing in both Japan and Australia, even if they have also been tied to other international responsibilities. In Japan especially, the first PKO-bills in the 1990s were directly linked to the war in the Persian Gulf and US demands to contribute forces there. [1203]

Notably, the pace of international operations has followed a similar overall pattern in both cases. Australia had decreased its number of troops in PKOs dramatically in the 1980s and Japan was just beginning to experiment with PKOs by sending civilians to Afghanistan in the 1980s. In both cases, there was a dramatic increase in personnel deployed to UN PKOs in the early 1990s. The link to US alliance was clear in several cases, and while few of the operations involved direct cooperation with US troops, this was mostly because of the policy of not deploying significant US forces to PKOs after the mid-1990s. For example, in the Balkans,

[1202] See Chapter 4, 91,93.
[1203] Dobson, *Japan and UN Peacekeeping*, 106-107; Cotton and Ravenhill, *The National Interests in a Global Era*, 177-178.

while some US forces were deployed, European allies and Australia provided most of the troops on the ground. However, airstrikes in retaliation to truce violations were conducted mostly by the US Air Force.[1204]

Operations in East Timor demonstrated that, as a form of alliance contribution, international operations were not reciprocal between the powerful ally and the smaller allies. The US encouraged and expected Australia to take a leading role, even while it declined Australian requests for support. US support was forthcoming only after the issue was made into public controversy and, even then, it was limited to the rear-area and transport support, with a small contingent of US forces at sea to act as a deterrent against hostile actions towards UN forces. No US land forces were available even though there were no other large-scale US deployments ongoing anywhere else at the time. This was also an outcome with which the US side was happy and the Australian effort to act without US forces was applauded by the US administration.[1205]

Australia and Japan had different regional environments concerning peacekeeping operations. For Australia, several peacekeeping and peace support operations were a direct response to threats towards Australia's regional stability. For Japan, peacekeeping operations did not address any immediate regional threats. However, both Japan and Australia participated in peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Middle East as well in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Hence, the threat of regional instability cannot account for the similar trends, even if immediate threats can account for some ADF deployments.

For Japan, after initially sending a significant number of troops to different UN operations in the early and late 1990s, the number of deployments declined significantly during the early part of the next decade. Noticeably, this decline coincided with the deployments related to US operations in Iraq and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, Australia strained its military while conducting regional peacekeeping operations while also maintaining significant deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. This strain was especially evident in the mid-2000s as Australia faced clear challenges to sending troops to the Solomon Islands after it had already beefed up its deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. So, in a sense, deployments to US operations even came at the expense of preparedness to respond to regional contingencies.

Further, after the early 2010s, Australia would have been able to send even more forces abroad as the different crises in the Pacific Islands had been stabilized. However, the reverse happened, and both Japan and Australia have only sent small

[1204] For a good overview of the UN operations in the Balkans, see, for example, Catherine Baker, *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s* (New York: Palgrawe educational, 2015).

[1205] See Chapter 4, 129-131.

contingents abroad since the late 2000s, even though the number of UN PKOs has actually increased globally since the late 1990s.[1206] Concerning Japan, the threat environment was becoming increasingly hostile, but while Japanese contributions to international peacekeeping declined, they still numbered some hundreds of troops, well above Australia's few dozen. Hence, the international PKOs do not show any clear correlations with the developments of the regional threat environment unless we observe Australia's PKOs in its immediate vicinity as a separate subset of observations. Even then, the question of why Australia prioritized Middle East deployments over regional operations is a difficult one to answer in a simple threat framework.

The domestic politics framework does not do well in explaining the proliferation or decline of PKOs either. As noted by some Neoclassical Realists, domestic politics, at most, offers a way to explain the particular developments surrounding these events, rather than the outcomes themselves.[1207] With the majority of the PKO deployments, few easily distinguishable domestic political interests were involved and, especially with Japan, the political act of sending troops to PKOs was done at the cost of political capital for the governments. Most notably, the early 1990s governments, particularly in Japan, were generally weak, lacked cohesion, and, therefore, according to the model, should have been unable to mobilize resources and mount effective policy responses, especially if these were controversial to begin with.[1208] Still, Japan managed to take drastic new steps by sending JSDF forces to the Persian Gulf, implemented its first PKO-bill, and deployed hundreds of JSDF ground troops to their first PKOs.

There is a clear correlation in the rise and decline in Japan's and Australia's international peacekeeping operations with US government strategies. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration documents constantly maintain the need for UN peacekeeping and for US allies' contributions. After the early 2000s, few US policy documents make specific reference to UN peacekeeping. Instead, the emphasis has shifted almost entirely to coalition operations against terrorist organizations and against the states supporting them. Correspondingly, both Australia and Japan emphasized deployments to the War on Terror at the expense of UN PKOs. After the early 2010s, the US agenda has shifted to fighting ISIS and containing China and, correspondingly, neither Japan nor Australia have returned to the levels of PKO deployments seen in the 1990s.

1206 United Nations Peacekeeping, Troop and Police Contributors, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors (Accessed August 8, 2021).

1207 E.g., Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no.1 (1998).

1208 Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, 13-14.

Technology cooperation in the alliances

Defense technology is a key factor in any country's ability to defend itself. In these cases, the complex dynamic of acquiring the most advanced defense technology in order to maintain an advantage over neighboring countries; securing access to support structures for equipment during a crisis while supporting domestic industries; keeping defense costs down; and ensuring necessary interoperability between allies, all come to play in the politics of the larger alliance. Both Japan and Australia have suffered from a declining technology edge over their immediate strategic environment at least since the mid-1990s. By the early 2010s, Australia had still advanced more significantly in terms of military technology in comparison to its neighbors. Japan, on the other hand, was rapidly losing its edge in relation to China.[1209]

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the US side saw its alliances as a way to maintain and contribute to its own technological superiority. At the time, Japan was perceived to have surpassed US technologies in various fields and, therefore, the US side was pushing Japan for increased technology cooperation. Australia did not have a similar technology base, so this was not a significant issue for the US in that alliance.[1210] Both Japan and Australia had an interest in the US supporting their own technology bases through the alliance. The Australian security documents even maintained that US technology was the most important benefit from the alliance in the early 1990s.[1211] Japan was initially reluctant to engage in two-sided technology cooperation and the first large cooperative projects were not entirely successful. Notably, even these projects were dominated by US pressure to purchase US products, with a significant share of the production taking place in the US.[1212]

All things being equal, the basic domestic incentive would be to balance technologically advanced acquisitions from abroad with support for indigenous technological development. The ideal way to do this would be to develop everything indigenously and to copy and further develop all the technological advances made by others as well. [1213] However, no country wants to simply give away technology, so it is always a matter of bartering and balancing between different interests. Of course, one might also want to offer their allies some technological capacities

1209 E.g., Andrew B. Kennedy and Darren J. Lim, "The innovation imperative: technology and US–China rivalry in the twenty-first century," *International Affairs* 94, no. 3 (2018).

1210 Chapter 4, 134, 137.

1211 Chapter 3, 74-75.

1212 Chapter 3, 58, 61-62.

1213 For a discussion on the role of domestic politics in the defense industry see, for example, Rebecca Thorpe, *The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).

commensurate to one's own, while not surrendering the most advanced elements.[1214] An example of this is the F-22 fighter, which is not sold to US allies, even though sales would have reduced the costs of the fighter and increased the Japanese ability to counter China. The F-35, on the other hand, is developed with several US allies and sold to all US partners as a way to support their capabilities and to cut the production costs per unit. Indeed, the US has been almost forcibly pushing for its allies to buy this technology. The establishment of maintenance hubs in Australia and Japan not only allows US planes to be maintained in theatre but also cuts the costs of transporting planes and maintaining facilities in the US. [1215]

Technology cooperation has now become by now a central feature of these alliances with both technology relations having been institutionalized with formal agreements and reinforced with several declarations. This has all been part of the US agenda for its allies since the 1980s. However, the tone of the cooperation has changed. The first priority in the 1990s was to support the US' technological advantage over possible adversaries. Currently, the issues of interoperability and maintaining the technological capacities of allied countries' militaries are more often emphasized. Another ongoing aspect of the contemporary evolution of technology cooperation has been the US need for allied countries be part of its ballistic missile defense system.[1216]

Both Japan and Australia have been involved with the missile defense projects since the 1980s. Their roles have been varying in the past and their participation has evolved over the last years to include similar elements. At the same time, it can be observed that US requirements for allied cooperation in this system have changed as well. Unlike in the past, the US does not simply need its allies to share development costs and decrease unit prices though sales. It increasingly also needs its partners to house the detection and targeting facilities, share related intelligence, incorporate their own vessels and systems to US ones, and to even intercept missiles targeted at US installations or the US homeland.[1217]

Overall, while specific technological acquisitions seem to correspond mostly to the security needs of the given states, some of the outcomes need other sources of

1214 For a discussion on US interest in providing weapons technologies to its allies see, for example, Jakub Grygiel, "Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities," *Parameters* 45, no.3 (2015).

1215 E.g., Stphanie von Hlatky and Jeffrey Rice, "Striking a deal on the F-35: multinational politics and US defence acquisition," *Defence Studies* 18, no. 1 (2018).

1216 Chapter 6, 250, 252.

1217 E.g., Jaganath Sankaran, *The Tactical Utility and Strategic Effects of the Emerging Asian Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System*, CISSM Publication, University of Maryland, January 2017. https://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/19720 (Accessed August 8, 2021).

explanations. For the most part, technology cooperation has been immediately and closely related to the specific threats or choices of defense posture. Examples include missile defense for Japan after the mid-1990s and over-the-horizon radars for Australia to maintain control of the sea-air gap. However, there are also instances when alliance considerations have clearly overweighed other considerations, such as the purchase of heavy battle tanks for Australia in the mid-2000s or the challenges relating to Japanese fighter acquisitions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The weight of US pressure has been implicit in drawing Australia's commitments to the missile defense system, which clearly has limited uses for defending Australia but significant value for participating in allied operations in South- and Northeast Asia. Notably, the US was also willing to employ explicit pressure on its allies in some cases to prop up its own military industries.[1218] Therefore, while immediate threats and domestic politics seem to explain some of the immediate outcomes of technology cooperation, here again, they leave a sizable part of the story untold.

The asymmetric alliance framework provides interesting insights for the longer-term trends. Looking at the developments from 1990 until the early 2010s, the two alliances have come to share significant aspects in terms of technology cooperation, although they initially differed significantly.[1219] In the early 1990s, Australia was used as a base for advanced US surveillance systems, while technology transfers were one-sided affairs involving direct purchases of US technology, whereas technology cooperation with Japan was actively sought by the US to add to its own technologies. Over the decades, both Japan and Australia have become increasingly involved with similar projects, ballistic missile defense being the most significant of these. Institutional arrangements for technology cooperation have been established in both alliances and are increasingly tied to US forces through increased interoperability and cross-servicing agreements, which bear close resemblance to each other in both cases. Further, ever since the late 1990s, both Japan and Australia have opted for similar naval build-up programs, centering on large helicopter-carrying landing ships, also capable of serving as carriers for F-35s, as well as Aegis-equipped destroyers that are easily integrated into US aerial- and missile defense networks. As Japan and Australia have entered into information sharing and security agreements with each other, and with the US in 2016, the data from these sensor-shooter platforms can be distributed seamlessly into a trilateral defense network if needed.[1220] Since the US provides most of the platforms and the most sophisticated

[1218] Goldsworthy, *Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 2000*, 237.
[1219] Chapter 3, 78.
[1220] Andrew Shearer, "U.S.–Japan–Australia Strategic Cooperation in the Trump Era," *Southeast Asian Affairs 2017*, ed. Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook (Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2018), 83-100.

sensors for the network, this system is heavily dependent on US leadership if it is to operate to its full potential. Further, as the surroundings and conditions of Japan and Australia have been different throughout the decades, this suggests that US influence has been the dominant variable in explaining this integration.

Alliance reaffirmations, developments, and periods with a lack of development

The developments of the alliance frameworks followed very closely what the US side wanted from them. It is possible to identify several distinct phases in the US posture during the period of the recent decades, which have clearly affected not only the alliance frameworks but also the security policy choices of its junior allies. Correspondingly, developments in these alliances largely coincide. The first significant period of developments in the alliance relations took place with the affirmations of the alliances in 1996. This followed the period of "alliance drifts" in both relationships in the first half of the 1990s. The late 1990s saw the initiatives of the mid-1990s bear fruit, albeit with lack of follow-through from the US side, and by the end of the decade, the lack of momentum was clearly visible.[1221] The early 2000s were again a period of increased development in the alliance, culminating in 2005-2006 with a series of initiatives. The latter part of the 2000s again saw a slight stagnation, but in the early 2010s, there was clear shift with momentum and focus as the alliances gathered speed towards deeper integration, even on trilateral frameworks.[1222]

During the first phase, Australia and Japan were still adapting to the US withdrawal from Asia-Pacific in the early 1970s. Australia's indigenous defense concept of "Defence of Australia" was reaching maturity and, correspondingly, ANZUS was increasingly seen as just one instrument for maintaining Australia's own defense capability. Japan, on the other hand, had also been taking larger responsibility for its own defense, but this was accompanied with increased practical security cooperation with the US along the 1978 guidelines. On its own, the end of the Cold War did not change much in respect to the Asia-Pacific strategic situation. However, the rest of the world changed and so did US priorities.

The drift in the alliances is not fully attributable to the end of the Cold War as the problems in the alliances had persisted since at least the mid-1980s. The altered situation in the early 1990s, however, exacerbated existing issues. The redefinition processes that began in the mid-1990s more or less correspond to the increasing threat of North Korea in Northeast Asia; however, they do not fit any corresponding

1221 Chapter 4, 108, 116-117.
1222 Chapter 5, 195-196; Chapter 6, 239, 244-245.

change in the South Pacific. Therefore, the threat environment can explain the reaffirmation of the Japan-US alliance but not of the ANZUS framework. The domestic politics of Japan and Australia were not directly conductive to the reaffirmations either as the preparations were carried out under non-conducive domestic political environments, particularly so in Japan but also in Australia. The explanatory variable that best corresponds to the outcomes, is the US initiative for the affirmations.

While both Australia and Japan had more pro-US domestic political conditions in the latter part of the 1990s, as well as increasingly hostile regional environments, the development of the alliance relations lacked the urgency that would be expected from these explanatory variables. The Japan-US alliance reaffirmation had been set in motion and was left to junior-level officials to advance from the US side.[1223] Australia did not receive the reforms asked for by the Howard government and the only clear development was the recasting of the already existing bilateral training framework into a regular event.[1224] The documents of the period also demonstrate a clear unwillingness from the US administration to deviate from its economically-oriented approach to discussing the security and alliance issues pursued by the governments of Australia and Japan.[1225]

The early 2000s brought in a US administration more focused on security issues and on maintaining US alliances. The War on Terror also provided US allies with ample opportunities to contribute to US operations. It was also possible to implement and test the alliance developments and plans as well as to concretely increase the interoperability of the respective armed forces. The domestic political situation in both Australia and Japan has often been credited with the increased alliance cooperation in the early 2000s, but this overlooks the fact that both Australia and Japan already sought increased cooperation in the late 1990s, and these efforts had, at the time, failed to bring about the desired results. The threat environment was increasingly complex in both Northeast Asia and the South Pacific, but as the intervention in East Timor demonstrated, increasing volatility only led to increased alliance cooperation if the US saw significant threats to its own interests.[1226] Hence, increased alliance cooperation in this period was clearly caused by an increasingly interested US administration.

The developments themselves, especially in the Japan-US alliance, had little to do with the War on Terror itself. Japan's participation in the War on Terror was

1223 Chapter 4, 116-117.
1224 Chapter 4, 114-115.
1225 Clinton Presidential Library, *Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto*, November 24, 1997, Vancouver Canada.
1226 Chapter 4, 130-131.

largely determined by alliance developments that took place in the 1990s.[1227] Correspondingly, the alliance developments that took place during the War on Terror -era also had little to do with operations in the Middle East as they mostly concerned changes in US force posture and the development of joint command sites, designed to respond to developments in the Northeast of Asia. However, these developments were clearly conditioned by US interest.[1228] In regard to Australia, the development of cooperation in the mid-2000s still mostly concerned operations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. However, the acquisitions of the period already point towards preparedness for high-end operations, the kind of which were not taking place in the Middle East nor in the South Pacific.[1229]

At the end of the 2000s, the domestic politics of Japan had a clear impact on alliance development, but the brief interlude of the Hatoyama administration did not last long and its failure to cope with the alliance-related issues arguably contributed to its downfall.[1230] Notably, the parties participating in the governing of Japan had to be at least partially pro-alliance, and, after the Socialist Party left the government, the new DPJ leadership essentially took up alliance development as its own policy and implemented several policies expanding Japan's security role in the alliance. These policies were again adopted under the Abe administration, but it should be borne in mind that the trend was also maintained and even built upon by the Kan and Noda administrations.

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, Australia also had an administration with less specific pro-alliance preferences. The biggest change in the alliance, which included the rotational basing of US Marines in Australia for the first time since WWII, was established under the Gillard administration, which was by far the least security-focused and most pro-Asia administration in Australia since the early 1990s. It is also worth noting that the small crises in the alliances in 2008 – 2009, took place at a time when the US leadership was overwhelmingly concentrated on the massive fallout of the financial crises that threatened to topple the largest US financial institutions and, therefore, it hardly paid attention to its alliance relation with Japan and Australia.[1231]

In the early 2010s, China was becoming an increasingly clear driving force behind the planning in the US alliances. At the end of the Cold War, China's eventual rise was already noted, but the first serious suggestions of Chinese aggression

1227 Chapter 5, 193.
1228 Chapter 5. 201.
1229 Chapter 5, 204-205.
1230 E.g., *New York Times*, "Ties to U.S. Played a Role in Downfall of Japanese Leader," June 2, 2010.
1231 E.g., Barack Obama, *A Promised Land* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2020), 277-278.

towards the US-led order surfaced after the Taiwan Straits Crisis in the mid-1990s. China began to be mentioned as a possible security challenge by the late 1990s and increasingly so after the early 2000s. However, there were few actual moves taken to counter a possible future China threat. Policy elites in both Japan and Australia were worried by the aggressive stance of the incoming Bush administration in the early 2000s.[1232] However, after 9/11, the US focus shifted and the idea of China as a military threat was effectively placed on hold until the end of the decade. The fact that both alliances are increasingly concerned over the issue now, instead of having already been so in the early 2000s and late 1990s, again points towards a US policy shift as the main explanatory variable. Even now, both Japan and Australia are increasingly involved with US operational planning for contingencies in East Asia that involve China.[1233] Further, as noted above in relation to increasing technology cooperation, both Japan and Australia are better able to contribute to these kinds of operations because of improved technological interoperability and their acquisitions of ships capable of participating in US maritime operations.

It can also be noted that the security policies of Japan and Australia have even started to bear an increasing resemblance. Both countries have reinforced their national security policy frameworks along the principles used in the US. Each has established US-style National Security Council structures (National Security Committee in Australia) in the early 2010s. In 2013, for the first time, both countries also released National Security Strategy documents similar to those released by every US administration,.[1234] And, as noted, both are becoming increasingly integrated in the operational level of US activities in the Asia-Pacific and more and more often directly participate in US 7th Fleet task forces and carrier groups. The acquisitions of flat-top carrier vessels and Aegis capable destroyers, as well as F-35 fighters along with the support and maintenance structures, are also similar. These analogous policy lines in these two countries with very different geopolitical environments can only be plausibly explained by their shared US alliance. The following chapter will further examine this argument and present the final theoretical conclusions.

1232 E.g., Henry S. Albinski, "The Bush Administration, Asia, & Australia," *Australian Quarterly* 73, no.1 (2001), 13-18.

1233 E.g., Stephen F. Burgess," Multilateral defense cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region: Tentative steps toward a regional NATO," *Contemporary Security Policy* 29, no.2 (2018)

1234 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Strong and secure: a strategy for Australia's national security*, January 23, 2013; Prime Minister's Office, *National Security Strategy*, December 17, 2013.

8 Theoretical discussion

This chapter will evaluate the different hypotheses presented in Part I against the observations of the two alliances. Each theoretical approach is assessed in separate sections that will briefly discuss how the hypothesis fits reality and assess the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. The chapter notes that threat-based explanations are the most applicable in accounting for some of the elements of technology cooperation but are limited in their capacity to offer direct explanations in other areas. Domestic politics are noted to be lacking plausibility in explanations and perform best as intervening variables in the outcomes of alliance development. The final parts explain the value of the asymmetric alliance framework in accounting for long-term developments and changes and discuss the reasons for the convergence of Japanese and Australian security policies.

Balance of power and threats as explanations

The simplest model of basic alliance forming comes from the school of Classic Realism and directly follows the concept of a balance of power.[1235] While this model appeals in its simplicity, it yields little direct explanations without adding further conditions. In threats-based alliance explanations, as described by Walt, the balance of power alone does not explain outcomes in alliances. Instead, while the balance of power functions as a central independent variable, it only translates into alliance outcomes when considered through offensive power, aggressive behavior, and geographical closeness.[1236] In this work, threats against the regional states were examined under this framework. There are of course more refined ways of deriving outcomes from threats, but these were implicitly dealt with under domestic politics, with the assumption that the threats as understood by different domestic political actors significantly influence the outcomes; and under the alliance security dilemma, the assumption is that the logic of fear of abandonment is directly linked to the threats facing the state.

Contributions to alliance operations or, in the case of Japan – other international operations, were rarely directly attributable to the threats facing the regional states. In Australia, the threat of terrorism was realized only after the bombings against Australian targets in Indonesia, which occurred after Australia was already engaged in anti-terror operations. However, regional international deployments by Australia to the nearby islands can be explained through threats, and while the US often applauded Australia's regional security role, these deployments had few other links

1235 Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.
1236 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances,* 22-23.

to the alliance. The development of technology cooperation matches closer to the threats as states tend to only acquire expensive military material that they need. There are, however, exceptions to this rule as well. Even while acquisitions by Japan, and largely also by Australia, mostly correspond to existing threats, the alliance relation conditioned the choices of both countries. Ballistic missile defense has been a key alliance issue as well, and while Japan has a clear need for the system, Australia's logic for participating in the program is less clear. Other notable exceptions to the logic of threats include Australia's aforementioned purchase of heavy and expensive main battle tanks and the equipment needed to deploy them abroad. Further, as Japan is increasingly facing threats from ballistic missiles, it has also sought independent capabilities in the field to lessen its reliance on US systems and deliveries.

In Japan's case, alliance development can be seen though the threat framework, but the pace is clearly set by the US, and not the Japanese, perception of threats. Regarding Australia, the threats directly facing Australia in the immediate regional environment clearly have little bearing on the alliance. The threat of regional instability facing Australia has not been seen in the US as important enough to prompt direct US involvement. Therefore, the alliance developments did not address these issues. Before the late 2000s, alliance development between the US and Australia was determined by the War on Terror, but later developments were increasingly driven by the threat of expanding Chinese power over the last decade. Notably, these threats are mostly directed towards the US and only towards Australia as a US proxy. So even while alliance development is threat driven, the threats driving the alliance developments are the ones facing the US, not necessarily its allies.

Therefore, we can conclude that direct threats as an explanatory framework have rarely directly corresponded to alliance outcomes other than technology cooperation. As the alliances are still primarily institutional security arrangements, responding to threats should still be their most important function. Hence, this is not to say that these alliances are not made for security – all our frameworks actually are based on the assumption of threats being the primary driver – simply that the threat environments do not directly explain the outcomes. A case could be made that this is due to a lack of concrete threats that would be severe enough to directly dictate policy during the periods in question. After all, US dominance in the post-Cold War world was one of unipolarity and, by definition, there were no other states capable of seriously threatening its interests in the world for most of this research's time span. This could change as new challenges arise and direct

threats increase in the system.[1237] Indeed, it seems that threats must be filtered through some other frameworks to translate into plausible explanations for our observed outcomes.

Applicability of the Alliance security dilemma

The alliance security dilemma is the dominant framework used for explaining outcomes in alliance relations. It is also arguably the most sophisticated framework built for the subject in the Realist IR literature. In a way, it encompasses threats and a state's pursuit of its own interests as competing variables. It also comprises parts of the asymmetric alliance theory in the form of the demands for alliance loyalty that eventually can lead to entrapment.[1238] In the terms of the asymmetric alliance framework, entrapment could be seen to represent the ultimate loss of sovereign freedom of choice.[1239] While the alliance security dilemma uses aspects of threat-based approaches and domestic politics, the game theoretic aspect of bargaining brings it to similar level as the asymmetric alliance framework. The alliance security dilemma and asymmetric alliance frameworks are arguably similar in many aspects as they both deal with bargaining positions. However, the main rules of the dynamics vary in these theories. The framework of abandonment versus entrapment presupposes the dynamic in which states evaluate threats against other interests and assesses to what extent they are willing to relinquish their ability to pursue these other interests in order to gain additional security.

We have observed that the alliance security dilemma as an explanatory framework can be made to correlate to most outcomes. The correlation in this framework should be to either fear of abandonment or fear of entrapment, which should be determined by the interests in question: dependence on the alliance partner and/or one's commitment to the alliance.[1240] However, as the outcomes are often already complex matters that involve different interest and threats, it becomes difficult to assess which interests and threats would determine the outcomes, and further, how strongly would a given state assess its alliance dependence to be at any

1237 There is an abundance of academic writing discussing the end of unipolarity and the post-Cold War period as it has defined. The precise timing regarding when it has or will take place are debatable as are its implications. But by the late 2010s, it is clear that US unipolarity will end soon if it has not done so already. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "This Time It's Real: End of Unipolarity and the Pac Americana," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (2012): 203-211; Charles L. Glaser, "Why unipolarity doesn't matter (much)," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no.2 (2011): 135-147.

1238 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 60-61, 171, 186-187.

1239 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 910-911.

1240 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 186-187.

given moment. Additionally, it becomes a matter open to interpretation as to how much these would affect the outcomes in any given situation. Assigning either fear of abandonment or fear of entrapment as explanations to any event seems possible as there are always two opposite explanations to choose from, some of which seem to fit both dynamics.[1241] Hence, it is difficult to find an outcome that could not be made to fit this framework by adding some conditioning variable, thus making this theory essentially unfalsifiable.

For a rigorous use of this theory, there should be a clear reason for using either fear of abandonment or entrapment to explain an outcome. Looking at the results, there are few outcomes that would be a clear match or where we could trace a process corresponding to either dynamic as described in the framework. Therefore, while the framework in and of itself makes sense and offers a good model of the incentives and threats present in any alliance relation, for this study the framework itself offers little insights into the actual outcomes studied. In a sense, it can be argued that the fact that the alliance security dilemma framework works with elements ranging from threats to other interest, as well as dependence and commitment, is both a weakness and strength for the framework. While it allows the framework to be used to conceptualize the complex two-level dynamic of an alliance security dilemma, it provides few ways to evaluate the relative power of different variables in any situation and can therefore be used quite liberally to argue for either an entrapment or abandonment dynamic in any situation.

Domestic politics as a source of explanations

The Neoclassical Realist emphasis on domestic politics as a factor explaining alliance outcomes is taken furthest by Schweller who argues that the alliance choices can only be explained through the domestic elites' perceptions of their threats and interests and by how able they are to take policy action.[1242] This study has observed that even the intervening effects of domestic politics in Japan and Australia have, at best, only conditioned the alliance outcomes. Especially when we look at long-term developments, the domestic politics of the junior allies have only had a limited impact on the developments. Further, we have observed that even weak governments with critical views of the US alliances eventually assumed pro-alliance policies after changes in the government, if not before.[1243] Further, failures in alliance-related policies and failed foreign policy initiatives contributed the downfalls of some administrations, even though they were hardly the main causes of their demise. For

[1241] Chapter 4, 146-147; Chapter 5, 210; Chapter 6, 257-258.
[1242] Schweller, *Unanswered Threats.*
[1243] Chapter 4, 116-117; Chapter 6, 229-230, 258-259.

example, in Japan, the Hatoyama government's poor handling of the alliance issues in the late 2009s directly contributed to its demise. The other side of the story has been that even while the domestic environment has been permissible to the alliance, development has been lacking whenever the US does not share similar aspirations.[1244]

Notably, the governments that tried to deviate from the mainstream lines of alliance development were unable to form solid and coherent governments and have lacked the ability to implement their policies. This study did not include a situation where a domestically strong government would have attempted to drastically change Japan's or Australia's alliance terms with the US.[1245] It could be postulated that the political actors who hold too divergent of views from the mainstream way of thinking are unable to form elite consensus on foreign policy because their views are already too different to begin with. As long as they fail to connect with the mainstream elite thinking, which likely at some level reflects the prevailing balance of power, they remain fragmented and vulnerable. To take Schweller's argument further: failure to correctly balance does not only result from weak and fragmented governments but can also contribute to the demise of weak governments.[1246]

While they do not determine the alliance outcomes, the intervening effects of domestic politics have been obvious in some cases. The first Gulf War in 1990-1991 clearly pushed Japan to expand its security role, but the response itself was dramatically conditioned by the Japanese government's poor ability to implement the necessary legislation within an appropriate timeframe. However, the outcome was still that Japan took part in the operations and implemented the legislation to facilitate the dispatch of troops to other international operations. Australia's

1244 Chapter 4, 115.

1245 Historically, it could be argued that the Whitlam Government in Australia, voted into office on an anti-Vietnam War platform in 1972, would have been strong enough to implement an anti-alliance platform during its term, which lasted until 1975 and successfully pursued several other controversial initiatives. However, its potentially controversial foreign policy initiatives – opening diplomatic relations with Communist China and withdrawing the remaining Australian forces from Vietnam – turned out to be the same policies pursued by the Nixon administration in the US. Even if the period was interpreted as a crisis of the alliance, it was also a period of crisis for the entire US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, sometimes referred to as the "Nixon-shocks." Therefore, it is debatable how much room for maneuver within the alliance framework was made by the domestic political changes and how much resulted from the dramatic policy changes initiated by the Nixon administration. See, for example, James Curran, *Unholy Fury: The US Alliance and the Whitlam-Nixon Crisis* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015).

1246 Schweller hints at this dynamic in his causal models but does not explicitly make the connection that the alliance dynamic could also function the other way around. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, 63-64.

approach to international dispatches has historically been more unproblematic, so there was no similar stumbling in the political debates. The international deployments of armed troops during the remainder of the 1990s were again conditioned by domestic processes in Japan. As noted, the interests served by these dispatches were not directly related to any domestic threat perceptions. In Australia, the regional role of the country was at stake in several regional deployments, especially the East Timor operation, which corresponded to public sentiments.[1247]

The War on Terror-related operations aroused debates in the domestic political scene in both countries. Still, despite some resistance, both Australia and Japan maintained their commitments to the Middle East, while Australia even redeployed troops to Iraq. Governments in both Japan and Australia were stable and governed by strong pro-alliance Prime Ministers who have been credited with the decision to deploy forces. However, these actions were nonetheless prompted by the US using the most forceful of terms.[1248] Further, the pattern of deploying to the Middle East had been made by an Australian Labor Party-led government long before; and in Japan, the alliance developments of the 1990s and the legislation on responding to situations in areas near Japan, were key factors facilitating the response. While these factors were domestic issues as well, they demonstrate how US demands had forced changes on Australia's and Japan's domestic political conditions over time, thus allowing these countries to respond effectively when called to do so. The fact that the domestic political environment was particularly well disposed towards the alliance at the time can only be assessed as having limited impact on the outcomes. The withdrawal from the Middle East in the latter half of the 2000s is also sometimes attributed to domestic politics, but these developments also coincided with the beginning of the US withdrawal. Therefore, domestic politics cannot be the main source of explanations for these events. Again, it is more plausible to argue that the domestic political scene set the tone for the events that were inevitably going to happen.

In the field of technology cooperation, domestic politics can clearly affect alliance cooperation in multiple ways. The interests that have been pursued in the domestic sphere through technology cooperation range from countering threats, to acquiring new advantageous technologies for a country, as well as creating orders for a country's industrial base, thus creating jobs.[1249] All of these interests have also at some point

1247 E.g., Ian McAlister, *Attitude Matters: Public opinion in Australia towards defense and security* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2004).

1248 Chapter 5, 166-167.

1249 E.g., Rebecca Thorpe, *The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).

been clearly pursued in these two alliances.[1250] However, the conflicts over technology cooperation present in the Japan-US alliance seem to have faded by the mid-1990s, and Australian trade conflicts with the US do not seem to have spilled over to defense technology cooperation. As far as can be observed in this study, the impact of domestic politics has been rather limited in technology cooperation issues aside from ballistic missile defense, which has at times been a matter of some controversy.

The development of the alliance frameworks again demonstrates the limits that the impact of domestic governance has had in Australia and Japan. As noted, the alliance reaffirmations of the mid-1990s were initiated by the US. In Japan, these took place under especially non-permissive domestic conditions following the large-scale backlash over the Okinawa rape incident, coupled with the Socialist Party holding the premiership.[1251] The Howard government in Australia sought to take credit for the Sydney declaration and reaffirmation; however, having been in office for only a few months before the events, this claim is hardly plausible. Further, the prepositioning of material and continued development of the relations pursued by Howard during the late 1990s were unsuccessful, thus undermining the credentials of his administration.[1252] Developments during the eight years of the Bush administration took place mostly within the context of the War on Terror and were largely motivated by the immediate need for interoperability. The brief spell of the Hatoyama cabinet provides an extreme example of how the mishandling of alliance-related issues can backfire against a domestic governing coalition.

Asymmetric Alliance Theory

The asymmetric alliance framework deals with security instead of threats. The framework is similar to the alliance security dilemma framework as they both include a bargaining process in which threats and interests are factors in the outcomes. However, while the relative bargaining position is determined by the threats of abandonment and entrapment in the alliance security dilemma framework, the asymmetric alliance framework determines the relative bargaining position through the relative strength of the allies as well as through the need for the security of the junior partners.[1253] The tradeoffs described are therefore also different. The specific tradeoff of autonomy versus security also includes specific explanatory variables and their relative power in explaining the outcomes. As discussed, the alliance security dilemma does not provide this information.

1250 Chapter 3, 58, 61, 74.
1251 Chapter 4, 109-110.
1252 Chapter 4, 114-115.
1253 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 912.

The asymmetric alliance framework points towards the demands and posture of the more powerful ally in the alliance as the main sources of explanations. This study has found that most outcomes conform to this framework. Especially the proliferation of international missions, both to US-led operations and to other UN peacekeeping missions, match closely to the US demands and policies of the time. Technology cooperation has also been shown to advance the most when there is a clear US demand for it, even while the regional security environment and the threat's arising from therein mostly determine the exact acquisitions and technology requirements. Additionally, there are at least three ways in which the asymmetric alliance framework has been found to explain technology choices. Firstly, there is a clear need to integrate smaller state's military systems to US defense networks, therefore, interoperability largely determines what kind of technology is needed e.g., for missile defense assets.[1254] Secondly, the US has exerted direct pressure and has used its alliance relations as leverage to pressure its allies to choose its preferred systems.[1255] Thirdly, the ability to contribute directly to US operations with complementary and interoperable forces has guided acquisitions in several cases.[1256] In regard to alliance development itself, the asymmetric alliance framework provides a strong fit for the outcome in almost all cases.

The asymmetric alliance framework suggests that the smaller alliance partners implicitly forfeit part of their autonomy when they gain added security from the powerful ally.[1257] This process of negotiating between added security and decreased autonomy is evident in several events throughout the study. One example was particularly apparent: the Japanese efforts to support US actions during the first Gulf War. The US demands were made very clearly by several legislative actions in the US Congress and the trade-off for maintaining the US alliance by conceding to demanded contributions was very evident. Consecutive Japanese administrations have maintained the alliance by accepting US demands. Other notable examples include the Socialist Party's ascension to government, for the purpose of which the party dropped its demand for abolishing the JSDF and the US alliance. The Socialist Party notably reinstated its objections to military force and to the alliance after losing its place in the government.[1258] The Democratic Party also fell in line behind the US alliance after a failed exploration of other options in 2009.

1254 Chapter 6, 253-254.
1255 Chapter 3, 58; Chapter 4, 137.
1256 Chapter 4, 136; Chapter 5, 178-179, 205-206.
1257 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 908-909.
1258 E.g., Michael J. Green, "The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 37, no.1 (2011).

The question of US bases in Okinawa provides a good illustration of how the asymmetric alliance framework can be used to explain a wider array of alliance-related questions other than theoretical approaches. The asymmetric framework includes the assumption that the tradeoffs between security and autonomy can also involve basing rights in exchange for security.[1259] The bases in Okinawa host the majority of US forces in Japan and thus contribute to Japan's security in a significant way, simultaneously providing US forces the freedom of movement throughout large areas of the Pacific and even Indian Oceans. The Japanese government exercises limited sovereignty over these bases as they are effectively US-controlled areas inside Japan. The Japanese governments have also consistently surrendered some of their domestic support to maintain those bases even in the face of significant controversies.

Australia has, for its part, consistently sought to form an asymmetric alliance with the most powerful naval power in the Pacific, repeatedly conceding elements of its autonomy in exchange for this alliance. It has often sent its forces to support its ally, even when there are no domestic threats or clear national interest at stake. Even at a time when Australia was increasingly distancing itself from the alliance, the deployments of Australian forces to the Middle East in the late 1980s and early 1990s, were almost a foregone conclusion.[1260] It is also worth noting that during the first decades of Australian independence, Australia was locked in a tight asymmetric alliance with the United Kingdom and its forces were even structured to complement the British Navy, having limited capability for independent action. In a sense, the history of Australian security strategy could be described as a slide from a fully subjected British dominion, with Australia essentially fully ceding its security and foreign policies to Britain in exchange for the security provided by the British Navy, to a fuller security autonomy, which was realized only after the Vietnam War and the withdrawal of US forces from Southeast Asia.[1261]

But even when Australia has sought greater autonomy, ANZUS has still remained and been reinforced. Australia has ceded parts of its own territory for US strategic facilities, supported controversial US operations in the Middle East, and is now increasingly committing itself to the US missile defense system. All these efforts have a limited direct value to Australian security and have clearly increased the chances of Australia being dragged into a conflict or being attacked as a US proxy. In the terms of alliance security dilemma, Australia is knowingly placing itself in a position of being entrapped by US conflicts. Hence, as with the alliance

1259 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 912.
1260 Chapter 4, 122-123.
1261 Chapter 3, 68-70.

security dilemma, neither threats alone nor domestic politics are enough to explain the continued trends in this relationship.

The change and continuity in these alliances is therefore best explained through the asymmetric alliance framework. The constant pressure from the US to increase commitments to the Middle East and Persian Gulf were a direct cause for alliance dispatches in the 1990s as well as the implementation of increased peacekeeping operations. Regional threat environments played only a minor role in these decisions and domestic politics at most provided the specific processes that took place before the deployments. One of the problems with the alliance security dilemma in these cases is that the continuous development of commitments while other aspects – such as threat and other interests – vary. The alliance security dilemma offers no way to account for this. However, the asymmetric alliance framework can account for this by emphasizing the continuously mounting US demands for contributions and the changing US strategic position and posture.

Other long-term trends also correspond to the asymmetric alliance framework better than to other possible explanations. As the study has demonstrated, the developments in the international deployments to both US and other operations, technology cooperation, and alliance development have all followed patterns that have matured from the late 1980s onwards. Other theoretical frameworks cannot account for these continuous and consistent developments even if they can provide very plausible explanations for particular events. Hence, the storyline provided by the asymmetric alliance framework is the most convincing one. The prominent position of the US in the late 1980s and early 1990s gave it an asymmetrical position to provide security for its allies to unprecedented levels. Therefore, its allies were increasingly willing to make US policies their own in order to maintain that security. This took place even though the threats were various during different periods. Notably, in other regions, increasingly rising threats have also caused smaller allies to go against US wishes. This is also clearly explainable in the asymmetric framework. If the US ability to provide security to its allies declines, the willingness of the smaller allies to follow its lead will diminish as well. This observation will inform some of the implications drawn in the following, final chapter.

Convergence and asymmetry

One final outcome, which has been passingly noted in the previous chapters but not fully explored, is the converge of Japan's and Australia's alliances as well as their security policies. The concept of convergence, discussed in the theoretical chapter, has some notable similarities with the results observed through the asymmetric

alliance framework.[1262] As discussed previously, convergence can be defined as the tendency of policies to grow more alike in the form of increasing similarity in structure, processes, and performances.[1263] It is quite clear that something like this has happened in our case studies, too. Examining Australia's and Japan's security policies in the early 1990s, and again in the late 2010s, makes it is easy to notice that they were quite different in almost all aspects of their security policies as well as in their relations with the US.[1264] However, by the late 2010s, both countries participated in the same operational cooperation frameworks alongside US forces, they both sent forces to Iraq and other operations in the War on Terror, and they were each increasingly integrated into the same alliance networks, even starting their own process of bilateral alignment.[1265]

Additionally, as was discussed previously, both countries have increasingly pursued similar security policies and even began publishing US-style National Security Strategies to guide their security decision-making in the 2010s. Almost coinciding with the acquisitions of F-35s and the vessels capable of carrying them, as well as the purchase of Aegis-equipped destroyers, this strongly suggests that there is a similar logic guiding the acquisitions of both countries. However, aside from being maritime countries, Japan and Australia share few similarities in their regional threat environment or even in their military industries, historical backgrounds, or identities. It is easy to see that the changes that have made Australia and Japan increasingly similar in their security outlook, have been the result of US demands on them.

As dictated by the comparative framework of least similar cases, when two cases are dissimilar in all but one independent variable, but nonetheless share the same dependent variable, the single common independent variable probably accounts for the common dependent variable.[1266] Therefore, this convergence is most likely attributable to the alliance relations that Japan and Australia have with the US. Further, the correlation is reinforced by the fact that the developments fit well with the causal processes suggested by the asymmetric alliance framework. As US alliances have guaranteed their security for the past decades, Australia and Japan

1262 E.g., Glenn Palmer and Clifton Morgan, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Chapter 7; Jennifer Strait, *Policy Convergence in Asymmetric Alliances*, Annual International Studies Association Conference, New York, February 14, 2004.

1263 Chapter 2, 36.

1264 Chapter 3, 78-79.

1265 E.g., *Mainichi*, "Japan, Australia to bolster defense ties amid China's rise," November 17, 2020.

1266 E.g., Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," in *Comparative Political Sciences* 40, no. 2 (2007): 175-175.

have both relinquished aspects of their autonomy in exchange for security. The demands made by the US have pushed both allies to form their own security choices so that these will best complement the senior ally's own security needs. This will naturally include military forces as the dominant ally wants its allies to complement its own power in order to optimize burden sharing.[1267] This dynamic has been clear in Japan's and Australia's peacekeeping operations, participation in Middle East deployments and the War on Terror, technology cooperation as well as general alliance development. The fact that Australia and Japan have made increasingly similar choices in the past decades also clearly supports the hypotheses of the asymmetric alliance framework.

It should be emphasized that the asymmetric alliance framework, as it was formulated in this work, suggests that the source of this convergence would be the increasing demands made by the asymmetrically more powerful ally. However, while this outcome is a logical outcome of the framework, all the results cannot be directly attributed to the observed demands. Outcomes such as defense acquisition decisions and the reformation of national decision-making to mimic US models do not correspond to any clear demands made by the US side. This leads to the question: are there other possible explanations for these outcomes, unaccounted for in our analysis? One could hypothesize that as power relations – even asymmetric ones – are always a matter of perception, the same perceptions of power could induce emulation in the hopes of increasing one's own power. There could also be other explanations that could be derived, for example, from the structure of defense industries and their marketing strategies. Overall, the question of how credibility and perceptions of power factor into the asymmetric alliance framework merits more analysis in the future. These are simply hypotheses to suggest possible examples for further research. Nevertheless, clearly the asymmetric alliance framework, as already formulated by James Morrow in the 1990s, has been underutilized in the IR field of alliance research. If anything, this study has shown that this framework has a lot to offer for the study of security relations during changes in regional and global balances of power. In the next chapter we will examine, what the results imply for the Asia-Pacific region.

[1267] Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 928-929.

9 Final discussion and implications

This concluding chapter will discuss the implications of the results of the study for regional security in the Asia-Pacific as well as for the US alliances. As noted, the main conclusions of the study relate to the validity of the asymmetric alliance framework in explaining most outcomes. As we observe the current situation in the Asia-Pacific in light of the asymmetric alliance framework and other results, we can make some clear implications for the future of the US Pacific alliance system. From where the case study chapters left the story so far, we can see that the main trends in the region involve increasing Chinese economic and military power and the continued corresponding relative decline of US predominance, at least in the Asia-Pacific.[1268] As the relative strength and reach of China's armed forces keep growing, this brings US allies in the area closer to China's military reach and correspondingly increases the possible threats facing US allies. In addition, US credibility as a reliable alliance partner has suffered some blows with the Trump administration unilaterally withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement and making a virtue out of sporadic and unpredictable foreign policy.[1269] North Korea remains a key factor of uncertainty in the northeastern region, while Southeast Asia appears relatively stable. China's inroads into the Pacific Islands in Australia's traditional interest area have aroused some concerns but have yet to show much in the way of military significance.

Overall, the current US policy and posture towards the Asia-Pacific has become increasingly focused on China. This means that China will more than likely remain the single most important foreign policy issue during the early 2020s. However, the US economy is still being disproportionately battered by the pandemic and its internal politics are in turmoil after the chaotic final days of the Trump administration; therefore, it is possible that the new administration will not be inclined to focus much of its resources on foreign affairs for some time,[1270] as we saw with both the Clinton and Obama administrations.[1271] While the US is currently

[1268] E.g., Dipasri Ghosh, Soumen De, Dilip K. Ghosh, "Overtaking the U.S. Economy by China and India: How Sound Are the Expectations?" *International Journal of Business* 23, no.1 (2018); Christopher Layne, "The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax American," *International Affairs* 94, no.1 (2018): 92-93.

[1269] E.g., Mark Beeson and Alan Bloomfield, "The Trump effect downunder: U.S. allies, Australian strategic culture, and the politics of path dependence," *Contemporary Security Policy* 40, no.3 (2019); Mira Rapp-Hooper, "Saving America's Alliances - The United States Still Needs the System That Put It on Top," *Foreign Affairs* 99, no.2 (2020)

[1270] E.g., Ben Rhodes, "The Democratic Renewal: What It Will Take to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 99, no.3 (2020): 46-48.

[1271] Chapter 4, 90-91; Chapter 6, 224-225.

engaging China unilaterally over trade issues, in the realm of defense, it is pushing for its allies to take part in burden-sharing by shoring-up their capabilities towards fending off China's ever-expanding power. The change that this has brought to the alliances was evident in the most recent upsurge of violence in the Middle East, which provides an enlightening example of the workings of this dynamic.

As discussed in Chapter 6, after the rise of ISIS, there was widespread coalition building for an international force under US leadership to deal with the crisis. While Australia, as usual, was one of the first nations to join US forces in the operations against the terrorist organization, there was no Japanese effort to dispatch any kind of military contribution, even though Japanese nationals were some of the first high-profile victims of ISIS. Instead, Japan has actually withdrawn from its international operations despite legislative reforms that would allow Japanese forces to be deployed to increasingly complicated and dangerous environments.[1272] Japan resorted to its traditional contribution of money and development aid. Australia, on the other hand, sent a large contingent consisting of fighters and other aircraft, training personnel and special forces. This is in line with Australian policy since the late 1980s.

It can be argued that the difference between this most recent round of military operations and the previous deployments to the Middle East was that the US need for contributions differed with regard to its Northeast Asian allies. During the 1990s, and especially 2000s, the Middle East had overwhelmingly been the focus of US administrations. Now, China and its aggressive policies and military expansion to nearby islands draws far more focus from the US. This suggests that the US pressure for its Asian allies to send forces to the Middle East would have declined. This is also evident from the policy papers dealt with in the beginning of Chapter 7. As the US side is pushing for its allies to counter China within a traditional military framework, its allies also have less incentive to dispatch forces abroad for UN peacekeeping as this would distract them from their primary tasks. Hence neither Japan nor South Korea sent forces to US operations against ISIS, even though both sent forces to Iraq.

As a counterfactual example, it could be argued that if the US focus would be more orientated towards the Middle East, we would expect that this would translate into increasing demands on its East Asian allies to contribute their own personnel to operations there. As the US is still capable of providing a significant increase in the security of its allies, beyond what they could acquire by themselves or elsewhere, the tradeoff between security and autonomy would prompt the eventual dispatch of forces by Japan and South Korea to the Middle East, if so requested. Therefore, the

[1272] Chapter 7, 264-265.

rise of China, and the associated threats, have changed the logic of alliance contributions by the US East Asian allies, but this has been due to the fact that China's ascent is drawing more and more US attention.

The increasing technological interconnectedness between the US and allied forces has been a major part of recent developments. The most high-profile case being missile defense systems, which serve the twin purposes of countering China's massive missile build-up as well as addressing North Korea's asymmetric nuclear threat.[1273] Both Japan and Australia have become increasingly involved in this framework. As one significant part of the system is to defend US capital warships against missiles; and as Australia is increasingly sending its ships to participate in US carrier battle groups, it is logical to assume that the Australian air-warfare *Hobart* class destroyers will be test firing standard missiles against ballistic missile targets, just as Japanese Aegis destroyers did in the late 2000s, and will, in the future, be increasingly acting in concert with US carrier battle groups, along with their Japanese counterparts.[1274] Further, Australia's large acquisitions after the late 2000s have been more fitting of large-scale naval operations in the Pacific. This suggests a change of priorities in Australia's planning.

Another aspect of the alliance's influence on the technology issue concerns the transfers of Japanese technology to other regional states, principally the Philippines but also to Vietnam and Indonesia, all of which are embroiled in their own regional conflicts with China.[1275] This serves to further increase the strength of these states while also bringing them closer to the US alliance system. Ballistic missile defense also increasingly includes other allies as South Korea is moving along the same path of acquiring Aegis-vessels, and the Philippines will also host parts of the radar network that detects missiles.[1276] This will naturally increase the value of the system as the area it covers grows. The involvement of several regional states will also create an interlinked security framework in which each party becomes a partial provider for the security of another. This has implications for all US regional alliances. Whether they want it or not, the US detection facilities in Japan and Australia will play a role if there are ever missile attacks against US forces or regional allies anywhere in the

1273 For a discussion on the twin dynamics of missile defense, see, for example, Eleni Ekmektsioglou and Ji-Young Lee, "North Korea, missile defense, and U.S.-China security dilemma," *Pacific Review* 33, no. 5, (2020).

1274 Chapter 6, 242, 244.

1275 E.g., *Nikkei Asia*, "In Indo-Pacific push, Japan to export arms to Vietnam," October 14, 2020; *The Diplomat*, "What's in the New Indonesia-Philippines Defense Industry Deal?" February 29, 2020.

1276 E.g., *Yonhap*, "S. Korea approves plan to develop new combat system for 'mini-Aegis' destroyer," April 27, 2020; *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, "DND welcomes US radar in PH," August 25, 2012.

region. Therefore, the increased security benefit will here again result in some loss of autonomy as assets in the smaller allies' territories will be involved without their separate prior approval.

The latest US-Japan alliance guidelines, and the following legislative reforms in Japan, make the alliance better suited for countering the kinds of hybrid threats involved in the gray-area contingencies that have been seen emanating from China with regard to the disputed islands and the use of paramilitary maritime militias.[1277] It is not yet clear if the US side will seek to further increase Japan's role in the alliance, considering that this might further antagonize China and possibly alienate South Korea. On the other hand, moves by the US to unilaterally engage China and North Korea will further increase Japanese incentives to develop indigenous capabilities as a hedge.

Regarding Australia, the observed developments suggest that the US is increasingly using its Australian alliance as a way to ensure its access to the South China Sea as well as ultimately to ensure basing options beyond the volatility of East Asia. As the alliance does not involve predetermined commitments to allow for such access, it is possible that the US side might seek to form a binding agreement on the availability of these installations in a contingency situation. This would further submit Australia's autonomy to US power as it would implicitly be dragged into any US conflicts. From this point of view, Australia's traditional way of contributing to far away wars, as it is still doing in Syria and Iraq, might no longer be enough to satisfy US demands. This could mean the end of Australia having the "best of both worlds," so to speak, as it would have to make the choice between its alliance and its interests tied to China's economic rise.

So far, we have concentrated on the change in US demands and their implication for the region. However, there is another side to this story. As China's relative power grows, this will eventually erode the US ability to provide security, which highlights another aspect of the implications of the asymmetric alliance framework. As the relative power of the US declines, so too will the amount of security it can provide. The smaller allies, while still looking for increased security from their alliance with the US, can actually rely less on the alliance as the threat grows. The hedging by Japan in the pursuit of its own indigenous satellite capability contra to US pressure, and its plans to acquire indigenous strike capabilities against targets outside Japan, may be seen as first symptoms of the decreased US ability to determine its allies' choices.[1278]

Hence, as the credibility of US security guarantees diminishes, its allies will become less willing to follow its lead and will more likely need to assert their own

[1277] Chapter 6, 241-242.
[1278] Chapter 5, 203-204.

sovereignty over their security choices. Notably as well, the willingness of the US to provide for its allies' security will also diminish if their policy choices differ too much from the US lead. The bargain for exchanging parts of smaller states' autonomy for security gains from larger states runs both ways. In this framework, the assertation of smaller allies' policies independent of US leadership could be seen to lead to a downward spiral for these alliances, which could eventually spell the end of the entire US Pacific alliance system.[1279]

Therefore, smaller states seeking to maintain their alliance relations with the US, while optimizing their hedges by also pursuing indigenous capabilities, should be careful about how much they follow the US lead and how much they assert their own choices. Dismissing US demands will necessarily lead to declining security from the powerful ally. As the smaller states will seek to maximize their security, they should carefully assess the US demands and posture and, as noted in the US National Defense Strategy 2018, optimize their alliance contributions while maintaining their own defenses.[1280] For Japan, this would mean investing more money into its own defense while carefully considering US positions on acquisitions such as indigenous strike capability. For Australia, it should prepare for the possibility that in the near future, US demands for support can no longer be satisfied by sending troops to the Middle East.

It is also possible that US credibility as a security guarantor could, in the foreseeable future, deteriorate to the point where the allied states are no longer willing to cede their autonomy for the diminishing security gains the more powerful ally provides. The ongoing turmoil in US internal politics, continuous budgetary fights, and the perception of inconsistent and unpredictable foreign policymaking, are arguably deteriorating US credibility as a partner. Further, as large segments of the US general populace seem to favor populist politicians who are hostile to the established policy elites in Washington, trust in the US ability to maintain its commitments deteriorates as well. The abrupt abandonment of the already agreed-upon Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was at its core an effort to build a regional counterbalance to China's economic rise, could be taken as a sign that the US administration could abandon its commitments to its Asian allies in other policy areas as well. This perception could lead US allies to further discount the credibility of US security guarantees and thus further reinforce the trend of independent security policies. This could manifest itself in further hedging in the form of internal balancing, building alliances with other regional states, and, ultimately,

1279 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 917.
1280 United States Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 22 January 2001.

bandwagoning with Chinese power should it become too large to be balanced independently.

In sum, both the above-studied alliances will likely continue developing as long as the US side maintains its focus on its allies. The multilateral frameworks among US allies, as they are being pressured by the US, as well as being pursued by regional states as a form of hedging, will keep growing.[1281] However, it is possible that US interests for the alliances will begin to conflict with the interests of its regional allies. Further, if US credibility as an ally should suffer significant blows, or if China should clearly replace the US as the dominant power in the region, the security provided by the US could diminish to a point in which smaller states would no longer be willing to follow its lead. As US security guarantees ultimately also underwrite the security networks formed between smaller states, these would likely unravel as well. After all, alliances with secondary states do not provide as many security benefits as those with large powers; thus, states will be unwilling to concede their autonomy to maintain them.[1282] Eventually, some smaller states could seek greater security by submitting parts of their autonomy to China – that is, by bandwagoning with it.

As the preceding chapters demonstrate, it is clear that changes in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific – and changes in US power in relation to other countries in particular – will largely determine the future of the US-centered alliance system. From this perspective, the evolution of alternative formations such as the quadrilateral security relationship between Australia, Japan, India, and the US, will make interesting cases for future study.[1283] The asymmetric alliance framework as we have discussed it here, would seem to directly suggest that the smaller states would join such a framework if pushed to do so by their powerful ally. However, multilateral security arrangements can also be seen as a form of hedging against possible abandonment or the overall weakening of US power, or as suggested by other Realist frameworks discussed in Chapter 2, could be seen as a form of tethering the US more securely to the Asia-Pacific. How to explain and best analyze these kinds of arrangements could be a good test case for the asymmetric alliance framework in a future study.

1281 E.g., Stephan Fruehling, "'Key to the defense of the free world': the past, present and future relevance of NATO for US allies in the Asia–Pacific," *Journal of Atlantic Studies* 17 (2019).

1282 Morrow, *Alliances and Asymmetry*, 914.

1283 The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, which was already proposed in the mid-2000s (see Chapter 5, p. 184) and re-established in 2017, has sometimes even been referred to as the new "Asian NATO." See, for example, *The Diplomat*, "The Quad: What It Is – And What It Is Not," March 24, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-quad-what-it-is-and-what-it-is-not/ (Accessed September 9, 2021)

Another interesting and more concrete aspect related to this dynamic can be seen in the increasing technological interconnectedness of the allies. The trend of military technology cooperation has, throughout the decades, ensured the dominance of US defense technology among its Pacific allies. Since the early 2000s, this dynamic increasingly tied US allies to its technology base and this has resulted in increasing interdependence among regional US allies. Missile defense systems currently rely on sensor networks connecting countries like Australia and the Philippines as well as Japan and the US. All F-35 fighters in the region will be serviced in either Australia or Japan, making these countries indirect military support areas for all regional users of the aircraft. While this dynamic is led by the US, playing the role of the powerful ally – as the asymmetric alliance framework suggests, the resulting interdependency involves links to others states that arguably all now share in the same security versus sovereignty bargain. However, as the basic Realist framework suggests, smaller states by themselves do not generate enough security to effectively balance against powerful states like China. Again, it is unclear how much the smaller states will be willing to sacrifice their freedom of action by committing themselves to technologically built interdependency if, at the same time, the US ability to guarantee its partners' security diminishes.

Abbreviations

A2/AD	Anti-access and area denial
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
ADF	Australian Defence Forces
ANZUS	Australia – New Zealand – United States alliance
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	Asean Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUSMIN	Australia – United States Ministerial Consultations
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control Systems
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CLB	Cabinet Legislative Bureau, Japan
DoA	Defence of Australia (Strategy)
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EASI	East Asian Strategic Initiative
EASR	East Asian Strategic Review
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Forces (Japan)
HNS	Host Nation Support
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
INTERFET	International Force East-Timor
IR	International Relations (academic field of study)
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Also ISIL or IS)
JAG-GC	Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JOAC	Joint Operational Access Concept
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force (United States Military)
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan, from 2001 onwards)

MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan, until 2001)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPO	National Defense Program Outline
NSS	National Security Strategy, United States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PKO	Peacekeeping operation
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PNG	Papua New Guinea
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROK	Republic of Korea
SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SCC	Security Consultative Committee (US – Japan)
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SSC	Security Sub-Committee (US – Japan)
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UKUSA	United Kingdom – United States Agreement (also Five Eyes)
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WoT	War on Terror
WTO	World Trade Organization

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TURUN
YLIOPISTO
UNIVERSITY
OF TURKU

Painosalama, Turku, Finland 2021

ISBN 978-951-29-8588-3 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-951-29-8589-0 (PDF)
ISSN 0082-6987 (Print)
ISSN 2343-3191 (Online)